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This book has been long in the making. Its constituent parts were scattered
over twenty-five years of specialization in Soviet, Russian and German af-
fairs in the form of articles, research papers, conference protocols and in-
terviews. The many fragments were integrated into one single entity and
published by Nomos in 1998. Since then, the book has sold out but de-
mand has remained constant so that the publisher decided to republish it,
suggesting that, if necessary, I would revise and update it. Major revisions,
however, turned out to be unnecessary – not least because of the fact that
not a single of the many reviews pointed to major or even minor mistakes
or omissions. There are, however, several aspects that I thought needed
elaboration and clarification.
Persisting Myths
The first concerns the question as to whether ‘the West’, NATO, or specif-
ic Western leaders gave the Soviet Union ‘firm guarantees’ or ‘assurances’
that, if Moscow consented to unified Germany’s membership in the At-
lantic alliance, NATO would not expand eastward beyond the borders of
East Germany. This portrayal of the outcome of the negotiations in 1990
about the external aspects of German unification is, of course, part of the
Kremlin’s current narrative that the West ‘reneged’ on its commitments.
NATO’s ‘betrayal’ had a deplorable moral quality to it but also an impor-
tant military-security dimension, as the expansion of the Western alliance
‘closer and closer to Russia’s borders’ threatened the country’s security in-
terests. Russian president Vladimir Putin used this argument among others
to justify the ‘return’ of the Crimea to Russia, saying in his speech of 18
March 2014 that this step was necessary because of ‘Kiev’s declarations of
intent for the soonest possible membership of Ukraine in NATO’, the ‘per-
spective that the fleet of NATO would have appeared in [Sevastopol], the
city of Russian glory’ and that such a development would have constituted
‘a danger for the whole of Russia’s south’. More space than in the previ-
ous edition, therefore, has been devoted to the description and analysis of
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s consent to unified Germany’s mem-
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bership in NATO and to proving that the West’s ‘firm guarantees’ and
‘solid assurances’ are, indeed, what they are: myth rather than fact.
A second myth concerns the idea that Gorbachev, as he was transform-
ing the Soviet Union through perestroika, glasnost’ and demokratizatsiia,
exerted pressure on East German communist party leader Erich Honecker
to fall in line and embark on corresponding reforms. The culmination of
such attempts, so the argument continues, came on 7 October 1989 during
Gorbachev’s visit to East Berlin, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of
the foundation of the GDR, when the Soviet leader allegedly said: ‘Those
who are late will be punished by history.’ The fact, however, is that Gor-
bachev never literally used that aphorism and, even more importantly,
with the exception of some cryptic statements on the above occasion, in
private conversations with Honecker was complimentary about the GDR’s
economic and technological achievements, praised its social policies and
even lauded its internal political development, comparing it favourably
with the (reformist) course pursued by Hungary and Poland.
‘Imperial Overstretch’ under Putin
There is a third consideration that persuaded me to embark on revision and
extension of the book. This is the return of the Soviet leaders’ ‘imperial
overstretch’ syndrome under Vladimir Putin. This is indicated not only by
the increasing structural similarities between communist party general sec-
retary Leonid Brezhnev’s USSR and Putin’s Russia – as, indeed, encapsu-
lated in the latter’s statement that ‘The Soviet Union, too, is Russia, only
under another name.’ The problem of overextension looms large also be-
cause of Putin’s Eurasian Union project that, despite all of his assurances
to the contrary, is to be considered as an attempt at restoration of the Sovi-
et Union’s ‘internal empire’, that is, the restoration not of the constitution-
al Union but in the form of Moscow’s de facto control over the Eurasian
geopolitical space from the Baltic to the Pacific, including the countries of
the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The danger of overextension, fi-
nally, is also coming into sharp focus because of Russia’s excessive ex-
penditures for internal and external security and low oil prices. The causes
for the collapse of the Soviet Union’s external and internal empire, there-
fore, provide the analyst with a potentially useful case study for consider-




Reviewing the history of the Cold War and reading contemporary docu-
ments, the term ‘Eastern Europe’ is like a grain of sand that perennially
scrapes inside some machinery. Set against previous centuries of European
history, the term as used from 1945 until 1990 as encompassing the Soviet
Union’s European satellites and member countries of the Warsaw pact –
Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania –
is utterly ahistorical. Never in European history did anyone consider
Berlin, Danzig, Dresden or Königsberg in Germany or Prague (Praha),
Pressburg (Bratislava), Brünn (Brno) and Pilsen (Plzeň) in Czechoslovakia
to be part of ‘Eastern Europe’. The absurdity of the Cold War mental map
is clearly revealed by a cursory look at the geographical map: Vienna, a
central European city, is located east of East Berlin and Prague. On the
other side of the East-West divide, Germany and Berlin were never con-
sidered to be part of ‘Western Europe’. Nevertheless, in the Cold War doc-
uments, the world is divided between ‘The United States and Western Eu-
rope’ and ‘The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’. In the 1980s, as will be
shown in Chapter 6, (ultimately successful) attempts were made to change
the Cold War mental map and resurrect the term Mitteleuropa, or Central
Europe. For the present purposes, however, in keeping with the contempo-
rary understanding of the term, ‘Eastern Europe’ will refer to the six coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact.
The location of ‘East Germany’ on mental maps is less of a problem –
but only for people who are not assimilated or socialized in any part of the
German-speaking world, including in Austria and parts of Switzerland. As
far as this writer is aware, in none of the documents on the German prob-
lem in German, neither those relating to the division nor to reunification,
does the term Ostdeutschland, the literal re-translation of East Germany,
ever appear. On the German mental map it was simply inconceivable to
place Berlin, Dresden, Halle, Leipzig and Magdeburg, or Rostock, Stral-
sund and Greifswald, anywhere else than in Mitteldeutschland, literally
Central Germany. Politically, Ostdeutschland did not exist, initially only
the ‘sowjetische Besatzungszone’ (Soviet zone of occupation), with SBZ
as its acronym, later, after its foundation, the DDR, the Deutsche
Demokratische Republik’ (GDR and German Democratic Republic).
‘Eastern Europe’
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Personal Background and Thanks
Despite its quest for objectivity, the book is likely to reveal bias and per-
sonal commitment. If so, this may be due in part to my personal back-
ground. I was born in 1942 in Memel, then a German city in East Prussia,
incorporated into the Soviet Union in the Second World War under the
name of Klaipeda and now the main sea port of independent Lithuania. I
developed a personal interest in Soviet and post-Soviet affairs, as well as
in divided Germany and Europe, not only because of my place of birth but
also because my father had fought at the eastern front during the war and
my mother and grandmother, with my two brothers and me, had been
forced to leave our homeland of East Prussia. The extended family was
separated during the war, some members ending up in North-Rhine West-
phalia and Bavaria in West Germany, others in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
in East Germany.
Personal involvement with the subject matter of the division of Ger-
many was deepened also by my experience as a student at the Freie Uni-
versität Berlin in the western part of the divided city; the direct exposure
to artificiality the and absurdity of the division of the city; and the arro-
gance and petty chicaneries of East German border guards on the check
points and access routes.
The academic part of interest and involvement in the subject matter was
enhanced in my many years of work at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik (SWP), first in Ebenhausen near Munich and then, after German unifi-
cation, in Berlin. The research institute, also known as the German Insti-
tute on International Politics and Security, made it possible to publish the
precursor of this book with Nomos. Albrecht Zunker, then one of the
deputy directors of SWP and chief editor of the publication series on inter-
national politics and security, had a central role in the book’s appearance
from beginning to end. SWP also gave me the opportunity to establish
lasting contacts with other research institutes in Germany and abroad; aca-
demic specialists and policy makers in Moscow; and officials at the
Auswärtige Amt and the Chancellor’s Office in Bonn and Berlin.
Concerning the latter, I would like to offer special thanks to all three
German ambassadors to Moscow during the Gorbachev era, Jörg Kastl,
Andreas Meyer-Landrut and Klaus Blech. They contributed significantly
to my understanding of the course of events by providing me with their
perspectives on official negotiations and more informal talks with Soviet
party and government officials.
PREFACE
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The book also profited from conversations with other Western officials
who participated, conceptually or at the operational level, in managing the
relations between the Soviet Union and the West on the German problem.
These include Rudolf Adam, Bob Blackwill, Sir Roderic Braithwaite, Ul-
rich Brandenburg, Frank Elbe, Wolfgang Ischinger, Klaus Neubert, Horst
Teltschik, Malcolm Toon, Jack Matlock, Dennis Ross, Gebhardt Weiß,
Phil Zelikow and Robert Zoellick.
Especially important were the interviews with former Soviet and East
German officials, including Vladimir Bykov, Anatoli Chernyaev, Gennadi
Gerasimov, Andrei Grachev, Sergei Grigoriev, Egon Krenz, Hans Missel-
witz, Yuli Kvitsinsky, Igor Maksimychev, Viktor Rykin, Georgi
Shakhnazarov, Thilo Steinbach, Sergei Tarasenko and Vadim Zagladin.
The specialists on international affairs at the various research institutes
in Moscow who were most helpful over the years in clarifying the context
and the course of events are Volodya Benevolensky, Vyacheslav
Dashichev, Andrei Kortunov, Viktor Kremenyuk, Sergei Karaganov, and
Vitaly Zhurkin. At the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, valuable insights
were provided by its director, Michael Stürmer, and current or previous
colleagues Falk Bomsdorf, Peer Lange, Friedemann Müller, Uwe Nerlich,
Christoph Royen, Reinhardt Rummel, Klaus Schröder, Gebhard Schwei-
gler, Klaus Segbers, Peter Stratmann and Bernhard von Plate. The re-
searchers at the then Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und interna-
tionale Studien in Cologne who were most helpful and influential in shap-
ing my views on the topic were its director, Heinrich Vogel, and Fred Old-
enburg, Gerhard Wettig and Heinz Timmermann.
Much of the writing for this book was done while I was Associate Pro-
fessor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
and Director of its Program on Russia and East-Central Europe. Thanks
are due in particular to its then Dean, Jack Galvin, and Professor Alan
Henrikson. I also would like to convey my very personal gratitude to Pro-
fessor Tim Colton and Lis Tarlow, Director and Associate Director respec-
tively, at the Kathryn W. and Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Russian
Studies at Harvard University, for their encouragement and support.
Two projects were most valuable in advancing my understanding of the
subject. One is the Cold War International History Project at Harvard Uni-
versity directed by Mark Kramer, the other the Project on Cold War Stud-
ies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, with Jim
Hershberg as its director. Several of the results of the projects’ confer-
ences and papers have been integrated here.
Personal Background and Thanks
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Many thanks, finally, are due to the Ford Foundation and the Fritz
Thyssen Stiftung. The two foundations made it possible for me to carry
out research in the party archives in Moscow and Berlin and conduct inter-
views with former Soviet and East German officials.
Transliteration of Russian Terms
The transliteration of Russian terms follows the style used by United
States Library of Congress. To enhance readability and avoid pedantry,
however, some modifications have been made. The soft sign, indicated by
an apostrophe in standard style, has been deleted in political household
words. In such words, the italics have also been dispensed with. Hence,
the stylistically correct glasnost’ and oblast’ according to the Library of
Congress system have been rendered here simply as glasnost and oblast.
The scientific transliteration was also abandoned in many proper nouns
and names. For instance, the text features Yuri Andropov, Alexander
Yakovlev, Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Petrovsky, Lavrenti Beria, and Boris
Yeltsin rather than Iurii Andropov, Aleksandr Iakovlev, Aleksei Arbatov,
Vladimir Petrovskii, Lavrentii Beriia, and Boris El’tsin. Accordingly, the
book refers to Yekaterinburg and Yaroslavl instead of Ekaterinburg and
Iaroslavl’. Perhaps at the risk of offending Ukrainian sentiments, Kiev has
not been altered to Kiyev, Kiyiv, or Kyyiv. Moscow, too, at least its




Why was Germany divided after the Second World War? Why was the
division of Germany maintained for almost half a century? Why did the
Soviet Union accept German unification? And why did it consent to uni-
fied Germany as a full member in the Atlantic alliance? These questions
form the subject of this book. Its main focus is the Soviet role in these
fateful events of the second half of the twentieth century. It is therefore
concerned with party and government leaders in Moscow, their political
ambitions, the ideological stereotypes they shared, the institutional pres-
sures they faced, and the systemic constraints with which they had to con-
tend.
The context into which the examination is placed is that of the rise, de-
cline, and fall of empires. The underlying assumption is that it is appropri-
ate to consider the Soviet Union an imperial entity consisting of three con-
centric rings. The first and innermost ring is that of the USSR itself with
its fifteen constituent republics. The second consists of what in the era of
the Cold War was called ‘Eastern Europe’, that is, the non-Soviet coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact.1 The third and outermost ring comprises
Moscow’s dependencies and its friends and allies outside the Central
Eurasian landmass, including at one time or another Cuba, North Vietnam,
Laos, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Yemen, An-
gola, and Mozambique.
This examination deals with Eastern Europe as the ring of empire most
closely linked to the centre and considered by successive Soviet leader-
ships as the most important staging area of their influence in Europe. This
necessitates scrutiny, above all, of the Soviet-East German relationship
and developments in East Germany as the most exposed and most impor-
tant entity of the Soviet strategic glacis in Europe. Since West German -
‘revisionism’ was regarded in Moscow as the main challenge to the post-
war order and West Berlin as a painful ‘thorn in the flesh’ of the East Ger-
man body politic, the Soviet Union’s relations with the Federal Republic
1 For the usage of the term ‘Eastern Europe’ see the Preface, p.13 xxx; for the at-
tempted and (ultimately successful) revision of the term as part of the Cold War
mental map see xxx Chapter 4, pp. 301-307.
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and Soviet reactions to West Germany’s Ostpolitik form another major fo-
cus of this book.
No claim will be advanced here that the division of Germany was part
of a blueprint drawn up by Stalin for the construction of an empire in East-
ern Europe. Soviet planning and consistency in the execution of a deliber-
ate design were much more in evidence, for instance, in the treatment of
Poland. Nevertheless, the integration of the part of Germany occupied by
the Red Army in the misnamed ‘socialist community’ followed an imperi-
al logic and was reinforced by Soviet ideology. To that extent, it is erro-
neous to contend, as many Russians still do, that since there was no design
in Moscow, the West was obviously responsible for the division.
The inexorable imperial and ideological logic also explains the tenacity
with which the Soviet Union clung to its possessions for such a long time.
However, it will be argued here, the attempt to incorporate the eastern part
of Germany, including part of the former capital of the German Reich, in
the empire was worse than many a crime committed in the Stalin era. It
was a serious political blunder. It was a major and, in Europe, the central
part of what in the title of this book is called ‘imperial overstretch’: the
expansion of Soviet control to areas that initially contributed to the recon-
struction of the Soviet Union but then became a serious economic liability.
Politically and militarily, Moscow’s attempt to hold on to the eastern part
of Germany locked the Soviet Union even more firmly into competition
and confrontation with the West than the ideology, under which its leader-
ship operated, seemed to require. Furthermore, without East Germany, the
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would have looked quite different. It
would have been more self-contained and hence relatively more manage-
able for Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. As a result,
early in the history of the Soviet empire the attempt at incorporating the
German chunk produced major symptoms of pathology. Such symptoms
became clearly visible in the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and the workers’
uprising in East Germany in 1953. They remained suppressed for some
time but flared up again in the protracted crisis of 1958-61 that led to the
building of the Berlin wall. In the 1970s and 1980s, it appeared to many
Soviet and Western observers that normalization of the difficult imperial
condition had set in. But this proved to be a major misperception, as the
rapidly unfolding events in 1989-90 and the collapse of empire were to
prove.
The story to be told here is full of paradoxes. One of them is the incon-
gruity of Soviet perceptions of East Germany. In the period of normaliza-
INTRODUCTION
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tion, the GDR came to be seen in Moscow as a successful example in the
construction of socialism. Gorbachev, as will be shown in detail, very
much admired the East German economic and technological achievements
and for quite some time was prone to accept at face value Honecker’s
progress reports about the GDR’s progress in microelectronics, computer
technology, industrial engineering, and biotechnology. He even went as far
as to concede expressly Honecker’s argument that Soviet perestroika was
essentially a delayed response to the challenges of the revolution in sci-
ence and technology of the second half of the twentieth century which the
GDR had already met. In principle at least there could also be little doubt
that the political regime established by Ulbricht and maintained by Ho-
necker rested on Marxist-Leninist foundations, and excessively so, as Gor-
bachev was to complain privately to his reformist colleagues in Moscow.
However, in stark contrast to such perceptions of the GDR’s economic re-
silience and political conservatism, Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to
Gorbachev and their German experts repeatedly expressed the concern and
even alarm, both in private conversation among themselves and in talks
with the East German leaders, that East Germany was becoming ever
more dependent financially and economically on West Germany, making
political concessions, and permitting an erosion of its system structure.
Such contradictions of perception that found their reflection in contradic-
tory policies were never meaningfully addressed let alone resolved until
the collapse of the GDR and the Soviet empire rendered any such possible
efforts obsolete.
Gorbachev’s eventual acceptance of German unification and his consent
to unified Germany’s membership in NATO as an integral part of this col-
lapse receive major attention here. The drama and enormity of these two
decisions can hardly be overestimated. They meant liquidation of four
decades of time-honoured Soviet ideological and strategic precepts; aban-
doning what seemed to be one of the most reliable allies of the Soviet
Union; relinquishing a crucial military component in the ‘correlation of
forces’; dispensing with what apparently was an indispensable factor in
the Soviet economy; signing the death warrant of the Warsaw Pact and
CMEA; and giving birth to a new Europe. Furthermore, the two decisions
were taken against the background of other paradoxes of Soviet empire
and the German problem. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union had
amassed tremendous military power. Its nuclear arsenal appeared to have
made its imperial position unassailable for all time. The nuclear age, it
seemed, had not only made Clausewitz obsolete but also all traditional
INTRODUCTION
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theories on the rise and fall of empires, including the idea that ‘no empire
is permanent’.2 Part of the explanation of why the Soviet Union divested
itself of its empire, it will be argued, lies in the discrepancy between eco-
nomic stagnation and global expansion and between an apparently thriving
military-industrial complex and a corroding socio-economic base – a gap
correctly recognized by Sovietologists as the ‘paradox of superpower’.3
One of the crucial factors in the rise and fall of empires is the political
will of the political establishment in the centre to maintain the empire.
Churchill is on record of having said that he had not become prime minis-
ter in order to preside over the dissolution of the British empire. What
about Gorbachev? Had he, according to his self-perception, become party
leader in order to give history a push and preside over the dissolution of
the Soviet empire? Specifically with respect to the Soviet Union’s East
German imperial legacy, what were his perceptions of the problem when
he took office in March 1985? Did he subscribe to the notion that in an era
of nationalism and the nation state the division of Germany was unnatural
and artificial, and that the division of Germany had to be ended in favor of
the construction of his Common European House? There is no evidence
for such an initiative, to introduce another paradox. Gorbachev’s accep-
tance of German unification and his consent to unified Germany’s mem-
bership in NATO, it will be shown, like the division of Germany under
Stalin, was not part of overall foresight and planning but occurred within a
new framework – the New Thinking – that left little room for alternative
options.
This interpretation of history allocates a role to both objective and sub-
jective factors in the rise, decline, and demise of the Soviet empire. As for
the latter set of factors, a particularly interesting and important feature is
the increasing alienation, animosity, and antipathy between Gorbachev
and Honecker in the period from 1985 until 1989. Outwardly, everything
looked normal in that relationship, with all the embraces, the kisses, the
awarding of medals, the cordial receptions, and attendance of congresses.4
But beneath the surface in the relationship between Gorbachev and Ho-
2 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 137.
3 See, for instance, Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Inter-
nal Decline (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).
4 Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze used such formulations to characterize the re-
lations among party leaders in the Soviet bloc in general; see Eduard Ambrosievich
Shevardnadze, Moi vybor. V zashchitu demokratii i svobody, 2nd ed. (Moscow:
INTRODUCTION
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necker, there was smouldering suspicion, resentment, and scheming, much
of it fuelled by Gorbachev’s realization that the East German leader was
risking serious instability by stubbornly refusing to go with the times and,
conversely, by Honecker’s conviction that the Soviet leader was pursuing
disastrous policies that undercut the legitimacy of his rule in the GDR and
the fabric of the ‘socialist community’. In that context, yet another para-
dox is to be noted. Given the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the
bloc and that of the Soviet party leader in inter-party relations, one would
have expected Gorbachev to exert severe pressure on Honecker to change
his policies. However, the record of private conversations between the two
leaders reveals that such pressure was not exerted. Matters were left to
drift and problems to accumulate until the end of the East German regime
and the Soviet empire.
Such observations underline the important role of the party leader in
communist systems, no matter whether it is one of omission or commis-
sion. But even in communist systems, foreign policy cannot not be formu-
lated and carried out by one person single-handedly. What is needed for
both policy making and the implementation of decisions are appropriate
domestic structures, institutions, and organisations. This fact of interna-
tional life raises questions at another level of analysis: Which of the estab-
lished Soviet institutions played a significant role in breaking new ground
on the German problem? Obvious contenders for such a role are several
party institutions, such as the Politburo, the Central Committee’s Interna-
tional Department (ID) and the CC’s Department for Liaison with the
Communist and Workers’ Parties; government agencies, such as the for-
eign ministry, the KGB, and the armed forces; and the Defence Council,
an institution whose membership consisted of top foreign and security pol-
icy personnel from both the party and the state.
These institutions can be regarded as having had a vested interest in ad-
hering to imperial policies and opposing change on the German problem.
This raises the question as to how Gorbachev was able to overcome bu-
reaucratic inertia and latent opposition to his policy changes. Several hy-
potheses for answering this question suggest themselves. One is the seri-
ousness of the internal crisis. It could be argued that the deterioration of
economic and social conditions, the spreading of ethnic violence and se-
Novosti, 1991), p. 199. They certainly apply to the relations between the Soviet and
the East German party leader.
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cessionism, and of obstructionism and opposition in the party were so se-
vere that international affairs were simply a side-show. A second hypothe-
sis, prevalent among analysts who are fond of easy and straightforward so-
lutions to intricate problems, is the notion that the disastrous economic
state of affairs in the Soviet Union persuaded Moscow to cut a deal with
rich West Germany: the consent to unification was given in exchange for
huge financial and economic benefit. A third hypothesis is the idea that the
severe internal crisis interacted with an equally severe crisis of empire and
that Gorbachev’s consent to German unification was a rational response to
overcommitment and overextension of empire.
But what approaches should be used in order to answer such questions?
To what extent is it still appropriate to utilize tools developed by the now
extinct field of Soviet studies? Sovietology, contrary to now popular criti-
cism, underwent significant transformations before the collapse of the So-
viet Union. In the 1940s and 1950s, the most widely accepted framework
of analysis was that of totalitarianism, which posited complete state con-
trol of politics, society, and the economy; one-man and one-party dictator-
ship; terror as a functional element of the system; and the impossibility of
reform: the system would either endure or collapse. In revised versions of
the model, the ‘totalitarian’ was replaced by ‘authoritarian’. There was
also a realization that one-man dictatorship after Stalin’s death had been
replaced by collective leadership and terror by less bloody forms of re-
pression. In essence, however, the proponents of the revised model still as-
sumed that the main features of the system had remained unchanged.
The behavioural revolution in communist studies of the 1960s and
1970s took issue with this framework of reference and focused on diversi-
ty and differentiation behind the façade of monolithism. Various ‘bureau-
cratic politics’ and ‘interest group’ models were applied to the study of
Soviet-type systems. But whereas such studies did advance the under-
standing of unplanned processes in communist systems, they also created
some serious impediments. This applied in particular to the notion that
Marxist-Leninist regimes bore many of the pluralist features characteristic
of Western political systems. It was probably this perceptual lens that pro-
duced the erroneous assumption that communist systems were amenable
to major structural reform. In retrospect, it appears that the revised ‘totali-
tarian’ or ‘authoritarian’ school was right after all in the sense that despite
all the attempts at reform the communist parties and the Soviet-type sys-
tem in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe proved resistant to reform.
Thus, what is evidently needed and will be applied here is a combination
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of traditional Kremlinological and more modern behavioural approaches
to decision making.
The design to tackle the theoretical and empirical problems as outlined
above is as follows: Chapter 1 establishes conceptual foundations by look-
ing at such theories on the rise, decline, and fall of empires as may be use-
ful for analysis. The theories examined will be called metrocentric, peri-
centric, international systemic, transnational, and integrative. Although
several of the approaches shed some light on the Soviet problem, one of
the most useful designs applied here can be found in Paul Kennedy’s
book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. This includes in particular
his argument that economic potential is required to underpin military pow-
er, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If,
however, too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from
the creation of wealth and allocated instead to military purposes, then this
will lead to a weakening of national power, to overcommitment and
overextension. As the subsequent chapters of the present book will show,
this became an important political problem once the Soviet Union had en-
tered a period of economic decline.
Chapter 2 features a discussion of Soviet perceptions and policies on
the German problem from the division of Germany under Stalin through
Khrushchev’s tenure in office to Brezhnev’s ‘era of stagnation’. The ana-
lytical thread that will help the reader through the maze of Soviet policies
on Germany in this period from the 1940s to the late 1970s will be called
the Ideological and Imperial paradigm. Its constituent elements can be said
to have been competitive and confrontational, with ideological, geopoliti-
cal, and military-strategic factors playing a dominant role and providing
the rationale and conceptual basis for the Soviet policy of imperial control
– notably in Central and Eastern Europe – and global expansion. Power
and ideology in this paradigm are regarded as having reinforced each oth-
er.
Chapter 3 demonstrates how this framework of analysis and policy un-
derwent a serious crisis in the last years of the Brezhnev era and during
the Andropov and Chernenko ‘interregnum’ from the late 1970s to the
mid-1980s. One of the major research questions in this period concerns
the role of military and economic power in the management of the Soviet
empire. The thread of Ariadne running through the analytical labyrinth in-
dicates that an increasing number of policy-makers and academic analysts
in Moscow had begun to doubt the political utility of Soviet military pow-
er, to express concern about the country’s ability to keep up with the Unit-
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ed States in the military-technological competition, and to appreciate the
importance of economic and technological factors as a source of global in-
fluence. A politically significant part of the Soviet political establishment
also began to recognize the stark fact of imperial decay and the necessity
of comprehensive reform if damaging trends were to be arrested and re-
versed. Such realization, however, remained politically irrelevant until the
very end of the interregnum. Practical policies continued to be mired in
bureaucratic inertia. They took a particularly vicious form in the severe
pressure that was exerted on West Germany to desist from consenting to
the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on its territory and on
East Germany to cease making political concessions to Bonn for allegedly
short-term and short-sighted economic and financial benefit and to submit
to bloc discipline.
Chapter 4 portrays the Gorbachev leadership’s recognition of the com-
prehensive crisis in domestic and international affairs and the lessons it
derived from that crisis. Since the role of statesmen in history and the role
of the party leader in communist systems are important issues to consider,
the chapter contains a political profile of Gorbachev. Under his leadership,
a new paradigm was constructed, tentatively and hesitatingly at first, but
then in a more determined, consistent, and comprehensive fashion. The
new philosophical and practical approach – the New Thinking – put the
emphasis on internal political, economic, and social development and in-
ternational cooperation. In domestic affairs, the new paradigm provided
for policies of democratization, federalism, and market-oriented reform. In
foreign policy, it emphasized devolution of empire; eradication of regional
military preponderance; abandonment of military-strategic parity; mem-
bership in international economic institutions, such as the GATT, IMF, and
the G-7; and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.
The chapter then deals in detail with Gorbachev’s perceptions and pol-
icies on Germany in the period from his assumption of power in March
1985 until his visit to West Germany in June 1989. The new Soviet leader,
it will be argued, had no intention to liquidate the empire but wanted to
reform it and make it more cost effective. East Germany was meant to
help in this endeavour. Since he considered that country as advanced in the
production of high technology, he even thought that it could make an ap-
preciable contribution to the modernization of the Soviet economy and to
undercutting President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
impact of Western policies on both the demise of the Soviet empire and
the changes in Gorbachev’s policies will also be examined in this chapter.
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Evidence will be presented concerning the question as to whether the de-
cline of empire was accelerated by the Reagan administration’s policy of
forcing the pace of the military-technological competition and deepening
the ‘fault lines of the Soviet empire’, or whether such attempts were essen-
tially counterproductive, delaying the fundamental changes that were
bound to come anyway, given the deep internal contradictions of the Sovi-
et empire.
Chapter 5 examines the institutional and domestic political setting of
the imperial collapse. In particular, it dwells on two internal Soviet para-
doxes. The first concerns the role of the German experts, or germanisty, in
policy-making on the German problem. On the basis of observations de-
rived from Western systems of government to the effect that the regional
experts’ detailed knowledge of and empathy with developments in their
area of specialization often predisposes them to become advocates of the
viewpoints and even interests of ‘their’ countries, one would have as-
sumed that the Soviet experts on Germany were instrumental in develop-
ing, advocating, and helping to implement fundamental policy changes.
Such assumptions do not apply in the Soviet case. Almost at every stage in
the rapid evolution of events, the German experts in both party and gov-
ernment institutions remained wedded to traditional views and policies
and engaged in procrastination and delay. The second paradox relates to
the role of the power institutions in the Soviet system. The comparative
history of the rise and fall of empires knows of many examples when the
mainstays of the system actively resisted imperial devolution and decline
and deposed those at the top who either looked with equanimity at that
process or even promoted it. A revolt of Soviet ‘Young Turks’, however,
failed to occur in the Soviet Union, and the old guard staged an ineffective
coup only in August 1991, when the external empire had already disap-
peared. The two paradoxes can be linked to each other: If the germanisty
in the party and the foreign ministry had a vested interest in the continua-
tion of the conceptual and practical approaches they had developed over
several decades of policy, why did they not conspire with officials and of-
ficers in the defence ministry, the armed forces, the military-industrial
complex, and the KGB – institutions opposed to German unification and
unified Germany’s membership in NATO – to bring down the whole edi-
fice of the New Thinking and the devolution of empire? Part of the answer
provided in this chapter is the shift in decision-making authority to a small
circle of leaders and their advisers and personal assistants; an extraordi-
nary improvement in the academic institutes’ access to and involvement in
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policy-making; effective cooperation of these institutes with the top eche-
lon of the foreign ministry; and the traditional organizational culture of the
armed forces that mitigated against their taking an active role in politics.
Chapter 6 covers the period from the fall of 1989 until the fall of 1990.
The argument will be developed here that the parameters of the New
Thinking did not extend to relinquishing Soviet control over the GDR and
that Gorbachev continued to cling to the idea that it would be possible to
have the cake and eat it, too: to retain East Germany in a Soviet sphere of
influence and to improve economic cooperation with West Germany. This
notion, furthermore, would still have been in accordance with his idea of
preserving the empire and making imperial rule more humane and cost-ef-
fective. This period also reveals one of the major dynamics leading to the
collapse of empire: unintended consequences of conceptual change, the
occurrence of unplanned and unforeseen events, and loss of control. The
force of events, as will be demonstrated, began to reveal its decisive im-
pact with the dismantling of the iron curtain by Hungary in May 1990. It
continued with the exodus of East Germans in the summer. And it culmi-
nated in the unintended and, from Moscow’s perspective, unauthorized
opening of the Berlin wall on 9 November. But Soviet loss of control over
events in the GDR also combined with Gorbachev’s loss of will to main-
tain the Soviet imperial position in Central and Eastern Europe – an im-
portant fact that is evidenced most of all by his refusal in principle to use
force in order to arrest the fundamental processes of change taking place
there.
The chapter differentiates between Gorbachev’s acceptance of the reali-
ty of German unification in January 1990 and his consent to unified Ger-
many’s membership in NATO, which occurred officially at the Soviet-
West German talks in Moscow and Arkhyz in July 1990. The driving
forces behind both the passive acceptance and the more active consent
were basically the same as in the previous phase. Faits accomplis were in-
cessantly being created and ratified by the Soviet leadership. As Gor-
bachev was to acknowledge at a meeting with East German prime minister
Hans Modrow in Moscow on 30 January 1990, time was exerting an im-
pact on the process and lending dynamism to it.
Acceptance of German unification was facilitated by changes in Soviet
perceptions concerning the importance of the GDR as an economic asset
and, as Gorbachev still was to say at the Malta summit in December 1989,
its function as a ‘strategic ally’ of the Soviet Union. By that time, how-
ever, the Soviet leadership had already come to realize that both the inter-
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nal political stability and the economic and technological advances of the
GDR had been exaggerated; that, relatively, a unified Germany and the
other Western industrialized countries had more to offer to the Soviet
Union than the GDR and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA); that a unified Germany would be willing and able to make a sig-
nificant contribution to the modernization of the Soviet economy; and that
for all of these reasons leaving the GDR to its fate could be reinterpreted
as a logical and consistent application of the new paradigm.
Similar observations are warranted regarding the decision on unified
Germany’s membership in NATO. The thought of the inevitability of tak-
ing this domestically highly sensitive step ripened in the minds of a top
circle of policy-makers in the period from the end of January to May
1990. The institutions that would ordinarily have been involved in prepar-
ing such a momentous decision were simply confronted with the outcome
of largely confidential deliberations. Analysis of decision-making, based
on the background provided in the preceding chapter on the institutional
setting reveals that these institutions, notably the party apparatus, includ-
ing the Central Committee’s International Department, but also the de-
fence ministry and the general staff, the KGB, and the foreign ministry bu-
reaucracy, were deliberately shunted aside. The same tactics of exclusion
governed the top decision makers’ treatment of the germanisty, the Ger-
man experts, who almost across the board either opposed or attempted to
put the brakes on German unification and, even more vehemently, on uni-
fied Germany’s membership in NATO.
The consent to unified Germany’s membership in NATO, the argument
continues in that chapter, had not only domestic but also international di-
mensions. The small circle of decision-makers around Gorbachev ulti-
mately realized that, as his foreign policy adviser put it, the West had the
better arguments.5 Another lay in the absence of viable alternative options:
the Soviet Union was internationally isolated on the issue of German neu-
trality and on Gorbachev’s idea of dual membership of unified Germany in
both military alliances. There was simply no support for it in Western and
Eastern Europe, let alone from across the Atlantic. There was also concern
among the top decision-makers in Moscow that a non-aligned Germany
might one day seek access to nuclear weapons in order to safeguard its se-
curity. A contributory factor to the consent was their illusion that the War-
5 Interview with Chernyaev.
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saw Pact could be reformed and would continue to play a role in European
security. The chapter concludes with an examination of the role of econo-
mic factors in the Soviet consent to unified Germany’s membership in
NATO.
Sources of Evidence
The validity of answers to the questions set forth in the introduction de-
pends of course on the availability and effective utilization of different
sets of sources. This author adopted the following procedure for the estab-
lishment of evidence. On the most basic and conventional level, he used
treaties and agreements on Soviet foreign policy commitments and statisti-
cal data on Soviet military and economic power and potential, the strategic
and conventional military balance, and demographic and social develop-
ments in order to reconstruct objective trends and the substantive context
in which decisions were made.
In addition, four types of sources were consulted: (1) the public record,
consisting of published diplomatic correspondence, government state-
ments, memoranda and notes, documentary materials of CPSU congresses
and Central Committee meetings and speeches, and articles and interviews
by government officials and party leaders; (2) the archives of the East
German communist party – the Zentrale Parteiarchiv des Instituts für
Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (Institute for the History of the Work-
ers’ Movement, Central Party Archives), now under the administration of
the German federal government; (3) interviews conducted by this author
with past Soviet government and party officials and their Western counter-
parts; and (4) the memoirs of these officials.
In order to get a reliable picture, the author checked and cross-checked
all four types of sources. Thus, the circumstances of particular Politburo
sessions and bilateral Soviet-East German and multilateral Warsaw Pact or
CMEA meetings, as reflected in the published materials and unpublished
documents, were verified in interviews with the government and party of-
ficials privy to concomitant information. Inconsistencies or contradictions
in the memoir literature were taken up with the interview partners. Espe-
cially valuable were the perspectives received in interviews with the per-
sonal assistants on foreign policy to Gorbachev, Soviet foreign minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, (West) German chancellor Helmut Kohl, and East
German prime minister Lothar de Maizière.
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Paraphrasing Mark Twain, one might be inclined to think that there are
lies, damned lies, and archives. This adage does not, however, apply to the
SED archives. The ‘Red Prussians’, like their predecessors, faithfully
practiced Deutsche Ordnung und Gründlichkeit, decreeing that their activ-
ities be neatly recorded for posterity. Presumably not in their worst night-
mares did the Soviet and East German leaders suspect that the record of
their private conversations, secret Warsaw Pact meetings, and talks behind
closed doors of that organization’s ordinary conferences would someday
be accessible to Western scholars. Their erroneous notion about the confi-
dentiality of the talks is one of the reasons why this author assumes that
there was no deliberate attempt at falsification of the record. Another rea-
son is the importance of the Soviet connection for the survival of the
regime. The members of the SED Politburo wanted to have reports, as
complete and accurate as possible, on every nuance and shading of what
the Soviet comrades thought, said, and did. Given this circumstance, it is
difficult to imagine scribes putting gloss, negative or positive, on the Sovi-
et position in secret, confidential, or open meetings.6 For further informa-
tion on sources the reader may want to refer to the Bibliographical and Bi-
ographical Note.




PART ONE: THE SOVIET EMPIRE

Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations
Conceptual Approaches
The term ‘empire’ is used with deliberation in this book. Obviously, this
word has no independent existence. It can encompass only the meaning
that social convention allocates to it. Unlike definitions of imperialism,
nationalism, or ideology, however, the notion of empire is less controver-
sial and the mental associations produced by it more uniform.7 The word
is derived from the Latin imperium which can be rendered as ‘command’,
‘authority’, or ‘power’. Imperium Romanum thus denoted the supreme
power in Rome and the realm which it commanded. Modern theorists have
variously defined empire as ‘any successful attempt to conquer and subju-
gate peoples with the intention of ruling them for an indefinite period’;8 as
relationships of ‘control imposed by some political societies over the ef-
fective sovereignty of other political societies’;9 and as a state entity in
‘which one ethnic group dominates others’.10 Empire, according to these
definitions, embodies elements of political inequality, military domination,
and economic exploitation. These features distinguish empires from feder-
ations, confederations, and alliances and explain the more pejorative and
emotionally charged ‘imperialism’ – a term that originated in nineteenth
century France to denote the grandiose foreign policy designs of Napoleon
III and that was used in Britain by supporters and opponents of Prime Mi-
Chapter 1:
1.
7 The discussion of empire and imperialism draws on Ariel Cohen, ‘The End of Em-
pire: Russian Imperial Development and Decline’, Ph.D. thesis, The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, December 1993, pp. 12-106. This
author was thesis supervisor. The thesis was revised and published as Russian Im-
perialism: Development and Crisis (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996). A useful
conceptual apparatus and rich empirical data can also be found in Karen Dawisha
and Bruce Parrott, eds., The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in
Comparative Perspective, Series ‘The International Politics of Eurasia’, Vol. 9
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
8 John Starchey, The End of Empire (London: Victor Gollanz, 1959), p. 319.
9 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 19.
10 Maxime Rodinson, as quoted in Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipa-
tion (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 245.
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nister Disraeli to describe his policies of global expansion.11 Taking these
definitions into consideration imperialism here will be understood as a
process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire.12
There is a curious anomaly, however, when it comes to the considera-
tion of the American and the Russian experience. Imperialism, at the end
of the nineteenth century, was considered primarily an activity of the
European maritime powers, the British, French, Germans, Spanish, Por-
tuguese, and Dutch, and less so of the United States or Russia. Perhaps
surprisingly, their cross-continental expansion was not labelled imperial-
ism but ‘nation building’.13 The internal structure of the state rather than
external expansion was the conceptual lens through which the American
‘manifest destiny’ and Russian ‘gathering of lands’ (sobiranie zemlei)
were viewed.14 In the American case, this lens would seem to be appropri-
ate since the massive influx of white settlers did not lead to a system of
imperial control but rather to the destruction of the social structure and
culture of the Indians and the formation of an entirely new nation state.
But the failure to call Russian cross-continental expansion by its proper
name is less comprehensible. Certainly, Czarist foreign minister Prince
Alexander Gorchakov, one of the architects of Russian imperial expan-
sion, left no doubt as to the nature of the exercise. In a circular letter in
1864, he explicitly told his European colleagues that he did not think that
the Russian imperial quest was in any way different from the mission
civilisatrice of other European powers. ‘The position of Russia in Central
Asia [and by implication in other areas subjugated by the Czars] is that of
all civilized states which are brought in contact with half-savage nomad
populations possessing no fixed social organization.’ In such cases, he ex-
plained, ‘the more civilized state is forced in the interest of the security of
its frontier to exercise a certain ascendancy over its turbulent and undesir-
able neighbours.’15
11 Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic Books, 1973),
p. 10.
12 This is the definition used by Doyle, Empires, pp. 44-45.
13 Cohen, The Question of Imperialism, p. 10.
14 Andreas Kappeler points out that the scholarly literature distinguishes between a
‘classic overseas colonialism’ and an ‘internal’ form; see his ‘The Multiethnic
Empire’, in James Cracraft, ed., Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1994), p. 401.
15 Ibid., pp. 410-11.
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In some respects, however, Russia’s expansion in the west, south, and
east did deviate from previous imperialist patterns. Traditionally, the
metropolis was economically, technologically, and culturally the most ad-
vanced part of the empire and was able, for this very reason, to spread its
influence and maintain control. Yet although military force loomed large
in other states’ empire-building, Russia’s expansion was almost exclusive-
ly based on force rather than commercial or cultural pre-eminence. This
certainly applied to her subjugation of more advanced peoples and states,
such as Poland, Finland, the Baltic nations, the Crimean Khanate, Khiva,
and Bukhara. As Count Witte, prime minister under Czar Nikolai II, perti-
nently remarked, ‘Who created the Russian empire, transforming the semi-
Asiatic Muscovite Czardom into the most influential, most dominant,
grandest European power? Only the power of the army’s bayonet. The
world bowed not to our culture, not to our bureaucratized church, not to
our wealth and prosperity. It bowed to our might.’16
The failure to regard Russia as an empire extended into the Soviet era,
despite the fact that the Bolsheviks, after having espoused the Wilsonian
principles of self-determination, set out to restore the Russian empire. By
the end of the civil war, the territorial domain of the USSR largely co-
incided with the Russia of the Romanovs. Russians were the dominating
ethnic component in the realm. As Lenin correctly observed, one only
needed to ‘scratch a communist to find a Great Russian chauvinist’, some-
one who would advance traditional geopolitical arguments in favor of ac-
quiring warm ports on the Indian Ocean, ‘liberating’ Constantinople, stir-
ring up revolution in China and India, or who just wanted to ensure a
steady supply of Uzbek cotton for the Red Army soldiers, Azeri oil to fuel
the tank engines, or Yakut diamonds to pay for the Comintern’s revolu-
tionary activities.17
Several factors may explain the failure conceptually to consider post-
World War I Soviet Russia as an empire. First, the vigorous campaign
waged by the Bolsheviks to undermine the British empire in the Middle
East and India deceptively made the new Soviet state appear as anti-colo-
nial and anti-imperialist. Second, the new Leninist connotation of imperi-
alism as the ‘highest stage of capitalism’ applied only to states with a spe-
cific systemic structure and, therefore, by definition not to the Soviet
16 I am indebted to Robert Legvold for this quotation but have been unable to verify
its source.
17 Cohen, ‘The End of Empire’, pp. 492-93.
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Union. Left-wing political forces in the West and revisionist theorists
adopted and disseminated this point of view. Third, European nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century imperialism was based on nationalism
and a strong state; Soviet ideology, in contrast, rested on internationalist
principles, aimed at the establishment of a universal classless society, and
foresaw the withering away of nationalism together with the state. Finally,
the sordid business of suppression of national self-assertion and indepen-
dence, from the Baltic to the Caucasus, and from the Arctic to the Hin-
dukush and the Amur, was not accompanied by much publicity, let alone
by ‘embedded’ television crews. The Soviet armed reconquista proceeded
largely concealed from world public opinion.
The conceptual muddle was left undisturbed after World War II – de-
spite the Soviet Union’s incorporation of the Baltic States; territorial ex-
pansion in Europe and Asia; establishment of a sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe; and transformation of the country from a regional to a
world power. The USSR was largely seen as a case sui generis to which it
was inappropriate to attach the imperial label. The closest approximation
of Soviet realities to Western images of empire occurred during the Cold
War when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were collectively called
the ‘Soviet bloc’ and the Eastern European countries referred to as ‘satel-
lites’. But these terms became politically incorrect during the détente peri-
od of the 1970s, when Western political leaders attempted to construct a
working relationship with the Soviet Union and Western scholars persuad-
ed themselves that they were discovering tendencies of diversity, autono-
my, pluralism, and emancipation in the ‘former’ bloc.
Obviously, such terms as ‘empire’ and ‘satellites’ were regarded as
anathema by Soviet political leaders and propagandists. Even in retro-
spect, former Soviet officials have been reluctant to accept such labels.
Gorbachev, both when he occupied the highest office in the Soviet Union
and after the collapse of the country, refrained from using the two terms.
He also resented the characterization of the relationship between the Sovi-
et Union and its Eastern European dependencies as ‘colonial’. For in-
stance, when Czechoslovak President Václav Havel visited Moscow in
February 1990 and told Gorbachev that his people would ‘comprehend
that finally the chapter of the traditional, as it were, colonial relations has
been closed’, his host resented the epithet: ‘Once again I had to object and
ask the president not to ascribe to us a colonial [design] in our relations
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with Czechoslovakia.’18 Even in retrospect, his terminology on Soviet re-
lations with Eastern Europe has remained euphemistic and apologetic.19
Georgi Shakhnazarov, his advisor on Eastern European affairs, adopted
a similarly equivocal and euphemistic stance on the issue. He, at least, ac-
knowledged that one could ‘consider the people’s democracies an organic
part or the periphery of a Soviet empire’. He also admitted that it was true
that ‘the social and state structures of all the countries belonging to the so-
cialist system were initially, soon after the Second World War, brought un-
der a common roof, that of one and the same Soviet system’; that the Sovi-
et Union ‘held its allies on an economic leash and, often to its own detri-
ment, supplied them with a considerable amount of oil, ore, metals, and at
times even grain’; and that the Eastern European countries were pulled in-
to military-political bloc, that their armies were equipped with Soviet
weapons, and that in the event of war they had to act together with the
armed forces of the Soviet Union under the orders of our High Command’.
But, then, he incongruously states that the term empire ‘explains little’. He
sees no difference between the position of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere and that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Furthermore,
he rejects the notion that Moscow had been able to behave in the socialist
community as it saw fit: ‘Nothing of the sort! ... Within the general princi-
ples of relations in the socialist system, there existed specific confines,
within which governments could act independently.’20
Vadim Medvedev, the former CPSU Central Committee secretary and
head of the Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers’
Parties, in his reflections on the collapse of the Soviet empire, eschewed
the sensitive word but aptly considered the Soviet Union and the countries
of Eastern Europe a single entity, with the latter having formed the ‘outer
ring of the Soviet bloc’.21 Alexander Yakovlev, his former Politburo col-
league and Gorbachev confidant, was less inclined to mince words. To
him the ‘socialist community’ represented a ‘strange empire’, and one
18 The exchange took place over the content of a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak declara-
tion; see Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), Vol. 2,
pp. 360-61.
19 For details see infra, pp. 272-73.
20 Georgi K. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody. Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego
pomoshchnika (Moscow: Rossika, Zevs, 1993), pp. 96-97.
21 Vadim A. Medvedev, Raspad. Kak on nazreval v ‘mirovoi sisteme sotsializma’
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), p. 3.
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where, although every leader played his own game and no one derived any
special gains from cooperation with the Soviet Union, ‘no one could have
even dreamt about the servility of the vassals’.22 Along the same lines, Vi-
taly Zhurkin, director of the Institute on Europe, deplored in a discussion
at the Central Committee’s Commission on International Policy in June
1990 the ‘amazing (udivitel’nyi) empire that we created’ in Eastern Euro-
pe – a zone of economic inefficiencies and one where ‘resentment and
even hatred toward the Soviet Union could grow’.23
If, then, it is analytically useful to treat the Soviet Union as an empire
subject to pressures and processes similar to those that affected empires in
the past, what are some of the major conceptual approaches that may help
us understand both the general and the specific features of the Soviet ex-
perience? Four major theoretical approaches can be distinguished. They
can be called the metrocentric, the pericentric, the international systemic,
and the transnational orientation.
Metrocentric Approaches
The first orientation can essentially be subdivided into three schools – (1)
the radical liberal school, with John A. Hobson as the main proponent; (2)
the Marxist school, which includes Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding,
and Lenin as the founding theorists, and neo-Marxist authors, such as Paul
Baran, Henry Brailsford, Michael Barratt Brown, Victor Kiernan, Harold
Laski, John Starchey, and Paul Sweezy; and (3) a political and sociologi-
cal approach, with Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter as the
founding father, which emphasizes expansionist inclinations of anti-demo-
cratic, militarist elites.24
2.
22 Alexander N. Yakovlev, Gor’kaia chasha: Bol’shevism i reformatsiia v Rossii
(Yaroslavl: Verkhnye-volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1994), p. 191.
23 ‘Peremeny v Tsentral’noi i Vostochnoi Evorope. S zasedaniia Komissii TsK KPSS
po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki 15 iiunia 1990 g.’, Izvestiia Tsk KPSS, No.
10 (October 1990), pp. 107-8. Apparently for reasons of what then was still con-
sidered to be politically correct, the editors of the journal chose to put Zhurkin’s
‘empire’ in quotation marks.
24 For a critique of neo-Marxist theories of imperialism see Hannes Adomeit, ‘Neo-
Marxist Theories of Imperialism: Clarification or Confusion of a Concept in Inter-
national Relations’, Co-existence, Vol. 12, No. 2 (October 1975), pp. 126-48.
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Hobson was the first to treat imperialism as a disposition of metropoli-
tan society to extend its rule. He was also the first to connect imperialism
and capitalism, disregarding all available evidence that there existed em-
pires based on slave and feudal social organization, and there was at least
a theoretical possibility that there would be empires under a different form
of societal formation than capitalism. Taking Britain as a point of depar-
ture, Hobson portrayed imperialism as the result of forces emanating from
its centre. Special interests, led by financiers, encouraged an expansionist
foreign policy designed to promote the needs of capitalist investors for in-
vestment outlets. These interests succeeded in manipulating the metropoli-
tan politics of parliamentary Britain through their influence over the press
and educational institutions, which provided them with imperialistic pro-
paganda.25
Lenin’s ‘territorial division of the world’ broadened Hobson’s concept
of formal territorial annexation to include the exercise of controlling influ-
ence by economic means – one of the modes of so-called ‘informal impe-
rialism’. For Lenin, imperialism was not only the product of high finance.
It was capitalism in its final, monopolistic stage driven to search for over-
seas profits, raw materials, and markets.26 Thus, the connection between
capitalism and imperialism was both consistent and central for ‘mature’
capitalist states. ‘The necessity for exporting capital’, he argued, ‘arises
from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become “over-ripe”
and ... capital cannot find “profitable” investment.’27 Imperialism, there-
fore, was not amenable to reform. It is for this very reason that Lenin at-
tacked the ‘revisionist renegade’ Karl Kautsky for arguing that ‘the urge
of present-day states to expand ... can best be promoted, not by the violent
means of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy’.28
Schumpeter rejected the Marxist approach. ‘It is not true’, he countered,
‘that the capitalist system as such must collapse because of immanent ne-
cessity, that it necessarily makes its continued existence impossible by its
25 Doyle, Empires, p. 20; summary by Cohen, ‘The End of Empire’, p. 15.
26 This was authoritatively stated by V. I. Lenin in his Imperialism: The Highest
Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939, new. ed.: 1969).
27 Ibid., p. 63.
28 Karl Kautsky, Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund (Nürnberg,
1915), pp. 70 and 72, as quoted by Lenin, Imperialism, p. 112.
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own growth and development.’29 To him, capitalism and imperialism were
not only unrelated but antithetical to each other. He defined imperialism as
the objectless disposition of a state to unlimited forcible expansion. This
phenomenon originated in atavistic, militaristic institutions, such as the
‘war machine’ of ancient Egypt, and similarly aggressive political systems
with a dominant social and economic position enjoyed by undemocratic
elites and the armed forces. Modern capitalism’s only link to these aggres-
sive forces of imperialism lay in the deformation imposed by the war ma-
chines of the absolutist monarchies of seventeenth and eighteenth century
Europe. Their monopoly position in the economy was benefitted by the
use of military force abroad. Force, in the perception of the elites, could
‘serve to break down foreign customs barriers’; they ‘can use cheap native
labour without its ceasing to be cheap; they can market their products,
even in the colonies, at monopoly prices; they can, finally, invest capital
that would only depress the profit rate at home’.30
The Dutch scholar Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse also rejects the Marxist
idea of economic determinism underlying imperialism. To him war and
the ‘bloodstained fetish of empire’ are not simply expressions of economic
dynamics but ‘primarily political phenomena, a manifestation of political
will’. Economic theories of imperialism, while elucidating many pertinent
dynamics, at the same time conceal a more important logic in the course
of affairs. They failed ‘to address the question of power, which lies with
the will to power, especially the will to power of strata who feel insecure
in their status. By failing to see power clearly in the past, this perspective
clouds the future.’31
Consideration of the rise and fall of the Soviet empire makes it neces-
sary to focus not only on developments in the imperial centre, the inner
ring of empire, but also in the outer rings. Historians and political scien-
tists have provided some conceptual and comparative approaches which
are applicable here.
29 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, transl. Heinz Norden, ed.
and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy (New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
1951), p. 108.
30 Ibid., pp. 109.
31 Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation, p. 216.
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Pericentric Approaches
Following the summary of Cohen, as a reaction to the prevailing views of
the metrocentrists, British historian John Gallagher, along with a number
of students and colleagues, such as Ronald Robinson and Anil Seal, de-
veloped a theory of imperialism primarily concerned with events in the
imperial periphery.32 This approach is conceptually useful in its assertion
that empires typically collapse as a result of decay at the centre, severe
difficulties of control at the periphery, or a combination of both. Prior to
the writings of the pericentrists, empire had been analyzed as if rulers had
no subjects and as if Europe’s pursuit of profit and power had taken place
in a world in which external forces did not exist.33 The pericentrists, in
contrast, proceed from the assumption that ‘global power, carried by a rul-
ing nation, cannot in the long run be supported solely by the people of that
nation ... In its relations with other peoples such a power must satisfy them
and give them an interest in the continuance and stability of the whole’.34
They regard expansion as a set of ‘unequal bargains’ between metropoli-
tan agents, sometimes with little support from the centre, and their indige-
nous allies and opponents, concerned with defending or improving their
position inside their own societies.35 Such concerns obviously provided
the centre with levers of influence in accordance with the time-honoured
Roman imperial principle of divide et impera.
A distinction can thus be drawn between formal and informal empire.
The former applies to peoples and nations that are integrated fully into the
political and legal system of the imperial state, typically with career op-
portunities for them in the central administration, with only the lower lev-
els of the imperial bureaucracy manned by locals of the periphery. The lat-
ter pertains to those dependent and penetrated societies which retain vary-
ing degrees of autonomy and where ‘the governance of extensive districts
of the colony is entrusted to members of the native elite under the supervi-
3.
32 J. A. Gallagher and R. E. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic
History Review, 2nd Ser., Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 1-15; summary by Cohen, ‘The End of
Empire’, pp. 75-76.
33 Anil Seal, Preface to John A. Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the
British Empire (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. viii; quoted by
Cohen, ‘The End of Empire’, p. 75.
34 G. Modelski, quoted in Geoffrey Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination (London
and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 6.
35 Cohen, ‘The End of Empire’, p. 76.
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sion of imperial governors’.36 In accordance with this classification, the
first ring or inner core of Soviet empire can be understood to be the formal
empire, while the second and third rings – Eastern Europe first and fore-
most, but also the dependent states, proxies, and allies outside the Warsaw
Pact scattered around the globe from Angola to Mongolia, and from Cuba
to Vietnam, can be regarded as forming the informal empire.
It can be argued that the more geographically expansive the imperial
realm, the more important the levers of informal and indirect control
wielded by the centre. One of the major reasons for this lies in the fact
that, with the help of cooperative local elites, the direct use of military
force can be avoided. Another potential benefit of informal control is the
limitation of risk through proxies. In the Soviet empire, East Germany
played such a role vis-à-vis the Western allies in and on the access routes
to Berlin; Cuba in Central America, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia;
and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. ‘Sub-imperialisms’ are able to develop on
the basis of indirect rule. This can be another bonus of informal empire
but also potentially a threat since the power of the subordinate entity
might turn into a challenge to central influence and control.
Some of the most important factors in the demise of empires are nation-
alism and tendencies of emancipation. Marxists have been notorious for
underestimating this important force of history, assuming that ‘objective’
class forces rather than ‘subjective’ factors such as nationalism propelled
world events. Indeed, it was the quest for national emancipation that seri-
ously shook the colonial system of the European powers after World War I
and II, and finally, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, destroyed it. Willem
Wertheim is thus correct in arguing that emancipation is ‘a decisive force
in both revolution and evolution, and has to be incorporated from the out-
set as a basic element, instead of being viewed as a force alien to social
reality’.37 Nederveen Pieterse specifies this general observation by stating
that the determining forces in the development and decline of empire were
not Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism à la Marx, Engels,
and Lenin, but the dialectics of ‘domination and liberation’ and of ‘empire
36 Doyle, Empires, p. 38.
37 Willem F. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipa-
tion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 86, as quoted by Nederveen Pieterse,
Empire and Emancipation, p. 83.
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and emancipation’.38 He also discovered an important dialectic relation-
ship between nationalism and imperialism.
Imperialism creates nations: It naturally highlights the international domain
and interstate conflict, and compels resistance to take on a similar form, the
form of the nation-state, to act as its counterpart in the arena it has created. If
empire building in its earlier stages is actually nation building, empire in its
later stages is still building nations: in the process of emancipation from em-
pire by means of defensive assimilation.39
The Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev were to varying degrees con-
scious of the significance of nationalism. But for the most part they re-
garded it merely as ‘remnants of the past’ (perezhitki proshlogo) that
would, with their assistance, be relegated to the ‘rubbish bin of history’.
To that extent, the Bolshevik leaders hardly differed from Prince Gor-
chakov and his conviction that the blessings of progressive ideas and a
more advanced social system had to be brought to backward societies. As
shrewd political leaders, however, both Lenin and Stalin knew that the
remnants of the past were forces to be taken seriously and could be ex-
ploited for the consolidation of power. Thus, within days of assuming
power, the Bolshevik government issued a Declaration of Rights of the na-
tional minorities. Without qualification, it affirmed that every nation had
the right to self-determination up to and including secession. The mistaken
belief of many of the nationalities that their fate would be better placed
with the Reds than the Whites in the civil war following the Bolshevik
revolution, helped decide the outcome of the war. Yet the slogan of ‘self-
determination’ not only failed to persuade the nationalities to become
more than temporary allies against the Whites and to support the Bolshe-
vik regime unconditionally but gave them the legitimate excuse to go their
own way. Wilsonian principles of self-determination, therefore, gave way
to ‘proletarian self-determination’. On its basis, the leaders in Petrograd
dispatched pro-Bolshevik armies to topple newly formed nationalist
regimes at Russia’s periphery. Although the attempt to restore Russian
control over Finland and the Baltic states failed, it was successful in
Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as in Cen-
tral Asia.40 As a consequence, the nationalist movements of the regions of
38 Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation, pp. xiv-xv, 353-81.
39 Ibid., p. 359.
40 See Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Random
House, 1995), the chapter entitled ‘The Red Empire’, esp. pp. 149, 151.
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Eurasia incorporated into the Soviet Union were suppressed. Their aspira-
tions, however, were only subdued rather than eradicated.
Nationalism and the forces of national emancipation also played a sig-
nificant role after World War II in the establishment of the Soviet empire
in Eastern Europe. Two major problems affected Soviet control. One was
the unwillingness of the Eastern European nations to reconcile themselves
with their dependent status and their resulting desire to emancipate them-
selves from Soviet rule. The other is the geographical extension of the
problem noted above in the context of the Czarist empire: the subjugation
of nations politically and economically more advanced than the core na-
tion of the empire. The consequences became visible, from the Soviet per-
spective, in the relatively benign phenomenon of ‘national communism’ in
Eastern Europe. But it also manifested itself in the more dangerous popu-
lar revolts in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in
1968, and the unrest in Poland in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81.
Such events serve to clarify that what was at issue in Soviet-East Euro-
pean relations was not a matter of ‘involuntary imperialism’ or ‘auto-colo-
nization’ – at least not on the societal level. As Karen Dawisha has argued,
the ruling elites in Eastern Europe adopted a pro-Soviet stance in order to
receive Soviet security assistance that would keep them in power. They
continued to do so and sought to maintain their colonial status even as the
impulse for empire was receding under Gorbachev.41 However, in larger
perspective, neither was the establishment of the Soviet empire in Eastern
Europe involuntary nor did society there ask to be subjugated. The rela-
tionship between the centre and the periphery in this case essentially fol-
lowed an all-too familiar imperial story. The regimes put in place by the
outside power proved to be exceedingly unpopular. This forced the imperi-
al centre recurrently to embark on rescue operations.
The consequences of the extension of Soviet control to Eastern Europe
were not always properly recognized. George Kennan, American diplo-
mat, scholar, and author of the influential ‘Mr. X’ article published in For-
eign Affairs in July 1947. In retrospect, he admitted that ‘a serious defi-
ciency of the article was the failure to mention the satellite area of Eastern
Europe – the failure to discuss Soviet power ... in terms of its involvement
41 Karen Dawisha, ‘Constructing and Deconstructing Empire’, in Dawisha and Par-
rott, eds., End of Empire?, p. 344.
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in this area’.42 The attentive reader, Kennan regretted, had every reason to
believe that ‘I was talking only about Russia proper’ and that the weak-
nesses of the Soviet system to which he was drawing attention ‘were ones
that had their existence only within the national boundaries of the Soviet
state’. He would have been able to present a far stronger argument about
the tenuous nature of Soviet rule, he concluded, if he had added the ‘em-
barrassments of imperialism which the Soviet leaders have taken upon
themselves with their conquest of Eastern Europe’ and the ‘unlikelihood
that Moscow would be permanently successful in holding that great area
in subjection’.43
East Germany and the unresolved problem of a separate East German
identity turned out to be one of the reasons why Kennan was right in that
Moscow would be unsuccessful in holding on to its extended western
glacis. Indeed, from the very beginning of the post-war era, the division of
Germany and thereby the potential resurgence of German nationalism
were central to Moscow’s problem of managing the new bipolar security
order and the Soviet Union’s European empire.
Concerning this issue, Stalin was not blinded by ideology but demon-
strated political realism. He furthermore exhibited a great degree of scepti-
cism, even cynicism, about the prospect of communist revolution without
the direct support of Soviet power. This was amply demonstrated when he
told visiting Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas that in Germany ‘you
cannot have a revolution because you have to step on the lawn’;44 when he
commented dryly on a pre-1941 Soviet war film featuring rebellious ele-
ments of the German proletariat disrupting the rear that ‘the German pro-
letariat did not rebel’;45 and when he told Polish leader Mikolajczyk that
communism fitted Germany ‘as the saddle a cow’.46 He appears to have
recognized German nationalism as a strong force that had to be taken into
consideration in any post-war European security structure.47
42 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p.
357 (italics in the original).
43 Ibid.
44 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, transl. Michael B. Petrovich (New
York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1962), p. 79.
45 Ibid., p. 103.
46 Charles Bohlen in a seminar session, Columbia University, 19 March 1970.
47 For evidence see Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior: A The-
oretical and Empirical Analysis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), esp. pp. 129-31.
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The realization of the ‘costs of empire’ associated with the processes of
national emancipation in Eastern Europe and the unresolved German prob-
lem surfaced periodically in the deliberations of Soviet leaders. Several
times, latent crises turned acute. However, after the building of the Berlin
wall in 1961, awareness of the problem in Moscow was to wane and was
to preoccupy the Soviet leadership in a major way only under Gorbachev.
International Systemic and Structural Approaches
Yet another explanation of imperialism focuses on the international sys-
tem. One such approach, as developed originally by Morton Kaplan, is
based on the assumption that basic structural features of the system, and
the distribution of power within it, determine the behaviour of states and
create strong pressures for states to act in certain ways in order to safe-
guard vital interests. Furthermore, the system would allow the analyst to
detect and predict patterns of behaviour.48 However, as critics have point-
ed out, Kaplan weakened his argument by asserting that changes of the
system occurred as a result of processes within states. The fundamental
dynamics of international politics, they have charged, thus remained un-
clear. It left unanswered the central question as to whether the internation-
al system shaped the behaviour of states or, conversely, whether the inter-
nal make-up of the states determined the structure of the international sys-
tem. Since Kaplan had made both assertions, the critics have maintained,
‘the logic of his analysis, and hence its capacity for forecasting, was ques-
tionable’.49
In an attempt to rescue structural theory, Kenneth Waltz has drawn a
sharp distinction between what he calls the ‘systems level’ and the ‘unit
level’ of analysis, stressing the tight limits set on state action by the inter-
national system.50 Such limits certainly existed in many areas of the politi-
4.
48 Basic for this approach is Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process and Internation-
al Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), pp. xvii-xviii; see also Kaplan, ‘Sys-
tems Theory and Political Science’, Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1968),
pp. 30-47.
49 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’,
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), p. 31.
50 Kenneth W. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House,
1979), pp. 97-98, as summarized by Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory’, p.
31.
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cal and military competition between the superpowers. However, there is
no particular reason why two superpowers should have been locked in in-
tense struggle had it not been for a specific conception of struggle shared
by both of them. As for the United States with its pluralist and democratic
structure, it can hardly be said that it was inherently prone to define itself
as part of an uncompromising, ‘antagonist’ world. It was only through the
definition imposed by the Soviet Union, that of international relations as
an ‘historically inevitable’ struggle between ‘two opposed socio-economic
systems’ that the United States also came to perceive the conflict in antag-
onist terms. But any major alteration of such a definition in Moscow
would cause both the functioning and the basic structure of the bipolar
system to change. This was shown conclusively in the second half of the
1980s, when the introduction of perestroika, glasnost, and the New Think-
ing fundamentally altered international politics. A separation of the inter-
national system and the state actors, therefore, is not very helpful.
Jack Snyder, in his Myths of Empire, is conscious of the inextricable
links between (1) the international system, (2) perceptions, and (3) the do-
mestic politics of states.51 In an attempt to come to grips with the origins
and processes of imperialism in comparative perspective, he tests various
hypotheses about these interrelationships in five states: Germany, Japan,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In the process, he distin-
guishes three theories which, in his opinion, can serve to explain imperial
expansion and overexpansion of great powers.
Concerning the first, the international systemic dimension, Snyder tests
in particular the theories of the Realist school, according to which expan-
sion is a rational response to international anarchy and the best means of
achieving security. Realism, as he explains, imputes to imperial statesmen
and strategists the idea that conquest increases power by adding human
and material resources that can be used in the competition with other great
powers. Conversely, these actors have thought that losses at the empire’s
periphery could lead to collapse of power in the imperial core. Further-
more, they have maintained that ‘the best defence is a good offense’. In
this view, cumulative gains in the imperial periphery can be reaped
through assertiveness and aggressive action, the establishment of a strate-
gic glacis and the creation of buffers, denying the adversary territory and
51 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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manpower, and allowing a cheap defence of empire, whereas defending
closer to home would be more costly. Expansion and aggression occur
whenever a state’s power in the international system is expected to de-
cline. Preventive action then seems required in order to forestall such a de-
velopment. Finally, as he writes, political leaders in the Realist perspective
have acted in accordance with the idea that threats make other states com-
pliant. This belief often implied a contradictory image of the opponent as
posing an immense security threat but at the same time as being too weak
or irresolute to counter remedial measures adopted by the adversary.52
Snyder calls the idea of expansion as a rational response to international
anarchy and allegedly the best means of achieving security the ‘central
myth’ of empire but also the ‘major force propelling every case of overex-
pansion by the industrialized great powers’.53 He sees the tendency toward
overextension and overstretch as correlated with each state’s position in
the international system. Germany and Japan, in this view, were the least
buffered from the dangers of international anarchy due to their size, geo-
graphical location, and resource endowments. They, consequently, had the
most to gain by attempting to expand to a position of economic and mili-
tary self-sufficiency. Furthermore, changes in a state’s international power
position over time correlated with the inclination to overexpand, as shown
by German and Japanese policies in the 1930s. As for the post-war period
and the Soviet Union, he concludes, the period of Moscow’s most militant
expansion ‘coincided with the time of fluid global power relations in Eu-
rope; the rise of revolutionary movements in Asia; and significant fluctua-
tions in the nuclear balance’. This ‘created an environment that spurred
domino fears and worries [in Moscow] about windows of vulnerability’.54
His second explanation of imperial expansion and overstretch is cogni-
tive. It addresses the problem of whether imperial myths are predicated
upon genuine belief or are mere instruments of policy. Since information
for rational decision-making is incomplete, political actors store what they
have learned in simplified, structured form. These actors often tended to
see current and future events as a rerun of formative experiences in their
political career. For instance, ‘when a whole generation undergoes the
same formative experiences, such as the lessons of Munich, the strategic
52 Ibid., pp. 1-18.
53 Ibid., p. 1.
54 Ibid., pp. 306-307. The same was true for the United States in this period, he ar-
gues.
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policy of the whole state is likely to be affected for many years’.55 Yet
based of the results of his case studies, he casts doubt on the value of cog-
nitive explanations for imperialist policies. He holds that ‘beliefs and
‘lessons’ correlate more strongly with personal and institutional interests
than with formative experience.56
As for the third – the domestic political – explanation, Snyder sees im-
perialist expansion as based on parochial interests and emanating from po-
litical coalitions, typically including important segments of the military,
the military-industrial complex, economic groups seeking to profit from
autarky and arms production, and government bureaucracies that stand to
gain from aggressive external policies. The theory of domestic coalition
politics, he writes, passed both cross sectional and time series tests. In
what can be considered a common sense conclusion not necessarily re-
quiring rigorous testing, he concludes: ‘Cartelized political systems like
Germany and Japan were the most recklessly overexpansionist; democrat-
ic systems and systems ruled by unitary oligarchies were less so.’57
Snyder’s ‘scientific’ inquiry has both strengths and weaknesses. On the
international systemic dimension, useful for analysis here is his observa-
tion that ‘the strategy of gaining security through expansion is rarely ef-
fective because the ideas underlying it contradict two of the most powerful
regularities in international politics: the balance of power and the rising
costs of expansion’.58 Indeed, in balance-of-power systems, individual
states tend to form coalitions in order to counteract power imbalances cre-
ated by revisionist states. As will be demonstrated infra, similar dynamics
applied to the post-World War II bipolar system where both coalitions
aimed at military preponderance. However, one of the weaknesses of Sny-
der’s examination is the fact that he draws no clear-cut distinction between
expansion and ‘overexpansion’; the terms are used interchangeably. But
surely there is a major difference. Imperial expansion, where benefits out-
weigh costs, will frequently command widespread domestic support and
pose relatively mild analytical and political problems. Imperial ‘overex-
pansion’, where costs exceed benefits, is more difficult to explain. It raises
the question as to when, in the opinion of the analyst, political leaders and
55 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
56 Ibid., p. 30.
57 Ibid., p. 308.
58 Ibid., p. 6.
4. International Systemic and Structural Approaches
49
citizens, the advantages of empire turn into liabilities – a difficult question
to answer and one that Snyder fails to address.
From practical political perspectives, this distinction is important. As
noted in the Preface, Putin’s policies on post-Soviet space can be called
imperial or neo-imperial, and they are costly. The brilliantly executed an-
nexation of Crimea and the national euphoria that accompanied it compen-
sated for the evident erosion of legitimacy of the ‘Putin system’, as evi-
dent for instance in the large-scale demonstrations in December 2011 and
March 2011 for a ‘Russia without Putin’. In Russian public opinion, the
costs of the Crimean operation in terms of public expenditure were and are
low, and in human lives non-existent, but the perceived benefits huge.
However, the proportion of people personally willing to pay for the inte-
gration of Crimea is low and even much lower is support for any military
involvement of the country in eastern Ukraine.59
Another weakness in the analysis of the international systemic dimen-
sion is Snyder’s assertion that imperial expansion is likely to occur when-
ever a state’s power is perceived to decline. In international politics,
whether an actor in decline will become more militant and aggressive de-
pends on many factors, including perceived opportunities and risks. For
instance, the more assertive Soviet foreign policy after the war in the late
1940s was not only the result of Moscow’s security concerns and fears
about falling dominos but also because opportunities existed for weaken-
ing the American position in Europe, undermining the Western colonial
system in Asia, exploiting the communist victory in China, and reaping
diplomatic capital from the first explosion of a nuclear device. Similarly,
the findings about a power responding with assertiveness and aggression
to perceived shifts in the ‘correlation of forces’ in favor of the adversary
are at odds with the course of events in the mid-1980s. In that period, the
international power position of the Soviet Union had indeed declined, but
59 See, for instance,the results of public opionion surveys by the independent Levada
polling organisation, ‘Prisoedinenie-kryma-k-rossii’, Levada.ru, 2 September
2014, <http://www.levada.ru/print/02-09-2014/prisoedinenie-kryma-k-rossii> and
by the state-owned All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM),
‘Two Thirds of Russians against Sending Troops to Ukraine – Poll,’ Itar.tass.com,
29 July 2014, <http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/742703> and Wciom.ru, 5 February
2015, <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=115137>. For an analysis of such
results see Maria Snegovaya, ‘Domestic Costs Are Rising for Mr. Putin’, The
American Interest, 19 Februar 2015, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/
2015/02/19/domestic-costs-are-rising-for-mr-putin/>.
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the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev responded by pursuing conciliato-
ry policies and embarking on a reduction rather than an expansion of im-
perial commitments.
Equally unsatisfactory are some of the Snyder’s assertions concerning
the second dimension of analysis: the cognitive explanations and their rel-
evance in international politics. In fact, the book harbours a major unre-
solved contradiction. On the one hand, it denigrates the importance of be-
liefs and ideas as ‘ex post facto justifications for policy and elements of a
strategic ideology’ and ‘rationalizations’.60 On the other hand, it sees vari-
ous ‘myths of empire’, that is, erroneous ideas, beliefs, and images as ly-
ing at the root of overexpansion by great powers. He concludes that beliefs
correlate more strongly with personal and institutional interests than with
formative experience. However, to posit congruence between images and
interests is denying the possibility that political leaders may free them-
selves from established beliefs, images, and lessons, and construct and an
entirely cognitive map and new operational principles. The evolution of
the New Thinking in the Gorbachev era, as will be demonstrated, is an ex-
ample of just such conceptual revision.
Domestic coalition politics is the third and most important explanatory
variable in the author’s research design. Unfortunately, the findings under
this heading are so complex and contradictory as to be almost meaning-
less. Snyder discerns the dissolution of the ‘more cartelized’ domestic
structure of the Soviet Union in the period between 1953 and 1985 and
thereafter, in the Gorbachev era, the emergence of a ‘more unitary’ and
‘more democratic’ system that produced more ‘moderate’ outcomes.61 But
was the Soviet Union under Gorbachev really more ‘unitary’ than under
Brezhnev? Assuming that it was, the author generalizes that ‘if strong car-
tels face a situation of weakly institutionalized democracy and truncated
debate, ... then increasing mass participation will exacerbate the cartel’s
inclination towards overexpansion’.62 That generalization does sound very
erudite but is it applicable to the real world? Not really. Conditions of
weak democracy and increasing mass participation did apply in the Gor-
bachev era but the policies of overexpansion were ended rather than con-
tinued, let alone reinforced.
60 Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 306, 308.
61 Ibid., p. 311.
62 Ibid., p. 310.
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Almost as an afterthought, and briefly mentioned in the discussion of
domestic politics, Snyder makes a final point: ‘Simple logrolling does not
explain most of these [five] cases without resort to ideology. In some cases
ideology was so integral to the political process that it played a central role
in determining what the individual “interest groups” wanted.’63 This find-
ing raises an interesting as well as fundamental question. Earlier, cognition
was declared only marginally significant. But who is to say with precision
what part of ideology is genuine and cognitive, what part constitutes for-
malized perception and dogma, and what part is instrumental? This is a
complex but crucial problem for the analysis of each and every major So-
viet foreign policy decision that cannot simply be swept under the analyti-
cal rug. Ultimately, the reader is left wondering what really is more impor-
tant for imperial expansion and overstretch: interests or ideology?
Imperial expansion and overstretch are also at issue in studies by
Charles Kupchan and Paul Kennedy. In The Vulnerability of Empire,
Kupchan asks why imperial powers often engage in self-defeating be-
haviour.64 Such behaviour, in his view, occurs in response to perceived ex-
ternal threats and is characterized either by overly competitive behaviour,
which tends to lead to ‘overextension’, or by overly cooperative be-
haviour, which results in ‘strategic exposure’.65 He focuses on selected
historical periods in which the United States, Germany, France, and Great
Britain engaged, in response to shifts in the international distribution of
power, in behaviour that tended to erode their strategic position.
Metropolitan vulnerability, he writes, not only results from shifts in the
global distribution of power but also from previous elite efforts to enlist
public support for imperial policies. That support later constrains the elites
from readjusting when the international political landscape changes. Like
Snyder’s approach, however, Kupchan’s study is of limited utility for the
study of the Soviet empire. Elite perceptions of vulnerability are only one
part of the explanation of Soviet overextension under Brezhnev and coop-
erative behaviour under Gorbachev. To arrive at a fuller more accurate un-
derstanding of both imperial expansion and contraction in the Soviet case,
many more factors need to be taken into consideration.
63 Ibid., p. 314.
64 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1994).
65 Ibid., p. 14.
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Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is more relevant to
the issues discussed in this book.66 He argues that the relative strengths of
the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally be-
cause of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and techno-
logical and organizational breakthroughs which bring greater advantage to
one society than to others. Once their productive capacity is enhanced,
they find it easier to sustain the burdens of paying for large-scale armies
and fleets. It may sound crudely mercantilistic, he continues, but wealth is
usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is needed
to acquire and protect wealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the
state’s resources is diverted from the creation of wealth and allocated in-
stead to military purposes, then this is likely over the longer term to lead
to a weakening of national power. In the same way, if a state overextends
itself strategically – by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the
waging of costly wars – it runs the risk that the potential benefits from ex-
ternal expansion may be outweighed by the expense of this endeavour. He
considers this a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has
entered a period of relative economic decline.67
Kennedy’s analysis of the great powers’ resource allocation dilemma –
how much to allocate to ‘guns’ or to ‘butter’, to ‘profit’ or to ‘power’ –
could have been discussed above under metrocentric approaches. How-
ever, it also fits into the present framework since Kennedy is interested in
the consequences of the state’s resource allocation policies for its interna-
tional power position and policies. He applies this interest to the bipolar
system of the post-war era and the competition between the superpowers
until the mid-1980s and concludes that the process of a ‘nation overex-
tending itself, geographically and strategically’ and ‘leaving less for pro-
ductive investment’ with its ‘economic output slowing down ... and dire
implications for its long-term capacity to maintain both its citizens’ con-
sumption demands and its international position …was happening in the
case of the USSR, the United States, and Britain’.68 In retrospect, as with
many a good book, there is some doubt as to whether its conclusions and
predictions correctly reflected current realities. Certainly, it failed to pre-
dict future events. Leaving aside the issue of American economic and mil-
66 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
67 Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
68 Ibid., p. 539.
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itary power and the United States’ role in world affairs, the book correctly
reconstructed what Sovietologists in their analyses of the Soviet Union
then diagnosed as the dilemma of internal decline and external expansion,
and a widening gap between a deteriorating economic base and rising mil-
itary capabilities. This they called the ‘paradox of superpower’, describing
the Soviet Union as a ‘military giant but economic dwarf’ or ‘giant on
clay feet’.69 West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt even referred to the
Soviet Union as an ‘Upper Volta with nuclear weapons.’70 Yet, Kennedy
thought that this ‘does not mean that the USSR is close to collapse’ and
considered it ‘highly unlikely that even an energetic regime in Moscow
would either abandon “scientific socialism” in order to boost the economy
or drastically cut the burdens of defence expenditures and thereby affect
the military core of the Soviet state’. The implications of this for the West
were unpalatable since there was ‘nothing in the character or tradition of
the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline
gracefully’.
Indeed, historically none of the overextended, multinational empires – the Ot-
toman, the Spanish, the Napoleonic, the British – ever retreated to their own
ethnic base until they had been defeated in a Great Power war, or (as with
Britain after 1945) were so weakened that an imperial withdrawal was politi-
cally unavoidable.71
Whereas Kennedy’s main proposition concerning the onset of the decline
of empires is entirely useful and also applicable to the Soviet Union, none
of his predictions about the reactions of the Soviet leadership turned out to
be accurate. Gorbachev, already in office for two years when the book ap-
69 Some of the best examples is Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Ex-
pansion, Internal Decline (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986) and Paul Dibb, The
Incomplete Superpower (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1988); see also
Hannes Adomeit, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy: The Internal Mechanism of External Ex-
pansion’, in id. and Robert Boardman, eds., Foreign Policy Making in Communist
Countries: A Comparative Approach (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1979), pp.
15-48. Pointing to the widening gap between economic and military power in the
period from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, as Arnold Horelick noted, was ‘al-
most becoming a cliché among Western Sovietologists’; see his ‘External Implica-
tions of Soviet Internal Development’, in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson,
eds., The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations (New York: Crane, Rus-
sak, 1985), pp. 123-51.
70 In several semi-official speeches and privately.
71 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 513-14.
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peared, embarked on an attempt at fundamentally realigning the relation-
ship between economic and military power. It drastically reduced its impe-
rial commitments. It aimed at significant cuts in defence expenditures. It
accepted imperial decline more or less gracefully, certainly without pro-
ducing cataclysmic international conflict. And the country over which the
leadership presided finally collapsed. All this makes the task of analyzing
the Gorbachev era even more challenging.
Transnational Approaches
Doyle is among the few theorists of empire who appreciate the fact that
transnational forces in the past influenced both imperialist policies and the
form which empires assumed. Settlers, missionaries, merchants, and pub-
lic officials, as he pointed out, were such forces.
Settlers destroyed native society altogether and welcomed formal imperial
rule provided it gave them a substantial voice in colonial policy. Commerce
tended to create local oligarchies, which could then become the collaborating
classes on which indirect rule depended. The military, which preferred direct
rule, destroyed armed tribal opposition and with it many of the leaders who
might have collaborated in indirect rule.72
But he and other theorists have inadequately focussed on the reverse pro-
cess: the influence which peripheries have exerted on the centre, often
through the same transnational forces that helped shape the dependen-
cies.73 Theories of international relations, in conjunction with those of the
rise and fall of empires, provide the scholar with guidance in understand-
ing the impact of these forces in general and mores specifically in the im-
perial context.
Karl Deutsch, for instance, in his seminal Nationalism and Social Com-
munication, analyzed social, economic and technological processes largely
beyond the control of the nation-states and the influence which these pro-
cesses exert on world development.74 Far from being prisoners of the na-
tion-state, citizenries, in his view, can bring about change through ‘social
communication’, or transnational, popularly centered activities towards a
5.
72 Doyle, Empires, p. 179.
73 Doyle, Empires, p. 38, notes this fact only in passing.




more peaceful and constructive international order. Accordingly, in the
late 1970s, in a statement directly applicable to the Soviet-American com-
petition, he thought that the best hope for change in relations among coun-
tries that seemingly remain locked in conflict may lie in a ‘combined strat-
egy of both internal and external change’.75
Several British and American scholars have placed this approach into
the general paradigm of global transnational influences and looked at it
through the lens of international political economy (IPE). In Britain, these
scholars include Robin Brown, Robert O’Brien, and Julian Saurin. IPE is
regarded by O’Brien as ‘a methodology that identifies the interaction of
economic and political domains as the central phenomenon in internation-
al relations’.76
While he does not focus on any particular context, he notes that
transnational influences are more properly examined under the broader
aegis of IPE than treated either as a case of simple technology transfer or
an issue of international security studies. He, as well as Brown, regards
both of the latter as subordinate to the increasing internationalization of
politics and economics, in the wake of which the influence of the state will
be reduced.77 Finally, in this group of scholars, Julian Saurin contends that
the state ‘has been taken as a model’ in traditional international relations
theory and ‘become the constitutive unit of the international system’. He
regrets that ‘the ontological primacy ascribed to the assumed state has ef-
fectively foreclosed alternative accounts of global social change and order
that derive from the actual historical experiences of people across the
world’.78 These scholars, while focusing on theory rather than the empiri-
cal dimension of East-West relations, reflect the growing importance of
75 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 196.
76 Robert O’Brien, ‘International Political Economy and International Relations: Ap-
prentice or Teacher?’, in John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater, eds., Boundaries
in Question: New Directions in International Relations (London: Pinter, 1995), p.
90; similarly Richard Higgot, ‘International Political Economy’, in A. J. R. Groom
and Margot Light, eds., Contemporary International Relations (London: Pinter,
1994), pp. 156-69.
77 Ibid. and Robin Brown, ‘Globalization and the End of the National Project’, in
Macmillan and Linklater, eds., Boundaries in Question, p. 55.
78 Julian Saurin, ‘The End of International Relations? The State and International
Theory in the Age of Globalization’, in Macmillan and Linklater, eds., Boundaries
in Question, p. 244.
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IPE in the study of international relations. Their theoretical constructs, fur-
thermore, are applicable to a variety of specific historical or political con-
texts, including the disintegration of the Soviet empire.
While British theorists have traditionally focused primarily on the inter-
action between national political and economic systems, American contri-
butions to the field of International Political Economy have been informed
by a larger, international, and institutional approach. Led by Robert Keo-
hane and Joseph Nye, these scholars have devoted their energies to under-
standing the extent to which the largely institutionalized post-1945 inter-
national regime (anchored by such institutions as the IMF, the United Na-
tions, and the World Bank) has altered or limited the authority of states
and their ability to make policy. Grouped together under the headings of
Transnational Theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism, these theorists have
posited that the role of international institutions and other non-state actors,
while largely beneficial, has limited the power of states in ways that have
yet to be fully understood. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf have ar-
gued that transnational forces can be ordered according to four categories:
trade and capital flows, military alliances, technological forces, and politi-
cal influence.79 Nye and Keohane have informed their study with the idea
of ‘regime change’, which tries to explain how the evolution of the inter-
national institutional landscape has altered the place of states in the inter-
national system. They have observed that international institutions act as
‘transmission belts’ through which the behaviour of one state affects that
of another.80 They also point out that ‘interests are constructed, not given’,
and that they ‘derive not only from considerations of geopolitical position
but also from both material interest and conceptions of principle as inter-
preted through varying domestic political structures’.81
The Neoliberal and Institutionalist perspectives have a bearing on the
hotly debated question about the role of external pressure in the collapse
of the Soviet empire. To look first at the probably still dominant, alterna-
79 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Trans-
formation, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 24.
80 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Transnational Relations and World Po-
litics’, International Organization, Vol. 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 325-49.
81 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘Introduction: The End of the Cold War in
Europe’, in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in
Europe, 1989-1991, eds. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 4.
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tive Realist interpretation, in a mirror image of Marxist-Leninist concepts,
the Soviet system was regarded as being driven by an inherent proclivity
to conduct expansionist policies. If it were denied the option of external
expansion, the system would either collapse or have to concentrate on in-
ternal development. These two outcomes of a strategy of ‘containment’
were first suggested by Kennan in 1947. The United States, in his view,
had it in its power ‘to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet
policy must operate [not only] to force upon the Kremlin a far greater de-
gree of moderation and circumspection [but also] ... to promote tendencies
which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradu-
al mellowing of Soviet power’.82 As it turned out, mellowing preceded the
break-up.
But several scholars and policy makers, looking at the world through
Realist lenses, went beyond the idea of containment to isolation of the So-
viet Union in order to achieve either of the two outcomes posited by Ken-
nan. A restrictive technology policy and the curtailment of trade and credit
relations were considered to be the appropriate means for this purpose.83
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, corresponding policies culminated in
the deliberate acceleration of the Soviet-American military-technological
competition and efforts at raising the ‘costs of Soviet empire’, exploiting
its ‘fault lines’ and making sure, to paraphrase Reagan, that it would ‘go
down with a whimper rather than a bang’.
Whereas adherents of Neoliberalism and Institutionalism conceded the
point of the inherent proclivity of the Soviet system towards expansion,
they ruled out the idea of collapse. They stressed instead the evolutionary
and reformist potential of the system. A policy of deliberate isolation of
the Soviet Union was regarded as too dangerous, since it would increase
the risk of military conflict, and also as counterproductive, since it would
delay adjustment processes.84 Some of its adherents thought that the struc-
82 George F. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, in id., American Diplomacy,
1900-1950, Mentor Books (New York: The New American Library, 1951), p. 105
(italics mine). The quote is from his ‘Mr. X’ article, referred to above.
83 Some of the more prominent Sovietologists that can be regarded as belonging to
this school are Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes, Abraham S. Becker, Charles
Wolf, Andrew Marshall and Michel Tatu; see especially Richard Pipes, Survival is
Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America’s Future (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1984), p. 266.
84 Sovietologists belonging to this group can be said to include Alexander Dallin,
Raymond L. Garthoff, Jerry F. Hough, George F. Kennan and Marshall D. Shul-
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tural deficiencies of the Soviet system made it unnecessary to increase
pressures from the outside and that governmental as well as transnational
interaction, including trade and credit relations, rather than keeping the
system alive, would sharpen the contradictions and induce reform. Such
diagnoses, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, gave rise to a mushrooming
literature on ‘convergence’ of the capitalist and socialist systems. Marxist
theorists in the United States, Eurocommunists in Western Europe and
some communist party officials in Eastern Europe shared these visions
and propounded ideas of ‘reform socialism’ and a ‘third road’ between the
two systems.
In the West, such notions also provided a conceptual underpinning for
the policies of détente, ‘bridge building’, ‘constructive engagement’, Ost-
politik and Wandel durch Annäherung, or change through rapprochement.
Western technology, trade and credits, and businessmen and bankers, were
deemed to be the kind of transnational forces that would have a major im-
pact on the Soviet empire and contribute to, in Kennan’s terms, ‘mellow-
ing’. Other, equally important forces were held to include Western Euro-
pean social democracy; the Eurocommunist parties, notably those of Italy,
France, and Spain; the trade unions; and cultural and church groups. In the
East, respondents and agents of change were thought to exist in the form
of reform communist parties or reformist factions in orthodox parties.
Such forces were interpreted in retrospect as having been effective in
their impact on the Soviet system and empire in the second half of the
1970s and in the 1980s. In that period, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), the Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent
foundation and activities of Helsinki Groups and Helsinki Committees in
communist countries, including in the Soviet Union, were regarded as
having provided a particularly useful umbrella under which reformist
forces could operate.
Until this very day, therefore, one of the most contentious issues analyt-
ically is the question as to what hastened the demise of the Soviet imperial
system: the strategies associated with Realist isolation of and pressure on
the Soviet Union, or the Neoliberal and Institutionalist approaches of con-
tainment, cooperation, and constructive engagement? Was it ‘hard power’,
man. Among German scholars, one of the best corresponding exposés is Christoph
Royen, Die sowjetische Koexistenzpolitik im Wandel: Voraussetzungen, Ziele,




military-political pressures applied by the Reagan administration, that
brought down the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself? Or was it
‘soft power’, the success and attractiveness of the Western democratic,
pluralist and law-based political systems, a market economy with fair
competition and an active civil society, that is, power through attraction
‘rather than coercion or payments’, combined with policies of détente?85
Evidently, both approaches played a role. The external pressure applied by
the United States initially served its purpose in concentrating the Soviet
(Gorbachev’s) mind on internal development. Once this happened, the
mainly Western European policy of constructive engagement at first facili-
tated and then reinforced Soviet policy shifts. Completing the circle of in-
teraction: once Gorbachev had demonstrated that he was willing to play by
Western rules of interdependence and integration, rather than by Leninist
principles of antagonism, the United States, too, like Western Europe, put
aside the Realist stick and replaced it by Neoliberal and Institutionalist
carrots.
An Integrative Approach
What, then, are the conclusions of this discussion of various theories about
the rise and fall of empires? Which of these theories, or parts thereof, can
meaningfully be employed for the subsequent inquiry into the collapse of
the Soviet empire? One conclusion is that none of theories are able to give
a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of imperialism; most of
them can contribute something to our understanding. International rela-
tions, of which the imperialist phenomenon is an integral part, are exceed-
ingly complex. They include ideological, political, military, economic,
technological, social, and psychological dimensions, all of which in one
way or another impinge on the behaviour of political leaders, elites, and
nations. The selection of one single dimension can, therefore, at best illu-
minate one segment of international relations but never the whole picture.
A similar reasoning can be applied to what in the international relations
literature has been referred to as the ‘level-of-analysis’ problem.86 Three
6.
85 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
86 J. David Singer, ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations’,
World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1961), pp. 77-92; see also id., Models,
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levels can be distinguished, that of the individual leader or statesman; the
nation state with different groups, elites and institutions involved in for-
eign policy decision-making; and the international system. As with the
various disciplines, each of the analytical levels and ‘cuts’ can shed light
on a given problem of international relations and foreign policy; none is
able to explain the ‘essence’ of decisions and events.87 Thus, while it is
useful for heuristic purposes to separate different dimensions and levels,
the analyst should try to reconstruct their complex interaction and to pro-
vide the reader with a hierarchy or rank ordering of their importance.
To apply these considerations to the study of imperial development and
decline, empires first and foremost need military power in order to expand
and maintain control. But they can hardly survive for long by the mere ex-
ercise of raw power. Legitimacy is called for. They must pay attention to
social costs in order not to lose a modicum of consent of the governed
necessary for imperial policies. They need recurrent success as well as an
ideological underpinning. Finally, they also require a viable political orga-
nization and an efficient economic base in order to sustain effective armed
forces and a modern military-industrial complex. None of these factors
should be neglected.
An integrative approach is also appropriate when considering the rele-
vance of the four major approaches discussed in this chapter. Obviously,
just as foreign policy, imperial construction and decline begin at home.
The metrocentric view, therefore, is basic to an understanding of the prob-
lem of imperialism. But this is not saying very much. It leaves open the
whole plethora of problems touched upon, including the question as to the
role of individual leaders in the rise and fall of empires and whether the
underlying dynamics of the process are power acquisition and aggrandize-
ment, economic determinism, or ideological zeal. The state of affairs at
the centre, in turn, cannot be looked at in isolation from what is happening
in the imperial possessions and dependencies. A pericentric perspective,
therefore, has to supplement the metrocentric view. Conditions there de-
cide on the cost effectiveness of imperial rule. This pertains in particular
to such questions as to whether the subjects of imperial possessions and
Methods, and Progress in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990) and
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959).
87 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971).
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dependencies are compliant or prone to resist; whether local elites can be
co-opted or have to be tightly controlled; and whether the periphery con-
tributes to the power and wealth of the centre or constitutes a constant
drain on its resources. Depending on the answer to these questions, the pe-
riphery can present a formidable challenge to imperial control. The same
is true for the complexities of the international system. Several types of
system, including the traditional ‘balance of power’ and the 20th century
bipolar variants, can be said to have acted as constraints on imperial ex-
pansion and contributed to imperial decline.
Finally, transnational forces play a role because competing powers will
usually attempt to affect the power position of an opposing empire not on-
ly by denying it new territory and resources outside its domains but also
by fomenting resistance, revolt and revolution in the periphery. This is
what the Soviet leadership deplored as ‘inadmissible interference in the in-
ternal affairs of socialist countries’ and what the Kremlin at present de-
scribes and decries as the essence of ‘colour revolutions’ on post-Soviet
space – the assertion that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are es-
sentially ‘foreign agents’; that they are ‘financed by foreign governments’;
and that these governments use them ‘as an instrument to carry out their
Russian policies’.88
There are, of course, pitfalls in adopting an integrative approach. ‘Sci-
entific’ inquiry in practice often consists of isolating a few selected ‘vari-
ables’ in order to verify or falsify clearly stated hypotheses. A research de-
sign that pays attention to the complex interaction of a variety of factors at
various levels of analysis will, therefore, surely expose the analyst to the
charge of ‘overexplanation’ of the main problems to be explained. How-
ever, it is better to ‘overexplain’ than to underexplain. Given the many in-
sights gained from archives, memoirs, and interviews, it would be a dis-
service to the reader to deprive him of rich data simply because they do
not fit into a narrowly defined analytical framework.
Having stated the research problem, outlined some of the theories appli-
cable and the approach to be taken here, it is now appropriate to begin the
next chapter, which consists in a reconsideration of Soviet perceptions of
and policies toward the German problem from the division of Germany
88 Putin in his in his speech at the 43rd Munich International Security Conference on
10 February 2007, Securityconference.de, <http://www.securityconference.de/
archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferen-
zen=&sprache=de&id=179&>.
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under Stalin through the hardening of the division under Khrushchev until
the last years of the Brezhnev era. The analytical thread that will help the
reader find his way through the empirical maze will be the Ideological and
Imperial paradigm.





The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm
Parameters of the Paradigm
At the Twenty-eighth and last CPSU Congress, in July 1990, Foreign Mi-
nister Shevardnadze asked the assembled party officials: ‘We have grown
accustomed to certain German realities. We have seen in them a guarantee
of our security. But let us think about this: Can there be a reliable guaran-
tee [of security] based on the artificial and unnatural division of a great na-
tion? And how long can it last?’89 Why, in the more than forty years of the
division of Germany, had no one before him dared stand up and ask such a
pertinent question?
The disadvantages of the division as a perennial state of confrontation
with the West should always have been obvious to Soviet leaders. The
problem, therefore, arises as to what may have led Stalin to opt or, as the
case may be, settle for a divided rather than an undivided Germany. Was it
not patently obvious from the very beginning that the division of Germany
could not last? If so, will the historical record now confirm Gorbachev’s
‘belief’ that Stalin was ready, ‘until the very end, to pay a price for a neu-
tral Germany’?90 Similarly, how credible is Politburo member Aleksandr
Yakovlev’s assertion that ‘we always advanced the question of Germany’s
unification’ but especially ‘at the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946,
and then repeatedly during the 1950s’?91 Is it true, as one of the present
Russian specialists on international relations claims, that the Soviet leader-
ship, in the period from the end of the war until the mid-1950s, ‘more or
less consistently supported German unification’; that a ‘peaceful, demo-
cratic, and neutral Germany’ was a ‘genuine’ goal of Soviet diplomacy;
and that this conclusion is supported by ‘geopolitical logic – perhaps the
only kind that Stalin mastered’?92
Chapter 2:
1.
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5 July 1990.
90 Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), p. 701.
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To answer such questions, it is useful to put Soviet policies on the Ger-
man problem under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev into an appropriate
framework of analysis. Such a framework can be called the Ideological
and Imperial paradigm, the essence of which will be held to consist of a
close interrelationship between power and ideology in domestic politics
and between imperial and revolutionary purposes in foreign policy.93 The
confluence of these two dimensions is, of course, the norm rather than the
exception. Empires cannot be built without power. Imperial control, in
turn, is difficult to maintain without universal appeal and purpose. In the
period from the ancient Egyptian theocracies to Europe in the age of abso-
lutism and the ‘divine right of kings’, power was legitimized primarily by
religion and dogma. After the Enlightenment, this form of legitimation
was replaced by more rational constructs, of which Marxism-Leninism is
one example. For the present purpose, to explain the ideological part of
the dual paradigm, it is appropriate to clarify what is meant by ideology, to
relate Marxism-Leninism to that clarification and to describe its impact on
Soviet foreign policy.
The Ideological Dimension
Ideology can be defined as a comprehensive system of political beliefs
that consists of cognitive, normative, and operational components.94 The
The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 332. Karaganov, at that time, was deputy di-
rector of the Institute on Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
93 This paradigm was first developed in my article, ‘Russia as a “Great Power” in
World Affairs: Images and Reality’, International Affairs (London), Vol. 71, No. 1
(January 1995), pp. 35-68. The utility of such a framework was recognized also by
Zubok and Pleshakov. In what is one of the best recent reconsiderations of the
Stalin and Khrushchev era – like the present book based on new archival evidence
and memoirs – the authors proceed from the assumption that Stalin saw no contra-
diction between strengthening the Soviet Union and empire building, on the one
hand, and advancing the cause of world revolution, on the other. They argue that
‘It was this revolutionary-imperial paradigm that the USSR followed consistently
from the early 1920s’, that is, from the emergence of Stalinism to the Khrushchev
era; Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War:
From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996),
p. 13 (italics mine).
94 This enumeration of the components of ideology and the subsequent formulations
draw on Nigel Gould-Davies, Introduction to Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy,
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cognitive or analytical element provides a theory about the nature of social
and political life and provides a set of concepts and categories for inter-
preting specific situations and events. The normative aspect articulates a
set of fundamental values and purposes that are considered the ultimate
objectives of political life and provide a legitimation of behaviour. The
tactical, instrumental, or operational properties refer to principles of con-
duct and axioms of behaviour that guide concrete action toward the attain-
ment of objectives. Its coherence, rigor, and claim to absolute truth distin-
guish ideology from looser categories of belief systems, such as liberal-
ism, conservatism, as well as mentalité and culture.95 Ideologies also dif-
fer from two other kinds of ideational systems of comparable rigor: unlike
philosophies, they include an explicit commitment to the use of force for
the attainment of political objectives; and unlike religion, they are founded
upon claims to knowledge about the nature of social existence rather than
on faith in a transcendent reality.96
If, then, an ideology can be understood to be a highly structured and ab-
solutist system of political beliefs, a revolutionary ideology is one that is
incompatible with the existing political order. Its interpretation of history
and social life is radically different from that of the other members of a
given international order; its objective is not the improvement but the fun-
damental transformation of this order and its replacement with a new sys-
tem based on higher principles. For this purpose, it uses methods not nor-
mally sanctioned by the established order. Since Marxism-Leninism
claimed to furnish a ‘scientific’ explanation of political and socio-econo-
mic phenomena, it is clearly an example of a revolutionary ideology. It
purported simultaneously to provide a philosophical method (dialectical
materialism); a teleological interpretation of world history (historical ma-
terialism); and principles of political economy with ‘laws of development’
pertaining to capitalist and socialist systems.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University (then in progress, co-supervised by this au-
thor). The threefold differentiation of ideology was adopted also by Stephen White
and Alex Pravda, eds., Ideology and Soviet Politics (Houndmills and London:
Macmillan, 1989).
95 The difference between ideology and political beliefs was aptly made, and applied
to the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, by Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA–USSR (New York: Viking Press,
1964).
96 Gould-Davies, Introduction to Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy.
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This is not the place to repeat at length the arguments of various
schools of thought concerning the significance of Marxist-Leninist ideolo-
gy for Soviet foreign policy or, as the case may be, lack thereof. Stated
briefly for the present purposes, it is useful to proceed from the premises
that there is no necessary contradiction between Marxist-Leninist ideology
and the Soviet ‘national interest’; that national interests are not self-evi-
dent but have to be defined by the political process; that such a definition
in the Soviet case certainly had a strong ideological component; and that
the latter was adapted to new conditions, not abandoned. Soviet foreign
policy, furthermore, was not that of a traditional state, formulated by the
foreign ministry, but that of a revisionist power whose policies were deter-
mined primarily by the Communist Party, the institutional embodiment of
ideology.97
The working assumption here, then, is that the analytical properties of
ideology, or at least its core elements, provided a filter through which the
Soviet leaders interpreted reality, and that the ‘balance of power’ also had
an ideologically determined equivalent: the ‘correlation of forces’.98 Con-
cerning the issue of legitimation versus mobilization, the question as to
whether the Soviet leaders genuinely believed in ideological precepts is
immaterial, since even false priests, apostates, and cynics, in order to serve
and stay in power, are constrained to act in accordance with the official
belief system and institutional requirements. The Marxist-Leninist claim
to ‘scientific’ – absolute and universal – truth required eradication of actu-
97 This is a summary of the main arguments by this author developed in his article
‘Ideology in the Soviet View of International Affairs’, in Christoph Bertram, ed.,
Prospects of Soviet Military Power in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1980),
pp. 103-10.
98 The ideological content of the ‘correlation of forces’ was aptly described by Ray-
mond L. Garthoff, ‘The Concept of the Balance of Forces in Soviet Policy-Mak-
ing’, World Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (October 1951), pp. 84-111; this author extended
Garthoff’s argument in his article on ‘The Political Rationale of Soviet Military
Capabilities and Doctrine’, in Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe:
Proposals for the 1980s, Report of the European Security Study (ESECS) (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 67-104. Confirmation of the argument was provided
also by Vernon Aspaturian, ‘Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces’,
Problems of Communism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May-June 1980), pp. 1-18. Some of the
Soviet portrayals are Georgi Shakhnazarov, ‘Deistvennye faktory mezhdunarod-
nykh otnoshenii’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ (Moscow), No. 1 (1977), pp. 87-96,
and Vadim V. Zagladin, ‘World Balance of Forces and the Development of Inter-
national Relations’, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3 (1985), pp. 65-79.
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al or potential challenges. Hence, whatever their preferences and convic-
tions, the Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev had to contend just as
much with deviationist phenomena under the heading of ‘socialism’, such
as Maoism, the Prague Spring, and Eurocommunism, as with Western lib-
eralism and capitalism. Ideology, therefore, of necessity had not only an ex
post facto but also an ex ante, motivating and mobilizing, function.
As codified in Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
and subsequent communist party documents, the constituent elements of
the ideological part of the paradigm can be summarized as follows:
1. International relations are an extension of domestic class struggle to
the international arena.
2. There is an irreconcilable contradiction between two opposed socioe-
conomic systems – socialism and capitalism.
3. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, is inherently militaristic
and aggressive.
4. There is a constant redistribution of power among the capitalist coun-
tries and changing coalitions and power centres. The contradictions be-
tween these centres – the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in
post-war conditions – are irreconcilable; the forces that divide these
centres are more basic than those that unite them.
5. Conflict (‘a series of frightful collisions’) among the imperialist states,
that is, military conflict (war), is as inevitable as war between imperial-
ism and socialism.
6. In the long run, the correlation of forces will shift in favor of socialism.
Conflict will end only with the victory of socialism. This is historically
predetermined. The shift will occur because of (a) the sharpening of
contradictions in the imperialist system; (b) the superiority of the so-
cialist over the capitalist mode of production; (c) the growing strength
of national-liberation movements; and (d) the emergence of new states
with a non-capitalist and ultimately socialist orientation.
7. Since class relations are the determining factor of international affairs,
nationalism will wither away. Nationalist phenomena under socialism
are merely perezhitki proshlogo: the remnants of an outdated socio-
economic system.
The conduct of Soviet foreign policy was constrained by a narrow spec-
trum of interpretation, within which a ‘correct’ and ‘principled’ policy had
to be pursued. Furthermore, ideology gave rise to certain axioms or opera-
tional principles of Soviet foreign policy behaviour, which can be defined
as follows:
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1. Since individual nations and coalitions of states are divided internally
along class lines, Soviet foreign policy has to be conducted on two
tiers or tracks: the ideological, or socio-economic, level and the state-
to-state level. ‘Internal contradictions’ within and among capitalist
countries are an important asset that should be utilized, wherever ap-
propriate, with the help of ‘peace movements’ and the communist par-
ties.
2. Since ‘peaceful coexistence’ can never be a goal in itself but is only a
tactical device, and since only countries with the same or similar sys-
tem structure as that of the Soviet Union can be regarded as trustwor-
thy, cooperation with the West can only be limited and temporary.
3. Since the adversary ‘power centres of imperialism’ must be expected
to exploit economic weaknesses of the socialist countries and exert
pressure, it is necessary, in economic affairs, to pursue autarkist pol-
icies.
4. Since the restoration of capitalism in a socialist state (‘counter-revolu-
tion’) is a betrayal of principles and could be the prelude to a general
‘roll back’ of socialism, counter-revolution must be prevented. How-
ever, limits set by the risks of military conflict with the West have to be
observed.
5. Since ideology (‘history’) provides legitimacy, the use of force presents
no moral problem; it is only a matter of expediency.
To turn to the ‘imperial’ dimension of the paradigm, a paradox must be
noted first. There was very little in Marxist-Leninist ideology that could
have been construed as providing the basis for the establishment of an im-
perial system. The essence of this body of thought was the idea that socio-
economic forces rather than political or military power propel history.
State institutions, military establishments included, were supposed to
‘wither away’. Yet, as noted, the Czarist empire was reconstituted under
Soviet rule and extended, first regionally, then globally. Military and
geopolitical factors in Soviet policy began to take precedence over econo-
mic considerations. Despite all the Soviet claims about the greater sophis-
tication of the ‘correlation of forces’ theory as compared with bourgeois
Western ‘balance of power’ constructs, Soviet leaders in foreign policy
conformed to the most primitive notions of Realist theory and all of the
above-noted myths of empire.
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The Imperial Dimension
The dichotomy between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet brand of
Realism, therefore, is more apparent than real. Before attempting to
demonstrate this, the basic elements of the ‘imperial’ part of the paradigm
will be enumerated. These elements had to be distilled primarily from
what Soviet leaders said privately and derived from the actual conduct of
their foreign policy rather than from official, publicly accessible sources.
The constituent elements of this part of the paradigm include the follow-
ing:
1. Power, prestige, status, and influence of any given country in world af-
fairs depend on the size of its population, geographical expanse, en-
dowment with natural resources, volume of industrial and agricultural
output, and access to or control over human and material resources
abroad. Expansion will add to the country’s resources and thereby to its
power and prestige.
2. The single most important factor determining the influence of a great
nation in international affairs is military power. Qualitative indicators
are important, as is the morale of the armed forces, but so are quantita-
tive indicators, such as the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, and ar-
tillery, and the number of nuclear missiles and warheads. In fact, quan-
tity can make up for deficiencies in quality.
3. Military threats, whether explicit or implicit, will make opponents
compliant. The greater the discrepancy between one’s own military ca-
pabilities and that of the opponent(s), the more effective the threat.
Both the domestic political orientation and the foreign policies of allies
and adversaries can be influenced by external pressure.
4. Close attention, therefore, has to be paid to the ‘correlation of forces’.
The Soviet Union, and the coalition of states over which it presides,
must be at least as strong as all of the potential enemies combined, and
preferably stronger.
5. Given the anarchic nature of the international system, the lack of com-
mon values and the objective condition of conflict between two antag-
onist socio-economic systems, security cannot be left to the good in-
tentions of the adversary. It must be sought through unilateral efforts.
6. Political means to achieve security, including the utilization of contra-
dictions within and between inimical countries, should not be neglect-
ed. However, these are only supplementary to the military-technical
means at one’s disposal.
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7. The Western countries’ clamour for the universal dissemination of hu-
man and civil rights, pluralism, democracy and the ‘free flow of infor-
mation’ as well as the encouragement of nationalism and the deploy-
ment of what their theorists call ‘transnational’ forces have to be con-
sidered attempts at subverting Soviet global and regional influence and
control. Vigilance and counteraction are required to stave off such at-
tempts.
The enumeration of imperial elements shows that they supplement rather
than supplant the ideological aspects of the dual paradigm. As early as
1924, Stalin had clarified this when he declared: ‘Soviet power in Russia
is the base, the bulwark, and the refuge of the revolutionary movement of
the entire world.’99 In the 1930s, he had reiterated the confluence of ideo-
logical and imperial dimensions in Soviet foreign policy by providing a
standard definition of a ‘true internationalist’ as someone who ‘is ready to
defend the USSR without reservation, without wavering, unconditional-
ly’.100
One explanation of this confluence lies in the fact that Marxist ideology
has many facets and that Lenin and Stalin, in the course of ‘creative devel-
opment of theory’ and adaptation of Marxism to Russian conditions, em-
phasized certain portions of the theory to the almost complete exclusion of
others. This led to the perversion or deformation of some of the main prin-
ciples of Marxist thought. It pertained above all to the de facto emphasis
placed by the Soviet leaders on military power as an agent of international
change rather than socio-economic development.
A second explanation for the confluence of ideological and imperial di-
mensions of the paradigm rather than their contradiction is connected with
the dogma of the ‘irreconcilable’ and ‘inevitable’ conflict between two op-
posed systems. This notion is essentially the ideological equivalent of the
Realist view of international relations as a zero-sum game, in which one
side’s loss is the other’s gain, and victory and defeat are the only possible
outcomes.
A third explanation has much to do with the fact that the revolution did
not occur in the advanced capitalist countries, such as Germany and Eng-
land, but in backward Russia. Apart from the basic structural deficiencies
of the system itself, this was one of the reasons why the heralded ‘superi-
99 J. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1947), p. 265, as quoted by
Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 13.
100 J. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 10 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1948), p. 53.
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ority of the socialist over the capitalist mode of production’ could not be
achieved, and why the communist system was imposed, maintained, and
expanded by force, rather than established and supported by popular will.
As time went by and imperial overstretch began to set in, the attractive-
ness of the Soviet-type system and model of development waned even
more. This reinforced the reliance on military means to maintain influence
and control.
Having established the Ideological and Imperial paradigm as a basic
framework of analysis, it is now appropriate to look at its practical conse-
quences and its application to Soviet policy toward Germany.
The Division of Germany: Design or Default?
The main propositions flowing from the paradigm are that (1) there was
considerable continuity in Soviet policy on the German problem, the
Kremlin leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev adhering to the principle of the
existence of two German states and relying on East Germany as a strategic
ally in their attempt to build an empire and control Eastern Europe; (2)
these and other top ranking party leaders may have realized the high costs
and negative consequences of clinging to the status quo on the German
problem and that this may have especially been true for Lavrenti Beria, the
former secret service chief, but that an overwhelming majority of the col-
lective leadership rejected the idea of abandoning the GDR; and (3) that
most of the initiatives on the German problem, including Stalin’s ‘peace
note’ of March 1952, were primarily political and propagandistic exercises
rather than a genuine search to end the division of Germany.
It is also one of the central arguments of this book that the establish-
ment of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the concomitant division
of Germany may not have been the inevitable consequence of Stalin’s ad-
herence to the paradigm but that it was a logically consistent and probable
result. An apt description of this nexus between the paradigm and the div-
ision of Germany after World War II can be found in Gorbachev’s obser-
vation that
It was nothing but imperial ideology and policy, the wish to create the most
[favourable] external conditions for socialism and for the USSR, that prompt-
ed the start of the race of nuclear and other arms after 1945, just when the
crushing defeat of fascism and militarism was, it would seem, offering a real-
istic opportunity for building a world without wars and a mechanism of inter-
2.
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national cooperation – the United Nations – had been created for this purpose.
But imperialism’s nature asserted itself that time again.101
Only one word was changed in this statement made by Gorbachev at the
Twenty-sixth party congress in February 1986. The ‘favourable’ in the
square bracket above was ‘unfavourable’ in the original, and the imperial-
ism he referred to was not that of the Soviet Union but purportedly that of
the United States.
As this example of mirror imaging in the interpretation of international
politics indicates, the Soviet and the Russian narrative consistently and un-
compromisingly asserts that Stalin did not want to divide Germany and
that the West was responsible for the division. The fatal flaw in this argu-
ment lies in the fact that the latter does not follow from the former. There
is indeed, as will be shown, a fair amount of evidence to suggest that Stal-
in was aware of, and averse to, the risks that the division of Germany
would pose; that he was conscious of the potentially disruptive strength of
German nationalism; that German nationalism could never be reconciled
with a divided country; and that he would, therefore, have preferred, as he
is reported as having stated at a Politburo meeting at the end of May 1945,
a ‘united, peaceloving, and democratic state’.102
What, however, was meant by ‘peaceloving’ and ‘democratic’? In
Moscow’s definition, the Soviet Union was such a state, as was the GDR
after its foundation. The question, therefore, needs to be posed as to
whether a systemic structure of a Germany as required by Stalin would
have been acceptable to the German population and to the Western allies.
If not, the preference for a united Germany, from a practical political point
of view, would have been meaningless. This would have been even more
correct if each occupation power, sovereign in its area of control, were to
proceed unilaterally and impose its own socio-economic and political sys-
tem. The explanation for the division can be found precisely in the corre-
sponding process. This can be highlighted by Stalin recognition as early as
April 1945 when he told a visiting Yugoslav delegation: ‘This war is not
as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own so-
101 Pravda, 26 February 1986.
102 As reported by Vladimir Semenov, who attended the Politburo meeting;
Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in
diplomatischer Mission, 1939-1991 (Berlin: Nikolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1995), p. 201.
Chapter 2: The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm
76
cial system.’103 In other word, the division of Germany occurred by de-
fault rather than design. Nevertheless, to repeat, the default was less not
accidental. The exigencies of ideology and empire played a decisive role.
To deal systematically with this proposition, it will first be assumed that
Stalin acted neither on the basis of revolutionary zeal nor of an expansion-
ist imperial blueprint but attempted to achieve Soviet security interests and
that, within that context, four main options could be distinguished. On this
basis, Soviet interests and behaviour will then be more directly related to
the pressures and requirements generated by the Ideological and Imperial
paradigm.
The starting point of analysis could be the battle of Stalingrad, after
which victory over Germany became a distinct possibility. This raised the
question for the Soviet leadership as to what the post-war European order
should look like, which in turn concerned in particular the role of Ger-
many in that order. Twice in the course of a quarter of a century the very
existence of the state had been threatened by Germany. Considering Stal-
in’s near paralysis for several weeks after the German attack and the seem-
ingly unstoppable offensives deep into Soviet territory, with German
troops reaching the outskirts of Moscow in the winter of 1941, it would
have been astonishing had he not seen Germany as the main security issue
for years to come.
But how was security vis-à-vis Germany to be safeguarded? The answer
is, probably by adopting any one of four broad options: (1) a revolutionary
transformation of the social and economic system of the whole of Ger-
many under the leadership of a communist party controlled by the Soviet
Union; (2) a substantial weakening of the economic and military potential
of Germany in conjunction with territorial reductions; (3) division or dis-
memberment and its long-term enforcement by the four powers; (4) a unit-
ed, neutral Germany.104
103 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New
York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1962), p. 114.
104 I first discussed these options in my book Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior,
pp. 112-161. The approach adopted there and the conclusions coincide with those
of Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Wider-
streit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsh-
errschaft, 1945-1949 (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand, 1966), pp. 201-270.
Schwarz’s Study is probably the most comprehensive and analytically most satis-
factory treatment of Germany in the international context. Although new archival
evidence, much of it generated under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson’s In-
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Option One: The ‘Revolutionary Transformation’ of Germany
According to classic Marxist theory, prospects for a revolutionary transfor-
mation of Germany in the early post-World War II period were bright. The
country, as Stalin commented, had ‘an extremely qualified and numerous
working class and technical intelligentsia’.105 In theory, capitalism had
reached its highest stage in Germany and had become ‘ripe’ for the next
stage in the historical transformation process. Fascism, an extreme form of
imperialism in Marxist terminology, had been discredited. Its collapse had
set in motion far-reaching processes of socio-economic change. Condi-
tions for a socialist transformation of Germany could be considered as
favourable also because, in one part of Germany, the Soviet Union exerted
unchallenged control and could impose its own policies. In the other part,
the influx of several millions of refugees from the formerly German re-
gions under Soviet and Polish control, as well as from Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, had produced fertile ground for social unrest. In fact, strikes and
mass demonstrations against inadequate living conditions and low food ra-
tions plagued the Western zones until the spring of 1948. Furthermore,
there was a widespread realization among the members of the two parties
of the Left, the Social Democrats (SPD) and Communists (KPD), that the
disunity of the working class had facilitated the rise of fascism in the
1930s and that it was now necessary to cooperate in the construction of a
new Germany.
However, as after World War I, the course of events after World War II
took an entirely different direction from what ideology predicted. Such so-
cialist and communist organizations, as well as democratic and antifascist
committees, as had sprung up spontaneously after the war, were dissolved
in July 1945 by the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) in Germany.
Political activity ‘from below’ was replaced by political manipulation
ternational Cold War History Project, has thrown more light on Stalin and his
policies in general, there is nevertheless very little that has come to light concern-
ing his thinking and policies on the German problem. This was a problem which
was encountered not only by this author but also by Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside
the Kremlin’s Cold War; Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity:
The Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Norman M.
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1995).
105 Stalin as quoted by Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 114.
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‘from above’. The communist apparat triumphed over what could have
been a powerful independent socialist movement.106 Resented for its at-
tempts to rally socialists around its flag in an organized as opposed to vol-
untary fashion, burdened by its association with an occupation power
whose internal structure had been consistently rejected by German social-
ists as a model of development and guilty by association for a hasty and
damaging reparations policy pursued by that power, the KPD was losing
out in the race with the SPD for the political support of the German popu-
lation. This led to a sudden reversal by the SMA of its initial preference
for separate development of the two parties. In April 1946, therefore, it or-
dered the merger of the two parties, with control firmly placed in the
hands of the communists. Autonomous political development was anathe-
ma, as shown by the fact that the merger occurred against the will of the
majority of the SPD membership. In that single instance, in the three
Western sectors of Berlin, where the merger proposal was put to a test it
was rejected by a vast majority (82 percent) of the SPD membership.107
And despite the fact that, organizationally, the SPD had ceased to exist in
the Soviet zone and the SMA was heavily favouring the new Socialist
Unity Party (SED), the latter party failed to win an absolute majority of
the votes in the October 1946 elections for the regional parliaments. It
fared even worse in the elections held in the same month for the city gov-
ernment in Berlin, where the SED received only 19.8 percent of the vote
as against 48.7 percent for the SPD, 22.2 percent for the Christian
Democrats, and 9.3 percent for the Liberals.108
If this was the fate of the political forces favoured by the SMA in the
area directly under its control (the Soviet zone), or acting in the shadow of
its power (in Berlin), it was clear that the chances for a successful commu-
nist revolution, or even the hope of influencing the course of events
through a strong communist party, were quite remote in the western parts
of Germany. The option of a ‘revolutionary transformation’ of the whole
of Germany, therefore, was only theoretical.
106 Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution, trans. C. M. Woodhouse (London:
Collins, 1957), pp. 325-27.
107 In a ballot on 30 March 1946; see Eberhard Schneider, Die DDR: Geschichte,
Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1975), p. 28.
108 To clarify this point, the SPD had only ceased to exist in the Soviet zone of occu-
pation, not in Berlin. The two parties, SPD and SED, were therefore pitted
against each other in the city elections.
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Option Two: Emasculation of Germany
A second possibility for safeguarding Soviet security interests and pre-
venting German aggression was the weakening of the economic and mili-
tary potential of Germany and the reduction of German territory. The pur-
suit of this option was implied in what Stalin said at the Politburo meeting
at the end of May 1945, that it was ‘unrealistic to think of breaking up
Germany into splinters or to destroy its industry and reduce it to an agrari-
an state. ... The task is not to destroy Germany but to deprive it of the pos-
sibility to rise again as an aggressive power in Europe.’109
One aspect of weakening Germany was territorial reductions. At the
Tehran conference in 1943 it was agreed that the northern part of East
Prussia should be transferred to the Soviet Union and a strong Poland cre-
ated with substantial territorial compensation, at Germany’s expense, in
the north and west. Churchill’s warnings at Yalta ‘not to overstuff the Pol-
ish goose’ were thereby ignored. Polish de facto sovereignty was extended
to the western Neisse river, Stalin thereby laying the basis for the most
probable development in the circumstance: long-term Polish-German hos-
tility and Polish dependence on the Soviet Union.110 Events seemed to
drift precisely in that direction because of the expulsion of more than 10
million Germans from the areas east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, the
westward shift of several million Poles, and the consolidation of the Sovi-
et and Polish administration in the new territories.
Another important aspect of weakening Germany was reparations. In
internal memoranda, at the Allied Control Council, and in the foreign min-
isters’ meetings, the Soviet representatives never tired of pointing to the
enormous losses the USSR had incurred during the war. Ivan Maisky,
head of the reparations commission, commented on one of its reports that
‘Our direct material losses surpass the national wealth of England or Ger-
many and constitute one-third of the overall national wealth of the United
States.’ He also thought that five million Germans, if they were to work at
109 Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, p. 201.
110 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 221-74. The difference between the west-
ern and eastern Neisse, which was at issue at Yalta, was not negligible as it in-
volved the fate of about 2.7 million ethnic Germans and hence the problem of fu-
ture German revanchism. The significance of the point will be explored below,
xxx pp. 86-87.
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Soviet plants for ten years, could contribute about $35-40 billion to the
Soviet economy.111 At the Yalta conference, the United States had agreed
to $20 billion (half of which for the USSR) as a ‘basis for discussion’,
which Soviet representatives had taken as an agreement in principle. Ac-
cording to the Potsdam Protocol, the Soviet Union was allowed to satisfy
its own reparation claims and those of Poland from its own zone of occu-
pation. This it proceeded to do rapaciously even before the war had ended,
transferring large amounts of industrial equipment from its zone – as, in-
deed, it did in the occupied areas in Eastern Europe.112 According to the
Protocol, the Soviet Union was also to receive 15 percent of such usable
and complete industrial capital equipment as was unnecessary for the Ger-
man peace economy in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, oil
products, and other commodities to be agreed upon (category A) and 10
percent of such industrial capital equipment as was not essential for the
German peace economy without payment or exchange (category B).113 Re-
moval of equipment as stipulated under A and B was to occur simultane-
ously, and the amount to be extracted from the Western zones was to be
determined within six months after the Potsdam conference.114 As General
Lucius D. Clay observed in September 1945, concurrently with the extrac-
tion of reparations from their own zone, the Russians were ‘most anxious
to get industrial facilities and equipment out of the Western zone[s] as
quickly as possible’.115
The Soviet reparation demands were perfectly understandable from a
practical economic point of view because of the USSR’s desperate need
for capital equipment. This point was emphasized by Semenov and other
Soviet foreign ministry officials in talks with Rudolf Nadolny, the German
111 In comments on a July 1944 report, I. Maisky and G. Arkadiev, ‘Osnovnie linii
reparatsionnoi programmy SSSR’, and in a 19 December 1944 letter to Stalin, as
quoted by Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 31.
112 Concerning the impact on and the estimated magnitude of the losses incurred by
the East German economy because of Soviet occupation policy, see Adomeit, So-
viet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior, pp. 127, 233-34.
113 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference
of Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1960), pp. 1478-98.
114 Ibid.
115 Letter from Clay to McCloy, 3 September 1945, in Smith, ed., The Clay Papers,
doc. 30, p. 64 (italics mine).
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ambassador to Moscow from 1933-34. In 1946, one of the officials told
the former German ambassador that
Germany should again become big and strong, and be friends with Soviet
Union. It should have the right to self-determination. In principle, the Soviet
government accepted the Weimar Constitution as a basis [for the political or-
ganization of] Germany but the constitutional question was one for Germany
to decide. However, the Soviet government could not compromise on the
[question of] reparations from current production; Russia had to be rebuilt
first, and then Germany, but not vice versa.116
It would be erroneous, however, to ascribe simplistic Marxist reasoning to
Stalin and to assert that he looked at economic issues without regard to
their political implications. The Soviet insistence on the breakup of trusts,
syndicates, cartels and monopolies, the dismantling of German industry
and demands for reparations as well as international control over the Ruhr
were all part of an overall objective: the weakening of Germany and, in
particular, the emasculation of her military-industrial potential. This was
frankly acknowledged by Molotov when he said that ‘The aim of com-
pletely disarming Germany militarily and economically should also be
served by the reparations plan. The fact that until now no such plan has
been drawn up, in spite of the repeated demands of the Soviet Govern-
ment, ... is a dangerous thing from the point of view of safeguarding the
future peace and security of nations.’117
By 1948, however, the Soviet reparations policy in Germany had come
to a dead end, and it appears that the unfolding of the Berlin crisis of
1948-49 was not unrelated to it.118 This was so because the blatantly ex-
ploitative nature of that policy had not only produced negative political
consequences for the competition between the two opposed socio-econo-
mic systems on German soil but had also begun to affect the economic
base of the Soviet zone itself. In 1946, Soviet reparation demands and pro-
116 Rudolf Nadolny, Mein Beitrag (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1955), p. 179 (italics
mine). This statement was made during one of Nadolny’s visits to Berlin-Karl-
shorst, the Soviet military headquarters.
117 At the 10 July 1946 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris; see V.
M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy: Speeches and Statements, April 1945 -
November 1948 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), p. 66
(italics mine).
118 The treatment of economic developments in the Soviet zone draws on J. P. Nettl,
The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany (London: Oxford University
Press, 1951), pp. 240-41.
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duction in the Soviet zone of occupation had risen sharply. In 1947, how-
ever, Soviet reparation policies changed. The removal of capital stock was
largely replaced by the extraction of commodities from current produc-
tion. During that time, although reparations extraction reached unprece-
dented heights, production still suffered only slightly. But after April
1948, the volume of industrial production in the occupied zone reached its
peak. It then dropped sharply and flattened out despite all efforts to re-
verse this trend. As events were to show, neither the currency reform in
the Soviet zone nor East Germany’s Two-Year Plan for 1949-50 achieved
their stated purpose of substantially increasing production. Stringent limits
of growth had resulted from the depletion of raw materials stocks and the
small net total of new and replacement investments after subtraction of
reparations in the form of capital goods. As the Soviet Union had not been
averse to taking food as reparations and continued to remove industrial
goods from current production, a wide gap in the standard of living be-
tween the Western zones and the Soviet zone could easily be predicted.
In contrast to the developments in the Soviet zone, economic recovery
in the Western zones had begun in the latter half of 1947. Industrial pro-
duction was catching up with that in the Soviet zone relative to the 1936
level. In June 1948, it surpassed that level, and production was given an
additional boost by the successful currency reform introduced in the same
month. As Germany was considered the key to the success of European
economic reconstruction, the prospects for the successful implementation
of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), signed in April 1948,
and of the objectives of the Organization for European Economic Cooper-
ation (OECD), founded in the same month, appeared bright indeed.
Two points about the weakening of Germany still need to be made. One
concerns, in May 1946, the suspension − in effect, the end − of the dis-
mantling of capital equipment in the American zone, and with it repara-
tions deliveries to the Soviet Union and also to Western claimants from
that zone. Molotov was to deplore this decision at the Moscow Foreign
Ministers’ Conference in March 1947. He complained that, since the Pots-
dam conference, the Soviet Union had received only the insignificant sum
of $7.5 million in reparations deliveries in exchange for commodities (pur-
suant to category A of the Potsdam Protocol) and $5 million in reparations
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free of charge (category B).119 But as the cooperation of the prime minis-
ters of the German Länder and other German political and economic lead-
ers was needed for the implementation of the London recommendations
for the establishment of a separate West German state, it was simply no
longer politically feasible to resume reparations deliveries to the Soviet
Union. If reparations from the whole of Germany were meant to be an ele-
ment of safeguarding Soviet security within the overall program of emas-
culating Germany, by 1948 matters looked bleak.
The same can be said for a second issue still to be considered: the con-
troversy about international control of the Ruhr. In the early four-power
discussions such control, as the extraction of reparations, was conceived
of only within the framework of the whole of Germany. Thus, from the
Western point of view, it appeared objectionable for the USSR to retain
complete control over the economy in the Soviet zone and demand addi-
tional rights in the economy of the Western zones. Clay was in full agree-
ment with predominant American and British (and on this issue also
French) views when he stated bluntly that ‘we should not enter into an
agreement for international control [of the Ruhr] until we know that such
an agreement will not involve Soviet representation in such control’.120
Stalin, as early as April 1945, appeared to be pessimistic about the like-
ly effectiveness of political and economic measures to curb the military
and industrial potential of Germany. He assumed that defeated Germany
would ‘recover, and very quickly’ because of its high level of industrial-
ization and, as quoted above, its ‘extremely qualified and numerous work-
ing class and technical intelligentsia’.121 He drew the conclusion from this
that the Germans would be ‘on their feet again’ in twelve to fifteen
years.122 On another occasion, as Djilas reported, Stalin rose from the ta-
ble, ‘hitched up his pants as though he was about to wrestle or to box, and
119 Yuri Zhukov, reporting Molotov’s statements at the conference, Pravda, 31
March 1947. The figures may very well have corresponded to the facts.
120 Clay, Eyes Only, for Draper, Top Secret, CC 3129, 7 February 1948, in Smith,
ed., The Clay Papers, doc. 329, p. 556.
121 Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 114.
122 Ibid. The Soviet foreign ministry official quoted above expressed a very similar
opinion to Nadolny. He told his German visitor that ‘the Soviet government was
not out to transform Germany into a Soviet satellite (es zu sowjetisieren). The
Germans at the moment were hungry and downcast, but gradually they would re-
cover, and then they would turn against Russia.’ (Nadolny, Mein Beitrag,
pp. 178-79).
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exclaimed: ‘The war shall be soon over. We shall recover in fifteen or
twenty years, and then we’ll have another go at it.’123 It is fair to infer
from all of this that, in Stalin’s mind, doubts about the viability of econo-
mic and political measures to control Germany, expectations for the
speedy recovery of Germany and apprehensions about the possibility or
even inevitability of another military conflict were all closely linked.
For all of these reasons, according to simple political logic, Stalin had
to resolve a fundamental conflict between economic and political priori-
ties: If Germany was to be preserved or re-established as a single nation-
state, the time to abandon a politically harmful economic policy had come
in the spring and summer of 1948. By that time, the insistent knocks at the
door of the three Western zones for the payment of reparations and the de-
mands for international control of the Ruhr had come to sound hollow and
anachronistic. A radical change in Soviet economic policy in Germany
was required if a united Germany was to respect the security interests of
the USSR and economically cooperate with it in good faith.
A similar conclusion had to be drawn if the division rather than the
emasculation of Germany was to be the main objective of Soviet policy in
Germany. If the creation of a West German state were to be answered by
the formation of an East German counterpart, the viability of such an enti-
ty also necessitated the abandonment of the counterproductive economic
policy. What evidence is there that such a course aiming at the division of
Germany was deliberately adopted by Stalin and, if so, at what time?
Option Three: Division and Dismemberment
As argued at the beginning of this section, it would be erroneous to say
that Soviet policy at the end of World War II had consciously and consis-
tently aimed at the dismemberment or division of Germany. On the con-
trary, as the end of the war approached, Stalin had increasingly rejected
this option. His rationale, to the extent that it can be accurately recon-
structed, was rooted primarily in applying lessons of the past. Historically,
war-time coalitions in Europe had a tendency to disintegrate after the
achievement of victory, and inter-allied agreements had proven difficult to
enforce as a consequence. As for Germany, the experience of Versailles
123 Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, pp. 114-15.
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had amply demonstrated the ineffectiveness of international controls. In
fact, international restrictions and tutelage had provided powerful stimuli
to revisionist and nationalist tendencies, even though the extent of territor-
ial reductions of Germany after World War I had been limited.
It was reasonable, therefore, to assume that the division or dismember-
ment of Germany after World War II, too, would unleash powerful forces
of German nationalism and create new security risks. Stalin’s recognition
of this danger is reflected in his statement that ‘The experience of history
shows that Hitlers come and go but the German nation, the German state,
remains.’124 It was foreshadowed earlier by the appeals to German nation-
alism rather than to ‘progressive forces’ as witnessed, in July 1943, by the
foundation of the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (Free German Na-
tional Committee) and the Bund Deutscher Offiziere (Federation of Ger-
man Officers) in an attempt to bring about an early political solution to the
war125 and by Stalin eschewing the idea of dismemberment at Tehran, be-
ing reluctant about it at the Yalta conference and declaring on Victory Day
(9 May 1945) that the USSR ‘has no intention of either dismembering or
destroying Germany’.126
The Soviet concern about a possible recrudescence of German national-
ism and the difficulty of enforcing a division of Germany was evident also
in what Soviet UN ambassador, Andrei Vyshinsky, stated to British war
correspondent Alexander Werth in 1947: ‘If there isn’t a central German
government, there will be before long a militarist West German govern-
ment.’127 In the same year, Foreign Minister Molotov even opposed the
idea of a federalization of Germany as ‘dangerous’ because it would ‘play
into the hands of the militarists playing on the German people’s longing
for “German unity”’.128
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the argument that Stalin did not
intend to divide Germany is supported by the extent of the transfer of Ger-
man territory to Poland and the scale of the expulsion of ethnic Germans.
124 J. V. Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 5th ed. (Moscow: For-
eign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 84.
125 See Bodo Scheurig, Freies Deutschland: Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund
Deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion 1943-1945 (Munich: Nymphenburger
Verlag, 1960).
126 Pravda, 10 May 1945.
127 Werth, Russia: The Post-War Years, p. 234.
128 At the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow, March 1947, ibid., p. 236.
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If Soviet post-war policy had provided for an East German state under So-
viet protection, it would have been much better to establish an East Ger-
man state of roughly the same geographical extent, population, and econo-
mic potential as Poland. For Moscow, this would have meant agreeing on
the eastern rather than the western Neisse river as the border between the
two countries: the area separated by the two rivers would have made an
important difference because it would not only have added significantly to
East Germany’s natural resources and production capacity (the area in
question had a diverse industrial base) but also to its population (2.7 mil-
lion people were living in this area, almost all of them ethnic Germans).
The problem of the tenuous viability of the GDR, which came to haunt the
Soviet Union, but most acutely in the June 1953 popular revolt and the
Berlin crisis of 1961, could have been alleviated to a considerable extent
by adopting such a course of action.129
In retrospect, it appears that the stronger the momentum towards the
creation of a separate West German government, the more insistent the So-
viet demands for the preservation of German unity and the more insistent
the claims that the West was responsible for the division. Thus, at the De-
cember 1947 Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London, Molotov was re-
ported in Pravda as having advocated a ‘united, independent, and demo-
cratic Germany’ and the formation of an ‘all-German Consultative Coun-
cil’ but that this had been rejected by the West, and ‘instead Western Ger-
many was being turned into the breeding ground for another world
war’.130
Such charges were repeated in 1948. The note of the Soviet Govern-
ment to the three Western powers of early March and the justification pro-
vided by Marshal Sokolovsky for the termination of Soviet participation in
the Control Council at the end of that month took issue with the London
conference and charged that the West had deliberately excluded the USSR
129 In recognition of the importance of the border problem for the viability and legiti-
macy of a future East German state, the United States ambassador in Moscow,
Walter Bedell Smith, wrote in August 1948 that if the Western powers ‘should be
forced out of Berlin’ and, following the establishment of a Western German gov-
ernment, a communist dominated government were to be established in eastern
Germany, the ‘latter’s prestige and power of attraction throughout the country
might be vastly increased by the return of part of the area east of the Oder and
western Neisse rivers’; telegram to Secretary of State Marshall, Secret, 21 August
1948, US Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 910.
130 Pravda, 18 December 1947.
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from decision-making and even consultation on problems concerning Ger-
many as a whole.131 On 26 March, that is, only a few days after
Sokolovsky’s dramatic walk-out from the Allied Control Council, Lieu-
tenant General Luk’ianchenko of the Soviet military administration in
Germany stated for the historical record: ‘The division of Germany is al-
ready an established fact and [it is clear to all that] the division was caused
by the USA, Britain, and France’.132
The fact that the USSR increasingly portrayed itself as the champion of
German unity and even advocated the holding of a referendum on this
question can be explained by the Soviet desire not to be held responsible
in a court of history for the powerful drift towards the division of Ger-
many, a drift which the Soviet Union itself had helped to set in motion.
But since the division of Germany contained the threat of territorial revi-
sionism and nationalism, it could still have appeared preferable from the
Soviet point of view, even in 1948, to be included in the making of deci-
sions concerning Germany as a whole rather than be excluded and faced
with a West German state hostile to the USSR by the very circumstances
of its creation. Maintenance of unity may also still have appeared advanta-
geous to the Soviet Union since it did not seem to have given up hope of
gaining access to reparations from the Western zones, and from the Ruhr
in particular.
A detached consideration of Soviet ‘national’ interests, therefore, would
have suggested maintaining a unified German state, neutral and non-com-
munist, based in its internal structure on a system somewhere between so-
cialism and capitalism, with a small army and police force for internal se-
curity and self-defense. This is the kind of policy suggested in essence by
Stalin in his note to the three Western powers on 10 March 1952, in pro-
posals made by his successors in 1954 and, as applied to Austria, in the
State Treaty of 1955. Was this option really ruled out by Stalin or fore-
closed by the post-war conditions?
131 The Soviet government’s note to the three Western powers was published in
Pravda, 9 March 1948; the Soviet version of the crucial events of 20 March (the
walkout of the Soviet representative at the Control Council) according to Pravda,
22 March 1948.
132 TASS report from Berlin, ibid., 29 March 1948. The phrase of ‘The division of
Germany is now an accomplished fact’ was the line of the day carried verbatim
by Neues Deutschland and Tägliche Rundschau, and it was amplified in an article
by Pravda correspondent Yuri Korol’kov, Pravda, 1 April 1948.
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Option Four: Neutralization of Germany
In principle, the option of a unified Germany was not foreclosed. But
adopting it would have made it necessary for the Soviet Union to meet
certain conditions. It would have required repudiation of the ‘two camp’
theory with all its implications of militant tactics. It also presupposed a
willingness to cooperate with the Western powers in the establishment and
management of a new European order. More specifically, the prevention
of German revisionism might also have required the return of the areas
east of the Oder and Neisse rivers – areas which many Germans, with
Western allied encouragement, had already begun to consider as only
‘temporarily under Soviet and Polish administration’. Even those Germans
who, like Nadolny, were favourably inclined towards the Soviet Union,
considered the return of most of these areas an indispensable precondition
for an overall Russian-German settlement. This was clearly stated in
Nadolny’s memorandum of 30 April 1947 to Molotov, in which he ex-
pressed his conviction that the
intended expulsion of nine million Germans from their traditional homeland
and the de facto separation of the eastern German provinces will never be ac-
cepted by the German people. However, the German people are prepared to
sacrifice as much territory as would be necessary for Polish access to the sea.
It is to be hoped that the Russian statesmen will find an appropriate solu-
tion.133
In the light of what has been said here about the non-viability of a revolu-
tionary transformation of the whole of Germany and the anti-Soviet and,
by implication, anti-Russian bias of German nationalism, the option of
neutralization, if adopted in the post-war era, would in all likelihood have
resulted in a Germany that was orienting itself toward the West. Such a de-
velopment would probably have been no different than the one that could
be observed in Finland and Austria, and indeed also in West Germany. The
difference, a crucial one in Stalin’s eyes, was one of scale. To prevent a
country without a major industrial base and with a population of only
about 7 million (Austria) or 5 million (Finland) from becoming a threat to
Soviet security was quite a different proposition from one that involved a
country with a heavy industrial base and a population of approximately 80
million people.
133 Nadolny, Mein Beitrag, p. 180 (italics mine).
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The maintenance or reestablishment of German unity in the post-war
era, if it involved an expression of preferences by the German people,
would undoubtedly have led to a substantial defeat for the Soviet-type sys-
tem in the eastern zone. There is much merit to the argument, therefore,
that Stalin, rather than risking such a development, chose what appeared to
him a lesser risk, namely, to hold fast to the area occupied by the Red
Army, complete a series of pacts ‘with all the states at its western border,
from the Black Sea to the Baltic and, after the conclusion of the Soviet-
Finnish treaty, right up to the Arctic ocean, deal a ‘powerful blow to all
instigators of a new world war’134 and make the resulting sphere of influ-
ence safe for the USSR by incorporating the whole of Berlin – were it not
for the equally valid argument in Stalin’s view that the enforcement of the
division of Germany was improbable or impossible.
Given these apparently insoluble dilemmas for Soviet security in the
post-war era, it would have been entirely understandable if Soviet policy
had merely drifted into acceptance of the division of Germany as in-
evitable, trying to contain emerging dangers by pursuing conciliatory pol-
icies. Instead, militant rhetoric was employed almost throughout the early
post-war period and, in the 1948-49 Berlin blockade, a strategy of coer-
cion was adopted, utilizing conventional military superiority in the area
and Soviet leverage over ‘progressive forces’ as means of forcing Western
compliance to ill-defined Soviet demands. Perhaps this strategy cannot be
explained entirely in rational terms, as a policy arrived at by the careful
weighing of ends and means. Beyond the vague feeling or anxiety that
Germany had been a threat to Soviet security in the past and that it was
likely to be one in the future, Stalin may never really have had a clear con-
ception on how to approach, let alone solve, the German problem.
To that extent, one would also be looking in vain for a single ‘decision’
that decided the issue of whether Germany should be divided or remain
whole. The division occurred as a consequence of a process of interaction
which, in turn, was driven in large measure by the pressures and require-
ments generated by the Ideological and Imperial paradigm. Their impact
on the process will be analyzed in the following sections.
134 That was the clarion call sounded in the communist party journal, ‘Sovetskaia
politika ravnopraviia natsii’, Bol’shevik, No. 9 (1948), p. 5.
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The Paradigm Applied: East Germany and Eastern Europe
The paradigm provided powerful reasons for integrating East Germany in-
to a Soviet sphere of influence. The primary function of this sphere, as
Shevardnadze later deplored, became that of a ‘buffer zone’, ‘a chain of
“allied” countries that would protect us from the West and [justify] the de-
ployment of large Soviet troop contingents in those countries’.135 Such a
conception also ‘implied that the Soviet Army had not liberated certain
countries of Europe but seized them as war trophies’.136 It also conforms
to the basic attitude of the architects of Soviet imperial policies in the
post-war era as reflected in private conversation and memoirs, that is, a
rigid and doctrinaire outlook on international affairs.
Stalin, for example, is reported in the summer of 1945 at a meeting at
one of his dachas as having pinned a map to the wall showing the prospec-
tive post-war frontiers. Stepping back, he pointed to the north and said that
he liked what he saw. The same was true for what he found in the north-
west: ‘The Baltic area – Russian from time immemorial!’ He then looked
to the east: ‘All of Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, Port Arthur, and Dalny are
ours. Well done! China, Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway – all un-
der [our] control.’ Then, stabbing a finger at the southern Caucasus, he ex-
claimed: ‘But here is where I don’t like our frontiers!’137
The imperial mind-set of the supreme leader (vozhd) was shared by
Molotov. He explained the origins of the cold war by saying, paradoxical-
ly, that the Western leaders were responsible because ‘we were on the of-
fensive’ and then went on to clarify the history of the creation of the Sovi-
et empire in Eastern Europe: ‘They were, of course, bitter about us, but we
had to consolidate our conquests. Create our own, socialist Germany out
of a part of [the whole country]. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yu-
3.
135 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 210-11.
136 Ibid., p. 211.
137 As reported by Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov, Sto sorok besed s Molo-
tovym. Iz dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), p. 14. This book essentially
can be regarded as having a memoir quality. It contains the transcripts of 139
conversations (and a neighbor’s remarks at Molotov’s funeral) between the for-
mer Soviet foreign minister and Felix Chuev. For details about the background of
the ‘memoirs’ and excerpts from the book see Woodford McClellan, ‘Molotov
Remembers’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 1 (Spring
1992), pp. 17-20.
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goslavia – they were feeble, we had to restore order everywhere.’138 And
what were the limits to such a ‘restoration’? They were obviously not set
by moral considerations and, in principle, unlimited. Thus, when Averell
Harriman asked Stalin whether he was pleased with the fact that while ear-
lier the Germans had been at the gates of Moscow, he was now engaged
with the Western powers in an effort to divide Berlin, he replied coldly:
‘Tsar Aleksandr went [all the way] to Paris.’139 The limits of imperial con-
solidation and expansion, therefore, were set by expediency. This is con-
firmed by Molotov. ‘Of course, you have to know when to stop. In this re-
gard I think Stalin observed strict limits.’140
The structure of the emerging empire conformed to the ideological part
of the paradigm and required close approximation of the dependencies to
the Soviet system. For tactical reasons, some experimentation and devia-
tion was allowed in East Germany and other parts of Eastern Europe, but
only until about 1948.141 From then on, the principle of ‘proletarian inter-
nationalism’ was to govern the relations between the Soviet Union and the
satellite countries. This carried with it the sub-principle of limited
sovereignty and the Soviet Union’s self-proclaimed right of armed inter-
vention when the socialist order appeared threatened. Although the latter
principle, held to be separate from and superior to ‘bourgeois’ internation-
al law, was formally asserted only in the Warsaw Pact intervention in
Czechoslovakia (the Brezhnev Doctrine), in practice it existed from the
very beginning of the imposition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.
One of the important issues connected with the ideological part of the
paradigm concerns the issue of popular consent. Marxism-Leninism and
traditional imperial exigencies again reinforced each other. The will of the
people(s) in the peripheral areas is typically of little or no concern to the
centre. The rationale of empire is to enhance the power and glory of the
centre and to discourage and suppress processes of emancipation at the pe-
riphery. In the Soviet case, this rationale was enhanced not only by the
universalist pretensions and anti-nationalist content of Marxist-Leninist
ideology but also by the Leninist disdain for ‘spontaneity’ and ‘subjec-
tivism’ as opposed to the allegedly objective requirements of history.
138 [Molotov], Sto sorok besed, p. 86.
139 Ibid., p. 103.
140 Ibid.
141 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. ed. (New York:
Praeger, 1961).
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It is useful in this context to present some evidence from secret reports
of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany about the conditions
and results of Soviet policies in this strategically important outpost of em-
pire.142 One of these reports referred to talks between SMA officers and
Prime Minister Steinhof of the Land Brandenburg concerning ‘the attitude
of the German population to the Soviet occupation powers’, drawing on a
‘number of materials from various districts of the Brandenburg Land’.143
Despite the severe constraints on the free flow of information under Stal-
inism, the report was quite sanguine about popular German attitudes. It
cited the Oberbürgermeister (chief mayor) of the city of Forst, Worter
(SED), as having stated at a meeting of Volksvertreter (people’s deputies)
to the city assembly: ‘We can’t go on this way. The Russians only give or-
ders, and we have to be quiet, listen and, without any complaint, carry out
these orders.’ These remarks by a communist party member ‘were met by
stormy applause’ among the CDU and LDP deputies. Similarly, at a meet-
ing in Greifenberg, the representative of the SED was reportedly verbally
attacked by members of the CDU who called the communist party mem-
bers ‘hirelings of the Kremlin’ and shouted: ‘Down with the Traitors of
the Fatherland!’144
SMA reports also accurately reflected the popular attitude to Russians
and the Soviet Union. Thus, at a meeting of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Ju-
142 The reports are to be found in the CPSU archives renamed Russian Center for the
Preservation of Contemporary Documents (Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi doku-
mentatsii – TsKhSD) in Moscow. This author was able freely to use see the docu-
ments in 1992. However, by the spring of 1993 usage policy in all the Russian
archives had changed. Thus, when returning in that year to continue with the
work, the registry (fondy) of documents had pencil marks next to military-securi-
ty related documents to the effect that they could ‘not be checked out to the read-
ing room’.
143 ‘Prem’er ministr zemli Brandenburg d-r Steingof [Steinhof] ob otnoshenii nemet-
skogo naseleniia k sovetskim okkupatsionnym vlastam’, Biuro informatsii SVA,
Biulleten’, No. 23, 18 June 1948, Top Secret, CPSU Archives, Tsentral’nyi
Komitet VKP (b), Otdel vneshnei politiki [hereafter TsK VKP] (b), Otdel vnesh-
nei politiki], fond 17, opis 128, ed. khr. 579. It is unclear whether the SMA offi-
cial engaged in what was typical of the Soviet period, that is, when party and
government policy was to be criticized, critics refrained from doing so directly,
quoting third party views instead. As the subsequent assessment of why it was
‘not easy to re-educate the German people’ would seem to indicate, the SMA of-
ficer most likely agreed with prime minister Steinhof’s view that Soviet occupa-
tion policy in Germany was ‘disastrous’.
144 Ibid.
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gend, the communist youth organization) in Wittenberg, the chairman of
the CDU is reported to have objected to the idea of holding a bicycle race
in support of the all-German referendum on German unity (on the referen-
dum see below). His argument was that the Russians would stop the bike
riders along the way and take away their bikes: ‘They are very keen on
these things’, was the problem. Bikes, of course, he went on to deplore,
‘are not the only things the Russians take’.145
On the basis of such information the Soviet Military Administration
lamented the fact that ‘it is not easy to re-educate the German people in
the spirit of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union’. In essence, it saw
three reasons for this difficulty: (1) the ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’ before
the war, which had exerted a powerful influence on popular images; (2)
quoting Steinhof, a ‘disastrous’ occupation policy which had reinforced
the prevalent negative stereotypes; and (3) skilful exploitation of SMA
‘mistakes and shortcomings’ by the opponents of the new order.146
Some background information is appropriate with respect to the second
of Steinhof’s observations. Even before Soviet occupation policy began to
take shape, large-scale plundering and rape committed by Red Army sol-
diers had seriously damaged the chances of Russian-German reconcilia-
tion and the successful introduction of a Soviet-type system.147 When the
Soviet army entered East Prussia and crossed the Vistula into Silesia and
Pomerania, it was common for Soviet soldiers when they entered towns
and villages to rape girls and women, killing many in the process, pillage
the homes for personal possessions, food, and alcohol, and leave the place
in flames. They acted in conformity with Ilya Ehrenburg’s calls for retri-
bution, which were widely disseminated in the armed forces: ‘We shall
kill. If you have not killed at least one German a day, you have wasted that
day ... If you kill one German, kill another – there is nothing funnier for us
than a pile of German corpses.’148 Since Stalin had rejected any criticism
of the savage behaviour of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and the
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 The account of the large-scale plundering and rape in which the Soviet soldiers
engaged in the areas conquered in 1944-45 follows the detailed study by
Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 69-140. Ehrenburg was active in war
journalism throughout World War II.
148 Ehrenburg as quoted ibid., p. 72.
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north-eastern part of Yugoslavia,149 it was not surprising that he would re-
spond even more negatively to complaints by East German communists. ‘I
will not allow anyone to drag the reputation of the Red Army in the mud’,
he is reported as having said.150 The rampages and rapes committed by
marauding and often drunk soldiers did not stop with the conquest of
Berlin and Germany’s formal surrender on 9 May. Although many Soviet
officers and Stalin had come to realize even before the end of the war that
letting the armed forces run berserk eroded army discipline and harmed
Soviet interests in Germany, it was not until the troops were confined to
strictly guarded posts and camps during the winter of 1946-47 that Ger-
man women were freed from the persistent threat of rape.151
Lasting damage to the chances for Russian-German reconciliation and
successful economic reconstruction in the Soviet zone of occupation was
done also by the rapacious reparations policy discussed in the previous
section. The policy went beyond the dismantling of industrial plants and
the shipment of products from current production to the Soviet Union. It
also included the deportation of nuclear scientists, missile engineers, and
technicians. For instance, in October 1946, in a carefully planned opera-
tion code-named Osoviakhim, thousands of German scientists and techni-
cians were rounded up and, with their families and possessions, trans-
ferred to the Soviet Union in ninety-two trains and, in special cases, in air-
planes.152 Finally, it included the requisition of forced labour. In fact, per-
haps nothing can demonstrate more convincingly Stalin’s determination to
use German resources for strengthening Soviet power than the utilization
of German labour for the extraction of uranium and, thus, for the building
nuclear weapons.
Ever since the United States had tested the atom bomb and used nuclear
weapons in the war against Japan, Stalin considered manufacture of Soviet
equivalents a high-priority project.153 General Leslie Groves, the chief ad-
ministrator of the American nuclear weapons program, had thought at the
149 Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, pp. 95, 101.
150 The source for this is Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution (Chicago: H.
Regnery, 1958), p. 365, as quoted by Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 71.
151 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 79.
152 Ibid., pp. 220-35.
153 See the carefully researched reconstruction of this top political and military prior-
ity by David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Ener-
gy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
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end of the war that it would take the Soviet Union about ten years to pro-
duce an atomic bomb. He estimated that the Czech and Russian supplies
of uranium constituted no more than 5 percent of the world’s supply and
that, as a result, even if the Soviets could produce a bomb, based on their
small stores of uranium, they would never be able to keep up with Western
bomb production.154 A Russian informant confirmed Groves’s assessment
of the Soviet predicament when he told American intelligence that ‘the
biggest drawback to making a Soviet atom bomb is the tremendous lack of
pure uranium available to the Soviet Union’. However, the western Erzge-
birge region of Saxony, located across the mountains of the Jáchymow
mines in Czechoslovakia, contained huge deposits of pitchblende, material
usable for pure uranium extraction. In the first months of 1947, the entire
region was cordoned off by Soviet military units, while the mining dis-
tricts themselves were placed under the administration of Moscow’s State
Security Ministry (NKVD) and guarded by troops of the Ministry of the
Interior (MVD). Within a relatively short time, the region was turned into
one of the richest uranium producing areas in the world and became an al-
most indispensable asset for the Soviet nuclear weapons project. This was
made possible only because tens of thousands of workers were forcibly re-
cruited for work in the mines and thereby exposed to dangerous levels of
radiation. The NKVD administrators were completely unresponsive to
complaints noo matter whether they were voiced by ordinary citizens or
East German communist party officials. In the secret police’s and Stalin’s
view, the extraction of strategically important resources took precedence
over long-term political interests. The viability and legitimacy of the East
German communist regime, therefore, was subordinated to Soviet military
requirements.
There was no particular need to engage in any skilful exploitation of
Soviet ‘mistakes and shortcomings’ – the third point Steinhof had made.
The policies of the Soviet occupation authorities and their East German
communist collaborators themselves were sufficient. Colonel Tiul’panov,
the chief of the SMA’s information department, for all practical purposes
confirmed this in his reports to Moscow about the Referendum on German
Unity. The referendum had been decided upon by a Second People’s
Congress in March 1948 and was held from 23 May to 13 June 1948. The
154 Citations and the subsequent analysis according to Naimark, The Russians in
Germany, pp. 235‑36.
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effectiveness of the referendum campaign could be taken as an indicator
of the degree of political support for the SED in the spring of 1948 in the
Western zones of occupation, the Soviet zone and in Berlin.155
The results in the British zone, the only Western zone where the refer-
endum was allowed by the occupation authorities, turned out as expected.
Support for the ‘German unity’ drive, as reported by Tiul’panov, was in
the single-digit range. Not much better, as shown in Table 1, were the re-
sults in the three Western sectors of Berlin.
Results of the May-June 1948 Referendum in Berlin
Soviet sector 681 000 79.8%
British sector 54 000 12.2%
American sector 48 000 6.6%
French sector 34 000 10.3%
In contrast, the results in the Soviet sector were extremely encouraging
from the SMA’s and the SED’s point of view: A total of 681 000 voters
(out of an estimated total population of 1.1 million of the Soviet sector)
had shown up, and 79.8 percent of those had supported the unity drive.
Tiul’panov, however, knew and reported the actual state of affairs in
Berlin. The referendum had revealed that a ‘significant part of the popula-
tion’ was negatively disposed towards the Soviet occupation power and
the SED. There ‘appeared to be a lack of influence of the FDJ on broad
segments of the youth’. When propagating the referendum, communist
party workers had been told: ‘We are all for unity. You don’t need to per-
suade us. Let the Russians pack up and leave, and we’ll have unity imme-
diately.’156
The chief of the SMA’s information department was also suspicious
about the high percentage of signatures in the Soviet zone of occupation.
The results contradicted reality. He candidly described the ‘negative atti-
tude among certain segments of the population towards the Soviet occupa-
tion powers, the SED, and the democratic camp’. Such attitudes, he
thought, could be observed especially among ‘the refugees, church organi-
zations and the religious denominations’. The Protestant Church, in partic-
Table 1:
155 SMAG, Department of Information, Report by Colonel Tiul’panov, chief of the
information department, to Comrade Baranov, CPSU Central Committee, 12 May
1948, CPSU Archives, Otdel vneshnei politiki, fond 17, opis 128, ed. khr. 568.
156 Ibid. (italics mine).
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ular, was regarded by him as being able to play an important role in shap-
ing popular perceptions. Finally, Tiul’panov pointed to the expulsion of
Germans from their homeland in the east – ‘ethnic cleansing’ as one
would say today – as posing serious problems for the occupation authori-
ties. He quoted one of the refugees from East Prussia as saying: ‘We
refugees would vote for the unity of Germany if the referendum question
would say that the borders of Germany will be moved to the east.’157
Despite the candour, even Tiul’panov remained captive to traditional
Bolshevik misperceptions or perhaps, contrary to better judgment, consid-
ered it expedient to adhere to them in his reports to Moscow. He, too, con-
structed unconvincing rationalizations, advocated unworkable remedies
and engaged in what German critics have called parteichinesisch (party
political jargon or gibberish). True to standard Marxist-Leninist and Stal-
inist rhetoric, he tried to convince his superiors that, despite all the atti-
tudes of German youth, the refugees and the petite bourgeoisie, ‘the refer-
endum was supported by the working class and peasantry’.158 In other re-
ports he even suggested that not all was lost in the relationship with Ger-
man social democracy. Adopting a traditional Leninist approach, he de-
tected a ‘growing rift between the provocative, anti-Soviet course of the
leadership of the SPD and the rank and file’ of the party. He also reassur-
ingly sensed a schism between the followers of Kurt Schumacher (one of
the SPD leaders firmly committed to a Western orientation), the ‘Shu-
makherovtsy’, as he called them, and the party base.159 Irrespective of the
glaring deficiencies of the Soviet system, the deep inter-war rift between
German social democracy and communism Russian style as well as the
behaviour of the Soviet forces after the war, the comforting notion was be-
ing conveyed to Moscow that the strategic line on Germany was sound
and that what was needed was simply to correct ‘tactical’ mistakes, errors
and shortcomings, ‘improve party political work’ and ‘strengthen organi-
zational activity’. One of the pieces of advice of the SMA correspondingly
reads: ‘The Central Committee of the SED must work out a clear ideo-
logical platform for work with the social democrats and take organization-
al measures that will ensure the mobilization of regional and lower eche-
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The SMA expressed similarly utopian views on the CDU, its ‘conserva-
tive’ party creation in the Soviet zone. Under the erroneous assumption
that the ‘pro-American’ and ‘anti-democratic line’ of the adherents of par-
ty leader Jakob Kaiser, the Kaizerovtsy, had been defeated, the eastern
CDU was now considered to be ‘in a position to act as a wedge that can
begin to loosen the front of Christian Democratic parties in West Germany
and perhaps, in the future, in other European Christian Democratic Parties
as well’.161
Finally, SMA portrayals of the economic state of affairs were character-
ized by the same wishful thinking characteristic of such political reports.
In conformity with the Ideological and Imperial paradigm, emphasis was
put on the ‘correctness’ of the main strategic line and the ‘progress’ made
in its implementation. Only some ‘temporary’ or ‘transitory’ problems had
to be overcome. One report reassured the imperial centre that ‘The
achievements in industrial work in 1947 provide the basis for stating that
the economy of the Soviet Zone is developing on a correct path; the public
sector is preeminent, and the private sector is losing its commanding pos-
ition.’162 But another report revealed that not everything was well at the
periphery. ‘The supply of the population of the Soviet zone of occupation
in several Länder’, it stated, even though ‘not catastrophic’, had neverthe-
less ‘significantly deteriorated’.163
These glimpses into the day-to-day problems of the administration of
empire and the kind of reporting provided to the centre confirm the validi-
ty of the present working hypothesis: the division of Germany occurred
not by design but by default. The partition was determined by the require-
161 SMAG, Department of Information, Report by Colonel Tiul’panov, chief of the
information department, to Comrade Baranov, CPSU Central Committee,
‘Polozhenie v Khristianstvo-Demokraticheskom Soiuze Sovetskoi zony okkupat-
sii i Berlina’, 23 April 1948, Secret, CPSU Archives, Otdel vneshnei politiki,
fond 17, opis 128, ed. khr. 568.
162 Report by V. Semenov [political counselor at the SMAG] and G. Arkad’ev [his
deputy] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade V.M. Molotov; Secretary of
the CPSU Central Committee, M.A. Suslov; and Deputy Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, A. Ia. Vyshshinskii, Secret, ‘Kratkii ekonomicheskii obzor po sovetskoi
zone okupatsii Germanii’, 27 March 1948, CPSU Archives, Otdel vneshnei poli-
tiki, fond 17, opis 128, ed. khr. 573.
163 SMAG, Information Bureau, ‘K voprosu o prodovol’stvennom polozhenii v
Sovetskoi zone’, Biulleten’, No. 32, August 1948, pp. 1-10, CPSU Archives, Ot-
del vneshnei politiki, fond 17, opis 128, ed. khr. 578.
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ments of a narrowly circumscribed paradigm, and once the division of
Germany had become a fait accompli, it was maintained by bureaucratic
inertia.
Since bureaucrats are the agents of inertia, some words are in order
about the personnel responsible for both policy formulation and imple-
mentation. One of the features characteristic for imperial appointments,
such as the satraps in Persia or the provincial governors in the Roman em-
pire, is the fact that officials are often sent abroad to distant and undesir-
able provinces as punishment for mistakes or failures or, if dispatched to
more important and desirable places, as a reward for faithful service. Typi-
cally, the officials’ ability to impose the will of the centre, rather than their
special knowledge of or sensitivity to local conditions, is the primary cri-
terion for their appointment abroad. This also applied to Soviet practices
in Eastern Europe. Former SMA political advisor Semenov, for instance,
in a matter of fact reported that Stalin ‘transferred the operational work
[i.e. everyday business] of the SMA to the Chief of the Political Depart-
ment of the Fifth Shock Army, General Fedor Efimovich Bokov’. Why?
Stalin had known Bokov ‘since the beginning of the war, when he was a
secretary in the party committee of the General Staff of the Red Army. He
had at times reported to Stalin and he [Stalin had] liked him. He always
had his hands at the seams of his trousers, no redundant words, let alone
demands.’164 What about Bokov’s special qualifications for the assign-
ment to Germany? None whatsoever. ‘His most important shortcoming
was surely that he didn’t know Germany and that he was also unwilling to
immerse himself in its problems.’165
Another feature of Soviet control consisted in the fact that, as Shevard-
nadze knew well when he assumed office as foreign minister, that ‘top
party officials were appointed to ambassadorial posts in Eastern Europe,
and those appointments were made exclusively by the Politburo’. Their
subordination to the party leadership in Moscow determined the way deci-
sions were made: ‘Former party officials appealed to higher party levels in
all questions, bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And in the coun-
tries where they were posted they would often act in a similar way, going
164 According to Semenov, this is how staff officers described him in their memoirs;
Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, p. 222.
165 Ibid., p. 224.
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directly to the top and ignoring the foreign ministries of the host coun-
try.’166
Centralization of decision making contributed to this closed system of
imperial personnel selection and control. Information passed upward in
the decision-making hierarchy, with several drafts working their way up to
the top through formalized resolutions of the Central Committee of the
CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The most important de-
cisions ultimately had to be approved by Stalin personally or, after his
death, ‘collectively’ in the Politburo. Once a decision was made, the prin-
ciple of ‘democratic centralism’ provided that there should be no further
discussion and no ‘factionalism’ in the party organs and state institutions
but strict implementation in accordance with the letter and spirit of the de-
cision. As for decision-making on the German problem, Semenov aptly
observed that
Stalin personally kept German matters in his hands. In accordance with [his]
orders, Vyacheslav Molotov dealt with them in the Politburo of the CC ... Pol-
icy questions and important operational actions would regularly be discussed
in meetings with Stalin. From the German side, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grote-
wohl, and Walter Ulbricht would be present. The Soviet participants as a rule
were Stalin, Molotov as well as, from the SMA, Vasili Sokolovsky [the head
of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany] and I [Semenov]. [Marshal
Georgi K.] Zhukov [the supreme commander of the Soviet forces in Ger-
many] settled many questions directly with Stalin [from headquarters in
Berlin] and was seldom called to the discussions in Moscow.167
After having provided the basic reasons why the division of Germany oc-
curred, examined the conceptual frame of reference and the mind-set of
the top decision-makers as well as described the ineptitude of the subordi-
nates supporting the establishment of empire, it is now appropriate to fo-
cus on some of the most important milestones in the hardening of the div-
ision, as well as on those instances that seemed to indicate that the Soviet
leadership was perhaps reconsidering the risks, costs and benefits of its
position in Germany.
166 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 194-95.
167 Ibid., pp. 230-31.
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The Impact of the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War
One of the milestones on the road to the division of Germany and a water-
shed of European history is the Berlin blockade of 1948-49. The main ana-
lytical problem that this ill-advised Soviet venture poses is whether it was
meant to be a lever with which to impede the Western processes for the
formation of a separate West German state and prevent the door from be-
ing firmly shut on German political and economic unity, or whether Berlin
was the prize of the endeavour, with the city to be merged with the Soviet
zone of occupation in an effort to consolidate the Soviet empire. There is
evidence for both interpretations.168
Evidence for the lever theory of the Berlin blockade and the Soviet
preference for maintaining German political and economic unity can be
found in the letter by the chief of the SMAG, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, to
his British counterpart, General Robertson. On 29 June 1948, eleven days
after the promulgation of the currency reform in the Western zones and the
beginning of the blockade as a response, Sokolovsky wrote: ‘I would like
to assure you that your opinion regarding the restrictions of movements of
the German population is correct’; they are of a ‘temporary nature and tak-
en for the protection of the currency of the Soviet zone’.169 Later Soviet
sources, such as the authoritative Short History of the USSR, summed up
the currency argument as follows:
On 20 June 1948 [18 June is the correct date] a secretly prepared money re-
form was suddenly announced in the three Western Zones. The devalued old
German marks instantly flooded Eastern Germany, creating a danger to its
economy. The Soviet occupation authorities were compelled to take urgent
measures. To block off currency profiteers all vehicles and passengers arriv-
ing from Western Germany were thoroughly checked.170
4.
168 See also in detail Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior, the chapter
on the origins, course of events and consequences of the Berlin crisis of 1948,
pp. 67-182.
169 Pravda, 1 July 1948 (italics mine); for the economic interpretation, see also Mar-
shal Sokolovsky’s letters to the American military governor in Germany, General
Lucius D. Clay, of 20 and 22 June 1948, Pravda, 22 and 23 June 1948.
170 Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of History , ed., A Short History of
the USSR, Part II (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 274. For the economic
justification of the blockade, see also V.G. Trukhanovskii, ed., Istoriia mezh-
dunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol. III: 1945-1963 (Moscow:
Izdatel’stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1964), p. 221.
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The currency issue was put into a broader economic context. In late 1947,
as the former US Secretary of State, Byrnes, recalls, Molotov responded to
a question about the ‘real Soviet motives in Europe’ that he (Molotov)
‘was willing to give up practically anything else’ in order to get a quadri-
partite arrangement on the Ruhr.171 During the Berlin crisis, half a year
later, the Soviet government returned to this issue in its note of 14 July to
the Western powers, complaining that ‘such a very important centre of
German military industry as the Ruhr district has been removed from the
control of the four powers’.172 In discussions with the three Western am-
bassadors, held from 2 to 30 August 1948 in Moscow, Stalin and Molotov
also mentioned the Ruhr repeatedly.173
Political and economic objectives were inextricably linked. Thus, the
communiqué of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the Soviet Union,
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and
Hungary, held from 23 to 24 June 1948 in Warsaw, touched upon econo-
mic issues but went on to deplore the Western allies’ policy toward Ger-
many as expressed in the London agreement of 7 June. By their an-
nounced plans for the merger of the three Western zones and the projected
creation of a separate West German state, the communiqué stated, the
United States, Britain, and France had ‘complete[d] the division and dis-
memberment of Germany’; they had ‘encourage[d] German revanchist el-
ements’ and ‘subordinate[d] the economy of Western Germany to the aims
of the USA and Britain’; they had acted in an ‘anti-democratic spirit’; and,
last but not least, they had committed a ‘gross violation of the Yalta and
Potsdam agreements’.174
Political issues ostensibly designed to maintain German unity were also
advanced by Marshal Sokolovsky at the conference of the four military
governors near Potsdam on 3 July. He stated tersely that the traffic restric-
tions would continue until the Western allies ‘abandoned [their] plans for a
West German government’.175 Similarly, in their discussions with the three
171 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 347.
172 Pravda, 16 July 1948.
173 According to Charles E. Bohlen, State Department Counsellor at that time, as
quoted in Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 347.
174 Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, Pravda, 25 June 1948.
175 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950),
p. 367.
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Western ambassadors in August, Stalin and Molotov reaffirmed the point
made in the Soviet note of 14 July to the effect that the conversations re-
garding Berlin were of ‘no useful purpose except within the framework of
conversations regarding all of Germany’.176 According to the account by
Walter Bedell Smith, the United States ambassador to the Soviet Union
and a participant in the Moscow discussions, Stalin made it clear ‘in no
uncertain terms’ that the Western powers had ‘forfeited their right to occu-
py Berlin’ by their introduction of a new currency in Berlin and by their
‘decision to set up a Western German government at Frankfurt’.177 Smith
also thought that ‘we could have produced an agreement in fifteen minutes
at any time by an offer to abandon the London decisions’.178
However, the interpretation of the Soviet blockade as having been im-
posed for the purpose of gaining Berlin as a prize can be made equally
persuasive. The SMA stridently maintained that Greater Berlin ‘lies in the
Soviet zone of occupation’ and ‘economically forms part of it’. It added
that the ‘whole mechanism of joint administration’ of Berlin and Germany
had collapsed and ‘with it any legitimate basis for the continued presence
of the American, British, and French authorities in Berlin’. It then arrived
at the ultima ratio of the argument, declaring that ‘the Soviet Military Ad-
ministration is the only legitimate occupation authority [in Berlin]. As a
consequence its orders have the force of law for the whole of Berlin’.179
Such statements clearly implied that Berlin was to be incorporated into the
Soviet zone of occupation. Alexander Werth, a former British war corre-
spondent, accordingly wrote that, ‘having accepted the fait accompli of a
separate Western Germany, the Russians tried to put an end to the Berlin
“anomaly” with their 1948 blockade of the former Reich capital’.180
Faced with the persuasiveness of both interpretations, a Western scholar
has argued that, from the Soviet point of view, Berlin was both, a lever
and a prize."181 This argument is close to this author’s conclusions. Stalin
simply had not made up his mind as to what would result from the pres-
176 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, Pa: Lippincott,
1950), p. 241.
177 Ibid., p. 244.
178 W.B. Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 253.
179 Tägliche Rundschau (SMAG newspaper), 24 June 1948.
180 Alexander Werth, Russia, the Post-War Years (London: Robert Hale, 1971),
p. 248.
181 Walter Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 144 (italics mine).
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sure tactics. Western analysts of Soviet foreign policy have often sought to
identify a single objective underlying Soviet foreign policy initiatives and
failed to neglect the possibility that the Soviet leaders may have pursued
several goals simultaneously, or were simply testing what could be
achieved. This modus operandi seems to have applied in the Berlin crisis.
Advantageous outcomes, from Stalin’s viewpoint, could either have been
the Western abandonment of the London recommendations for the founda-
tion of a separate West German state or a withdrawal of the Western allies
from Berlin. Yet both of these objectives were unacceptable to the Western
powers. This, together with the ambiguity of the Soviet stance, accounted
for the resounding failure of Stalin’s risky venture. The constant fluctua-
tion between narrow objectives (incorporation of Berlin in the Soviet
zone) and larger goals (maintaining German unity), interspersed with the
absurd assertion that the blockade essentially was a figment of Western
imagination since there existed only ‘technical difficulties’ on the roads,
railways and canals to and from Berlin. This led to confusion among
Western diplomats as to what Stalin really wanted and whether compro-
mise on any of the German issues was feasible.
What, then, were the immediate consequences of Stalin’s initiative and
their impact on subsequent Soviet policies on the German problem?
First and foremost, the blockade, far from arresting the momentum to-
ward the foundation of the Federal Republic, actually served to accelerate
it. This step was followed by the establishment of a German Democratic
Republic: on 30 May 1949, a People’s Congress (Volkskongress) adopted a
draft constitution and, with Soviet ‘consent’, constituted itself as the
GDR’s parliament (Volkskammer). The corresponding constitution was du-
ly adopted on 7 October 1949, and on the same day the parliament autho-
rized SED leader Otto Grotewohl to form a provisional government.182
These measures, however, did not terminate the imperial nature of the re-
lationship between the USSR and the GDR. The transfer of sovereignty
was limited, and this was clearly indicated by a name change: the Soviet
Military Administration in Germany turned into the Soviet Control Com-
mission in Germany. As General Chuikov, the head of the SCCG clarified,
the task of this body was to watch over the implementation of the Potsdam
182 Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Teilung: Die sow-
jetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1979 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979),
pp. 39-41.
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Protocol and other Four Power agreements.183 Furthermore, the East Ger-
man constitution did not mention the division of Germany. According to
its preamble, ‘the German people’ had given itself a constitution, and in
Article 1 it referred to Germany as ‘an indivisible [sic] democratic repub-
lic’. The limited transfer of sovereignty to the GDR and the constitutional
constructs of this entity clearly pointed to Soviet intentions to maintain
control in its part of Germany and simultaneously to extend its influence
through the GDR and residual Four Power mechanisms to West German
affairs.
Consolidation of the empire also meant the drawing of new borders. On
the occasion of a visit to Poland, SED leader Walter Ulbricht committed
the GDR to the ‘recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a border of
peace’.184 This commitment was honoured and formalized in 1950 in the
East German-Polish treaty of Görlitz. But the question was as yet undecid-
ed as to whether the new state with its limitations on sovereignty, new bor-
ders contested by West Germany and a regime detested by the East Ger-
man population were constructs that could endure.
The impact of the failed Berlin venture was reinforced by that of the
Korean war of 1950‑52. The division of Korea, like that of Germany, can
serve to reinforce the conclusions about the compelling nature of the Ideo-
logical and Imperial paradigm for policy-making. The archival evidence
suggests that Stalin’s ideas about Korea were in no way more defined and
refined than those on Germany.185 Publicly, both the Soviet and the North
Korean communists adhered to the idea of a unified government for Korea
– not, however, because Stalin purposefully aimed at the reestablishment
of a single country but, as a Soviet foreign ministry background report
written by Jakob Malik openly declared, because ‘it would be politically
inexpedient for the Soviet Union to oppose the creation of a single Korean
government’.186 The vehicle that permitted Stalin to assert imperial inter-
183 Chuikov statement of 11 November 1949, Neue Welt (East Berlin), No. 19
(1949), pp. 4-5.
184 Neues Deutschland, 21 November 1948.
185 The argument and evidence presented follow Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Soviet Aims
in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950’, Cold War International
History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Pa-
per No. 8, November 1993.
186 Jakob Malik, On the Question of a Single Government for Korea, 10 December
1945, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0102, opis 1, delo 15, papka 1,
1.8-10, as quoted by Weathersby, ‘Soviet Aims in Korea’, p. 14 (italics mine). −
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ests in Korea and that caused the division of Korea were the decisions of
the Moscow foreign ministers’ conference of December 1945. These stip-
ulated a four-power ‘trusteeship’ for Korea with a joint Soviet-American
commission to prepare elections for a Korean provisional government.
The Soviet delegation to the talks was instructed that it should support on-
ly those political groups that accepted Moscow’s position. Since only the
communist party in both halves of Korea supported the ‘trusteeship’ idea
and the Soviet delegation held firm to its instructions, the commission’s
work and the chances for a single Korea ended in May 1946. This did
nothing to lessen Soviet verbal support for Korean reunification.
As in Germany, narrowly defined military and economic interests gov-
erned a process that led to the partition of Korea. Another internal foreign
ministry report bluntly asserted that Cheju Island and the ports of Pusan
and Inchon ‘must be controlled by the Soviet military command. By in-
sisting on the allocation of the strategic regions in Korea to the USSR, we
can exert pressure on the position of the Americans, using their wish to re-
ceive for themselves strategic regions in the Pacific Ocean.’187
There were also strong parallels between Korea and Germany on eco-
nomic issues. For the Soviet foreign ministry, it went without saying that
‘the Japanese enterprises of military and heavy industry located in North
Korea must be considered trophies of the Red Army’.188 But the economic
interests went further and were linked again with strategic interests in the
form of a mineral called monazite, black sand that contains small amounts
of thorium, a radioactive material that can be used in the production of nu-
clear weapons. From the very beginning of the occupation, Soviet officials
investigated the exploitation of monazite deposits, and samples were
Malik was Soviet ambassador to the United Nations from 1948 to 1952. At the
time when the UN Security Council Resolution 82 authorizing peace enforce-
ment action in Korea was put to a vote on 25 June 1950, he boycotted the pres-
ence of the Nationalist Chinese representative. His absence enabled the resolution
to pass unanimously.
187 Notes on the Question of Former Japanese Colonies and Mandated Territories,
Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0431, opis 1, delo 52, papka 8, 1.40-43,
as quoted by Weathersby, ‘Soviet Aims in Korea’, p. 10.
188 Report by Suzdalev, senior advisor to the foreign ministry’s 2nd Far Eastern De-
partment, December 1945, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0102, opis 1,
delo 15, papka 1, 1.22-29, as quoted ibid., p. 15.
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brought to the USSR.189 In full realization of the strategic importance of
these minerals, the highest-ranking Soviet officer in Korea, General Teren-
ti Shtykov, wrote to Stalin that he considered it ‘necessary to take mea-
sures to increase the export from North Korea to the USSR of concentrates
of monazite, tantalum, and niobium and to begin the export of uranium
ore. For this purpose I ask your orders to corresponding Soviet organiza-
tions about aiding the Korean government in the development of deposits
and in the organization of the extraction of concentrate and the mining of
the above indicated rare metals.’190
The parallels between Germany and Korea extend to perceptions of
risks and costs, rather than respect for principles of self-determination, as
governing the limits of Soviet imperial expansion. The documentary evi-
dence proves that it was the highly nationalistic North Korean communists
under Kim Il-Sung who were determined to establish control over the
whole country by military means; that Stalin initially opposed the idea be-
cause he was concerned about American power in the Pacific region and
the risks of US intervention; but that, in January 1950, he endorsed the
North Korean invasion plans and aided the military push to the south after
the ‘correlation of forces’ had seemingly shifted in favour of the socialist
world system (anti-colonial uprisings in Indonesia and Indochina, guerrilla
wars in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, unrest in the British and
French territories in North Africa and the Middle East, the abolition of the
US nuclear monopoly in August 1949, and the victory of the Chinese
communists in October 1949) and after Mao Tse-tung had committed him-
self to assist Kim Il-Sung if, contrary to expectations, the United States
were to intervene.191
As in the Berlin blockade, Stalin miscalculated likely United States re-
actions in Korea and had to pay a heavy price. The combined effect of
both failed ventures was that Washington committed itself to a large secu-
rity role not only in Asia but also in Europe. Thus, even before the end of
the Berlin blockade, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. Rather than
189 General [Terentii F.] Shtykov to Stalin, 12 March 1949, Russian Foreign Ministry
Archives, fond 07, opis 22a, delo 223, papka 14, 1.1-2, as quoted ibid., p. 21.
190 Ibid.
191 See the full documentation of the deliberations between Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and
Kim Il-Sung in the compendium ‘The Cold War in Asia’, Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., Cold War International History
Project Bulletin, Nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/96).
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continuing to dismantle its military bases and ‘bringing the boys home’,
the United States reintroduced large forces to the European continent.
Whereas, at the outbreak of the Berlin crisis in June 1948, the US army in
Europe had consisted of only 90 000 officers and men, by 1953 this num-
ber had risen to 427, 000 troops, most of whom stationed in Germany. A
huge network of bases and supply depots was constructed for the Ameri-
can forces in Germany, Britain, France, and the Mediterranean countries
and later extended to the Near and Middle East, South East Asia, and the
Pacific. American strategists were, in Moscow’s perspective, aiming at
‘closing the circle of air bases around Russia’ and making that circle
‘smaller and smaller, tighter and tighter, until the Russians are throttled’.
They were allegedly planning ‘combined air, naval and ground operations
from American bases located near the Russian mainland and their use for
intensive bombing raids and attacks by guided missiles’.192
The obvious Soviet concern now was the possibility that West Ger-
many’s manpower, and its economic and military potential, would be
added to American economic and technological resources, maritime
supremacy, conventional forces, and nuclear weapons in Europe, and that
the United States would use West Germany as a ‘springboard for aggres-
sion’ against the Soviet Union. Such concerns were fuelled by the possi-
bility that a rearmed West Germany would be intent on ‘taking revenge’
and. With the help of U.S. military, try to regain lost territories in the east.
The North Atlantic Treaty, therefore, was interpreted in Moscow as a dan-
gerous scheme that ‘absolutely ignores the possibility of a repetition of
German aggression’. The Brussels treaty on the foundation of NATO had
to be ‘regarded as directed against the USSR, one of the chief allies of the
United States, Great Britain, and France in the last war’.193 Even though
the Soviet Union had succeeded in exploding a nuclear device in August
1949 and tested a hydrogen bomb four years later, it lacked the kind of in-
tercontinental delivery systems to put America at risk. The United States,
in essence, remained strategically invulnerable. It enjoyed unchallenged
naval supremacy in the Atlantic and the Pacific. It also possessed vastly
192 Quoted from a formal protest by the Soviet embassy in Washington in reference
to a speech by General Kenney, commander of the Strategic Air Command, and
an article based on it in Newsweek; text as published in Department of State, For-
eign Relations, 1948, Vol. 4, p. 887.
193 Memorandum issued by the Soviet government on 31 March 1949 in reaction to
the impending conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty; Pravda, 1 April 1949.
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superior scientific-technological and economic resources. In fact, until the
late 1950s it remained the only superpower, both economically and mili-
tarily.
In the light of such unfavourable trends in the ‘correlation of forces’
and the existence of various plans for the rearmament of West Germany
and her inclusion in a European Defense Community (EDC), initiatives
appeared to be called for in Moscow to prevent, or at least delay, such a
development. Stalin’s note of 10 March 1952 can be interpreted as such an
initiative.
Stalin’s 1952 ‘Peace Note’: Lost Opportunity or Political Manoeuvre?
The diplomatic note to the United States, Britain and France dropped the
previous Soviet insistence on a disarmed Germany and raised the prospect
of both unification and free elections. A German peace conference was to
be convened with participation of an all-German government ‘expressing
the will of the German people’. Unification was offered in exchange for
neutralization. A unified Germany would not be allowed to enter any
coalition or military alliance directed against the Soviet Union. Its territory
would be devoid of foreign troops and foreign military bases. The size and
weaponry of its armed forces, as well as arms production, would be strict-
ly limited. And it would be prohibited from harbouring ‘organizations hos-
tile to democracy and the cause of maintaining peace’.194
Controversy has raged for several decades as to the meaning of the note
and the subsequent exchanges between the USSR and the Western powers.
One interpretation has been that of a genuine offer and ‘lost opportunity’
for the reestablishment of German unity. Soviet propagandists and govern-
ment officials advocated this point of view, some styling West German
chancellor Konrad Adenauer as the chief culprit in the rejection of the So-
viet proposal and asserting that he was ‘not only a political opponent of
Russia but even felt irrational hate towards the Russians’.195 West German
5.
194 Text of the note as published in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Vol. 7, pp. 167-172.
195 Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, p. 269. Semenov failed to provide detail
on the origins, main protagonists, processes and reasoning behind the 1952
‘peace note’. One suspects that the reason for this is that he would not have been
able to make a convincing case for his assertion that the offer was genuine.
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social democrats have accused the CDU of having squandered German
unity because of its preference for Western integration. Western scholars,
too, have argued this case, one of its strongest advocates being Rolf
Steininger.196
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Germany, the evi-
dence adduced to support the notion of a genuine Soviet reunification of-
fer in his and other Western studies had to be derived from Western
archival sources. Such sources, however, could not help in the reconstruc-
tion of the rationale and reasons for the Soviet proposal. They failed to
shed light on Soviet decision-making processes. After the collapse of com-
munism, it became possible to conduct research using Soviet and East
German archival materials. The archival evidence strongly suggests that
the diplomatic note and its sequels were a tactical device designed to
achieve some or all of the following objectives: to gain a greater degree of
influence over West German public opinion; to counteract then current
Western initiatives on ‘free elections’ to be held in both parts of Germany
under United Nations supervision; to delay or prevent West German de-
fense integration in the framework of the European Defense Community;
and to obtain a gradual pullout of Western allied troops from West Ger-
many.197
The following direct and circumstantial evidence justifies this conclu-
sion. First, the manipulative and instrumental character of the initiative
196 Rolf Steininger, Eine vertane Chance: Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und
die Wiedervereinigung (Bonn: Dietz, 1985).
197 The most thorough of the new studies is Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note
vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außen-
ministeriums’, Deutschland Archiv, No. 7 (June 1993), pp. 786-805. Wettig’s
conclusions essentially are shared by Ruud van Dijk, ‘The 1952 Stalin Note De-
bate: Myth or Missed Opportunity?’, Cold War International History Project,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper, No. 14, May
1996. – Willfriede Otto, ‘Sowjetische Deutschlandnote 1952: Stalin und die
DDR. Bisher unveröffentlichte handschriftliche Notizen Wilhelm Piecks’,
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (March 1991), pp. 374-81. The
account by Otto is based on handwritten notes taken by Wilhelm Pieck, the East
German president. – On the basis of many of the same sources, however, Wilfried
Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage: Studien zur sowjetischen
Deutschlandpolitik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), arrives at dif-
ferent conclusions. For a summary of Loth’s studies and arguments see the book
review by Rolf Badstübner, ‘W. Loth: Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage’,
<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=22097>.
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was clearly stated by its chief architects in the course of its preparation.
The ‘peace note’, according to comments sent by then deputy Foreign Mi-
nister Gromyko to Stalin, ‘would have great political meaning for the
strengthening of the struggle for peace and against the remilitarization of
West Germany and would help the supporters of the unity of Germany and
peace to expose the aggressive intentions of the three Western powers con-
nected with the General Treaty [on the transfer of sovereignty to West
Germany]’.198
Second, the manipulative and propagandist quality of the note is appar-
ent also in the fact that the initiative was not quietly discussed among So-
viet and Western diplomats but published immediately for maximum polit-
ical impact. The new evidence clarifies that this purpose was uppermost in
the minds of Soviet officials who participated in drafting the note. In full
realization of the lack of support for the communist party in West Ger-
many (KPD), the party’s grave organizational weaknesses, and the ‘ab-
sence of correct and flexible tactics’,199 an appeal was to be made to the
proverbial ‘masses’. Suitable respondents would be found among the
many, allegedly disgruntled, rank and file social democrats and in the ‘op-
positional bourgeoisie’.200 The publication of the note, as Soviet and East
German leaders incongruously agreed, had ‘triggered a great movement of
the masses’ and this had ‘put the Western powers and the Adenauer gov-
ernment under considerable pressure’. They even entertained the (utterly
unrealistic) notion that the ‘question of elections without a UN Commis-
sion’ could be transformed into a ‘mass struggle for toppling the Adenauer
government’.201
198 A. Gromyko to I. Stalin, 21 January 1952, Archiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (hereafter AVPRF), 07, 25, 100, 13, A-124/ag (supplement), as quoted
by Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, p. 799. The sequence of numbers and letters
follows the Soviet archival classification system in the following order: fond,
opis, delo, and papka. The last letters and numbers refer to the specific document
on file.
199 From a report of 15 March 1952 of the head of the diplomatic mission of the
USSR in the GDR, G.M. Pushkin, sent to the Soviet foreign ministry: ‘Eko-
nomicheskii i politicheskii obzor polozheniia Zapadnoi Germanii v 1951 godu’,
15 March 1952, AVPRF, 82, 40, 042-Ge/2, 254, E-1248/A-675/3, as quoted by
Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, pp. 801-2.
200 Ibid.
201 Based on notes taken by GDR president Wilhelm Pieck on the occasion of the
talks held with Stalin on 1 and 7 April 1952, Otto, ‘Sowjetische Deutschland-
Note’, pp. 382-83. They do not clarify who exactly made these points and gave
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A third important aspect of the Soviet initiative that casts doubt on the
‘lost opportunity’ interpretation is the fact that the preparation of the note
did not occur in secrecy and over the heads of the East German commu-
nists, who would have been the victims of unification, but with their full
knowledge and active participation. It is difficult to see why the SED
should have joined the project if it had harboured suspicions that it was
being invited to provide helpful suggestions for its self-liquidation.
Fourth, the new evidence not only fails to provide support for the argu-
ment that Stalin had decided to liquidate East Germany but, on the con-
trary, shows that he was determined to strengthen its ‘socialist founda-
tions’. The details of this objective were discussed in meetings between
Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl of the SED leadership
and Stalin and other top Soviet officials in Moscow from 31 March until
10 April. The discussion included plans for the replacement along Soviet
lines of the traditional Länder structure of East German by smaller admin-
istrative districts (Bezirke); an expansion of the state and collective sector
in agriculture; organizational streamlining of the SED as a ‘party of a new
type’; border protection measures between East and West Germany; and
the build-up of national armed forces in the GDR.202
Fifth, the enhanced efforts to consolidate socialism in the GDR co-
incided with determined Soviet attempts at tightening bloc discipline.
Starting in September 1949 in Hungary with the arrest, trial and later exe-
cution by garrotting of Laszlo Rajk (a Politburo member and the minister
of the interior), purges began to take place throughout Eastern Europe, the
most extensive of which occurring in Czechoslovakia, reaching its zenith
in November 1951 with the arrest and later trial and execution of Rudolf
Slansky, a deputy prime minister and former party secretary.203 Decon-
structing the socialist foundations in the GDR for the sake of a united neu-
tral Germany simply would not have fit the overall pattern of imperial
construction.
the appropriate instructions, Ulbricht or Stalin. The difference is largely immate-
rial since, as argued here, no major divergence in Soviet and East German view-
points can be detected.
202 Based on notes taken by Pieck according to Otto, ‘Sowjetische Deutschland-
Note’, pp. 388-89, and documents from the Soviet foreign ministry archives, A.
Gromyko to A. Vyshinsksii, 18 April 1952, AVPRF, 07, 27, 162, 42, E-3347/r., as
quoted by Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, pp. 802-3.
203 Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 93-94.
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A sixth rationale concerns Soviet domestic politics. A genuine Soviet
reunification offer, as argued, would have meant a significant change in
established policies. This, in turn, would have been reflected in a shift in
internal power alignments. However, the note was carefully prepared and
continuously ‘improved’ in accordance with routine bureaucratic proce-
dures and decision-making processes. The idea of a note was apparently
first suggested to Gromyko by Mikhail Gribanov, the head of the MFA’s
Third European Department. What was needed, he told his superior, was
‘a real step to a peaceful settlement with Germany ... in order to counteract
the erroneous declaration of the three [Western] powers on the termination
of the state of war with Germany.’204 For that purpose, he proposed con-
vening a commission of experts that would draft principles for a German
peace treaty.205 He also suggested to Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky
in the same month that the GDR should first propose to West Germany a
joint initiative urging the four powers to conclude a peace treaty with Ger-
many. After the expected rejection of this démarche by Bonn, the East
German government should then unilaterally address the four powers. On-
ly thereafter would Moscow launch corresponding initiatives.206 The first
draft of the principles of a peace treaty was sent by Gribanov to the com-
mission of experts on 8 September 1951. In the subsequent months, Molo-
tov, who at the time dealt with foreign policy matters in the Politburo, and
Gromyko were actively involved in modifying and commenting on the
draft. On three occasions it was sent to Stalin for final approval.207 No evi-
dence has come to light to the effect that disagreements existed among the
top leaders or the major institutions involved in decision-making either on
substance or procedure. There is also no evidence showing that a pro-Ger-
man faction in the foreign ministry or the Politburo had suddenly become
ascendant and been able to embark on a drastic departure from the tradi-
tional paradigm.
This leads to a seventh point in the rebuttal of the ‘genuine offer’ thesis.
One would expect that major changes on an issue as crucial as that of Ger-
many would not only be reflected in domestic political changes but also be
204 M. Gribanov to A. A. Gromyko, 3 August 1951, AVPRF, 082, 38, 112, 250,
A-1475/Zeo, as quoted by Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, p. 792.
205 Ibid.
206 M. Gribanov to A. Ia. Vyshinsksii, 15 August 1951, AVPRF, 082, 38, 112, 250,
A-1558/Zeo, as quoted by Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, p. 793.
207 Ibid., p. 798.
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embedded in an overall change of Soviet ideology, domestic politics and
foreign policy. This, however, was not the case. Concerning ideology,
while Soviet foreign ministry officials and diplomats were busy drafting,
promulgating and propagandizing the ‘peace note’, party officials im-
mersed themselves in the task of preparing the Nineteenth Party Congress,
to be held in October 1952. Their primary business centred on domestic
affairs – the new party statutes, the Fifth Five-Year Plan, the necessity for
priority development of heavy industry, and the intensification of the
struggle against slackness and corruption in the economic bureaucracy.
These topics reappeared in a collection of comments published in Bolshe-
vik, Pravda, and in tens of millions of pamphlet reprints under the title of
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, written in February, April,
May and September 1952.208 One would search in vain in these pamphlets
if one were to look for ideological justification of new policies.
As for international affairs, matters were only slightly different. Stalin’s
pamphlets confirmed the validity of the ‘two camp’ theory. The only sig-
nificant departure from orthodoxy was a revision of the Leninist theory of
the inevitability of war. Stalin now declared the ‘contradictions’ among
the imperialist states to be more acute than those between the imperialist
camp and world socialism. The dogma on the inevitability of war between
the two opposed socio-economic systems was thereby not discarded but
modified: war among the imperialist states was held to be more likely than
war between the two systems. More specifically, in the Stalinist perspec-
tive, West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, resentful of Ameri-
can ‘tutelage’, ‘bondage’, ‘domination’ and ‘oppression’, would sooner or
later try to throw off the American yoke.209 Obviously, if this diagnosis
were correct, Soviet diplomats would have ample opportunities to exploit
‘contradictions’ both within and between these countries. The note, as ar-
gued, attempted to use such opportunities.
Put into the larger foreign policy context, the Berlin blockade and the
Korean war had resulted in increased international tensions and a build-up
of Western military power. In accordance with previous patterns of be-
haviour, Soviet foreign policy subsequently aimed at the mitigation of
208 The pamphlets were discussed before and after the Nineteenth Congress and then
integrated in a textbook on political economy published in many languages, the
English version being Joseph V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the
USSR (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952).
209 Ibid., pp. 37-41.
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these adverse trends by some conciliatory gestures and by playing on
Western divergences. As Marshall D. Shulman has written in his seminal
Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised:
By restraint in the use of overt acts of provocation after the Korean attack,
and by encouraging the development of neutralism, nationalism, the peace
movement, and anticolonial agitation, Soviet foreign policy was intended to
achieve such specific purposes as the weakening of the structure of American
strategic air bases abroad ... as well as such general purposes as undermining
the cohesion and momentum of the Western alliance.210
Stalin’s ‘peace note’ on Germany corresponded with these purposes.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in line with such ideo-
logical preconceptions on international affairs, the suggestion of neutrality
could not have been regarded as anything but, as Mao Tse-tung said, a
‘hoax’.211 As will be shown in the next section, the rejection of a unified
‘neutral’ Germany was reaffirmed by Stalin’s successors.
Imperial Dilemmas: Beria and the Crisis in the GDR
As with Stalin’s ‘peace note’, a substantial amount of evidence from Sovi-
et archives, memoirs, and interviews has emerged to shed new light on So-
viet thinking on the German problem in the 1950s. Some of this evidence
has surfaced in connection with the so-called ‘Beria affair’, the alleged at-
tempt by the former chief of the secret police to ‘sell off’ East Germany
after Stalin’s death in March 1953 in the context of the New Course adopt-
ed by Prime Minister Malenkov.212 Lavrenti Beria at that time had just
6.
210 Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York:
Atheneum, 1965), p. 259.
211 Mao Tse-tung, ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, as quoted in H. Wei,
China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 264.
212 The new sources include the memoirs of Andrei A. Gromyko, transl. Harold
Shukman, Memories (London: Hutchinson, 1989); a supplement to Khrushchev’s
memoirs, N. S. Khrushchev, transl. and ed. Jerrold L. Schecter with Viacheslav
V. Luchkov, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1990); and N. S. Khrushchev, ‘Aktsii’, in V. F. Nekrasov, ed., Beria:
Konets kar’ery (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). − Molotov’s reminiscences, recorded
in numerous conversations with the former foreign minister in the last ten years
of his life by an obscure poet and ardent Stalinist named Felix Chuev, Sto sorok
besed s Molotovym, have already been mentioned. − Malenkov’s side of the story
can be found in several articles written by his son Andrei, as well as in interviews
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taken charge of the new Ministry of the Interior (MVD), created by the
merger of the interior and state security ministries. The stenographic
record of a top secret CPSU Central Committee meeting, held on 2 July
1953, to discuss and approve Beria’s arrest and execution, is particularly
interesting.213 It provides fascinating insights into the mind-set of the ad-
herents to the Imperial and Ideological paradigm. It is, therefore, appropri-
ate to look at some of the nuggets from this gold mine of information.
The CC meeting was preceded on 27 May by an important session of
the Council of Ministers (the government) at which, according to
Malenkov, the ‘topic on the floor’ had been the ‘German problem’ and the
‘serious failure of the situation in the GDR’.
We all concluded that as a result of incorrect policies, many mistakes had
been made in the GDR. Among the German population there was huge dissat-
isfaction, which was particularly evident in the fact that the population of East
Germany had begun to leave for West Germany. In the most recent period, ap-
proximately in the last two years, about 500,000 people have escaped to West
Germany.
Analysis of the internal political and economic situation in the GDR, no-
tably the ‘mass migration’ of East Germans to West Germany, had indicat-
ed that ‘we are facing an internal catastrophe. We were obliged to face the
truth and to admit that without the presence of Soviet troops the existing
given to him and others by Dmitrii Sukhanov, Malenkov’s closest aide in the
1940s and 1950s; Andrei Malenkov, ‘Protivoborstvo’, Zhurnalist, No. 2 (Febru-
ary 1991), pp. 60-66, and Dmitrii Varskii, ‘Skhvatka’ (interview with Andrei
Malenkov), Vostochnii ekspress, No. 16 (1991), pp. 8-9. − East German sources
include the memoirs of Rudolf Herrnstadt, a former SED Politburo member,
chief editor of Neues Deutschland and a major proponent of reform in the period
after Stalin’s death; Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt, ed., Das Herrnstadt Dokument: Das
Politburo der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953 (Reinbek: Rowohlt,
1990). − The Soviet instructions to the East German leadership in June 1953 have
also now been published: ‘Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom
Mai 1953’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Vol. 32, No. 5
(1990), pp. 648-654, and ‘Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED 1953’,
ibid., Vol. 32, No. 5, (1990), pp. 655-672.
213 CPSU, CC, Top Secret, Plenum TsK KPSS, Iiul’ 1953 goda. Stenograficheskii
otchet, ‘O prestupnykh antipartiinykh i antigosudarstvennykh deistviiakh Beriia’,
2-7 July 1953, Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 1 (1991), pp. 140-214 and No. 2 (1991),
pp. 141-208. All citations of this report will refer to the first installment in the
January edition unless otherwise noted. Beria was arrested on 26 June 1953 and
executed on 23 December.
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regime in the GDR is not stable’.214 Foreign Minister Molotov provided
some detail about the internal catastrophe facing East Germany, saying
that, ‘in the period from January 1951 until April 1953, 450,000 people
left the GDR for West Germany’; that this movement of people had in-
creased ‘particularly in the first months of this year’; and that ‘among the
escapees there were more than a few workers, including several thousand
members’ of the SED and the FDJ, the Union of Free German Youth.
Conveniently shunning any Soviet responsibility for the mass exodus,
Molotov concluded that all this was ‘clearly an indication of huge defi-
ciencies in the work of our friends in East Germany’.215
As the record unequivocally shows, there was no complacency among
the top Soviet leaders in May and June 1953. This is confirmed, among
other sources, by Pavel Sudoplatov, the head of the MVD’s Ninth Depart-
ment, known also as the Bureau for Special Tasks. In that capacity he was
directly responsible to Beria and privy to the most sensitive information,
including on East Germany. According to Sudoplatov, his chief was aware
of the severe economic crisis in East Germany and also in Poland, which
had caused thousands of people to flee to the West. A divided Germany
would force the Soviet Union to supply both countries with cheap raw ma-
terials and foodstuffs until collectivization of agriculture and industrializa-
tion could mitigate the problem. German unification, on the other hand,
would bring substantial economic benefits. He was ‘obsessed’ by the idea
that $10 billion could be obtained for the reconstruction of the Soviet
Union. ‘The Kremlin’, he told Sudoplatov, thought that the creation of a
unified neutral Germany under a coalition government could be a buffer
between the Soviet Union and the United States in Western Europe and
the best way to strengthen the Moscow’s global position. Ulbricht was to
be forced to cooperate and consent to East Germany becoming an au-
tonomous province in the new unified Germany.216 Sudoplatov was told to
explore the feasibility of a concomitant initiative and – through secret con-
tacts in West Germany and Austria – to spread the rumour that the USSR
was prepared to make a deal on Germany. The urgency of the matter was
214 Ibid., pp. 143-44 (italics mine). The mixture of past and present tense is as in the
original.
215 Ibid., p. 162.
216 Pavel Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’. Zapiski nezhelatel’nogo svidetelia
(Moscow: TOO ‘Geia’, 1996), pp. 414-15. Provintsiia is the term used by the au-
thor.
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reinforced by Ulbricht’s statements to the effect that it was the SED’s goal
to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in the GDR and by East Ger-
man reports of a split in the top leadership of the SED.217 The top leader-
ship of the CPSU was split, too. Molotov, in particular, opposed the idea
of a unified neutral Germany. He, Beria, and Malenkov formed a commis-
sion to formulate policy guidelines for future Soviet policy in East Ger-
many and to define the conditions for German unification.218
On 5 June, Vladimir Semenov, the newly appointed Soviet High Com-
missioner in Germany told the top East German leadership to slow down
the building of socialism in the GDR and work for German unity. East
Berlin asked for a delay of two weeks in order to consider the Soviet di-
rectives. Semenov rejected this request, commenting that the GDR would
(then already?) be an autonomous area in a unified Germany.219 At the be-
ginning of June, Ulbricht and other top East German leaders were ordered
to appear in Moscow. In a meeting with Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev,
Molotov, Semenov and General Andrei Grechko (the commander of the
Soviet forces in Germany), the East Germans were informed of the Soviet
decision against an accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR. Ul-
bricht is reported as having vehemently opposed this directive, as a result
of which Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev decided to depose him.220
The concern of the Soviet leadership was exacerbated by the outbreak
of serious popular discontent, starting in East Berlin on 17 June and then
rapidly spreading throughout East Germany, in response to an increase in
work norms. This, too, was part of Ulbricht’s drive for the accelerated
construction of socialism in the GDR. How, then, did Beria react? Accord-
ing to Sudoplatov, his chief ordered Grechko and Semenov to use the So-
viet armed forces in order to suppress the popular revolt, hoping that as a
result of this demonstration of power he would enhance the chances for
compromise with the Western countries. The West was to be under no illu-
217 In May, the East German State Security chief, General Ernst Wollweber, had
been called to Moscow and provided this information; ibid., p. 415.
218 Ibid. Until late in his life, Molotov clung to the view – and disapproved – that
Beria was prepared to sacrifice the GDR; see Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molo-
tovym, p. 335.
219 Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’, p. 416. The author uses oblast’ here.
220 This position was formally adopted in a 12 June 1953 CPSU Presidium (Polit-
buro) decision. Although the decision has been referred to in official documents,
a copy of it thus far has not been found, according to Sudoplatov; ibid.
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sion that Soviet Union could be expelled from the GDR by a popular up-
rising.221
In view of the bankruptcy of Soviet and East German policies, why did
the leadership in Moscow not cut its losses and liquidate the imperial out-
post? And what about Beria? Was he really prepared to face up to the un-
palatable East German realities and determined to free the Soviet Union of
Stalin’s imperial legacy in Germany? The proceedings at the July 1953
Central Committee meeting appear to confirm Sudoplatov’s account that
he was. At the meeting, Malenkov charged that Beria (presumably at the
May 1953 session of the Council of Ministers) had ‘suggested a course to-
ward [the establishment of] a bourgeois Germany’. Similarly, Khrushchev
decried that he (Beria) had ‘proposed turning away from the construction
of socialism in the GDR and heading toward concessions to the West’
(which, in Khrushchev’s view, would have meant ‘giving away 18 million
Germans to the rule of the American imperialists’) and that he had said:
‘We must create a neutral, democratic Germany.’222
The problem with these accusations is that the Kremlin leaders respon-
sible for Beria’s arrest were sure to find or fabricate the most heinous
crimes in his past as justification for his execution.223 In fact, taking a few
leaves from Stalin’s Great Book of Purges, they unmasked Beria as a
‘bourgeois degenerate’ (Malenkov); as a ‘person from the bourgeois
camp’ (Molotov); as a treacherous ‘bandit’ who behaved ‘not like a com-
munist but like a provocateur’ (Khrushchev); as someone who, ‘without a
221 Ibid., p. 417.
222 CPSU, CC Plenum, ‘O prestupnykh deisviiakh Beriia’, p. 157. Khrushchev, like
Molotov, continued to adhere to his position. In November 1960, he told Ulbricht
in private conversation that Beria and Malenkov had ‘wanted to liquidate the
GDR, but we fired one [Malenkov] and shot the other [Beria]’; Record of the
Meeting between Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and Comrade W. Ulbricht on 30
November 1960, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0742, opis 6, por. 4,
papka 43, Secret. The transcript of the meeting as published by Hope Harrison,
‘Ulbricht and the Concrete “Rose”: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of
Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61’, Cold War Interna-
tional History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Work-
ing Paper No. 5, May 1993 (hereafter Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’), Ap-
pendix A.
223 In fact, several Western analyses have considered the charges against Beria to
have been motivated almost exclusively by the power struggle in the Kremlin;
see, for instance, Victor Baras, ‘Beria’s Fall and Ulbricht’s Survival’, Soviet Stud-
ies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 381-95.
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doubt, was connected with international imperialist intelligence services as
a full-scale agent and spy’ (Kaganovich); and an ‘enemy of the Soviet
Union’ (Molotov). Even if one chooses to discount the more outlandish al-
legations, the CC proceedings and evidence from East German sources
nevertheless indicate that Beria was prepared to go farther on the German
problem than his erstwhile colleagues. But how far exactly? Trade union
chief Lazar M. Kaganovich only spoke of Beria’s ‘leanings towards what
amounted to liquidating the GDR’,224 and Molotov revealed that Beria, in
his draft resolution before the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on the
German question, had
proposed that we ‘concede the error of building socialism in the German
Democratic Republic under existing conditions’. He also suggested that we
‘turn away from building socialism in the GDR at the present time’. This pro-
posal was, of course, completely unacceptable. When I objected, Beria an-
swered that, after all, he was only proposing to turn away from socialism in
the GDR ‘at present’.225
Such portrayals suggest that Beria only advocated a slower pace in the
systemic transformation of East Germany but not to abandon the Soviet
outpost altogether.
What, then, was the thinking of the majority of Politburo and Central
Committee members? How should one ‘correctly’ have addressed the in-
ternal crisis in the GDR? And, above all, what was to be done? Perhaps
paradoxically, the remedy they suggested for curing the ills at the periph-
ery of empire was not altogether different from what Beria as a minimum
appears to have advocated: reducing the pace in the ‘construction of so-
cialism’ in the GDR. Nothing more than that. As Molotov reported to the
CC meeting, ‘[w]e explained this to our German friends, and they agreed
completely that, given current international conditions, it is unwise to
force the construction of socialism in the GDR’.226
No detail was provided as to how effective such a course of action
could possibly have been. The common operating assumption apparently
was that the problems were only temporary and would somehow disap-
pear. Such notions were nurtured by rationalizations. Molotov, for in-
stance, thought:
224 CPSU, CC Plenum, ‘O prestupnykh deisviiakh Beriia’, p. 199 (italics mine).
225 Ibid. p. 163 (italics mine).
226 Ibid., p. 143; similarly Molotov, ibid., p. 162.
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When examining the affair, we must consider that the GDR embarked upon
an extremely hurried course of industrialization and that the Germans were
involved in construction projects that far exceeded their resources. At the
same time, East Germany was also required to bear significant expenditures
for the occupation and to pay war reparations. Not to mention the reconstruc-
tion necessary after the war. Meanwhile, we must not forget that East Ger-
many finds itself in particularly complex circumstances: The occupying pow-
ers in Berlin – the USA, England, and France – as well West Germany, have a
disorganizing effect on the political and economic situation in the GDR.227
Indeed, these problems did contribute to the severe crisis in the GDR. Giv-
en the facts as acknowledged by the Soviet leaders, that much harm had
been done by a rapacious reparations policy, that the success of economic
reconstruction in West Germany was causing ideological and political
problems and that the East German outpost could only be kept as long as
Soviet troops were stationed there, the question needs to be restated even
more emphatically: why did the Soviet leaders not follow the path imputed
to Beria and stop the construction of socialism in East Germany? And
why, in particular, did they not draw the conclusion from the June 1953
workers’ uprising that their position in the GDR was even more tenuous
than they had thought and abandon it?
The proceedings of the July 1953 CC meeting provide several answers
to these questions. The first and foremost was impeccably Marxist-Lenin-
ist: a ‘bourgeois’, even though ostensibly democratic, Germany could not
possibly be neutral. In Molotov’s words, Beria was
verbose in his explanations to the effect that it would be fine for the So-
viet Union if Germany united as a single state on bourgeois foundations –
as if it were possible for a modern-day bourgeois Germany not to be tight-
ly linked with other imperialist nations; and if, under present conditions, it
were possible for a bourgeois Germany to exist that would not be at the
same time an imperialist, aggressive Germany.228
His central point: ‘As Marxists, it is clear to us that in the given situa-
tion, that is, in the imperialist epoch, the idea that bourgeois Germany
might become peace-loving or neutral in relation to the USSR is not only
an illusion but, in fact, a position foreign to communism.’229 Khrushchev
supported this reasoning and asked:
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., p. 162 (italics mine).
229 Ibid., p. 162 (italics mine).
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Could a democratic bourgeois Germany really be neutral? Is this possible?
Beria said, ‘We shall conclude a treaty.’ But what would a treaty like this cost
us? We know the price of treaties. A treaty is strong only if it is backed by
guns. If a treaty is not backed up by force, it is worth nothing. We would be
laughed at, we would be considered naive.230
A second rationale was that of the importance of the GDR in the struggle
for influence in Europe. To Molotov it was self-evident that the very exis-
tence of the German Democratic Republic was ‘a serious blow not only
against German imperialism but also against the imperialist system
throughout Europe’. If the GDR followed the ‘correct political course’, it
would become a ‘reliable friend of the Soviet Union’ and ‘a serious obsta-
cle to the success of imperialist plans in Europe’.231
A third rationale was moral, psychological and emotional. To have fol-
lowed Beria’s course would have meant ‘renouncing what was won with
the blood of our soldiers, the blood of our people, in the tough battle
against Hitlerism’.232
A fourth and final reason was the importance of East German uranium
for the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons program. This was acknowledged
by Avrami Zavenyagin, the deputy head of the Ministry for Medium Ma-
chine Building, one of the military-industrial ministries responsible for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons. ‘Large quantities of uranium are mined
in the GDR’, he said, ‘perhaps no less than what is at the disposal of the
Americans. This fact was well known to Beria, and he should have men-
tioned it to the Central Committee so they could have kept it in mind.’233
Given East Germany’s manifest instability and blatant Western ‘inter-
ference’, was it not likely that Moscow could be forced to abandon its ex-
posed position in Central Europe? The top leadership assembled in secret
thought that it would not have to yield under pressure. And why not?
Molotov gave the answer: ‘The correlation of international forces has fun-
damentally changed after the Second World War in favour of the USSR
and the states which are friendly towards it.’ Among the friendly coun-
tries, in addition to East Germany, he counted China, North Korea,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Mon-
golia. He thereby arrived at a total of 800 million people engaged in the
230 Ibid., pp. 157-58.
231 Ibid., p. 162.
232 Ibid., p. 162.
233 Ibid., No. 2 (February 1991), p. 170.
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building of socialism.234 Furthermore, nuclear weapons could be counted
on to discourage Western adventurism. Thus, Zavenyagin reminded his
colleagues that the United States’ monopoly in nuclear fission weapons
had been ‘liquidated’. Having realized this, the ‘Americans have begun to
develop a hydrogen bomb’. Such a weapon would have a ‘destructive
force ten times greater than that of the conventional nuclear bomb’ and
have not only technical but global political significance. Prevention of a
second US monopoly therefore would be a ‘most important event in world
politics’, and he assured his colleagues that, in the race for the develop-
ment of this weapon, ‘we think that we have not fallen behind the Ameri-
cans’.235
To summarize, the Soviet leaders were perfectly well aware of the main
problems of imperial control in Germany. The GDR lacked legitimacy.
There was a tremendous outflow of people. Politically, the regime was un-
stable. It could be kept in power only by the presence of Soviet forces.
Ideologically, the GDR was in a difficult position because of the presence
of the Western allies and the flourishing of a Western way of life in West
Berlin. Economically, the GDR had fallen behind its Western counterpart
because of the Soviet Union’s reparations policy, structural deficiencies
and the diversion of trade. Nevertheless, the competition with imperialism
required holding on to East Germany. The more favourable ‘correlation of
forces’ made it possible to do so.
Such assessments, however, posed two basic questions as to future
trends: (1) Could the shift in the ‘correlation of forces’ in favour of social-
ism be maintained and external threats to the Soviet position in Germany
be warded off for the long term? (2) Was it going to be possible to achieve
viability of the GDR and avert an internal collapse? The course of events
from the mid-1950s to the beginning of the 1960s was still to give am-
biguous answers to these questions.
To extend this overview of Soviet perceptions and policies on the Ger-
man problem to the mid-1950s, proposals put forward by the collective
leadership under Malenkov in 1954 were in all likelihood, like Stalin’s
note, a tactical device rather than a genuine offer of reunification and
timed to prevent or delay the entry of the Federal Republic in NATO, a
step that, in accordance with the October 1954 Paris agreements, was
234 Ibid., p. 170.
235 Ibid., No. 2 (February 1991), p. 166.
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scheduled to take place in May 1955. When Khrushchev became the dom-
inant figure in the Soviet leadership in that year he therefore did not find
himself faced with similarly difficult choices and complexities as his pre-
decessors: West Germany was firmly being integrated in the Atlantic al-
liance and the European Economic Community. East Germany became a
member of the Warsaw Pact and its economic extension, the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and the Soviet leaders were com-
mitting themselves firmly to the GDR’s survival and viability. But the
achievement of these objectives remained elusive. The next major crisis in
the periphery was already brewing.
Imperial Dilemmas: The Berlin Wall
The driving forces behind the outbreak of yet another crisis of Soviet con-
trol in the GDR and the reasons for the construction of the Berlin wall in
August 1961 are by now well understood. As in 1952-53, they consisted
of East Germany’s ever present lack of political legitimacy, economic de-
ficiencies and the exodus of significant numbers of East Germans to West
Germany that suddenly became acute. Soviet archival sources, memoirs
and interviews have served to clarify this.236 Formally, at the international
diplomatic level, the crisis began at the end of October 1958 with the as-
sertion by East German leader Walter Ulbricht that ‘The Western powers
have destroyed the legal basis for their presence in Berlin’ and that they
‘no longer have any legal, moral, or political justification for their contin-
ued occupation of West Berlin’. He also de facto threatened the replace-
ment of Four Power rights with East German sovereignty by claiming that
‘All of Berlin lies on the territory of the GDR’.237
The threat against the Western presence and Western access rights was
amplified by Khrushchev two weeks later. On 10 November, at a friend-
7.
236 For the most important presentation of such evidence, see Harrison, ‘New
Archival Evidence’, and Vladislav Zubok, ‘The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962: New
Evidence from Soviet Archives’, Conference on the Cold War, Moscow, January
1993.
237 Gerhard Keiderling and Percy Stulz, Berlin 1945-1968: Zur Geschichte der
Hauptstadt der DDR und der selbständigen politischen Einheit Westberlin ([East]
Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1970), p. 461.
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ship meeting at the Polish embassy in Moscow, he stated that the Western
powers had
violated the Potsdam Agreement repeatedly and with impunity, while we have
remained loyal to it as if nothing had changed. We have every reason to set
ourselves free from obligations under the Potsdam Agreement, obligations
which have outlived themselves and which the Western powers are clinging
to, and to pursue a policy with regard to Berlin that would spring from the
interests of the Warsaw Treaty.238
Khrushchev also argued that ‘if the Western powers are interested in any
questions regarding Berlin’ they should ‘build their relations with the Ger-
man Democratic Republic’.239 Implied here was the threat of a unilateral
Soviet renunciation of the Potsdam Agreement and the establishment of a
system that would take into account vaguely defined interests of the so-
cialist countries and include the GDR as a sovereign, internationally rec-
ognized state.
This threat was spelled out in more detail in the Berlin ultimatum of 28
November 1958 – identical notes sent by the Soviet government to the
three Western powers and a similar note addressed to the Federal Republic
of Germany.240 The central point advanced in the note to the three Western
powers is the proposal
to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of
West Berlin into an independent political unit [samostoiatel’naia politich-
eskaia edinitsa] – a free city, without any state, including both existing Ger-
man states, interfering in its life. Specifically, it might be possible to agree
that the territory of the free city be demilitarized and that no armed forces be
maintained there. The free city, West Berlin, could regulate its own economic,
administrative, and other affairs.241
The proposal could be regarded as limited in scope. However, the political
stakes were raised considerably by declarations of the Soviet government
to the effect that it regarded the wartime agreements relating to zones of
occupation, administration, and control machinery in Germany and Berlin
as null and void; that it proposed, for six months only, ‘not to make any
changes in the present procedure for military traffic’ of the three powers
238 Pravda, 11 November 1958 (italics mine).
239 Ibid.
240 The full text of the notes and Khrushchev’s comments are published in Pravda,
28 November 1958.
241 Ibid.
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between West Germany and West Berlin; and that if this grace period were
not used to reach an acceptable agreement, ‘the Soviet Union will then
carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the GDR’.242
Khrushchev’s demands raise the analytical problem, as in the Berlin cri-
sis of 1948-49, of whether Berlin in Moscow’s perspective was a lever
with which to achieve more far-reaching objectives or a prize in order to
stabilize the GDR. In a strict sense, West Berlin was the primary topic of
the note. But at the same time, the ‘free city’ proposal touched upon a
whole range of broad issues, such as the extent of Four Power rights and
responsibilities in Germany and Berlin; relations between West Berlin and
Bonn; access to West Berlin for West German and Western allied person-
nel and goods; recognition of the GDR, de facto or de iure; the role of East
Germany in European politics; the nature of relations between East and
West Germany; and, finally, the question of European security and super-
power relations. While it was theoretically possible to separate West
Berlin from larger issues, in practice it was impossible.
As in the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, therefore, it is appropriate to aban-
don the idea of a single objective pursued by the Soviet Union in the crisis
and to proceed instead from the idea that Khrushchev, during the pro-
longed campaign for the conclusion of a peace treaty, pursued a range of
objectives. The most important of these goals can be listed as follows: to
induce the Western powers to yield their position in Berlin – the goal most
unlikely to be realized; to enhance the domestic stability and the interna-
tional status of the GDR; to limit the influence of West Berlin as a show-
case of the West and enhance its sense of vulnerability by weakening its
ties with West Germany; to win final and irrevocable acceptance of the
post-war political and social order in Europe; and to neutralize the threat
to this order emanating from West Germany, that is, her declared policy of
non-recognition of the GDR (and the borders) and her desire to see Ger-
many united.243
The new archival evidence corroborates previous Western interpreta-
tions to the effect that Khrushchev was determined to change the status
quo and use the demand for the conclusion of a peace treaty for this pur-
242 Ibid.
243 This interpretation of a range of objectives rather than a single goal pursued by
Khrushchev in the Berlin crisis is shared by Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and
Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970),
pp. 89-90.
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pose. At a meeting between Khrushchev and Ulbricht in November 1960,
the Soviet leader told his East German counterpart that
When we put forward the question of a peace treaty we also made allowance
for the possibility of concluding an interim agreement, that is, an agreement
between the four powers on a temporary status for West Berlin for a limited
time, during which both Germanys would have to agree on the issues. If they
did not agree, then we would be free to conclude a peace treaty with the
GDR. This was our concession to Eisenhower so as to save his prestige and
not create the impression that we would expel them [the Western powers]
from West Berlin. This continues to remain true now. You Germans probably
will not agree amongst yourselves and then we will sign a peace treaty with
you, and the Western powers will not conclude any peace treaty at all. But
this does not worry us.244
What in part may have prompted Khrushchev to take the initiative in au-
tumn 1958 was his assumption that the ‘correlation of forces’ had again
shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The favourable trends, from the Sovi-
et perspective, included the launching of the Sputnik earth satellite in Oc-
tober 1957, which conveyed the notion that the Soviet Union was not only
a ‘revolutionary’ power ideologically but also a force to be reckoned with
technologically. The feat in space also had military implications: it demon-
strated that the Soviet Union was able to produce ICBMs. This in turn
raised concern in the United States about the possible emergence of a
‘missile gap’ in favor of the USSR. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union
never embarked on the production of first-generation ICBMs, the success-
ful launching of the Sputnik and subsequent highly publicized Soviet
ICBM flight tests heralded the end of United States invulnerability to
long-range Soviet missile attack. Predictably, the psychological repercus-
sions of this new reality and the concern about actual or potential shifts in
the balance of power to the West’s disadvantage were skilfully exploited
by Khrushchev during the Berlin crisis.245
Similar considerations apply to the economic competition between the
two world systems. The Soviet Union’s economic growth rates in the late
244 Record of the Meeting between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Comrade W. Ul-
bricht on 30 November 1960, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0742,
opis 6, por 4, papka 43, Secret. The transcript of the meeting as published by
Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’, Appendix A.
245 This was carefully documented by Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strate-
gic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1966).
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1950s, according to official Soviet data, were quite high, with industrial
production growing at more than ten percent, whereas corresponding
American growth rates were only little more than two percent. This gave
Khrushchev the idea that it would be possible ‘to catch up with and over-
take the USA by 1970’ – wishful thinking which, much to later Soviet em-
barrassment and regret, was enshrined as a goal in the 1959 Seven-Year
Plan and the 1961 party program. Finally, favourable trends in the ‘corre-
lation of forces’ also seemed to be inherent in the rapidly accelerating pro-
cesses of decolonization which severely shook the Western ‘imperialist’
system and, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory, threatened to pro-
duce the final collapse of the opposed socio-economic system.
By 1961, however, the ‘correlation of forces’ and corresponding per-
ceptions in Washington and Moscow had significantly shifted to the disad-
vantage of the Soviet Union. Soviet ICBM capabilities and claims had
turned out to be exaggerated. The ‘missile gap’ was recognized as what it
was: a myth. The rift with China, carefully concealed from the outside
world in the late 1950s, became public in 1961. The processes of decolo-
nization did not automatically and invariably favour the Soviet Union.
More often than not they merely led to the replacement of direct with indi-
rect Western control but certainly did not produce the collapse of the capi-
talist world system as predicted by Soviet ideology. Most important for the
present inquiry, the balance of power in Central Europe was shifting
against the Soviet Union. Western security cooperation and defense inte-
gration were proceeding at a rapid pace, including in particular the cre-
ation of the West German Bundeswehr and its possible equipment with nu-
clear weapons under a ‘dual key’ system, with joint German and Ameri-
can decision-making as to their use. Thus, in October 1958, the Soviet am-
bassador to West Germany, Andrei Smirnov, told Ulbricht that ‘the situa-
tion in West Germany has become much more complicated for us’ and that
‘In West Germany, they are continuing the arming of the Bundeswehr with
nuclear weapons, which are now legal’.246
246 Record of the Meeting with Ulbricht on 5 October 1958 (Pervukhin’s diary, entry
of 11 October 1958), TsKhSD, rolik 8875, fond 5, opis 49, delo 82, p. 7-8, as
quoted by Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’, p. 13. Smirnov, the Soviet ambas-
sador to Bonn, in conversation with Ulbricht, the Soviet ambassador to East
Berlin, Mikhail Pervukhin and Soviet foreign ministry official Sergei Astavin. –
The ‘arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons’ as well as the creation of
a legal basis in West Germany to that effect did not correspond to reality. A Nato
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Soviet and East German perceptions of shifts in the balance of power
increased concerns in Moscow and East Berlin that the West would make
more determined efforts to undermine the communist system in East Ger-
many. Thus, the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, Mikhail Pervukhin, told
Ulbricht in September 1958, that ‘the West is preparing to carry out a se-
ries of significant economic and political measures against the GDR’.247
Smirnov, agreed, warning that ‘the Western powers are talking openly
about activating the struggle against the GDR’. It was even possible that
‘the West will not stop at limited local provocations on GDR territory’.248
Trends in the socio-economic sphere, from Soviet and East German
perspectives, were of equal concern. Western European integration, as
epitomized by the success of the European Economic Community (EEC),
posed the danger of Western Europe outpacing Eastern Europe in econo-
mic performance, power and prosperity. The West German
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) made shambles of Ulbricht’s idea,
borrowed from Khrushchev’s precepts of Soviet-American competition, to
‘catch up with and overtake’ West Germany. Instead of narrowing, the
economic gap between the two German competitors threatened to widen
and exacerbate the problems of ideological competition and East German
viability and legitimacy. Pervukhin, in an internal report, deplored ‘the un-
controlled borders between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly
prompt the [East German] population to make a comparison between both
agreement of December 1957 gave custody of nuclear warheads to the Ameri-
cans, while the allies maintained the delivery vehicles. In the communications be-
tween Soviet officials in East and West Germany and the center in Moscow es-
sentially no distinction was drawn between equipping the German armed forces
with delivery vehicles and the ‘dual key’ system for their use (i.e. the U.S. would
always have to agree), on the one hand, and independent West German access to
nuclear weapons, on the other.
247 Record of the Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 26 September 1958 (Per-
vukhin’s diary, entry of 30 September 1958), TsKhSD, rolik 8873, fond 5, opis
49, delo 76, p. 1, ibid., p. 14. Pervukhin was Soviet ambassador to East Berlin
from 1958 to 1962.
248 Record of the Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 5 October 1958 (Per-
vukhin’s diary, entry of 11 October 1958), TsKhSD, rolik 8875, fond 5, opis 49,
delo 8276, p. 9, ibid. Smirnov was Soviet ambassador to West Germany from
1956 to 1966.
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parts of the city, which unfortunately does not always turn out in favour of
Democratic Berlin’.249
Three factors interacted to produce a severe socio-economic crisis in
the GDR in 1961.250 The first was a new wave of collectivization in agri-
culture. In 1949-58, the pace of conversion of private lands into collective
farms had been slow. At the end of 1958, as much as two-thirds of the to-
tal agricultural area was still in private hands. In 1959, however, the SED
leadership decided to make greater efforts in the ‘socialist construction in
the countryside’. Severe pressure was exerted on private farmers to join
collective farms, with 300,000 private farms changing ownership in that
year, and another 300,000 in the first four months of 1960. As a result, pri-
vate farming in the GDR practically ceased to exist but at the cost of a se-
vere decline in agricultural production. The history of forced collectivisa-
tion in the Stalin’s Soviet Union found its repetition in Ulbricht’s East
Germany.
A second factor of the crisis lay in a simultaneously launched ambitious
investment programme. Because of the disproportionally higher wartime
destruction as compared to West Germany, greater dismantling of equip-
ment by the occupying power, reparations extracted from current produc-
tion, utilization of forced labour for the benefit of the USSR, monetary
losses due to unequal trade with the Soviet Union and an aging capital
base the East German economy was in a dismal state. The Seven-Year
Plan of 1959-65, therefore, sought to create new capacities, and to create
them rapidly. Investment was to increase by 142 billion marks, which ex-
ceeded the GDR’s total net material product of 141 billion marks! Despite
consumer-oriented rhetoric, the emphasis was put on investment in heavy
industry. The means with which the unrealistic goals were to be achieved,
as an 1953, were demands by the SED for greater efforts by the working
population, higher work norms, tightened labour discipline and cutbacks
in private consumption.
The two factors, collectivization and tougher work norms for industrial-
ization, interacted to produce a third: an increasing shortage of skilled
labour, due primarily to the westward migration of East German farmers,
249 On Several Issues Regarding the Economic and Political Situation in Berlin, Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry Archives, delo 022/GDR, Referentyra p GDR, opis 4, por.
3, papka 27, p. 1, as quoted by Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’, p. 26.
250 The description of the factors producing a socio-economic crisis in the GDR in
1961 follows Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior, pp. 232-37.
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workers, technicians, and managers. To put things in perspective, in the
period from the end of the Second World War until 1961 a total of 3.8 mil-
lion people had emigrated to West Germany but only 565,000 had migrat-
ed to the east – a net loss of 3.25 million inhabitants.251 In the period
1949-61 the population of the GDR had decreased from more than 19 mil-
lion to little more than 17 million. In 1953, the year of the June workers’
revolt, more than 330,000 had left the GDR – the highest annual figure at
any time in the state’s existence. After a decline in 1954 and 1955, the
numbers rose to about 279,000 in 1956. They then fell again to 144,000 in
1959. But despite the then much lower base of the population, the number
of migrants increased in 1960 to nearly 200,000 people. In the last months
of 1960 and the first six months of 1961 the monthly rate rose dramatically
to reach between 20,000 and 30,000 people. A critical point had been
reached. Disruption of the whole complex planning and production pro-
cess became endemic since qualified replacements for farm managers,
skilled mechanics and engineers in heavy industry, or foremen in the con-
struction industry could no longer be found.
As in 1953, the serious consequences were well understood in Moscow.
The problem of the stability of the GDR and its repercussions on the Sovi-
et empire in Eastern Europe again moved to centre stage in the discussions
among and between Soviet and East German officials. As early as August
1958, Yuri Andropov, the then head of the Central Committee department
on relations with the communist and workers’ parties, wrote an urgent let-
ter to the CC in which he pointed to the significant rise in the number of
highly qualified East German personnel among the refugees, an increase
of 50 percent as compared to the previous year. The East German leader-
ship, he complained, claimed that the qualified cadres were leaving for the
higher standard of living in West Germany. However, reports from
refugees indicated that their motives were often more political than mate-
rial. ‘In view of the fact that the issue of the flight of [skilled workers and]
the intelligentsia from the GDR has reached a particularly critical phase’,
he warned, ‘it would be expedient to discuss this with Comrade Ulbricht,
251 Sources for these data are Die Flucht aus der Sowjetzone und die Sperrmaßnah-
men des kommunistischen Regimes vom 13. August 1961 (Bonn: Bundesminis-
terium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1961); DDR-Handbuch, 3rd ed., Cologne
1985, esp. p. 419; and Thomas Ammer, ‘Flucht aus der DDR’, Deutschland-
Archiv, No. 11 (1989), p. 1207.
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using his stay in the USSR to explain to him our apprehensions on this is-
sue.252
Discussions did ensue. In Western interpretation, it has generally been
accepted that it was Ulbricht who attempted to push Khrushchev toward
taking action on both the specific issue of stopping the outflow of refugees
and the larger problem of a peace treaty, and that Khrushchev resisted
these pressures. In private conversation between the two leaders on 30
November 1960 in Moscow, however, the Khrushchev wanted to separate
the two issues, his preference being the conclusion of a peace treaty, with
Ulbricht in the interim taking measures to close the Berlin loophole. At a
crucial juncture in the conversation, the Kremlin leader asked Ulbricht
about his views on the conclusion of a peace treaty.
N.S. Khrushchev: When will we sign it, in 1961?
W. Ulbricht: No!
N.S. Khrushchev: Why [not]?
W. Ulbricht: We don’t have the courage.
N.S. Khrushchev: Politically or economically?
W. Ulbricht: Just economically. Politically I am in favour.253
In a strange reversal of positions, the Soviet leader then attempted to con-
vince his East German counterpart that the peace treaty was a top priority;
that the risks of a Western military response were small; and that econo-
mic consequences could be contained. A peace treaty should be concluded
in 1961, either jointly with the Western powers or separately between the
USSR and the GDR. The date to be envisaged was the planned summit
conference with President Kennedy in June. As for the risks of Western
military counteraction in response to the conclusion of a separate treaty,
Khrushchev told Ulbricht that ‘we are almost certain that the Western
powers will not start a war’. On the economic front, he said, ‘we would
lose little economically by [that step]. ... Essentially, the existing situation
would be preserved.’254 In contrast, the major benefit of proceeding as he
suggested lay in the political realm.
252 Letter from Yu. Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee of 28 August 1958,
TsKhSD, rolik 8875, fond 5, opis 49, delo 82, pp. 1-3, as quoted by Harrison,
‘New Archival Evidence’, p. 17.
253 Record of the Meeting between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Comrade W. Ul-
bricht of 30 November 1960, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond 0742, opis
6, por. 4, papka 43, Secret. The transcript of the meeting as published by Harri-
son, ‘New Archival Evidence’, Appendix A.
254 Ibid.
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[P]olitically, our situation would improve, since it would mean a defeat of the
West. If we don’t sign a peace treaty in 1961, then when? If we don’t sign it
in 1961, then our prestige will have been dealt a blow and the position of the
West, and West Germany in particular, will be strengthened. We could get
away with not signing a peace treaty if an interim agreement on West Berlin
were concluded. If there is not an interim agreement, then we will sign a
peace treaty with the GDR and let them see their defeat. They will not start a
war. Of course, in signing a peace treaty, we will have to put our rockets on
military alert. But, luckily, our adversaries still haven’t gone crazy; they still
think, and their nerves still aren’t bad.
The priority which Khrushchev gave to political issues, however, by no
means indicated a lack of concern about East Germany’s economic crisis,
her vulnerability to West German pressure and the costs of empire. Like
Brezhnev and Gorbachev subsequently, he was incensed about what he
perceived to be unacceptable East German economic dependency on West
Germany and the apparent necessity for the Soviet Union and other War-
saw Pact countries for strategic reasons to stabilize economic conditions in
the GDR. Both ‘our and your fault’, he told Ulbricht, ‘lies in the fact that
we did not sufficiently think through and work out economic measures.
We should have thought more precisely about liberating the GDR econo-
my from the FRG. ... We did not know that the GDR is so vulnerable to
West Germany. This is not good; we must correct this.’ He then put the
blame squarely on Ulbricht: ‘[Y]ou did not offer resistance [to the West
Germans], you did not disentangle yourselves, you got used to thinking
that Germany was [still] one.’255
Furthermore, the record elucidates in vivid detail Soviet awareness of
the costs of empire. It also reveals an acute dilemma: the aversion to sub-
sidize the GDR but at the same time the perceived necessity of having to
do so in the interest of safeguarding the Soviet strategic position in the
centre of Europe and to improve the competitive position of East Germany
vis-à-vis West Germany. In typically colourful and contradictory
Khrushchevian fashion, he told Ulbricht: ‘We must create a special group
in our Gosplan with [East German Minister of Economic Affairs, Bruno]
Leuschner, which will receive everything needed on his demand. There is
no other way. The GDR must develop and maintain the increase [sic] in
the standard of living of its population.’ But Khrushchev then clarified
that everything should not to be taken too literally. For instance, ‘you ask
255 Ibid. (italics mine).
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[us] for 68 tons of gold. This is inconceivable. We can’t have a situation
where you buy goods and we must pay for them. We don’t have much
gold, and we must keep it for an emergency.’ Earlier in the private conver-
sation, he had warned: ‘[Y]ou will not encroach on our gold. Why give
you gold? If you need cocoa, coffee, rubber, then buy it in Ceylon or In-
donesia. Build something there. But free us from this and don’t thrust your
hands into our pockets.’ Ignoring the exigencies of central planning and
the close involvement of the Soviet Union in East German economic af-
fairs, Khrushchev complained: ‘By old habit, you try to do everything
through us. You should have learned how to walk on your own two feet in-
stead of leaning on us all the time.’256
The evidence also confirms that other Warsaw Pact member countries
were not at all pleased by the prospect of having to participate in a mas-
sive subsidization of East Germany in the interest of maintaining the via-
bility of the Soviet empire. At the summit conference of leaders of the so-
cialist bloc, from 3 to 5 August 1961, Khrushchev praised Ulbricht for his
‘heroic job’ in the construction of socialism in the GDR, notably the com-
pletion of collectivization of agriculture (‘you cannot build socialism with-
out it’). Without referring directly to the Polish and Czechoslovak party
leaders Władysław Gomułka and Antonín Novotný, he chided them for
‘national narrow-mindedness’ and excessive ‘enthusiasm about peaceful
construction’ to the detriment of the interests of the socialist community as
a whole. He then proceeded to ask two questions: (1) Do we need the
GDR as the first line of defense? (2) Do we have to maintain the high liv-
ing standards in the GDR even at the expense of improvements in the So-
viet Union and Eastern European countries?257 Both questions he an-
swered in the affirmative, and for the benefit of the Polish and Czechoslo-
vak comrades he painted the likely consequences of a failure to support
the GDR in stark colours. A lowering of living standards of the GDR to
the East European level would lead to East Germany being swallowed by
West Germany and would create an intolerable strategic situation: ‘[T]he
Bundeswehr would advance to the Polish border ... to the border with
Czechoslovakia ... nearer to our Soviet border.’258
256 Ibid. (italics mine).
257 Transcript of summit conference, TsKhSD, fond 5, opis 49, delo 365, 11. 165,
168, 170, as quoted by Zubok, ‘The Berlin Crisis’, p. 31.
258 Ibid. (italics mine).
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On the surface, the November 1960 exchanges appear to indicate that it
was Khrushchev who was pushing for political action despite economic
constraints, whereas Ulbricht was attempting to put the brakes on Soviet
political initiatives because of economic considerations. To repeat, where-
as the Soviet leader was still aiming at solutions within a Four Power
framework and a peace treaty, his East German counterpart wanted an im-
mediate practical solution of the problem of open borders around Berlin
and trying to persuade his Soviet counterpart to take unilateral action. This
basic asymmetry was clearly recognized by Pervukhin. In a ‘top secret’
letter to Foreign Minister Gromyko, he wrote:
Trying to liquidate the remnants of the occupation period as soon as possible,
our German friends sometimes demonstrate impatience and a somewhat one-
sided approach to this problem, not always heeding the interests of the entire
socialist camp or the international situation at the given moment. Evidence for
this, for example, is their effort to stop the free movement between the GDR
and West Berlin as soon as possible by any means, which in the present con-
ditions would complicate carrying out the struggle for a peace treaty. Recog-
nizing the correctness of our position that the liquidation of the remains of the
occupation period is possible only on the basis of a peace treaty, our friends
therefore urge a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.259
A decision in principle to close the borders was apparently reached at the
3-5 August 1961 meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Moscow. The exten-
sive but still incomplete record does not reveal whether a final decision
was made at the conference. There is no mention of a wall to be built. No
reference exists as to whether the Soviet and East German leaders met
separately before, during, or after the conference to discuss details of im-
plementation.260 Ulbricht was to state later that the meeting had agreed ‘to
carry out the various measures gradually’, which could mean that the de-
tails were left up to him as long as there would be no serious complica-
tions.261 Whatever the case may be, by the summer of 1961 Khrushchev
259 Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko, 19 May 1961,
Top Secret, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, fond: Referentyra po GDR, opis
6, por. 34, inv. 193/3, Vol. 1, papka 46. The letter as published by Harrison, ‘New
Archival Evidence’, Appendix D (italics mine).
260 On these issues, see Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’, pp. 47-51.
261 Letter from Ulbricht and the SED Central Committee Delegation to the CPSU
Twenty-second Congress in Moscow to Khrushchev, 30 October 1961, SED Cen-
tral Archives, NL 182/1206. Text as published by Harrison, ‘New Archival Evi-
dence’, Appendix K.
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had become convinced that drastic unilateral action to close the borders
had become inevitable if the empire was to be maintained and that the
green light had to be given to the East German leadership to act according-
ly.
There is, of course, another interpretation. The counter-argument holds
that Ulbricht was hardly ever a pliable and passive ally, and as the domes-
tic situation in the GDR deteriorated, he turned even more intractable. He
disregarded Soviet advice and defied instructions. In particular, he ‘acted
against Soviet wishes regarding the control regime at the Berlin sectoral
border’. He ‘instructed [sic] Khrushchev on how to handle negotiations
with the West’. Finally, ‘he forced Khrushchev to act’. The Soviet leader
‘caved in’ because he wanted to forestall ever more ‘unilateral actions’ by
Ulbricht, and he wanted ‘to get him off his back’ once and for all.262
Such reasoning is fundamentally erroneous. In natural history, the tail
does not wag the dog. It is the other way around. This fact of natural life
applies to the history of Soviet-East German relations as well. Given the
Kremlin’s firm determination to hold on to its imperial possessions in Eu-
rope but faced with the prospect of one of its allies collapsing, resolute ac-
tion was, to use a favourite Soviet term, ‘objectively’ required; and
Khrushchev ultimately did what he himself – not Ulbricht – thought what
was necessary.263
The measures adopted had profound consequences.
Consolidation of the Soviet Empire and the ‘Correlation of Forces’
In a letter written one month after the imposition of border controls, Ul-
bricht was to inform Khrushchev that the measures of 13 August had been
a tremendous success. Not only ‘must [I] say that the adversary undertook
8.
262 This is the line of argument developed by Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets
up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961; quotes on pp. 219 and
223.
263 The ‘East German tail wags the Soviet dog’ theory was competently rejected also
by Gerhard Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963: Drohpolitik und
Mauerbau (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 285-87. To emphasize the point:
It is a well known phenomenon of life, including international life, that it is far
easier to obstruct and prevent decisions than to compel someone to take deci-
sions.
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fewer countermeasures than expected’, but the following aims had been
achieved:
1. ‘The protection of the GDR against the organization of a civil war and
military provocations from West Berlin.’
2. ‘The cessation of the economic and cultural undermining of the capital
of the GDR by the West Berlin swamp.’
3. ‘A change in the political situation will occur. The Bonn government
has understood that the policy of revenge and the plan to roll back the
GDR ... have been destroyed for all time. This will later have great ef-
fects on the tactics of the Western powers regarding Poland and
Czechoslovakia.’
4. ‘The authority of the GDR state, which was weakened by its tolerance
towards the subversive measures from West Berlin, was strengthened
and a revolution in the thinking of the population of the capital and the
GDR has occurred.’264
Soviet analysts agreed. They noted that ‘the rug was pulled from under the
feet of the adventurist elements, who had hoped to kindle a military con-
flict at the open border between the GDR and West Berlin.’265 In West
Germany, they asserted, Adenauer’s policies from positions of strength, or
Politik der Stärke, came to be seen as unworkable. The building of the
wall ‘significantly consolidated the domestic situation in the GDR and
contributed to the successful building of socialism in that country’.266 In
fact, that process was regarded as being so successful that, in the 1970s
and 1980s, the GDR came to be considered as politically the most stable
and economically and technologically the most advanced country in the
Soviet bloc. From Moscow’s perspective, in that period the GDR was
changing from a liability to an asset. It retained its position as a strategic
264 Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 15 September 1961, SED Central Archives,
Central Committee files, Büro Walter Ulbricht, J IV, 2/202/130. Text as published
by Harrison, ‘New Archival Evidence’, Appendix I.
265 A. S. Grossman, ‘Granitsa mira’, Voprosy istorii, No. 10 (1969), p. 201; V. G.
Trukhanovskii, ed., Istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki
SSSR, Vol. 3: 1945-1963 gg. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1964),
pp. 211-212; and N. N. Inozemtsev, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia posle vtoroi
mirovoi voiny, Vol. 3: 1956‑1964 gg. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1962), pp. 523-34.
266 Grossman, ‘Granitsa mira’, p. 201; similarly Georgi M. Akopov, Zapadnyi
Berlin. Problemy i resheniia (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1974),
pp. 164‑255; and Viktor Vysotskii, Zapadnyi Berlin i ego mesto v sisteme sovrem-
menykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Mysl, 1971), pp. 237-45.
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outpost but one that no longer needed to be subsidized, and was perceived
to contribute to making the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe more viable.
However, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, two developments
marred Moscow’s perceptions of fundamental progress achieved in the
consolidation of empire, one rather predictable and consistent with the
East German success story, the other seemingly contradicting it: (1) the
rising self-confidence of the SED leaders, of both Ulbricht and Honecker,
made the GDR a much more difficult country to deal with, and (2) despite
its apparent success, the GDR was regarded as drifting again into danger-
ous dependencies on West Germany.
Soviet perceptions of the progress that was made in the consolidation of
the empire were closely tied yet again to the ‘correlation of forces’. One of
the most important lessons which the Soviet leaders derived from the
Berlin crisis was that of the continued importance of military power, both
conventional and nuclear, in international affairs. As a result, as other in-
struments of exerting influence and retaining imperial control were be-
coming dull, the military instrument was sharpened. Strong attempts were
made by successive Soviet leaderships to change the military balance in
their favor. In the early post-war period, the Soviet Union had achieved
preponderance in conventional weapons. In both East and West, the asym-
metries were generally perceived to be so wide that the Soviet Union was
considered to be able to overrun Western Europe. To counteract this ad-
vantage, the United States, beginning in 1947, had begun to build a coun-
tervailing force in the form of nuclear weapons. But Western Europe was
not to escape its predicament as a Soviet ‘hostage’ since the USSR, too,
transformed itself into a formidable nuclear power. This transformation
began at the theatre nuclear level in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was
extended thereafter to intermediate‑range nuclear forces, with the deploy-
ment of a large bomber and missile force. After the Cuban missile crisis,
the military build-up was to include intercontinental forces, the Soviet
Union achieving rough strategic parity with the United States by the end
of the 1960s. Finally, in the 1970s, the Soviet Union embarked on a pro-
gram of developing capabilities for intervention and power projection far
beyond its borders.
The improvement of the Soviet position in the military balance of pow-
er was duly noted by Khrushchev. As he was to say later: ‘No longer were
we contaminated by Stalin’s fear. No longer did we look at the world
through his eyes. Now it was our enemies who trembled in their boots.
Thanks to our missiles, we could deliver a nuclear bomb to a target at any
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place in the world. No longer was the industrial heartland of the United
States invulnerable to our counterattack.’267 Khrushchev continued: ‘Of
course, we tried to derive maximum advantage from the fact that we were
the first to launch our rockets into space. We wanted to exert pressure on
American militarists – and also to influence the minds of more reasonable
politicians.’268
Pressure based on vague nuclear threats was exerted not only on Ameri-
can ‘militarists’ but also, in fact, even more so, on European policy mak-
ers and public opinion. This design to safeguard Soviet security interests
and expand Soviet influence was first used during the Suez crisis in 1956,
when Khrushchev issued nuclear threats against Britain and France. It was
also applied during the protracted controversy over Berlin between 1958
and 1961, when he threatened that, in the event of war, NATO military
bases in various European countries would be destroyed by Soviet nuclear
strikes (in Italy, ‘even if they are in orange groves’, or in Greece, in ‘olive
groves’);269 that Germany would be ‘reduced to dust’;270 and that ‘the very
existence of the population of West Germany would be called in
question’.271
Khrushchev, in retrospect, held such threats to have been effective: If a
third world war were to be unleashed, he quoted Adenauer as having said
numerous times, West Germany would be the first country to perish. ‘I
was pleased to hear this, and Adenauer was absolutely right in what he
said’. Khrushchev then continued: ‘For him to be making public state-
ments was a great achievement on our part. Not only were we keeping our
number one enemy in line, but Adenauer was helping to keep our other
enemies in line, too.’272
In Khrushchev’s perspective, too, significant gains had been made in
Berlin and Germany. The West had ‘swallowed one bitter pill’.273 Provid-
267 Khrushchev Remembers, p. 53.
268 Ibid.
269 Pravda, 12 August 1961.
270 Ibid., 8 August 1961.
271 Ibid., 12 August 1961.
272 Khrushchev Remembers, p. 569.
273 This is a phrase used by Khrushchev; ibid., p. 509. The same metaphor occurs in
reference to the assumptions of Khrushchev and his supporters in the Presidium
of the CPSU, in Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers, transl. P. Deriabin, with
an introduction and commentary by Frank Gibney and a foreword by Edward
Crankshaw (London: Collins, 1965), p. 161.
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ed the United States could be put under more direct pressure and confront-
ed with a more credible threat, and its sense of vulnerability raised to the
European level, conditions in Central Europe would perhaps get ‘more
mature’, and the West might then be prepared to swallow another bitter
pill. Undoubtedly, this was part of the reasoning underlying Khrushchev’s
attempt to improve Soviet strategic capabilities and deploy intermediate-
range nuclear missiles in Cuba.
The lesson which Brezhnev and his colleagues drew from the failed
venture in the Caribbean was not that military power in the nuclear age
was ineffective. In their perspective even greater efforts had to be made to
catch up with and overtake the United States in the military competition.
Military power came to be regarded by them as one of the main tools with
which to advance the claim to political equality with the United States and
play a stronger role in global politics. In Eastern Europe, as demonstrated
by the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, military pow-
er remained necessary for enforcing bloc discipline. And towards the
Western European countries, above all West Germany, it served as an in-
strument with which to win acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Euro-
pe; establish a code of conduct in their relations with the ‘socialist com-
munity’ (that is, ‘non-interference’ in its internal affairs); and influence
their domestic and foreign policies in directions favourable to the Soviet
Union. In conformity with such aims, Soviet analysts later were to write
that ‘In conjunction with the liquidation of the strategic invulnerability of
the United States, the belief of the countries of Western Europe in the so-
called “nuclear guarantees” of their trans-oceanic partner was being erod-
ed. Europe began to recognize what a catastrophe a contemporary rocket-
nuclear war would be for the continent. From this stems the general inter-
est of the Europeans to avoid a military conflict, to abstain from military-
political confrontation, and to develop diverse contacts between Eastern
and Western Europe.’274
To summarize Soviet attitudes and policies on the German problem un-
der Khrushchev and looking ahead to the Brezhnev era, the building of the
Berlin wall had alleviated East Germany’s perennial manpower and cur-
rency drain, enhanced the country’s economic viability, induced the popu-
lation to come to terms with communist rule and improved the GDR’s
274 A. O. Chubar’ian, ed., Evropa – veka. Problemy mira i bezopasnosti (Moscow:
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1985), p. 135.
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chances for political legitimacy. To the extent that the Soviet leaders were
still concerned about possible Western challenges to its empire in Eastern
Europe, they could find reassurance in the fact that the wall, and with it
the post-war borders and order in Europe, were effectively guarded by the
East German armed forces and border troops, with the Soviet army in the
background. There was a new confidence in Moscow that was reflected in
Soviet attitudes towards East-West relations. Détente in the late 1960s and
early 1970s was authoritatively explained and widely believed in Moscow
to be the result of significant changes in the ‘correlation of world forces’,
meaning primarily a shift in the military balance in favour of the Soviet
Union.275 As Georgi Arbatov, one of chief theoreticians of East‑West
détente claimed, if the ‘imperialist powers’ were now becoming partners
in efforts to lessen the threat of war and the normalization of relations, this
was ‘not because of any change in the class nature of their policy’.276 It
was because of the fact that these powers had ‘to adapt their internal and
foreign policies to objective realities, the new correlation of forces [which,
in turn] had resulted from the activity of the Communist Party, the Soviet
state, and the entire Soviet people to strengthen the economic and defense
might of the country’.277 The Kremlin leaders’ new confidence as well as
a new stridency was apparent also in the Soviet Union’s relations with
West Germany. Bonn’s Ostpolitik, like détente, was seen by them as an-
other example of the West’s adaptation to the ‘new realities’.
Soviet Responses to West Germany’s Ostpolitik
In fact, the growth of Soviet military power, the consolidation of the GDR
and the waning prospects of German unification did induce West Germany
to modify its policies towards the East. Its standard position to the effect
that any relaxation of tension and ‘normalization’ of relations in Europe
could and should take place only as a result of German unification became
untenable. Reunification, as West German policy makers now assumed,
could only occur in the context of détente, not prior to it. Thus, a modus
9.
275 Brezhnev’s report to the Twenty-fifth CPSU Congress, Pravda, 25 February
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276 Georgi Arbatov, ‘O Sovetsko-Amerikanskikh otnosheniakh’, Kommunist, No. 3
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vivendi had to be reached first not only with the Soviet Union but also
with its dependencies in Eastern Europe, including the GDR.
Policy changes, therefore, were put into effect in the period from 1966
to 1969 by the Grand Coalition government of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger
(CDU) and Willy Brandt (SPD). The changes included the willingness of
the federal government to enter into negotiations with all the European
communist states for a ‘normalization’ of relations, including the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations; consent to the establishment of contacts
with the GDR at all governmental and non‑governmental levels; inclusion
of the GDR in an agreement on the renunciation of force; abandonment of
claims that Germany continued to exist as a legal entity in the borders of
1937; and adoption of the position that the 1938 Munich agreement was
concluded by the threat of force and was invalid ex post facto.
However, from the vantage point of the Soviet leadership under Brezh-
nev, Kosygin and Podgorny the policy changes were inadequate and po-
tentially dangerous. They did not go far enough in the direction of the
recognition of the GDR as a separate state but too far in encouraging the
Eastern European governments to normalize political relations and benefit
from the West German Wirtschaftswunder. The result was a campaign of
severe pressure on Bonn and the attempt to isolate West Germany both in
her relations towards the East and within the Western alliance. The cam-
paign had several facets.
First, the Soviet leaders construed a ‘USA-FRG axis’ as a major threat
to European security and world peace by declaring that ‘each one of the
peculiar partners conspires to use the other for its own goals’, the United
States using the German problem as a ‘pretext with which to continue the
stationing of troops in Europe and as a lever with which to influence the
politics and economics of Western Europe, and the Federal Republic using
the United States for the realization of its revanchist plans to change the
map of Europe’.278
Second, French President Charles de Gaulle’s NATO initiatives,
France’s exit from the military organization of the alliance and the ensuing
Franco-Soviet rapprochement were held up as an example to follow. West
Germany, in other words, should follow the French lead.
278 Brezhnev at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, Materialy III-ogo s’’ezda KPSS
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1966), p. 26.
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Third, the Soviet leaders appealed to latent anti-German attitudes in
both Eastern and Western Europe, reminding the ‘peoples of Europe’ that
there still existed a ‘threat stemming from the aspirations of the West Ger-
man revenge seekers’.279
Fourth, the Soviet leaders refused to differentiate between the major po-
litical parties in the Federal Republic. Although Brezhnev, at the Karlovy
Vary Conference of European Communist and Workers’ Parties in April
1967, had endorsed cooperation between communists and social
democrats, in practice the SPD was excluded as a possible partner. The
ideological justification used was the charge that after the promulgation of
its 1958 Godesberg programme the party had fallen into the hands of
‘rightist leaders’.280
Fifth, Moscow exploited the fact that in the period from 1966 until
1969 the nationalist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
was able to poll more than 5 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elec-
tions in some of the German Länder and thereby gain representation in the
state legislature. The Soviet leaders asserted not only that neo-Nazism was
on the rise but also that the federal German government had ‘much in
common with the political aims of the neo-Nazis of all shadings’.281
A sixth issue turned against the West German government was Bonn’s
presumed quest to gain access to nuclear weapons and, related to this, its
alleged refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
The conclusion that Moscow drew from the alleged ‘militarist’, ‘revan-
chist’ and ‘neo-Nazi’ turn of West German politics and society was that
the Federal Republic could ‘not claim the same equal status’ as other
sovereign states.282 It gave this argument an ominous twist by demanding,
in essence, a right of intervention in West German affairs. It did so by re-
ferring to Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter which, as leg-
es speciales to Article 2 (lex generalis), sanction coercive measures
279 Ibid., p. 27.
280 See, for instance, the analysis by V.G. Vasin, Godesbergskaia programma SDPG.
Otkrytoe otrochenie Marksizma (Moscow: Politizdat 1963). ‘Right’ in the Soviet
ideological frame of reference meant ‘revisionist’ in the direction of ‘unprinci-
pled’ compromise and accommodation, and abandonment of the class struggle.
281 Soviet Government Declaration on the State of Affairs in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Neues aus der UdSSR, Soviet embassy, Bonn, 1 February 1967.
282 Aide memoire of the Soviet Government to the Government of the German Fed-
eral Republic on the Question of Renunciation of Force, 5 July 1968, Neues
Deutschland, 14 July 1968.
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against a former enemy state of the anti-Hitler coalition. On this basis, it
threatened that ‘the Soviet Union together with other peace loving states is
prepared, in accordance with the obligations emanating from the Potsdam
Agreement and other international agreements, to take, if necessary, all the
measures which arise from the state of affairs in the Federal Republic of
Germany.’283
What, then, were the results of the propagandistic assault on Bonn? By
and large, they were negligible. By 1969 it was evident that the attempt at
isolating West Germany within the Western alliance had failed. De Gaulle
refused to bend the Franco-Soviet entente into an anti-German direction.
The Federal Republic adhered to its close ties with the United States while
continuing to strengthen its relations with France continuing its efforts at
deepening Western European integration. At the same time, the electorate
was ready for a change of power in Bonn – a fact that had much to do with
the internal divisions and the weakness of leadership in the CDU and
changes in German society but very little with Soviet policy. As a result,
any ‘scientifically based’ approach in Moscow sooner or later would have
had to abandon the approach of circumventing and isolating the govern-
ment in Bonn and refusing to deal with the main political forces in the
country. Conditions in Eastern Europe were also ‘ripe’ for new Soviet per-
spectives and policies on Germany. Before the Warsaw Pact military inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, ‘revisionism’, reformism and
the rising attractiveness of West German social democratic ideas and West
German capital had posed a challenge to imperial control. The interven-
tion, paradoxically, untied the hands of the Soviet leadership and facilitat-
ed a more favourable response to the Ostpolitik of the new coalition gov-
ernment of SPD and FDP, formed in October 1969.
In his inaugural address, Chancellor Willy Brandt, for the first time in
the history of official government statements to the Bundestag, spoke of
‘two states in Germany’. Bonn, thereby, in line with the demands put for-
ward by Moscow and East Berlin, was taking another step towards accep-
tance of the post-war ‘realities’. The new government, almost immediately
after coming to power, also proceeded to sign the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion treaty. Transformation of Soviet military preponderance into political
influence, stabilization of the empire and the achievement of a modus
vivendi based on the division of Germany now appeared to be within reach
283 Neues aus der UdSSR, Soviet embassy, Bonn, 1 February 1967.
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of Soviet policy in Europe. To accelerate the process, Brezhnev committed
himself to new appraisals of West Germany by declaring that the forma-
tion of the coalition government led by the SPD represented a ‘significant
change in the constellation of political forces in the German Federal Re-
public’.284 Similarly, the communiqué of the Warsaw Pact summit confer-
ence of December 1969 noted trends in West Germany ‘directed at a real-
istic policy of cooperation and understanding’ in Europe and characterized
Bonn’s signature of the non-proliferation treaty as a ‘positive element’.285
In the course of the 1970s, West Germany fully participated in the pro-
cess of East-West détente. It joined the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE), concluded treaties for the normalization of rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, set its relation-
ship with the GDR on a new footing, facilitated the September 1971
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, played an active role in arms control
negotiations, such as the Mutual Balanced Forces Reductions (MBFR)
talks in Vienna, provided an important impetus to East-West economic co-
operation and achieved some of the highest growth rates in trade of the
Western industrialized countries with the USSR. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that West Germany in the 1970s became an interlocuteur privilégié
of the Soviet Union in the West.
Soviet analysts predicted that the 1970s would be a period of ‘broad de-
ployment of political forces in all directions’ with a favourable outcome
also for the Soviet Union because of the fact that ‘the majority of the West
German population maintains the position of recognizing realities and de-
sires peace and good-neighbourly relations with all the peoples of Euro-
pe’.286 Indeed, in retrospect, one can classify the 1970s as a golden era in
Soviet-West German relations. Soviet analysts writing at the end of the
decade were generous in their praise. The relations between the socialist
countries and the Federal Republic in the 1970s had been an ‘important
factor of stability and good-neighbourliness in Europe’.287 They pointed in
284 At a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship meeting, Pravda, 29 October 1969.
285 Pravda, 4 December 1969.
286 D. E. Mel’nikov, ‘Vneshniaia politika FRG’, in Federativnaia Respublika Ger-
manii, published in the series Ekonomika i politika stran sovremmenogo kapital-
izma (Moscow: Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniia, 1974), p. 463 (italics mine).
287 See, for instance, V. Iu. Kuz’min, Vazhnyi faktor stabil’nosti i dobrososedstva v
Evrope: sotsialisticheskie strany i FRG v 70-e gody (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye
otnosheniia, 1980).
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particular to the signing of the August 1970 Moscow treaty and its provi-
sions on the non-use of force between the USSR and the FRG; the recog-
nition by the FRG of the European borders and the European territorial re-
alities created at the end of the Second World War; and her contribution to
the development of détente.288
What, then, is the significance of this era in historical perspective? The
Soviet Union and West Germany, it would seem, were engaged in a futile
effort at normalizing the abnormal. It is true that some of their interests
coincided. They both wanted to reduce the risk of military conflict in Cen-
tral Europe. They saw benefits in the expansion of trade. Yet their goals
remained fundamentally different. The Soviet Union had no intention of
permitting spillovers from the improvement in political relations to the
ideological sphere. Notwithstanding CSCE, Moscow continued to rule out
any ‘interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries’. As the
on-going military build-up and the lack of progress in the MBFR talks
demonstrated, it also objected to an extension of détente to the military
competition. Specifically on the German problem, it continued to insist on
the idea of the existence of two separate German states, on the perman-
ence of the post-war European borders and on West Berlin as a special en-
tity that was not to be governed by the Federal Republic, with ties between
the two entities to be kept at a minimum.
West German political leaders and public opinion, in contrast, hoped
that the ideological rigidities in the Soviet bloc would soften and that both
the military preponderance of the Warsaw Pact and the pace of the arms
competition in Europe would be reduced. Regarding the German problem,
they expected that the improvement of political relations would create
favourable conditions for overcoming the division of Germany and the
continent – a fact underlined by the West German government’s Letter on
German Unity attached to the 1970 Moscow treaty.289 They also expected
that the viability of West Berlin would be enhanced by an expansion of
288 B.M. Khalosha, Voenno-politicheskie soiuzy imperializma: osnovnye osobennosti
i tendentsiia v 70-kh – nachale 80-kh godov (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), pp. 271-72.
289 The letter was delivered by the West German embassy in Moscow to the Soviet
foreign ministry shortly before the signing of the August 1970 Soviet-West Ger-
man treaty on the renunciation of force. Moscow officially acknowledged its ex-
istence only in April 1972, as the Bundestag was debating ratification of the
treaty; see Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev
to Gorbachev, Studies of the Harriman Institute (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1990), p. 185.
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contacts between the city and West Germany and by its inclusion in the
country’s trade agreements with the USSR and other CMEA members.
The existence of a wide chasm between Soviet and West German ex-
pectations connected with the ‘normalization’ of relations can be corrobo-
rated on the basis of new evidence. Two weeks prior to the signing of the
Moscow treaty, and as part of the preparations for the removal of Ulbricht
from the office of party chief, Brezhnev told Erich Honecker in private
conversation in Moscow: ‘We don’t have any erroneous ideas about
Brandt and West German social democracy. Illusions are out of place.’
There wasn’t a single example of a social democratic party having em-
barked on a socialist transformation, and such a development would not
occur in West Germany either but even more than that, West Germany
continued to aim at the transformation and liquidation of the GDR. In that
respect, there was essentially
no difference between Brandt and [Bavarian prime minister and CSU chair-
man Franz Josef] Strauß. Perhaps one can’t put it like that now. But it is true.
Both are for the capitalist system, both are for the liquidation of the GDR.
Brandt is under ... pressure. He has to come to agreements with us. He hopes
in this way to realize his goal in relation to the GDR, the social-democratiza-
tion of the GDR.290
The West Germans, Brezhnev went on, ‘are strong economically. They are
trying to gain influence in the GDR, to swallow the GDR, one way or an-
other.’ The Soviet Union and the socialist community, however, would
safeguard the results of victory in World War II. They would neither per-
mit a development that would weaken their position in the GDR nor per-
mit an Anschluss of the GDR. ‘On the contrary’, he (erroneously) predict-
ed, ‘the trench between the GDR and the FRG will become deeper.’291
This prediction was tied to a normative statement: ‘There is, there cannot
be and it should not come to a process of rapprochement between the FRG
and the GDR.’292
Brezhnev made equally blunt statements about the Federal Republic’s
position concerning the ‘special nature’ of intra-German relations. Special
290 Record of a Meeting Between L.I. Brezhnev and Erich Honecker on 28 July
1970. The document is from the Central Party Archives of the SED, publ. by Pe-
ter Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro [Vol. I]: Die Akte Honecker (Berlin: Rowohlt,
1991), Doc. 15, p. 287.
291 Ibid., p. 287.
292 Ibid. (italics mine).
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relations between the two Germanys were unacceptable. The GDR ‘is part
of the socialist camp. That will never be different. What, then, is the point
about the talk [in the FRG] that the GDR “cannot be a foreign country to
us”? Is it [the GDR] a state that is independent from West Germany or
not?’293
Finally, in a meeting between top leaders of the CPSU and the SED,
held less than two weeks after the signing of the Moscow treaty, Brezh-
nev, according to the SED’s archives, tried to assuage ‘Comrade Walter
[Ulbricht’s] disquiet about West Berlin’. The Soviet party chief had told
Brandt that limited compromises on the issue were possible only if two
conditions were met. Brandt had to recognize, first, that ‘West Berlin does
not belong to the FRG and will never belong to it’ and, second, that a ‘po-
litical presence of the FRG in West Berlin will not be accepted’.294
Brezhnev’s clarifications reveal an uncompromising commitment to the
division of Germany. But the viability of the Soviet Union’s stance on the
German problem continued, in turn, to depend on the viability of the
GDR. In retrospect, this was recognized by, among others, Valentin Falin,
one of the chief architects of the Soviet response to Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
‘At the beginning of the 1970s,’ he wrote, he was optimistic on that score.
‘I thought that [the GDR] had reserves in order to solve the existing prob-
lems and to correct mistakes that had been committed.’295 Brezhnev and
other top Soviet leaders were of the same opinion. However, as will be
shown in the next section, they were also becoming increasingly con-
cerned about internal developments in the GDR and went as far as draw-
ing the conclusion that Ulbricht was a satrap who was neither able to cor-
rect nor even willing to admit ‘mistakes’.
293 Ibid. (italics mine).
294 Excerpts from a secret protocol on the meeting between a delegation of the CC of
the CPSU and a delegation of the CC of the SED on 21 August 1970 in Moscow.
The document is from the Central Party Archives of the SED, published by Peter
Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro [Vol. I]: Die Akte Honecker (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991),
Doc. 16, p. 290.
295 Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), p. 64.
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Soviet Responses to East Germany’s Assertiveness
Ulbricht regarded détente as a threat to East Germany’s stability. This per-
ception was not lessened by the fact that, after 1969, the SPD had formed
a coalition government in Bonn. Whenever the SED had felt confident
enough to compete with the West German Social Democrats for the hearts
and minds of all Germans it had opened a horror chamber: the long-de-
clared-dead Geist des Sozialdemokratismus, the ghost or spirit of social
democracy, had risen in the GDR and haunted the communist party faith-
ful.296 The ghost had appeared in full view in the 1966 SPD-SED corre-
spondence with its projected speakers’ exchange and it reappeared during
the 1970 visit by chancellor Willy Brandt in Erfurt, where he was given an
enthusiastic welcome, foreshadowing the equally exuberant welcome that
would be extended to chancellor Kohl in Dresden in December 1989.
As East-West détente began to develop in 1969, therefore, Ulbricht and
other orthodox East European communist leaders were apprehensive and
suspicious that the Soviet Union would move too fast and too far in its
rapprochement with West Germany, thereby forcing them to participate in
a process which they thought they could not easily manage.297 In particu-
lar, there was anxiety in East Berlin that Moscow would make deals with
the three Western allies and West Germany at the expense of East German
interests; abandon the joint Soviet-East German demand for full recogni-
tion of the GDR under international law; fail to support the GDR in its
claim to codify the status of West Berlin as an ‘independent political enti-
ty’; refuse to endorse the East German quest for exclusive rights in matters
concerning transit to Berlin; and continue to exercise rights on matters
concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole, thus limiting East Germany
sovereignty.
The East German party leader, as a consequence, tried to define the
Warsaw Pact’s rules of engagement with the West and bend them in a
more restrictive and ideologically orthodox direction than was thought ex-
10.
296 Geist in German has two meanings. It can be translated either as spirit or ghost.
Sozialdemokratismus, in communist pejorative usage, had to be understood as a
militant form of spreading social democratic ideas and policies.
297 Concerning the Soviet-East German rift in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see
Gerhard Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp: The Soviet
Union, East Germany, and the German Problem, 1965-1972, trans. Edwina
Moreton and Hannes Adomeit (London: C. Hurst, 1975).
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pedient in Moscow. He insisted that the West, and notably West Germany,
meet some or all of the following conditions before any normalization of
relations could take place: (1) codification of the territorial status quo,
with the post-war borders in Europe to be declared ‘immutable’ (as op-
posed to inviolable); (2) freezing of the post-war socio-economic and po-
litical status quo in Europe; (3) full international legal recognition of the
GDR; (4) changes in the status of West Berlin to make the city more de-
pendent on East Germany; (5) full West German respect for a separate
East German citizenship; and (6) abandonment by Bonn of its legal pos-
ition that East Germans had an automatic right to West German citizen-
ship.
As evidence from the SED’s archives has confirmed, the differences be-
tween the USSR and the GDR over détente and Soviet-West German rap-
prochement led to a crisis of confidence in Soviet-East German relations
that reached its high point in the winter of 1970 and the spring of 1971 and
that was (temporarily) resolved only by the replacement of Ulbricht and
the appointment of Erich Honecker as new party chief. The archives again
provide fascinating insights into the thinking of the Soviet leadership re-
garding the German problem and the quality of relations between the im-
perial centre and the periphery.
Contrary to public appearances and fraternal kisses, the relationship be-
tween Brezhnev and Ulbricht was tense. In July 1970, in private conversa-
tion with Honecker, the Soviet leader even admitted to having had trau-
matic experiences with his (Honecker’s) predecessor.
You know, back in 1964 [at his] dacha [in Döllnsee], he [Ulbricht] simply
move[ed] my delegation (Tikhonov and others) aside, pushe[d] me into a
small room and start[ed] lecturing me about what is wrong with us and exem-
plary with you [East German communists]. It was hot. I was perspiring. He
didn’t care. I only noticed that he wanted to give me instructions as to how we
must work and govern, [he didn’t] even let me speak. His whole arrogance
became apparent there, his disregard for the thinking and the experience of
others.298
Brezhnev generalized from this unpleasant personal experience and
lamented the tendency in East Germany to portray the GDR as ‘the best
298 Record of a Meeting Between L.I. Brezhnev and Erich Honecker on 28 July
1970. The document is from the Central Party Archives of the SED, published by
Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro Vol. I, Doc. 15, p. 287. The original mixes past and
present tense.
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model of socialism’ and to assert that ‘Everything that is being done is
done better in the GDR, everyone should learn from the GDR, GDR so-
cialism exerts influence on other countries, and it does everything right’.
This arrogance, he complained, was insulting to other socialist countries,
Poland and Czechoslovakia, for instance, but also to the Soviet Union.
‘We are concerned about this, and this has to be changed; the Politburo of
the SED [and] you have to change it.’299
The archival record also clarifies that Brezhnev and his successors
found the East German arrogance particularly irksome because of the
GDR’s dual dependency – economically on West Germany and in econo-
mic and security terms on the Soviet Union. Concerning economic affairs,
as Khrushchev had already noted, the GDR was becoming more depen-
dent on West Germany than was politically expedient. By 1970 the coun-
try was also in debt to the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. Sev-
eral members in the SED Politburo had begun to realize that Ulbricht’s
economic policies conducted under the heading of the New Economic
System were overly ambitious. His policies, designed to catch up with and
overtake West Germany in labour productivity, were predicated on an ac-
celeration of scientific-technological progress. But the huge investments in
computer technology and other advanced products and processes exceeded
East Germany’s resources. They failed to enhance the country’s techno-
logical competitiveness or to benefit its economy. Significant distortions
were the result. Consumer goods production declined. Shortages in supply
occurred. The construction of housing was being curtailed.300
A faction in the Politburo attacked the ‘high unplanned indebtedness to
the CMEA countries ... and to the FRG and West Berlin’ and criticized
goals such as ‘a 10 percent increase in labour productivity and production
per annum for [the realization of which] the preconditions are in reality
lacking’.301 Reports by informants in the SED Politburo and Pyotr Abrasi-
mov, the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, made Brezhnev aware of the
deterioration of economic conditions in the GDR. As a result, he told Ho-
necker in private: ‘For us the important thing is the strengthening of the
299 Ibid. The meaning of Brezhnev’s statement was obvious. Ulbricht had to be re-
placed by Honecker.
300 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. I, p. 103.
301 Paul Verner and Willi Stoph at the plenary meeting of the SED Central Commit-
tee, 9-10 December 1970, as quoted by Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. I,
p. 105.
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positions of the GDR, its further positive economic development, and a
corresponding increase in the conditions of life of the population [and] the
working class of the GDR. One should concentrate on these tasks.’302 He
obviously thought that Honecker would be more willing and better pre-
pared to realize them.
Brezhnev’s second major irritation was connected with a paradox of im-
perial control. The periphery may completely be dependent on the centre
for protection but the provincial governor may nevertheless act contrary to
the centre’s preferences and even refuse to carry out instructions. This typ-
ically raises the problem of choosing a suitable successor. The centre’s
emissaries then tend to get embroiled in the domestic power struggles at
the periphery. A case in point is Moscow’s involvement in Ulbricht’s ‘res-
ignation’ from his position as first party secretary and his retirement to the
more ceremonial role as president (Vorsitzender des Staatsrats).
Expressing his irritation with Ulbricht, the Soviet party leader assured
would-be successor Honecker: ‘I tell you quite openly that it will not be
possible for him to govern by leaving us out and to take ill-conceived
steps against you and other comrades in the Politburo.303 Clearly with a
view to a possible replacement of Ulbricht with Honecker, he reminded
the latter of the GDR’s complete dependency on the USSR for protection:
"We have troops [stationed] with you [in the GDR]. Erich, I tell you
frankly, and never forget this: The GDR cannot exist without us, without
the S[oviet] U[nion], its power and strength. Without us there is no
GDR.’304
It was not only the centre but also Moscow’s emissaries in East Berlin
who got directly involved in the power struggle. As reported by Yuli
Kvitsinsky (then a foreign ministry official at the Soviet embassy in Bonn
and later an active participant in the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin,
with a previous appointment in East Berlin), ambassador Pyotr Abrasimov
was in the picture regarding the struggle for power in the highest echelon
of the East German leadership. His relations with Honecker and his sup-
porters had become close over time, and he was kept up to date about all
steps taken. This was no secret to the other members of the SED Politburo
302 Record of the Brezhnev-Honecker meeting of 28 July 1970, Przybylski, Tatort
Politbüro, Vol. I, Doc. 15, p. 284.
303 Ibid., p. 281.
304 Ibid. (italics mine).
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and it conveyed the impression that a possible change of power would
take place at least with Moscow’s silent approval.305
However, some members of the Politburo in Moscow were against Ul-
bricht’s replacement. The then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai
Podgorny, is said to have voiced especially strong opposition to such a
step. Brezhnev, too, despite all his complaints about Ulbricht, was still
hesitant about having him removed from office, stating at a meeting be-
tween high ranking officials of the SED and the CPSU in mid-August
1970 that ‘We have recently received several signals and rumours that, let
us say, frictions and quarrels have arisen in your Politburo.’ However, he
saw as yet ‘no reason for change’. Instead, he appealed to the SED to
strengthen the ‘collective’ and the ‘unity of leadership’, and he told Ul-
bricht and his colleagues to work out their differences – who, in turn,
promised that they would behave.306 Dark clouds were thus brewing over
Abrasimov’s head. Kvitsinsky realized this when Gromyko, who was oth-
erwise cautious on personnel issues, once unexpectedly said in his pres-
ence that he had apparently been mistaken about Abrasimov, personally
and politically. Instead of carrying out the line of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, the ambassador had participated in completely inappropriate in-
trigues, for which he would have to answer.307
The scales, nevertheless, began to tilt in Honecker’s favor. This was
caused in part by massive attacks against Ulbricht from inside the SED
and ultimately direct appeals to Brezhnev to get rid of him. In January
1971, the oppositional faction complained in a letter to the Soviet leader
that Ulbricht had reneged on all the promises on party unity made in Au-
gust. In domestic politics as well as on the GDR’s policies towards the
FRG, they said, ‘Comrade Walter is pursuing a personal line to which is
he clinging stubbornly’. At 78 years of age, anyone would have difficulty
to manage things effectively, the charges continued, but in his case the age
problem was compounded by a ‘difficult personality’. Ulbricht displayed
305 Julij A. Kwizinskij [Yuli A. Kvitsinsky], Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines
Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), p. 255. Kvitsinsky served from 1959 until
1965 in the Soviet embassy in the GDR and from 1978 until 1981 in the embassy
in Bonn.
306 Secret protocol of the meeting between a delegation of the CC of the CPSU and a
delegation of the CC of the SED on 21 August 1970 in Moscow. The document is
from the Central Party Archives of the SED, published by Przybylski, Tatort
Politbüro, Vol. I, Doc. 16, pp. 292-93.
307 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 255-56.
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ever more ‘irrational ideas and subjectivism’. In his attitudes and be-
haviour towards ‘comrades in the Politburo and other comrades he is often
rude, insulting, and discusses things from a position of infallibility’.308
The combined pressure of his colleagues in East Berlin and finally from
Moscow persuaded Ulbricht to throw in the towel. On 3 May 1971, he
asked the plenum of the Central Committee of the SED to relieve him of
the duties of first secretary, referring to his old age which had made it im-
possible for him to continue his work on behalf of the Central Committee,
the party and the people. In accordance with what he knew to be the Sovi-
et preference, he proposed Honecker as his successor.
Soviet dissatisfaction with Ulbricht and his removal from office are
symptomatic of another problem of imperial rule: the aversion of the cen-
tre to recognize the existence of basic structural deficiencies of empire and
to blame subordinate bureaucrats and local officials for problems in their
nominal sphere of responsibility. But the supreme irony of Ulbricht’s re-
placement is that Honecker proved to engage in the same ‘mistakes’ and
turned out to be, in the centre’s perspective, just as ‘subjectivist’, arrogant,
assertive, recalcitrant and, in the end, unmanageable as his predecessor.
This was not immediately apparent. The first two to three years after
Honecker had assumed office passed without much conflict. As Kvitsin-
sky pertinently observed, Honecker made a significant contribution to the
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin concluded on 3 September 1971. He
was flexible but vigorous in his negotiations with West Germany. He sup-
ported the idea of socialist integration in the CMEA framework.309 On do-
mestic issues, one month into his rule – at the Eighth congress of the SED
in June 1971 – he submitted a far-reaching program of change to improve
the material situation of the population. Incomes of GDR citizens grew by
four percent annually. Minimum wages and pensions were increased; paid
working holidays and maternity leave were extended; an extensive new
housing programme was initiated, and so was the construction of numer-
308 Letter by 13 full and candidate members of the SED Politburo to Brezhnev, dated
21 January 1971. The document is from the Central Party Archives of the SED,
as published by Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. I, Doc. 17, pp. 297-303. The
wording is very much reminiscent of what Lenin had to say about Stalin in his
‘testament’, a collection of notes and letters written before his death.
309 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 258.
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ous sports facilities and public buildings. Industrial plants that had become
outdated were to be renovated as soon as possible.310
Yet despite the protective shield of the Berlin wall and the apparent suc-
cess of his socio-economic programs, Honecker for several years to come
remained conscious of East Germany’s insecurity, vulnerability and lack
of domestic legitimacy. This realization as well as East Germany’s inferior
status vis-à-vis West Germany and its international isolation made Ho-
necker almost pathologically bent on securing unconditional Soviet sup-
port. He expressly asked Brezhnev to view the GDR de facto as a Union
Republic of the USSR and as such to include it in the Soviet Union’s eco-
nomic plans.311 He was not content merely with a ‘close partnership
USSR-GDR’ but had the GDR declare itself, in Article 6 of its 1974 con-
stitution, to be ‘forever and irrevocably allied’ to the Soviet Union and to
commit itself, in article 1 of the 1975 treaty of alliance with the Soviet
Union, to maintaining ‘relations of eternal and unbreakable friendship and
fraternal mutual assistance’. The reference in the previous GDR constitu-
tion to ‘two German states of [one] German nation’ had made it unneces-
sary to emphasize the specific character of the relations between both Ger-
man states in each and every Soviet-German or intra-German treaty. Now,
however, the substitution of this formula with ‘eternal friendship’ with the
Soviet Union, as Falin later was to comment, was ‘stupidity bordering on
provocation’ because the political logic of this change was that anyone
striving for a united, free, and democratic, rather than a Soviet-type Ger-
many allied with the Soviet Union had to oppose the ‘special’ Soviet-East
German relationship.312
But then, in the eyes of Soviet policy makers in the 1970s and early
1980s, the new political logic was perfectly acceptable. The consolidation
of the empire seemed to require eradication of all ideas about German uni-
fication now considered politically harmful, no matter whether under capi-
talist, socialist or any other auspices. The new rationale was demonstrated
by an exchange between Falin and foreign minister Gromyko in 1977.
Falin had pointed out to his superior that it was unproductive to emphasize
the theme of ‘two German states’ and unprincipled to abandon the vision
of a united socialist Germany. The criticism was rejected. Gromyko re-
310 Ibid., on actual and intended changes in the GDR economy.
311 Ibid.
312 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 238.
Chapter 2: The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm
156
marked that ‘We don’t need a united Germany at all, not even a socialist
one. The united socialist China is enough for us.’313
The honeymoon in the relationship between the Soviet leaders and Ho-
necker, however, was destined to come to an end. The first of many rea-
sons is connected with a generational change and the background of the
new leadership in East Berlin. To quote Kvitsinsky again because of his
well-informed perspective, he had long observed that in the GDR the
group of the so-called ‘KZ people’ (KZler, derived from Konzentra-
tionslager) was pressing for power. These were party officials who had
spent the Hitler era neither in capitals of unoccupied Europe nor in quiet
Comintern offices in Moscow but in the concentration camps and prisons
of the Third Reich. Latent tensions had always existed between them and
the emigrants. Honecker was a typical representative of the KZler who, in
contrast to Moscow emigrants such as Ulbricht and Pieck, were less in-
clined to place allegiance to Moscow above the interests of their own
country. That is why, among other reasons, he was more popular than Ul-
bricht with the younger SED officials of the second rank, who had gradu-
ally ascended to leadership positions at the district and regional levels and
who were now moving into the central party organs. One of the indica-
tions of this change in the make-up of the party leadership lay in the fact
that Honecker, after his appointment as party chief, was single-mindedly
surrounding himself with former FDJ cadres. From Moscow’s vantage
point, therefore, there was a distinct possibility that the policies of the
GDR would be determined to a greater degree than before by tendencies
of national patriotism and claims for a more independent role in intra-bloc
and international affairs.314
There was another aspect of Honecker’s biography that was to cause
concern in Moscow. Honecker was born on 25 August 1912 in Ne-
unkirchen in the Land Saarland in the south-western part of Germany, the
son of a miner. At the tender age of ten, pressured by his father, he entered
the communist youth organization there. He did not do well at school,
failed to receive a decent apprenticeship position, went to work for a time
as a farm labourer in Pomerania, returned to the Saarland to work as a
roofer for his uncle, turned professional communist youth organizer and
then rose through the ranks to become a leading member of a KPD district
313 Ibid., p. 239 (italics mine).
314 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 256-257.
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committee in that Land.315 Although, according to Marxist theory, ethnic,
regional, or national attributes are secondary to class characteristics, Ho-
necker’s background could be interpreted as establishing an-all German
predisposition. Such assumptions turned out to be correct. Furthermore, as
will be shown in the next chapter, his background was part of his unbend-
ing desire to visit West Germany, to return to the places where he had
worked as a youth, and to see the grave of his father.316 From the Soviet
perspective, therefore, the combination of a latent tendency to assert GDR
interests and an all-German longing for Heimat produced a psychological
profile whose political repercussions were unpredictable and perhaps diffi-
cult to control.
Before this eventuality became reality, it turned out that Honecker’s
economic programme was no less ambitious and impossible to realize than
that of his predecessor. Kvitsinsky aptly describes the attendant deteriora-
tion in economic conditions and the downturn in Soviet-GDR political re-
lations.
[W]e received information [in the early to mid-1970s] that the GDR con-
sumed much more than it was able to produce. The result of this development
was a rapid increase of the state’s foreign debt, which under Ulbricht had re-
mained within acceptable limits. But cautious warnings from Moscow had no
effect on Honecker. He explained to us that in today’s world only fools would
not take up loans, that the GDR had significant reserves of gold and foreign
currency, and that it had a broad range of possibilities to increase its exports
for freely convertible currency.
Soon, however, it turned out that almost the entire export growth of the GDR
was used up to service the loans that had already been taken up. Many of the
GDR’s economists sounded the alarm but no one in the Central Committee of
the SED seemed to value their opinion. The GDR now needed such goods
from the West as the Soviet Union could not deliver. The Soviet admonitions
to be frugal also went largely unheeded: After international recognition and
the normalization of its relations with the Federal Republic, the GDR with
Honecker at the top, now wanted to venture out independently onto the
stormy sea of international politics. After all, why not? Was the GDR inferior
to Poland or Czechoslovakia?317
315 See the biographies by Heinz Lippman, Honecker: Portrait eines Nachfolgers
(Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971) and Dieter Borkowski, Erich Honeck-
er: Statthalter Moskaus oder deutscher Patriot? Eine Biografie (Munich: C. Ber-
telsmann, 1987).
316 Interview with Krenz.
317 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 258-59.
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In late 1974, Soviet officials learned that East Berlin had worked out a
package of agreements with Bonn to the effect that the GDR should re-
ceive several million West German marks for the improvement of the con-
nections between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and for an expan-
sion of contacts between the population of both German states. This con-
cerned, among other things, the construction or rebuilding of roads, the
opening of new telephone lines, and the cession of small parts of East Ger-
man territory to West Berlin. All this, as Kvitsinsky observed,
made the impression of a very adroit political and commercial deal. The GDR
modernized its roads with its own personnel and was paid for it in foreign
currency by Bonn. The GDR improved its telephone network and again the
Federal Republic was ready to pay for it. And a whole series of similar deals
was in preparation: the modernization not only of the road system but also the
railway links, the opening of additional checkpoints on the border with the
Federal Republic and the expansion of the already existing ones, the facilita-
tion of tourist trips of West Germans into the GDR and of visits to relatives,
the authorization of money transfers, and the lifting of restrictions on postal
parcels. For many of these projects the GDR received the money from Bonn
in advance, so that it was bound to keep its pledges. Ulbricht’s thesis of the
strict separation (Abgrenzung) of both German states was practically buried
quietly. The GDR claimed the right to play a ground-breaking role in the nor-
malization of human relations between Eastern and Western Europe.
The budding relationship between the two Germanys was carefully moni-
tored in Moscow and caused concern that would not cease until the col-
lapse of East Germany. To continue with Kvitsinsky’s account:
Andrei Gromyko viewed this turn in the policy of our German friends with
great doubts from the very start. Although its internal stability, due to the na-
tional division, was substantially less than that of our other allies, the GDR
ventured out far in comparison to the Soviet Union and the other countries of
the Warsaw Treaty. It was clear that Bonn would only invest in the GDR in
order to advance the political goal of the development of German domestic
special relations, that is, to achieve the "change through rapprochement" that
Brandt and Bahr had already conceived in 1963.
And one more completely new element in the policy of the GDR aroused sus-
picion in Moscow: The entire package of agreements with the Federal Repub-
lic had been negotiated without consultations with Moscow. Basically, we had
simply been presented with a fait accompli.318 ...
Gromyko attempted to bring about a top-level dialogue with the GDR on this
whole complex of questions. However, when Honecker heard what it was
about, he avoided meeting with Brezhnev. In January 1975, he sent a delega-
318 Ibid., pp. 259-60.
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tion to Moscow that was led by [SED] Politburo member Hermann Axen,
who was in charge of international relations.
The talk led to nothing. Gromyko expounded the Soviet doubts quite directly
and openly and indicated that the Soviet general staff had a negative opinion
of the measures planned by "the friends" in regard to ensuring the security of
the GDR. But what was the reply of Axen who had been sent expressly be-
cause no one wanted to change anything in the agreements that had already
been signed and made public most hurriedly? He raised up his short arms, ap-
peared insulted by the mistrust of the "Soviet friends" toward the policy of the
GDR, praised the agreements and their advantages for the GDR, and swore
that in regard to the German question there would always be only a policy
closely coordinated with the Soviet Union.319
The stage for a serious crisis in Soviet-East German relations had irrevo-
cably been set. Its proportions were far to exceed the scale of the conflict
that had existed in the Ulbricht era. The gravity of basic policy disagree-
ments was compounded by other factors of a more ‘technical’ nature. One
was the fact that Honecker attempted to conceal from his colleagues in the
Politburo all the reservations and warnings conveyed to him from
Moscow, transferring them to his personal files.320 Another was the fact
that the Kremlin had informants in the SED Politburo who reported that
Honecker spoke more and more disparagingly about Brezhnev and the So-
viet Union. The bad-mouthing behind the top Soviet leader’s back in-
creased the resentment towards Honecker felt in Moscow.321
In 1976-78, careful and, as events were to confirm, entirely accurate
analyses of the internal situation of the GDR were prepared in the Soviet
foreign ministry with the participation of the KGB and the defense min-
istry. The studies predicted a rapid development of relations between both
German states and a growing dependence of East Germany on West Ger-
many. The authors anticipated that the Protestant Church would become
the crystallization point of opposition forces and warned that the structures
of the party, the army, and state security, which on the surface appeared to
be reliable and stable, were in reality swiftly eroding.322
Why, then, did the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev fail to react more
forcefully? One of the reasons is connected with internal factors. The ‘era
of stagnation’ (zastoy) seriously affected the top levels of decision making
319 Ibid., pp. 260-61.
320 Ibid., pp. 262-63. Further examples of such concealment of information will be
provided in the next chapter.
321 Ibid., p. 263.
322 Ibid., pp. 264-65.
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– a weakness that was enhanced by Brezhnev’s failing health. Even more
importantly, what were the Soviet options? Economic pressures would
have had negative repercussions on a deteriorating Soviet economy. Such
measures, furthermore, were likely to push the GDR even more quickly
into the arms of West Germany. Finally, Honecker’s closest followers were
now in leading positions in the party, government, and state security.
There was no oppositional faction on which Moscow could rely. Finally,
in contrast to Ulbricht, it was difficult to imagine that Honecker would co-
operate in his removal from office. The imperial centre was beginning to
lose control.
In the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, this predicament of
empire coincided with a serious crisis in all dimensions of Soviet power.
As will be shown in the next chapter, the failures of Soviet policies on the
German problem were both a cause and a symptom of a deepening overall
crisis of the Marxist-Leninist and Imperial paradigm.
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The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire
The Crisis of Ideology
The Soviet empire and the Ideological and Imperial paradigm as its analyt-
ical frame of reference had rested on three major pillars: Marxist-Leninist
ideology, military power and economic resources. For the imperial edifice
to collapse, it would have been sufficient for one of the pillars to fall. In
the period from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, however, all three sup-
ports had begun to crumble. What were the reasons for this turn of events?
What role, if any, did developments in the two Germanys play in Soviet
imperial decline? And what contribution did the German problem make to
the fundamental reconsideration of priorities and policies that was to occur
under Gorbachev? These are the central questions to be analyzed in this
chapter.
As described in the previous chapter, in any political or imperial sys-
tem, ideology can be said to play a number of important functions. It can
fulfil four major functions: analytical or cognitive; utopian, visionary or
missionary; operational; and legitimizing. By the end of the1970s, Marx-
ist-Leninist ideology failed to fulfil any of these functions. Alexander
Yakovlev, the chief architect of major revision and ultimately destruction
of the whole edifice of Soviet ideology, made this very clear. The theoreti-
cal basis on which the Soviet system and the Soviet Union’s approach to
international politics rested, as he told a conference of communist party
secretaries in September 1989, had been gravely ‘deformed’. The model
of socialist development as exemplified by the Soviet Union had essential-
ly ‘exhausted’ itself.323
Indeed, each and every major cognitive and predictive element of
Marxist-Leninist ideology had turned out to be false. Some of the dogmas
had been revised under Khrushchev, notably the idea that military conflict
among the imperialist states was as ‘inevitable’ as war between imperial-
Chapter 3:
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323 Speech by Alexander Yakovlev at the Conference of Communist Party Secre-
taries for Ideological Questions, Varna (Bulgaria), 26-28 September 1989. The
speech was included as agenda item 8 for the SED Politburo meeting of 17 Octo-
ber 1989; SED, Central Archives, Politburo Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/3247.
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ism and socialism. But other major formalized perceptions and predictions
had remained in force. This concerned the notions that the ‘contradictions’
between the ‘power centres of imperialism’ were more basic than the links
that unite them; that in the long run the ‘correlation of forces’ would shift
in favor of socialism; that conflict would end with the victory of social-
ism; that the socialist mode of production was superior to that of capital-
ism; that the ‘national-liberation movements’ would bring about states
with anti-imperialist, non-capitalist and ultimately socialist orientation;
that class relations are the determining factor of international affairs; and
that nationalism would wither away. The increasing gap between ideology
and reality and the decline in the effectiveness of the Soviet system did not
lead to a withering away of the state or of nationalism but rather of the at-
tractiveness of the Soviet model of development. The ensuing crisis of
ideology affected all areas of international politics. It was evident first and
foremost in the highly developed industrialized world, that is, in Western
Europe, the United States, and Japan. But it also pervaded Central and
Eastern Europe, and the countries of the Third World.
In Western Europe, in the late 1970s, the principles of individualism,
pluralism, democracy, the market economy and an active civil society
clashed with the communist ideas of monolithic politics and society as
well as central planning in the economy. The communist parties in West-
ern Europe, in order to enhance their influence and chances to win power,
increasingly began to distance themselves from the Soviet model and de-
velop a new body of thought under the heading of ‘Eurocommunism’. The
Italian and Spanish, much less so the French, but other smaller European
communist parties, subscribed to it.
This development in the international communist movement was vehe-
mently opposed by Soviet ideologists. By the end of the 1980s, in part as a
result of Soviet measures but also because of a significant credibility gap
between the communist parties and mainstream political and socio-econo-
mic forces, ‘Eurocommunism’ in Western Europe had run its course. Even
the traditionally strong communist parties of Italy and France found them-
selves faced with a serious decline in their electoral strength. In other
Western European countries things remained as unsatisfactory as ever
from the Soviet perspective. In West Germany, for instance, the German
Communist Party (DKP) continued to receive less than one percent of the
vote in Bundestag and Länder parliamentary elections and thus failed to
gain representation at both the federal and the state level. It thus had no
measurable influence in West German political life.
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In Central and Eastern Europe Soviet ideology had never taken root.
The communist regimes in the countries of this area suffered from the de-
fects of having come to power and being kept there by the Soviet armed
forces. Society in that region was perennially affected by Western viruses
leading to infections such as ‘socialism with a human face’ and ‘market
socialism’. Moscow was able to suppress acute flare-ups of the disease but
unable to provide a cure. The last cycle in, from Moscow’s perspective,
political pathology requiring strong curative medicine, had been the
Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, necessitating the Warsaw Pact’s inter-
vention in August 1968. Some return from the acute to a latent state of the
‘revisionist’ disease had taken place in the country in the early 1970s.
However, not least as a result of the CSCE Final Act of 1975 and the ac-
tivities of the Helsinki Groups, serious remissions occurred in the CSSR
and throughout Eastern Europe. In Poland the outbreak in 1980-81 was es-
pecially serious and proved to have serious consequences also for the Ger-
man problem.
To put the developments in Poland and their effects on the Soviet em-
pire in Eastern Europe in perspective, according to the orthodox Soviet
definition ‘antagonist contradictions’ could exist and crises could occur
only in capitalist systems.324 Andropov, in his position as general party
secretary, still adhered to this dogma but he had at least admitted: ‘Yes, we
do experience contradictions as well as difficulties.’ To think that this
could be different would be ‘abandoning safe, even though harsh reali-
ties.’ History had taught that ‘contradictions that by their nature are non-
antagonist can produce serious collisions if they are not taken into consid-
eration’.325 Several theorists went beyond the ideological euphemisms still
apparent in the pronouncements of their chief. They called attention to the
absurdity of drawing a distinction between contradictions that cannot be
solved at all and contradictions that can be solved in theory but not in
practice. To them, as the crisis in Poland 1980-81 had shown, it was non-
sense to stick to the theory of the perezhitki proshlogo, that simply the
‘remnants of the past’ were responsible for acute problems. It was more
appropriate in their view to look at the policies of the local communist
324 The security implications and management problems of the Polish crisis will be
dealt with in the next section. In the present section only the ideological dimen-
sion of the crisis will be considered.
325 Yuri N. Andropov, ‘Uchenie Karla Marksa i nekotorye voprosy sotsialistichesko-
go stroitel’stva v SSSR’, Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1983), p. 21.
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parties which could produce ‘political crises with all its dangers for social-
ism’.326
The ideological failures were equally momentous in the Third World. In
the 1950s and 1960s, it had seemed to Soviet ideologists and political
leaders that the rapidly accelerating processes of decolonization would set
the newly independent ex-colonial countries on a non-capitalist path of de-
velopment in internal system structure and on an anti-Western course in
foreign policy. From Moscow’s vantage point, to accelerate the process it
had appeared expedient to provide aid to the so-called ‘national-liberation
struggle’. But whereas it turned out that Soviet support could occasionally
decide the question of power in the short term, the Soviet Union was inca-
pable of contributing meaningfully to long-term socio-economic develop-
ment of the countries concerned. More often than not, after a period of co-
operation with Warsaw Pact countries in the security field, the new states
turned to the West for development aid. Furthermore, Moscow’s overesti-
mation of the importance of the Third World in the East-West competition
contributed to the overextension, overcommitment and rising costs of em-
pire of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
As for the costs of empire, to underpin its (crumbling) ideological basis
significant sums of money were wasted for an endless procession of visit-
ing communist dignitaries, their medical treatment in special hospitals in
Moscow, vacations in Sochi and hunting trips in Siberia despite the fact
that these dignitaries often had no more than a nuisance value in their own
countries.327 In fact, the smaller and more unimportant the party, the
greater its profession of loyalty to Moscow. This was noted also by Gor-
bachev even before he became chief of the CPSU and embarked on a ma-
jor revision of Soviet ideology: ‘We have to ask ourselves, why it is that
influential and strong parties separate themselves from us, whereas the
326 A. P. Butenko, ‘Protivorechiia razvitiia sotsializma kak obshchestvennogo stroia’,
Voprosy filosofii, No. 10 (1982), p. 27. The author at that time was a member of
the USSR Academy of Sciences and Deputy Director of the Institute for the
Economy of the World Socialist System. A similar approach was taken by several
other authors, including the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
P. N. Fedoseev, ‘Dialektik des gesellschaftlichen Lebens’, Probleme des Friedens
und des Sozialismus, No. 9 (September 1981), pp. 1192-1200.
327 Interviews with Zagladin, Rykin, and Grigoriev.
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small and insignificant parties remain orthodox and faithful to
Moscow.’328 Such pertinent questions, it would seem, are an illustration of
a more general malaise felt by Soviet leaders and part of their realization
that the international communist movement had turned from an asset into
a liability. Indeed, as Vadim Medvedev, head of the CC’s department for
relations with communist and workers’ parties in 1986-88, observed in ret-
rospect: Whereas earlier, ‘world socialism’ in theory and practice had ex-
erted a powerful influence on world affairs, ‘at the end of the 1970s and
the beginning of the 1980s, its development stopped, which contrasted
sharply with the rapid progress [achieved] in the West and among some
newly industrializing countries’.329
Military Power and Declining Political Influence
The second pillar on which the Soviet empire had rested was military
power. In retrospect, it is quite apparent that some fairly simple but stub-
bornly executed ideas underlay Soviet foreign policy from Stalin to Cher-
nenko: military power could be transformed into global political influence;
military-strategic parity with the United States could be used to advance
claims to political equality; preponderance in conventional weaponry and
forces and superiority in short and medium-range nuclear systems could
serve not only to safeguard Soviet positions in Eastern Europe but to
change the domestic and foreign policies of the Western European coun-
tries in directions favourable to Soviet interests; and the deployment of
naval and airborne forces capable of intervention and power-projection far
beyond the periphery of the Soviet Union would deter Western interven-
tion in Third World countries and induce them to cooperate with the Sovi-
et Union.330 In the 1970s, from Soviet perspectives, favourable develop-
ments in international relations had seemed to confirm the validity of such
notions. In the early 1980s, however, failures occurred more or less simul-
2.
328 In October 1984 in a conversation with Vadim Zagladin, as reported by
Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 19. Zagladin at that time was one of the
deputy chiefs of the CC’s International Department.
329 Medvedev, Raspad, p. 8.
330 See Hannes Adomeit, ‘The Political Rationale of Soviet Military Capabilities and
Doctrine’, in Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for
the 1980s, Report of the European Security Study (ESECS) (London: Macmillan,
1983), pp. 67‑104.
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taneously in Soviet policies towards the United States, Western Europe,
Central and Eastern Europe, Japan, China, and the Third World, necessi-
tating a fundamental conceptual reassessment.
The United States. In the early 1980s, Soviet international relations spe-
cialists began to realize that the depth of ‘contradictions’ in the West had
been overestimated and that the forces that bound together the three main
‘power centres of imperialism’ were stronger than those that put them at
odds with each other. In practical political terms, it had proved impossible
to separate the United States from Western Europe and Japan. There had,
of course, been many divisive issues in Western alliance relations: sanc-
tions in response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; sanctions as a
punishment for martial law in Poland; the West German gas, credit, and
pipeline deal; the stationing of medium-range missiles in Europe; and
doubts about the reliability and loyalty of various European allies. How-
ever, after autumn 1983, these controversies had receded in importance or
disappeared altogether.
In the United States, the strength, composition, and orientation of socio-
economic and political forces had also changed, a fact that the
amerikanisty, the Soviet experts on American affairs, were quick to recog-
nize. Their main line of interpretation at the beginning of the first Reagan
administration was the notion that the new conservative philosophy and
hard-line political approaches in the United States were essentially
short‑lived and would soon subside. However, as the Republican Party
headed for a resounding electoral victory in 1984, they and other interna-
tional relations experts increasingly came to adhere to the view that, what
they called the ‘conservative wave’ in the United States was a more last-
ing and dangerous phenomenon.331
As for American defense policies, it may have appeared to Soviet polit-
ical leaders and analysts that NATO in the mid-1970s was no longer able
successfully to compete with the Warsaw Pact in the arms competition,
331 Yakovlev, for instance, as late as June 1985, thought that the ‘conservative wave’
in the United States was generated and supported by that part of the bourgeoisie
that was intimately connected with the scientific-technological revolution and
high-technology military industry. In his view, this explained the interest of the
Reagan administration in shifting the East-West competition to the military-tech-
nological sphere; see the discussion between him and Vadim Zagladin, chaired by
Fyodor Burlatsky, ‘Vostok – Zapad. Tsivilizatsionnye otnosheniia: Neobkhodi-
most’? Real’nost’? Utopia?’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 26 June 1985.
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that the Western countries were primarily reacting to Soviet initiatives and
that they were increasingly putting faith in arms control negotiations to re-
dress, from their perspective, a deteriorating military balance. Such per-
ceptions, to the extent that they existed, were rendered invalid by new re-
alities in the East-West arms competition. In the late 1970s, defense out-
lays in the United States began to rise sharply. New challenges were is-
sued to the Warsaw Pact, one in the form of laser-guided conventional
weapons and computerized command and control systems, the other in the
shape of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The deployment of
intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the resulting capability of NATO
to strike at Soviet territory from Western Europe as well as the ongoing
US strategic modernization programs also put Soviet Union under pres-
sure to respond and to do so in an area in which it could compete less easi-
ly and effectively: military high technology.332
The in-flight destruction, on the night of 31 August – 1 September
1983, of an unarmed civilian South Korean airliner en route from New
York to Seoul (KAL 007) over the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk exacer-
bated Soviet-American relations and deepened the international isolation
into which the Soviet Union had manoeuvred itself. It also underlined the
pitfalls of a mental attitude that relied uncritically on the military and its
standard operating procedures. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, then So-
viet ambassador in Washington, the KAL 007 crisis ‘illuminated the diffi-
cult relations and lack of communication between our civilian leaders and
the military establishment, the generals being even more isolated from the
rest of the world than the politicians’. As invectives were exchanged be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union, a ‘haggard and worried’
Andropov told Dobrynin: ‘Return immediately to Washington and try to
do your utmost to dampen this needless conflict bit by bit. Our military
made a gross blunder by shooting down the airliner and it probably will
take a long time to get out of this mess.’333 Yet at the same time, the
Kremlin leadership ‘did not have enough courage to recognize publicly
and immediately with deep regret that it [the plane] had been shot down
332 The impact of SDI on Soviet perceptions and policies will be discussed on pp.
149-50 and pp. 226-27.
333 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold
War Presidents (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 536-37.
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over Soviet territory by a tragic mistake. ... It was unusual at that time for
the Soviet government to accept [that] it had made any kind of error.’334
Western Europe. Another crucially important failure in the attempt to
transform military power into political influence was the Soviet campaign
against the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the Pershing
2 and cruise missiles, in Western Europe. Chancellor Schmidt had at-
tempted several times to impress upon the Soviet leadership that legiti-
mate Western European security interests would be violated and that West
Germany, above all the SPD, would be pushed into a very difficult politi-
cal situation if the Soviet Union were to deploy a large force of intermedi-
ate range nuclear weapons – SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. How-
ever, until the break-up of the negotiations in 1983, no Western offer for
compromise as part of NATO’s ‘dual track’ decision was deemed accept-
able in Moscow. Nothing, therefore, slowed the momentum of Soviet de-
ployments. The Soviet Union continued to improve its quantitative and
qualitative superiority in INF systems. It attempted at the same time to de-
lay or to prevent altogether the NATO counter-deployments in Western
Europe. Its major instrument was a Western ‘peace movement’ that
reached impressive strength in 1983.
But what were the results of the conflict over INF deployments? Mili-
tarily, even after the Western the stationing of the Pershing 2 and cruise
missiles, the Soviet Union gained some advantage. Politically, however,
the Kremlin suffered tremendous losses. The SPD-FDP government under
Schmidt, as a result of intra-party (SPD) controversies over the issue, fell
apart and after the March 1983 parliamentary elections was replaced by a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government under Helmut Kohl. In Western Eu-
rope the Soviet leadership saw itself faced with governments of varying
composition, conservative in West Germany and Britain and socialist in
France and Italy, yet all of these governments strongly supported the sta-
tioning of US nuclear-armed missiles in Europe, the improvement of con-
ventional defense and the strengthening of Atlantic ties. The opposition
parties seemed far removed from winning power and shaping defense pol-
icies. Finally, the ‘peace movement’ as an instrument of Soviet state poli-
cy in Western Europe severely declined in importance.335
334 Ibid.
335 Chancellor Kohl, in a speech on 12 November 1991 in Strasbourg, reflected on
the significance of the INF controversy. He stated that the Soviet leadership had
come ‘to recognize the futility of its attempts at decoupling European and Ameri-
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Decline of the ‘Peace Movement’. In 1984, officials at the CC’s interna-
tional department were still trying to reassure themselves and the top Sovi-
et leadership that the ‘peace movement’ was far from defeated. They
cheerfully claimed that a June 1984 opinion survey in West Germany had
revealed that 87 percent of the respondents were still ‘opposed to the sta-
tioning of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles’ and that they ‘support-
ed the withdrawal of those [missiles] that are already deployed’.336 Soviet
propagandists were still consoling themselves with the idea that in the past
there had been recurrent waves and periodic ebbs and flows of Western
anti-war movements. Each and every wave had tended to be larger and
more broadly based. The ‘peace movement’, they acknowledged, had lost
the INF-campaign. They thought, however, that it was now entering ‘a
new stage of development’ and gradually transforming itself into a ‘per-
manent political factor’ that would be able ‘effectively to exert influence’
on government decisions.337
Doubts as to the validity of such interpretations were made official only
at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in February-March 1986. Gor-
bachev in his capacity as general secretary promised that the communist
party always ‘proceeds from the realities of the modern world’. Such reali-
ties included the fact that ‘It is, of course, not possible to solve the prob-
lem of international security with one or two even very intense peace of-
fensives. Only consistent, systematic, and persistent work can bring suc-
cess.’338 Subsequently, even Pravda commentators were prepared to ac-
knowledge what perceptive analysts had known for some time and dis-
cussed in private: ‘In the last few years a tendency could be noted among
the anti-war movements, including among the most active and relatively
important ones, to put themselves at a distance from the peace organiza-
can security’ and ‘dividing the alliance’. He was convinced that this realization
had been ‘an essential precondition for the policy of the New Thinking in the So-
viet Union. President Gorbachev himself confirmed this in conversation with
me’; Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin, No. 137,
pp. 1115-16 (italics mine).
336 G. Kirillov and V. Shenaev, ‘FRG: Oslablenie pozitsii praviashchei koalitsii’, in
Oleg N. Bykov, ed., Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegodnik: Vypusk 1985 goda. Politika i
ekonomika (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1985), pp. 193-194.
The book appeared in 1985 but the article was written in 1984.
337 V. Orel, ‘Antivoennoe dvizhenie: dostizheniia i perspektivy’, Kommunist, No. 12
(1984), pp. 87-98 (italics mine).
338 Pravda, 26 February 1986.
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tions of the socialist countries.’ This tendency threatened to ‘divide the
progressive forces and thus to diminish their strength’.339
Afghanistan and the Third World. Soviet failures in the competition
over the internal systemic structure and foreign policy orientation of the
countries of the Third World were equally glaring. In the 1970s, the dis-
patch of Soviet military advisers and weapons as well as cooperation with
proxies such as Cuba and Vietnam had seemed to have resulted in substan-
tial gains for the Soviet Union at little risk of confrontation with the Unit-
ed States. The early 1980s, however, began to look different. The Reagan
administration appeared to be unaffected by the dual shock of Watergate
and Vietnam. It was ready to return to a more active containment policy
and even a rollback of Soviet gains. Several opportunities for such a poli-
cy presented themselves. In Angola, for instance, Soviet and Cuban inter-
vention had failed to arrest the civil war. The government’s loss of control
over wide areas of the country as a result opened the prospect that the
Marxist regime in Luanda could be overthrown. In Ethiopia, joint Soviet-
Cuban intervention had been unable to stop the Eritrean secession and the
deterioration of socio-economic conditions. North Vietnam’s victory in the
south and its occupation of Cambodia had led to significant economic and
political costs, complicating Sino-Soviet relations and the relationship be-
tween the Soviet Union and the prospering non-communist countries of
Southeast Asia. Finally and most importantly, in contrast to previous inter-
ventions in Eastern Europe, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had not
produced a quick military solution and political stabilization. It had led in-
stead to a widening guerrilla war supported by the United States. It re-
mained, as Gorbachev deplored at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress, an
"open wound."340
Eastern Europe. The war in Afghanistan had coincided with the rise of
Solidarity in Poland. In fact, in 1980-81, the Soviet leadership under
Brezhnev faced an acute dilemma in its attempt to restore control. She-
vardnadze later remembered that Afghanistan and the Soviet domestic sit-
uation interacted with the events in Poland and heightened anxiety in the
Kremlin about possible negative reactions from the West. ‘But that was
not all. I think Moscow was given pause by serious and, I suppose, correct
fears that the Poles would fight back and that full-scale military actions
339 Yuri Zhukov, ‘The Anti-War Movements’, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4
(April 1987), p. 23.
340 Pravda, 26 February 1986.
Chapter 3: The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire
172
would have to be unleashed.’341 Archival evidence has revealed the exis-
tence of such fears. When the issue was discussed at a Politburo meeting
in late October 1981, even traditional hard-liners such as defense minister
Dmitri Ustinov and KGB chairman Andropov had to concede that ‘it
would be impossible now for us to send troops to Poland’. They thought
that the Soviet Union ‘must steadfastly adhere to [its] line not to send in
troops’.342 Mikhail Suslov, the CC secretary in charge of ideology, is re-
ported to have supported this line. ‘Under no circumstances are we going
to use force in Poland’, he exclaimed.343 However, the collective mind of
the Politburo was also made up to the effect that, as foreign minister
Gromyko put it, ‘we simply cannot and must not lose Poland’.344 The two
positions seemed mutually exclusive. The Soviet leadership was neverthe-
less able to avoid military intervention when General Wojciech Jaruzelski
imposed martial law. But the basic structural problems of imperial control
in Eastern Europe remained. The internal ferment did not end. No stable
solution was achieved.345 As Poland had shown conclusively, the attempt
at transforming military preponderance into legitimate and effective politi-
cal control in Eastern Europe had failed.
To summarize the discussion of military power and its political utility,
by 1983-84 the Soviet leaders found themselves in a position of severe in-
ternational isolation. Unwilling or unable to embark upon a comprehen-
sive rearrangement of relations with the United States, Western Europe,
Japan, and China, they adopted an attitude of ‘insulted giant’ and ‘bear in
hibernation’.346 Based on the conviction that in response to the implemen-
tation of NATO’s dual-track decision they had to live up to their threats of
341 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 205-6.
342 For the documentary evidence as compiled and analyzed by Mark Kramer,
‘Poland, 1980-81: Soviet Policy during the Polish Crisis’, Cold War International
History Project Bulletin (Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington,
D.C.), No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-26; p. 121 (italics mine).
343 According to Shevardnadze, at one point in the crisis, ‘I happened to be in
Suslov’s office. Someone phoned him to report about the worsening situation in
Poland and to insist, as I understood it, on an ‘activation of forces.’ Suslov re-
peated firmly several times, “There is no way that we are going to use force in
Poland”’; Moi vybor, pp. 205-6.
344 At a Politburo meeting in October 1980, Kramer, ‘Poland, 1980-81’, p. 118 (ital-
ics mine).
345 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 205-6.
346 Terms used in lead articles by The Economist at the time.
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political and military countermeasures, they showed a stone-hard face to
the outside world. In typically Brezhnevite fashion, Andropov continued
with the further deployment of SS-20 missiles, the stationing of ‘opera-
tional-tactical missiles’ in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and the forward
positioning of nuclear-armed submarines ‘in ocean areas’ close to the US
coast. He broke off the arms control negotiations on strategic and medi-
um-range nuclear weapons and for a time also those on conventional arms.
Chernenko, his successor, abandoned the policy of selective détente to-
ward the Western European countries, his propagandists attacking the
West German government for allegedly aiding and abetting ‘revanchist’
and ‘neo-Nazi’ tendencies. Trends for cooperation between China and the
West in economic and security matters were growing. In the Islamic world
the standing of the Soviet Union continued to be affected negatively by
the occupation of Afghanistan and Moscow’s support for a pro-Soviet and
pro-communist system in that country.
All lines of communication were blocked. The Soviet leadership for all
practical purposes ceased to be an active participant in international polit-
ics and was relegating itself to the role of bystander. However, behind the
façade of defiance and stridency, the realization was beginning to gain
ground that power in international relations does not primarily depend on
quantitative indicators such as the number of weapons and troops, reserves
of raw materials, size of the population and the acreage owned or con-
trolled on the Hindukush or the Horn of Africa but on the effectiveness
and efficiency of the socio-economic and political system to develop the
human potential – the chelovecheskii faktor, as this was called under An-
dropov. A greater awareness of the importance of political, cultural, eco-
nomic, and technological instruments in the competition for influence in
world affairs also began to develop and ultimately to give rise to the New
Political Thinking under Gorbachev.
Declining Economic Performance and the "Costs of Empire"
The third pillar on which the superpower status of the Soviet Union had
rested was that of economic potential. This pillar, too, was being seriously
eroded. To take one of the crudest measures of stagnation and decline, that
of the gross domestic product, in 1961 Khrushchev had quoted unnamed
economists as estimating that, at the end of the Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65), ‘the USSR will surpass the USA in the volume of production
3.
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and approximately by 1970 in per capita output’.347 The authoritative CP-
SU programme of the same year improved on this prediction. The ‘ap-
proximately’ was replaced by the assertion that the USSR ‘will surpass the
USA ... in per capita output’ in 1970.348 That year, however, came and
went, and starting from 1975 the official USSR statistical annuals began to
show Soviet national income unchanged at the same proportion of US na-
tional income, namely at 67 percent. Correspondingly, the slogan of catch-
ing up with and overtaking the United States was scrapped. Furthermore,
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in
Moscow made its own calculations and estimated Soviet national income
to amount to only half of the American volume. It also concluded that the
gap was widening rather than narrowing.349 Unofficial Soviet estimates
later put the Soviet-American national income ratio even lower than
that.350
The Soviet economists’ sense of urgency was sharpened by the fact
that, in the second half of the 1980s, labour and capital inputs were
doomed to slow more rapidly and natural-resource exploitation costs to
rise faster. Extrapolation of trends indicated that the Soviet economy was
heading for zero and negative growth. As Table 2 shows, Western (CIA)
and official Soviet statistical time series data coincided in this portrayal of
trends.351
347 Khrushchev on 6 January 1991 at a meeting of party organizations, Pravda, 25
January 1961.
348 The embarrassing program was adopted at the June 1961 plenary meeting of the
Central Committee of the CPSU; see Pravda and Izvestiia, 30 July 1961 (italics
mine).
349 Information received from IMEMO researchers by Philip Hanson of the Univer-
sity of Birmingham. The subsequent analysis of economic developments is based
on Phil Hanson’s contribution to The Gorbachev Challenge and European Secu-
rity, Report by the European Strategy Group (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), pp.
53-69. Hanson was the principal author of the economic section of the report.
350 A particularly sophisticated re-evaluation of the Soviet official data for the 1970s
and 1980s and their downward revision was provided by Gregory Khanin, ‘Eco-
nomic Growth in the 1980s,’ in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, eds.,
The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London: Routledge, 1992),
pp. 73-85.
351 Sources: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (various years); Pravda, 24 January 1988;
CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington, 1986); CIA and DIA, Gor-
bachev’s Modernization Program: A Status Report, Paper prepared for the Sub-
committee on Security Economics of the US Congress Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 19 March 1987; ESG Report, The Gorbachev Challenge, p. 58.
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Decline of Soviet Economic Growth, 1965-1985
 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
A. Soviet official measures
NMP produced 7.7 5.7 4.2 3.5
NMP utilized 7.1 5.1 3.9 3.2
Gross industrial output 8.5 7.4 4.4 3.6
Gross agricultural outputa 3.9 2.4 1.7 1.1
Investmenta 7.4 7.2 5.2 3.2
Capital stock 7.5 7.9 6.8 6.0
Electric power 7.9 7.0 4.5 3.6
Oil, coal, and gas 5.2 5.4 4.2 2.5
B. CIA estimatesb
GNP 5.1 3.0 2.3 1.9
Industrial output 6.4 5.5 2.7 1.9
Agricultural output 3.6 -0.6 0.8 2.1
Investment 5.5 4.3 4.3 3.4
Capital stock 7.4 8.0 6.9 6.2
Labour (man hours) 2.0 1.7 1.2 0.7
Notes. All output series and the investment and capital stock figures are in constant
prices, that is, they denote "real" changes. The Soviet official series, however, are
known to contain an element of hidden inflation and therefore are upwardly biased.
Note a: For five-year periods, the growth rates shown are those between the total for
the period and the total for the preceding five-year period. Note b: At 1982 rouble fac-
tor-cost.
Growth, of course, is only one aspect of economic development. When
looking at a country’s status, prestige and influence in international affairs,
other factors are equally important. These concern the quality and techno-
logical level of its products, its share in world commodity and financial
markets, its capacity for innovation, the volume of foreign direct invest-
ment received and the size of development assistance spent abroad. In all
of these categories, the Soviet Union was performing poorly. Innovation
essentially was limited to the military sphere, with hardly any spillover to
the civilian economy. The design features, reliability, and technological
sophistication of its industrial products were notoriously poor. Even with
large price rebates, they were hopelessly uncompetitive in comparison
with Western products. The structure of the Soviet Union’s foreign trade
very much resembled that of a developing country: the USSR exported
large quantities of raw materials, notably oil and natural gas, and imported
Table 2:
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machinery. Its share in world trade in the 1970s and early 1980s hovered
around 4 percent, was far lower than that of the United States, West Ger-
many or Japan, and was declining. With an economy run by the state, the
Soviet Union provided no private investment, which had proven to be an
important factor of growth for many of the newly industrializing countries
such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China.
The Soviet Union’s share in economic assistance programmes was also
small. It lacked the West’s private programs, and government aid lagged
far behind Western shares. The commitments were sometimes impressive
but actual disbursements small. In accordance with the imperial and ideo-
logical paradigm, strategic considerations typically determined aid. But
there were also major problems with the aid provided. Servicing and spare
parts were difficult to obtain, and regimes in the Third World that were
shifting from the acquisition to the consolidation of power and economic
development frequently found that the benefits of cooperation with the
West outweighed those that could be obtained from the Soviet Union.
Specialization and the division of labour in CMEA did not help. The or-
ganization’s system of economic exchanges was like ‘trading dead cat for
dead dog’.352 The economic organization’s inefficiencies merely reflected
those of the Soviet-type system of planning and management. In a normal-
ly functioning empire, the dependencies are meant to provide benefits to
the centre. This was not the case in the Soviet empire. After a period of
blatantly exploitative trade and economic relations in the Stalin era, the
Soviet Union began to subsidize its hold on Eastern Europe. As noted
above, East Germany before the building of the wall was an early example
of what came to be a more general pattern under Khrushchev and Brezh-
nev. Subsidization occurred in the form of the delivery of cheap oil and
gas; overpayment for industrial products relative to world market prices;
and acceptance of industrial products whose quality was inferior to that of
commodities exported by Moscow’s allies to the West in exchange for
hard currency. Whereas such deficiencies were serious enough per se, the
main concern of the Soviet leaders, in what an astute analyst of Soviet af-
fairs called the ‘harsh decade’ of the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was the
352 The claim to fame for this apt characterization is unclear but probably belongs to
Hungarian economists.
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impact of the deceleration of economic growth and lagging technological
innovation on the military-industrial sector and the armed forces.353
The Military-Industrial Complex and the Challenge of SDI
A number of special features characterized the Soviet military-industrial
complex.354 In conjunction, they amounted to a heavy burden on the Sovi-
et economic mule that, in conjunction with other burdens of empire, it was
ultimately no longer able to bear. Excessive secrecy was one of the many
bales of straw that threatened to break its back. This feature, indeed, was
one of the most pervasive phenomena in both Czarist and Soviet Russia.
By the late 1960s, it had penetrated the system to such an extent that dur-
ing the SALT I negotiations members of the Soviet foreign ministry’s
negotiation team were denied access to information about force levels and
other ‘secrets’ by the members of the Soviet military delegation.355 Even
after the termination of this practice in SALT II, the most important as-
pects of military affairs remained concealed. These concerned the size and
composition of the military budget; the strength, organization, and deploy-
ment of the Soviet armed forces; the priorities in military research and de-
velopment; the scope and rates of weapons production; and the volume,
composition, and geographical distribution of arms exports and military
assistance. Initiatives in foreign policy were announced only after they had
353 See Seweryn Bialer, ‘The Harsh Decade’, chapter 4 in his The Soviet Paradox:
External Expansion, Internal Decline, Vintage Books (New York: Random
House, 1986), pp. 57-80.
354 The term was coined by Eisenhower. In 1961, in his farewell address, he warned
against a collusion between ‘big business’ and the military, that is, against the
possible emergence of a ‘military-industrial complex’ that could ‘acquire unwar-
ranted and potentially dangerous political power’; as reported in The New York
Times, 18 January 1961. The Soviet military, of course, denied the existence of
such a complex in the USSR. To General V.N. Lobov, first deputy chief of staff
of the Soviet armed forces and a first deputy minister of defense, that idea was
‘absurd’; ‘Est’ li v SSSR voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks?’, Izvestiia, 16 Octo-
ber 1988. For the late Soviet period, however, it was essentially correct to say
that, whereas the United States has a military-industrial complex, the Soviet
Union is a military-industrial complex.
355 This fact was first revealed by Raymond Garthoff, an American participant in the
SALT I negotiations. It was confirmed to this author at that time by a Soviet for-
eign ministry official.
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been decided. Discussions in the Politburo and Central Committee on in-
ternational security affairs remained unpublished.
A second feature of military affairs and the military-industrial complex
damaging to the economy was the priority given to the arms industry in
the allocation of resources. Military industry received the best in machine
tools and instruments. It paid its workers more than what workers and em-
ployees would receive in the civilian sector, and they had easier access to
better housing and medical facilities. Supply bottlenecks were fewer in
arms research, development and production since managers, state officials,
and party secretaries learned to attend more quickly to requests from that
industry.
A third special feature with negative impact on the economy was the
one-way flow of technological innovation. As part of the priority given to
the military sector, great emphasis was put on military research and devel-
opment. According to Roald Sagdeev, the former head of the Institute for
Space Research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the Brezhnev era at
least 70 percent of the personnel employed in scientific tasks worked in
the military and, therefore, secret and ‘closed’ sector of science.356 Mili-
tary industry was almost exclusively the beneficiary of innovation, with
spillover occurring only in one direction: from civilian research and devel-
opment to the military sector.
Fourth, military industry was largely exempted from planning con-
straints. It was able to enjoy the supply advantages of central planning
without suffering its demand disadvantages. Production quotas, for in-
stance, were not assigned to pilot plants and experimental factories, and
retooling to upgrade weapons in these enterprises was standard practice.
Fifth, relative to the civilian sector, there was more effective quality
control in military industry. The defense ministry, as the sole buyer of
weapons, made sure that it would get what it wanted. This was achieved
mainly by quality-control inspectors attached to each plant. These voennye
predstavitely, or military representatives, were empowered to reject prod-
ucts that did not conform to the stringent design specifications laid down
by the ministry. They received their salaries from the ministry, and since
they were neither employed nor paid by the plant, the establishment of
cosy and corrupt relations between them and the plant management was
made difficult.
356 Novoe vremia, No. 47 (1988), p. 27.
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Finally, the high levels of military expenditure contributed to the bur-
dens of empire and the downfall of the Soviet economy. According to
Western estimates, Soviet military spending in current prices was said to
have increased from about 50 billion roubles in 1970 to approximately 130
billion in 1986.357 In the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, mil-
itary expenditures were estimated to have increased by 10 percent annual-
ly in current prices. Since such rates of growth exceeded that of the econo-
my, the proportion of military expenditures in GNP, according to Western
estimates, increased from 12-14 percent at the beginning of the 1970s to
15-17 percent at the beginning of the 1980s.358 Many Western and Soviet
observers, including Gorbachev after he had become General Secretary,
thought that such estimates were too low. In conversation with Gromyko,
for instance, he assumed that military expenditures constituted 16 percent
of national income but ‘if one added to that 4 percent for the MVD [Min-
istry of the Interior] and the KGB, the total would amount to 20 percent,
which is the highest [proportion of] military expenditures [of GDP] in the
world’.359
The level of defense expenditure did not constitute much of a problem
in the conditions of relatively high economic growth in the 1950s and
1960s. But as the decline in the growth rates of the Soviet economy con-
tinued in the 1970s, objective constraints made themselves felt. The priori-
ty allocation of resources to the military sector of the economy became a
cancerous growth, a malignant tumour that sapped the strength of the
whole economic organism and threatened to destroy it. Starting from the
second half of the 1970s, growth of Soviet military expenditures in real
terms, based on 1970 prices, was estimated as having decreased from
about 4 to 2 percent per annum; no growth was recorded any longer in
military procurement.360 Such trends, according to Western analysts, were
not the result of deliberate decisions by the political leadership but the in-
357 The Soviet Economy under a New Leader, Paper Prepared Jointly by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for Submission to the
Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness and Security Eco-
nomics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 19
March 1986.
358 Ibid.
359 As quoted by Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, p. 49.
360 According to CIA calculations, USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Devel-
opment, 1950-1980, Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Commit-
tee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., December 1982, p. 54.
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exorable consequence of the overall slowdown of the Soviet economy.361
Even political leaders with a limited understanding of economic affairs –
essentially all of the Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev – could no
longer ignore the fact that the share of military expenditures in the gross
national product could not continue to rise indefinitely; that a technologi-
cally advanced military sector could not exist in isolation from the econo-
my; that the future effectiveness and modernity of the armed forces was
threatened by the economic deficiencies; and that tinkering with the sys-
tem and yet another round of ‘administrative streamlining’ were no longer
enough to remedy the problem. The Soviet military was certainly getting
restless about the political leadership’s inability to achieve a level of tech-
nological sophistication in the military-industrial sphere that would guar-
antee high military technology competitiveness and military-strategic pari-
ty with the United States.362 Perhaps conscious of the dissatisfaction inside
the main pillar of Soviet global power, Brezhnev addressed the top mili-
tary leaders in the Kremlin only two weeks before his death. He attempted
to reassure them that they would get everything they needed. But he also
had to tell them that ‘politics can only be effective if it is based on real
economic and military power’.363
It is into this setting that Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’, or Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI), has to be placed. As Dobrynin has observed, ‘Our physicists,
headed by Academician Yevgeni Velikhov, were as sceptical as many of
their American counterparts [about the prospects for developing an effect-
ive strategic defense in space] but their views hardly carried much
weight. ... Our leadership, however, was convinced that the great technical
potential of the United States had scored again and treated Reagan’s
361 See, for instance, Abraham S. Becker, Sitting on Bayonets: The Soviet Defense
Burden and the Slowdown of Soviet Defense Spending, Rand / UCLA Center for
the Study of Soviet International Behavior, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
CA, JRS-01, December 1985.
362 Disagreements over economic and military priorities in all likelihood led to the
dismissal of chief of staff Nikolai Ogarkov in September 1984; see Jeremy R.
Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, The
RAND Corporation, R-3521-AF, June 1987; see also Dale R. Herspring, ‘Nikolai
Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs’,
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 29-59.
363 ‘Soveshchanie voenachal’nikov v Kremle’, Pravda, 28 October 1982 (italics
mine).
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statement as a real threat.’364 Such perceptions were not only by the
Kremlin in the Andropov and Chernenko interregnum after the death of
Brezhnev but also by Gorbachev. Since the argument is made in this book
that the crumbling of the three main pillars of empire and a grave domestic
political crisis formed a compelling rationale for Gorbachev’s New Think-
ing, his views on the SDI issue are of considerable importance. There is
little direct evidence how he regarded the problem before his accession to
power but there is ample proof in his first months in office. The evidence
available shows that he recognized science and technology as crucial fac-
tors of global political influence and Reagan’s Star Wars not simply as one
of the many gyrations of the arms competition but as a fundamental chal-
lenge to the Soviet Union.365
Prior to Gorbachev’s accession to power, a growing number of party of-
ficials and academic specialists became concerned about the social costs
of high defense expenditures. Shevardnadze later recalled that he had ex-
pressed his concern about the impact of the arms race on both superpow-
ers. In a private conversation at his (Shevardnadze’s) home in Moscow,
United States ambassador Thomas J. Watson had told him that in the Unit-
ed States signs of a falling standard of living had appeared and that this
could probably be attributed to the high costs of the arms race. In his opin-
ion, the same applied to the Soviet Union. By carrying the burden of the
arms race both the USA and the USSR were beginning to sacrifice com-
petitiveness relative to other countries. Shevardnadze agreed and cited the
examples of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan: ‘While we were
competing in the production and stockpiling of state-of-the-art weapons,
they, freed from this burden, surged ahead of us.’366 Furthermore, he con-
tinued, ‘in our economy only the military-industrial complex operated at
364 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 528 (italics mine).
365 Evidence will be presented below; see xxx pp. 275-76. Gorbachev, in retrospect,
has attempted to deemphasize the importance of SDI for changes in the Soviet
approach towards the West. For instance, at a conference on ‘A World Restored:
Reflections on Ending the Cold War’, organized by West Point Military Acade-
my, 8-9 October 1995, he stated that the Soviet Union had an advanced research
program and was ready for cost-effective responses. ‘SDI was not decisive in our
movement to a new relationship. Change in the Soviet Union was the decisive
factor’; quoted from notes taken by one of the participants.
366 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 149-50. No date was provided for the conversa-
tion. From the context, it appears that it took place in 1985, after Shevardnadze’s
appointment to the post of foreign minister.
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peak performance, thriving at the country’s expense and making it possi-
ble for the country to entertain illusions of its own might and power. But
suddenly it dawned on us that real power is something much more than
nuclear warheads’.367
To return to the main line of the argument, the erosion of the three main
pillars of empire reflected long-term structural deficiencies of the Soviet
empire and the Soviet system. The crisis of empire which this erosion pro-
duced was intimately connected with a domestic political crisis in the So-
viet Union.
The Domestic Political Crisis
The self-proclaimed ‘stability of cadres’ had been one the main building
blocks of the Soviet system under Brezhnev. After the cycles of physical
liquidation under Stalin and the hectic administrative reshuffling and fre-
quent discoveries of ‘anti-party groups’ in the Khrushchev era, Brezhnev
finally met the ruling elite’s longing for predictability and security of
tenure – at a price. Stability turned into stagnation (zastoy). Corruption
and nepotism became rampant. The ‘new class’ of party officials became
ever more insulated from society.368 The system of self-generating and
self-selecting appointments according to centrally controlled lists (nomen-
klatura) turned party officials into an oligarchy, or a special caste, some-
thing akin to an aristocracy, with life peerage that provided power, perks
and privileges.369 The elite, if this term can be meaningfully applied, had
its own clannish ties, special stores, maternity wards, funeral services,
health resorts and hunting lodges. Its children spent time together, re-
ceived priority access to higher education and often intermarried. Brezh-
nev’s son, to take an example from the highest level of the hierarchy, be-
came deputy minister for foreign trade, and his son-in-law was promoted
to first deputy minister of the interior.370
4.
367 Ibid.
368 This phenomenon in the evolution of Soviet-type systems was aptly described by
Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1968).
369 Terminology used by Mikhail Voslensky, Nomenklatura, transl. Eric Mosbacher
(London: Bodley Head, 1984), and Georgi Arbatov, The Soviet System: An Insid-
er’s Life in Soviet Politics, with an introduction by Strobe Talbott (New York:
Random House, 1992), p. 227.
370 Ibid.
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There was one segment of growth in the period of stagnation: the bu-
reaucracy. In accordance with Parkinson’s Law, the number of bureaucrats
in the Brezhnev era rose to unprecedentedly high levels. The party apparat
expanded by tens of thousands of officials, many of whom incorporated as
a result of the creation of agricultural departments in the party’s district
committees. About half a million officials (chinovniki) filled the hierarch-
ical layers of the party bureaucracy, from the central apparatus (Politburo,
Secretariat, CC departments) to the regional and local offices in the Union
republics, regions, districts, cities, and territories. Growth occurred also in
the number of officials in state and economic administrations. Between
1975 and 1980, their ranks swelled by three million and in 1984 surged to
a level of 18.6 million bureaucrats. They could be found, some of the time
at least, at their desks in 36 councils of ministers, more than 1,000 min-
istries and state committees, 51,700 executive committees of the regional
and locals soviets, 44,600 production and scientific-production asso-
ciations, 21,600 state farms (sovkhozy), transportation, construction, trad-
ing, and service enterprises as well as health and educational institu-
tions.371
These data excluded the officers and men in the Soviet armed forces,
the KGB, border troops, interior ministry and the police. The strength of
the five branches of the armed forces – the army, the navy, the air force,
the strategic rocket forces, and air defense – added up to a total of about 5
million officers and men.372 The secret police (KGB) had an estimated
720,000 agents on its payroll, and this agency and the interior ministry
(MVD) had under their command 570,000 officers and men in military
formations, including several divisions of border and internal security
troops.373 Excluded also were the officials in the labour unions, youth or-
371 Data as compiled by M.U. Klimko, Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 11 (1984), p. 16, as
quoted by Gyula Józsa, ‘The Party Apparatus under Andropov and Chernenko’,
in Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, ed., The Soviet
Union 1984/85 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 25-27.
372 Data from various issues of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Military Balance (London).
373 Astrid von Borcke, ‘The Role of the Secret Service’, in Federal Institute for East
European and International Studies, ed., The Soviet Union 1984/85 (Boulder, Co-
lo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 49 and 56 as well as various issues of the IISS Military
Balance. The figure of 720,000 KGB agents is based on research by Yevgenia
Albats, The State within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present
and Future, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
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ganization (Komsomol) and other ‘social formations’, collective farms, or
kolkhozy, and the state farms (sovkhozy).
The numerical expansion of the administrative apparatus and the exter-
nal and internal security services was matched by an increase in their po-
litical representation and influence. The defense minister and the head of
the KGB became full members of the Politburo. Brezhnev appointed him-
self Marshal of the Soviet Union and emphasized his role as supreme
commander of the armed forces. Important questions of internal and exter-
nal security were discussed and decided in a reactivated defense council
(sovet oborony), a select body of top party and state officials and high-
ranking military officers. Prominence, status and prestige of the military
were demonstratively elevated. On the occasion of official celebrations in
Red Square, the top military leaders were prominently placed atop the ros-
trum at the Lenin mausoleum, at the right-hand side of the General Secre-
tary; as if to demonstrate equality with the party, they took up half of the
rostrum.
The armed forces were called upon to assume a new ‘internationalist’
function in order to be able to advance world-wide ‘state interests’. For
that purpose, the navy and the air force were equipped with long-range in-
tervention capabilities.374
The priority allocated to military industry in the economy, the privi-
leged position of the military in politics and society as well as the more
prominent role of the armed forces in foreign policy could be interpreted
as rampant ‘Bonapartism’ or at least as a successful bid by the military for
power at the expense of the party. This, however, would be an erroneous
interpretation of the essence of civil-military relations under Brezhnev.
The undoubted growth in the military’s status and influence did not result
1994), p, 23. For detail on these figures see infra, chapter 5, the section on the
KGB.
374 The new ‘internationalist’ role of the Soviet armed forces was explained by [Mar-
shal] Andrei A. Grechko, ‘Rukovodiashchaia rol’ KPSS v stroitel’stve armii sot-
sialisticheskogo armii’, Voprosy istorii KPSS, Vol. 5 (1974), pp. 30-47. The case
for using the navy as an instrument for the advancement of Soviet ‘state interests’
was vigorously made by Admiral Sergei S. Gorshkov in a series of articles in the
navy’s journal Morskoi sbornik. For a detailed analysis see Hannes Adomeit,
‘Militärische Macht als Instrument sowjetischer Außempolitik: Überholt? Un-
brauchbar? Unentbehrlich?’, in Hannes Adomeit, Hans-Hermann Höhmann and
Günter Wagenlehner, eds., Die Sowjetunion als Militärmacht (Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1987), pp. 200-235.
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from a politicization of the armed forces or their deliberate push for power
but from a pull exerted by the party.
The same can be said for the enhanced role of the secret police in the
1970s and early 1980s. The KGB was permitted to increase its influence
and representation in the Central Committee and the party bureaus of the
Union republics. Heydar Aliev, head of the KGB in Azerbaijan, and Boris
Pugo, his counterpart in Latvia, became party chiefs in their respective re-
publics. Andropov was chief of the KGB until his transfer to the party ap-
paratus in May 1982. Under his tutelage, the secret police became ever
more prominent and active. It was instrumental in implementing a whole
series of restrictive measures, curbing cultural expression, religious rights
and freedoms and the free flow of information. It helped stifle and silence
dissent. It persecuted and suppressed human rights groups like the Helsin-
ki CSCE watch committees. All along, the KGB engaged in image build-
ing. It fostered the idea that it was a modern, efficient and reliable institu-
tion, devoid of internal corruption and dedicated to furthering the interests
of the party, the state and the people, and hence entitled to a privileged
role in politics and society.
Bureaucratization and militarization interacted with a crisis of political
leadership. One of its many causes lay in the serious health problems that
Brezhnev developed after 1975. In the last years of his rule, he was said to
have been able to work only for a few hours each day. His death in
November 1982 at the age of almost 76 thus came almost as a relief to re-
form-minded officials in the party and government. In fact, the Politburo’s
selection of Andropov as his successor was greeted, according to
Chernyaev, with an ‘outburst of ovations’ in the November 1982 plenary
meeting of the Central Committee.375 Such outbursts had occurred previ-
ously, some of them carefully stage-managed. This time, however, the en-
thusiasm appeared to be genuine.
The new leader had the reputation of being intelligent, shrewd, skilful,
hard-working, and immune to corruption. He was regarded as having a re-
markable mind, political talents, and an intellectual bent and as being in-
corruptible and selfless, which on occasion bordered on asceticism.376 His
record as ambassador to Hungary during the 1956 revolution, CC secre-
tary in charge of relations with the ruling communist parties in the 1960s,
375 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 12-13.
376 Andropov as characterized by Arbatov, The System, p. 256.
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and head of the KGB in the period from 1967 to 1982 made him appear
better informed than anyone in the top leadership about the shortcomings
of the Soviet system and the problems of empire in Eastern Europe. He
seemed to combine perfectly the qualities of enlightened intellectual and
efficient technocrat. Nothing, however, was to come of the high hopes that
had accompanied his appointment. He merely prescribed the time-hon-
oured Soviet medicine of a new campaign to cure the social and economic
ills that had befallen the country. The campaign was conducted under the
heading of ‘mobilization of reserves’ inherent in the system in order to
modernize it. The imposition of discipline was meant to help in this effort.
The structural deficiencies of the system had led to a plethora of activi-
ties at the margin or outside the legal framework and a thriving ‘second
economy’. Many of these activities were advantageous to the consumer
since they mitigated the rigidities of central planning and alleviated supply
and distribution shortages. Yet rather than legalizing and constructively
channelling these forms of private initiative, the new party leader set out
to eradicate them. He decreed a relentless struggle against ‘social para-
sites’, ‘idlers’, ‘work shirkers’ and ‘violators of work discipline’. New
regulations went into effect imposing harsher penalties for certain econo-
mic offenses such as bribery, speculation and theft of products or tools
from the workplace. The police were roused from their doldrums and
forced to conduct dragnet operations in shops, bars, restaurants, movie
theatres and steam baths to check whether the people found there had le-
gitimate reasons or were skipping work. The dragnet operation was also
employed as part of yet another anti-alcoholism campaign. Drunkards
were rounded up and punished by pay cuts, demotions, and public denun-
ciations.
It is possible that Andropov considered the expansion of police powers
and intrusion into the private sphere to be a preparatory stage for more far-
reaching structural changes, perhaps even in a more liberal direction. If so,
such changes were never outlined. A mere three months after his inaugu-
ration as secretary general of the party, he was put on a dialysis machine
for kidney failure. In April 1983, rumours abounded that he no longer
commanded a majority among the top leadership. Politburo and Central
Committee meetings were postponed. The party chief was last seen in
public on 18 August 1983. Like actors in a theâtre absurd, and in a repeti-
tion of practices adopted in the last years of Brezhnev’s life, Andropov’s
subordinates excused the party leader’s absence with claims that he was
suffering from recurrent colds. Letters and documents were published on
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his behalf to prove that he was keeping abreast of the affairs of state and
working indefatigably. Yet Andropov was not at hand to announce and
justify the ‘countermeasures’ in response to the West German parliament’s
decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and he failed to
appear in public in order to explain the circumstances that had led to the
destruction of the civilian Korean airliner on flight KAL 007. These tasks
were left to Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet armed forces’ chief of
staff. Essentially, Soviet decision-making, or lack thereof, had reverted to
the last years of the Brezhnevite zastoy. The political and personal agony,
perhaps mercifully, came to an end only on 9 February 1984, when An-
dropov died.
Another succession and leadership crisis erupted. Reform-minded party
officials had hoped that this time the Politburo would chose Gorbachev as
party leader. This was not to be. As vividly described by Chernyaev, on 14
February the top leadership was ready to announce its choice for An-
dropov’s successor to the assembled members of the Central Committee.
Five minutes before the beginning of the session, the candidate members of
the Politburo and the CC secretaries, as was customary, entered the hall
through a side entrance. [Politburo candidate member and CC secretary]
Ponomarev, the perennially first among the second, led the procession. The
tension had reached its high point. All eyes were focussed on the left door be-
hind the rostrum, that is, the entrance to the presidium. Who will appear first?
Exactly at 11 a.m. Chernenko appeared. Behind him followed [Prime Minis-
ter] Tikhonov, [Foreign Minister] Gromyko, [Defense Minister] Ustinov, [CC
secretary] Gorbachev and the others. There was dead silence in the hall. No
one stirred. When Andropov, after Brezhnev’s death, had been first to enter
the plenary hall, everyone had stood up. The members of the presidium sat
down, Gorbachev directly next to Chernenko. It was still uncertain [who had
been chosen]. Chernenko rose, bent over steeply towards his notes on the ta-
ble and in an asthmatic voice mumbled a few words about the deceased.
Tikhonov then announced that the Politburo had completed its delibera-
tions and instructed him to ‘propose to the plenum to consider the candi-
dacy of comrade Chernenko’. The Central Committee was stunned. It re-
sponded to the proposal with lukewarm applause and to Tikhonov’s lauda-
tio of the candidate with embarrassed silence.377 Predictably, the new lead-
er proved to be as frail as his predecessor, although less imaginative.
One is left to wonder why that selection was made and why Gorbachev
was not chosen instead. Some understanding of the reasons may shed
377 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 11-13.
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some light on how one should view Gorbachev’s position at that time and
the policies he pursued subsequently.378 Four possible reasons can be ad-
vanced.
The first is that the gerontocracy did not understand the seriousness of
the Soviet predicament and, to the extent that it did recognize problems,
thought that they could be managed. In the light of the Politburo’s rejec-
tion of Chernenko and preference for Andropov in 1982, however, this ra-
tionale is unconvincing.
The second possibility is that the Politburo chose a transitional figure
with the idea in mind that it would put its trust in a second-in-command
(Gorbachev), who would effectively run party and state affairs and take
over from him on Chernenko’s departure. This explanation is disingenu-
ous. Its attractiveness lies in the fact that, at least up to a point, subsequent
events moved in this direction. There is no evidence, however, that this
was the Politburo’s reasoning at the time.
The third rationale is the idea that the members of the Politburo had
been frightened by Andropov’s initiatives and feared for their job if they
were to select a younger, more dynamic leader. What speaks for such an
interpretation is the fact that in his speech of praise to the CC Tikhonov
had emphasized the candidate’s ‘benevolent attitude’ towards the cadres
and, as Gorbachev discovered at the meeting, there were many happy
faces around. These belonged to members of the Central Committee who
had felt ‘threatened by dismissal or who had already retired but still be-
longed to the CC. They were hopeful that ‘now their time, the tranquil and
“stable” [time], in a word, the “time of Brezhnev”, would return’.379
Finally, opting for someone like Gorbachev, with his only fifty-two
years of age at the time of Andropov’s death, would have been far re-
moved from the collective political mind of the Politburo. In their view,
Gorbachev was simply too young to be allowed to skip several steps on
the ladder of seniority. Although no spring chicken at the age of seventy-
two, Chernenko was ‘younger’ than other leading candidates for the top
party post – Tikhonov was seventy-eight, Ustinov seventy-five, and
Gromyko seventy-four. Did they remember and feel encouraged by the re-
mark made by Andrei Kirilenko, a then member of the Politburo, who had
378 This discussion draws on John Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet
Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 39-40.
379 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 242.
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stated at Brezhnev’s birthday celebrations in 1976 that seventy years of
age was being thought of in the Soviet Union as ‘middle age’?380 Perhaps.
In conformity with the last argument, a private meeting is said to have
taken place shortly prior to the Central Committee plenum, with
Gromyko, Ustinov, Tikhonov, and Chernenko in attendance. The four ap-
pear to have taken the crucial decision on the succession. Tikhonov was
overheard in the corridor as saying, ‘I believe that we did indeed decide
correctly. Mikhail [Gorbachev] is still young. One also doesn’t know how
he would behave in that position [of General Secretary]. Kostya [Cher-
nenko] is exactly the right man.’381
Whatever the precise reason for his selection, Chernenko as party chief
meant continuation of the ineptitude, incompetence, inertia and lack of in-
novation of the Soviet system. Collectivism in decision-making and conti-
nuity of policy would again be emphasized. As previously, some econo-
mic experiments and pilot projects would be authorized but comprehen-
sive reform was ruled out. In foreign policy, matters would turn from bad
to worse. Given the party chief’s infirmities (he was said to suffer from
emphysema) and his long periods of absence from the job (for instance,
from 15 July to 5 September 1984 he never appeared in public), it is safe
to assume that Gromyko was effectively in charge. Some Western scholars
have made valiant attempts to portray this interval as rife with Soviet en-
deavours to re-establish détente with the West.382 More pertinent, it would
seem, are contemporary observations to the effect that under Chernenko’s
nominal leadership the counterproductive attitudes of ‘bear in hibernation’
and ‘insulted giant’ not only continued but turned into an ‘aggressively
isolationist mood’.383 The number of Jews permitted to emigrate shrank to
a trickle. Andrei Sakharov, already exiled in Gorki, was denied a visa for
medical treatment in the West. The Soviet Union cancelled its participa-
380 Pravda, 15 October 1976.
381 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 241. Gorbachev thus in essence confirms what
American journalist David Remnick had heard. "‘Kostya [Chernenko] will be
easier to control than Misha [Gorbachev],’ one of the Politburo members said as
he left the room where they had settled the issue." As quoted in his Lenin’s Tomb:
The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 63.
382 For instance, Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Rela-
tions and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984), pp.
168-94.
383 This was the observation made by Richard Owen, ‘Chernenko Walling Out the
West’, The Times (London), 28 June 1984.
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tion in the 1984 summer Olympic games. The country’s direct-dial inter-
national telephone circuits, installed for the 1980 Olympics in Moscow,
were unplugged and replaced by old-fashioned Soviet operators.384 New
fences topped with barbed wire went up around foreigners’ compounds in
Moscow and police were instructed to check Russian visitors more strin-
gently. A new article 13 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation
made it a crime to pass on to foreigners ‘information that constitutes a pro-
fessional secret’. Another law imposed a fine of 50 roubles on citizens
who invited foreigners to stay at their home without informing the police.
There was an increase in psychological intimidation and even physical as-
sault against Western, notably American, journalists, diplomats, and
tourists.385 The list of xenophobic measures could be extended and supple-
mented by examples of a nationalist and military-patriotic revival. At this
stage, however, it is necessary to return to the main topic and examine the
interaction between the multidimensional crisis of empire and the German
problem.
The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-East German Relations
The accelerating decay at the centre also affected East Germany as the
most exposed part of the Soviet imperial periphery. Perhaps paradoxically,
it was not the GDR’s actual or perceived socio-economic decline that
prompted a crisis in Soviet-East German relations but contradictory Soviet
perceptions and policies conducted on their basis. The Kremlin leaders, on
the one hand, believed at least part of what they heard from the East Ger-
man leadership: that the GDR was a political and economic success story.
But, on the other hand, and quite in contrast to the idea of the GDR’s polit-
ical consolidation and economic prowess, they were concerned about the
country’s allegedly increasing dependence on West Germany and drift
away from the Warsaw Pact and CMEA. Not least because of this depen-
dency did the Kremlin resent the SED leadership’s newly found self-confi-
dence and assertiveness. As described in the previous chapter, early in his
5.
384 This appears to have happened in 1982, still under Brezhnev, but the practice
continued under Andropov and Chernenko; see Kevin Klose, ‘The New Soviet
Isolationism: A Sorry Retreat’, International Herald Tribune, 26 May 1984.
385 Richard Owen, ‘Chernenko Walling Out the West’, The Times (London), 28 June
1984.
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tenure Honecker had been willing to consent to a package of quadripartite
agreements and understandings on Berlin and bilateral agreements with
West Germany on intra-German relations. However, in the second half of
the 1970s, the new provincial governor had become more self-confident
and independent and just as difficult to manage as his predecessor. There
was less coordination and consultation between the GDR and the USSR
than in the past. The Soviet leadership reacted with admonitions to the
SED comrades not to overestimate their role and, in their relations with
West Germany, not to let themselves be drawn into further economic de-
pendencies. However, the admonitions fell on deaf ears. And there was
very little the USSR could do since it had transferred most of its occupa-
tion rights to the GDR and Honecker was firmly in control of the party.386
As for the early 1980s, the archival evidence clearly shows how, in Ho-
necker’s perception, the GDR’s profile had grown after it had received in-
ternational recognition, including UN membership. A lot of room in SED
Politburo meetings is taken up by often exuberant reports on the various
visits by Honecker and other Politburo members abroad, visits by Western
and other dignitaries to the GDR, exchanges between SPD and SED party
leaders, and meetings between East and West German government offi-
cials. The new evidence also reveals that, while the relationship with the
Soviet Union remained an important part of East German foreign policy,
its relative importance for the GDR was declining. East Germany was di-
versifying its foreign policy, a reversal of roles and policies was taking
place and the sources of Soviet-East German conflict changed. In the early
1970s, the controversies had concerned questions of foreign policy. At that
time, Moscow had felt confident enough to push for East-West détente. In
the late 1970s and early 1980s. and most acutely in 1983-84, East German
foreign policy deviationism was again at issue. This time, however, it was
East Berlin that felt brave enough to make closer contact with the class en-
emy.
Honecker’s confidence was reflected in his new attitudes towards Ger-
man unification, thereby confirming Soviet anxiety about East Germany’s
possible drift into an all-German direction. Turning future events on their
head, Honecker told SED officials in February 1981 that,
386 ‘Mauerbau mit Genehmigung Moskaus: Kwizinskij als Zeuge im Keßler-Prozeß’,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 July 1993.
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if today certain people in the West make presumptuous speeches and pretend
that reunification of the two German states is more important to them than
their wallet, then we would like to tell them: be careful! Socialism will one
day knock on your door, and when the day comes that the workers of the Fed-
eral Republic decide to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a so-
cialist state, then the question of German reunification poses itself completely
anew. There shall be no doubt how we will decide then.387
Contrary to such unrealistic notions, as Gromyko had clarified earlier, a
united socialist Germany was no longer in the Soviet interest. Although
German unification under socialist auspices had no chance ever to be put
on the agenda of practical politics, Honecker’s all-German pretensions did
produce considerable irritation in Moscow (see infra in this section).
Whenever it came to a confrontation over specific issues deemed impor-
tant from the Soviet vantage point, the interests of the centre still took
precedence over those of the fiefdom. However, the degree of influence
the Soviet Union could exert on the broad sweep of East German policies
was even more limited than in the past. Frequently it yielded on subordi-
nate issues. In 1983, for instance, Honecker demanded the recall of the
two-time Soviet ambassador, Pyotr Abrasimov, who had long conducted
himself as if the GDR were his personal fiefdom, attending East German
Politburo sessions and interfering almost at will. Andropov obliged.388
Whereas the CPSU, after Andropov’s death and Chernenko’s appointment
to the post of General Secretary in February 1984, was demoralized, inter-
nally divided and internationally isolated, the SED, in contrast, was able to
present an almost undivided front. If the weak and ineffective Soviet lead-
ership had wanted to undermine or replace Honecker, it would hardly have
known on whom to rely in a reshuffle.389
The enhanced self-assurance of the SED derived not only from its im-
proved image and standing in the West but also from developments in
Eastern Europe. In the late 1960s, the GDR had only been a junior partner
in the Warsaw Pact’s so-called ‘iron triangle’, comprising East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia – a powerful bulwark based on coal, iron and
387 ‘Honecker spricht von Vereinigung beider deutscher Staaten’, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 17 February 1981.
388 See Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 263-64; see also his remarks on the conduct
of Yefremov, Abrasimov’s predecessor.
389 See James A. McAdams, ‘The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations’, Problems
of Communism, Vol. 37, No. 5 (September-October 1988), pp. 52-53; see also
Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 255-66.
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steel in the economy, orthodoxy in ideology and retrenchment in foreign
policy. The triangle, however, had disintegrated in 1968, when the
Czechoslovak communist party succumbed to the disease of ‘revisionism’
from which, essentially, it was never to recover. In the second half of the
1970s, helped by massive borrowing from the West, Poland became the
Soviet Union’s preferred partner in bridge-building between East and West
in Europe. But that country’s role, too, collapsed with the disastrous
downturn of its economy, the rise of Solidarity and the downfall of the
party. East Germany was the only side of the triangle that seemingly re-
mained unaffected by the viruses of internal dissent and economic decline.
Outwardly, throughout the 1970s, it maintained domestic political stability
and officially it boasted steady economic progress. Whereas, according to
government data of the three countries concerned, the net material product
of Poland and Czechoslovakia decreased at the beginning of the 1980s (in
Poland, it fell by 12 percent in 1981, and by 5.5 percent in 1982; in
Czechoslovakia, by 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent respectively), the East
German economy grew by 4.8 percent and 2.5 percent. East Germany’s re-
ported economic performance in 1983 and 1984 was even better, the
growth of the East German national product outpacing that of any other
CMEA country.
What, then, were the consequences of the increased self-confidence of
the East German leadership for USSR-GDR relations? In the period from
the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 to the
Bundestag’s consent to the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles on
West German soil in November 1983 they were difficult to recognize for
the outside observer. Both Moscow and East Berlin had a shared interest
in maintaining reasonably good political and economic relations with the
countries of Western Europe. Thus Brezhnev, Andropov, and Honecker
had fostered the notion of the divisibility of détente and the possibilities
for Europe to remain a tranquil island in the rough seas of superpower
competition. They had portrayed the Reagan administration as the driving
force behind an increased danger of war in Europe and exempted the
Schmidt government from the worst criticism. The purposes of this policy
of differentiation were apparently to undercut American economic sanc-
tions, to enhance the influence of the West German ‘peace movement’ and
to exacerbate divisions in the Western alliance. Both Moscow and East
Berlin warned that the European idyll could abruptly come to an end.
They threatened that if Bonn were to implement the December 1979 ‘dual
track’ decision of NATO and consent to the deployment of intermediate-
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range nuclear systems on its soil, intra-German relations would be one of
the first major casualties of a new cold war in Europe. They cautioned that
the whole carefully woven network of legal, political and economic rela-
tions between West Germany and its neighbours in the East could sudden-
ly unravel. Gromyko, for instance, in the fall of 1983, stated in East Berlin
that the deployment of U.S. missiles on West German soil would ‘contra-
dict the spirit and letter’ of the treaties normalizing Bonn’s relations with
Moscow and East Berlin.390 Similarly, in October 1983, Honecker warned
that if the Bundestag were to consent to the stationing of the missiles, a
‘new ice age’ would ensue in relations between East and West Ger-
many.391
But it soon became apparent that Moscow and East Berlin had different
reasons for opposing the deployment of missiles in Western Europe. The
primary objective of the Soviet leadership was to maintain its military pre-
ponderance in Europe and to expand its political influence by means of the
‘peace movement’ and protracted arms control negotiations. By contrast,
the East German leadership seems to have been motivated by the desire to
avoid being drawn into an accelerated arms race between East and West in
Europe and having to bear the brunt of a deterioration in East-West politi-
cal relations.
In the autumn of 1983, shortly before the Bundestag decision, the atti-
tudes and policies of the Soviet Union and East Germany began to diverge
openly. Neues Deutschland started publishing letters to Honecker from
Evangelical Church congregations, urging him to continue the dialogue
between the two German states. Mutual trust, the letters said, should flow
from the dialogue and form the basis of a ‘security partnership’ and, as he
had explicitly advocated, the formation of a Koalition der Vernunft, or
‘coalition of reason’.392 He also, in order to emphasize the East German
position, stated at a plenary meeting of the SED Central Committee in
November 1983, that is, only two days after the beginning of missile de-
ployments in West Germany, that the countermeasures decided upon by
the Warsaw Pact did ‘not elicit any enthusiasm’ in the GDR and that it
was of ‘great importance to continue the political dialogue with all forces’.
Charging that the Kohl government had taken upon itself a great responsi-
bility by agreeing to the stationing of missiles, he nevertheless assured the
390 Pravda, 19 October 1983.
391 In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Neues Deutschland, 10 October 1983.
392 Neues Deutschland, 22 October 1983.
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Central Committee: ‘We are in favor of limiting the damage as much as
possible.’393 Thus, new seeds of East German deviation from the Soviet
foreign policy line had been sown.
From the Soviet point of view, the problem was difficult to manage
since party leaders in several other Eastern European countries, too, con-
tinued to be interested in normal relations with the West. Hungary, Roma-
nia and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria were openly asserting their own for-
eign policy preferences. There was even sweeping ideological justification
for the divergence from the Soviet line and the challenge to Soviet author-
ity. Such justification was developed by Matyas Szürös, head of the inter-
national department of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Commu-
nist Party, in October 1983. In the era of the Comintern and the Comin-
form, he argued, the national interests of the member states of the ‘social-
ist community’ had ‘unconditionally’ been subordinated to international
interests. Such subordination, he stated emphatically, should no longer ob-
tain. Differences in experience were completely natural since there was no
‘single correct model’ to imitate. Both historic traditions and contempo-
rary conditions made it possible for ‘relations between individual socialist
and capitalist states to continue to develop despite the fact that the deterio-
ration of East-West relations and the contraction of contacts are the gener-
al trend’.394
In 1983-84, the SED also began to deviate from the CPSU’s internal
policies, notably on the issue of the relationship between the state and so-
ciety. In contrast to the Soviet leadership under Andropov and Chernenko
and its attitudes towards dissent, the East German government granted a
certain degree of autonomy to the Evangelical Church. It also permitted
the establishment of some transnational links between the two German so-
cieties, including the churches and the ‘peace movement’. On the ideo-
logical plane, the SED began to cultivate a new ‘special relationship’ with
Western European social democratic parties. In April 1983, for instance, it
organized a major conference in East Berlin on the legacy of Karl Marx, at
which the SED argued that the cause of preserving peace had assumed pri-
ority over the promotion of social change. Not only were communist par-
393 Ibid., 26-27 November 1983.
394 In a lecture delivered on 20-21 October 1983 at a conference on the teaching of
history after World War II. The lecture was not published at the time. However,
an article by Szürös based on it appeared in the Hungarian journal Tadarsalmi
szemle (Budapest), No. 1 (January 1984), pp. 13-21.
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ties of all orientations invited to send delegations to the conference, but so
too were numerous social democratic parties, including the SPD. Then, in
the following year, the SED began a series of direct negotiations with the
SPD on common security issues, first, on a proposed chemical weapons-
free zone and later on a European nuclear-free corridor.395
Soviet concern was reinforced not only by the fact that Honecker was
toying with the idea of German unification under socialist auspices but
also by another twist in East Germany’s perennial search for national iden-
tity. It still emphasized its socialist roots but no longer derived its exis-
tence exclusively from the ‘revolutionary’ strands of German history. It re-
tained the claim that the GDR was the culmination of the tradition associ-
ated with the peasant wars of the early 16th century and its leaders (e.g.,
Thomas Münzer, Götz von Berlichingen and Florian Geyer), the bourgeois
revolutions of 1830 and 1848 as well as the proletarian revolution of
November 1918. But it now began to associate itself also with the ‘whole
richness of German history’. Thus, the SED discovered precursors and
parallels to its own world view in the writings of Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe and Immanuel Kant and began to reinterpret the historic role of
Martin Luther, Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck. To the chagrin
of the Soviet comrades, it also began to revaluate the conspiracy to assas-
sinate Hitler on 20 July 1944.396
Thus, on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the assassination at-
tempt, at a meeting of the (East) German Society of Historians and the
Central Institute on History at the Academy of Sciences, SED court histo-
rians and ideologues claimed that the resistance group under Colonel Graf
Stauffenberg had included ‘patriotic officers’ who deserved ‘a place of
honour in the history of the German anti-Fascist resistance struggle’. Their
cooperation with other leading personalities from different sections of
German society had to be regarded as an incipient ‘coalition of reason’ (!)
and their attempt against the life of Hitler on 20 July 1944 as ‘a coura-
geous act of historic and national significance’.397 Contrary to such rein-
terpretations, an article in the Soviet army newspaper scathingly attacked
the Stauffenberg circle as having consisted of forces close to the German
‘monopoly bourgeoisie’ and having ‘advocated an alliance with American
imperialism and the creation of a united imperialist front against the Sovi-
395 McAdams, ‘The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations’, p. 53.
396 Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1984; Krasnaia zvezda, 19 July 1984.
397 Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1984.
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et Union’. In obvious allusion to the East German historiographical depar-
tures, it warned that current efforts aimed at elevating such forces to the
‘rank of national heroes’ could not be considered separately from the ‘acti-
vation of revanchist and nationalist tendencies in West Germany’.398
The most important issue, however, and one that was to provide the
first of two main triggering mechanisms for a severe crisis in Soviet-East
German relations, was the extension of substantial amounts of West Ger-
man credit to the GDR. In July 1983, the West German government had
guaranteed a credit to East Germany in the amount of 1 billion (West Ger-
man) marks. In June 1984, on a visit in Moscow, Honecker was warned
not to increase GDR dependence on West Germany. Honecker chose to ig-
nore the comradely advice, and in late July 1984 another major West Ger-
man government-guaranteed credit to East Germany in the amount of 950
million German marks was agreed upon. Unacceptably from Moscow’s
perspective, the West German economic and financial benefits were linked
to East German political concessions. For instance, when Bonn announced
the second credit, it stated that East Berlin had consented to a list of eleven
measures for the improvement of intra-German travel and visits and had
given firm assurances that it would permit several thousands of its citizens
to emigrate to West Germany in the current year.399 In fact, in the first half
of 1984 a larger number of East German citizens – almost 30,000 – visited
West Germany than ever before. Given the importance of the issue for the
increasing alienation in Soviet-East German relations and the animosity
between Honecker and Gorbachev, the problem of debts and dependency
will be analyzed later in more detail.
The second triggering device for the severe crisis in Soviet-East Ger-
man relations in the summer of 1984 was the preparation of an official
state visit by Honecker to the Federal Republic. For the East German party
leader such a visit was, in the opinion of former SED Politburo colleagues,
an ‘important, even emotional issue’ and the likely ‘crowning of his ca-
reer’.400 To provide some background, in November 1981, Brezhnev had
visited West Germany for the third time during his tenure in office and had
supported the idea of a meeting between Schmidt and Honecker. On 11-13
December 1981, Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher paid
398 Krasnaia zvezda, 19 July 1984.
399 See the reports on this linkage in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 1984.
400 Interview with Krenz; Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 35.
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an official visit to East Germany and held talks with Honecker at Lake
Werbellin and in Güstrow. However, the German chancellor and his for-
eign minister, as indeed international public opinion, were shocked when
General Jaruzelski, on the last day of Schmidt’s visit in the GDR, declared
martial law in Poland. The ‘internal intervention’ in Poland that made it
unnecessary for the Soviet Union to intervene could not possibly have
been carried out without Brezhnev’s endorsement.401 It was not unlikely,
therefore, that the Soviet and, in association with them, the East German
stage managers had intentionally attempted to embarrass Schmidt. They
could at least have had the decency to delay their action until after
Schmidt’s return to West Germany. But now, as Polish internal security
forces were rounding up Solidarity activists, the intra-German handshakes
looked strangely out of place. In fact, not having been given discreet ad-
vance warning for a timely cancellation of the visit to East Germany, the
chancellor and his foreign minister appeared duped to the West German
public. Schmidt nevertheless extended an invitation to Honecker to visit
the Federal Republic.
In the circumstances, that is, the continuing East German support for
the repression of Solidarity in Poland and the widening controversy over
the stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a visit by Honeck-
er to West Germany at any time in the period from December 1981 to
November 1983 seemed completely out of the question. But in 1984, after
Honecker’s deviation from the harsh Soviet line and the extension of the
second West German credit to East Germany, the visit advanced from a
dim prospect to specific planning. September was the month agreed upon
for the visit. But the Soviet leadership, as will be shown, was adamant that
it should not take place. Before examining this hotly debated issue, it is
appropriate to sketch the deterioration of Soviet-West German relations
that coincided with the crisis in Soviet-East German affairs.
The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-West German Relations
In March 1984, the Soviet leadership under Chernenko’s frail guidance re-
sponded to the challenge in the bloc with an ideological counteroffensive
6.
401 See Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet
Policies and Intentions, Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 135-53.
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and at the April plenum of the Central Committee decided to show a
stone-hard face to the outside world.402 Part of the new harsh attitude was
the abandonment of selective détente, that is, the policy of relative good-
will and inducements to West Germany and Western Europe, while adher-
ing to an uncompromising attitude toward the United States. The first indi-
cations of the new Soviet policy toward West Germany appeared in a com-
muniqué issued at the end of the conference of foreign ministers of the
Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on 20 April 1984, which expressed
concern that once again ‘concepts are being propagated that put into
question the borders of the European states and their social order and that
are directed against the political and territorial realities in Europe’.403
Thus, yet another propaganda campaign against Bonn began to take
shape. As if in preparation for Foreign Minister Genscher’s visit to
Moscow at the end of May, Soviet politicians and party hacks suddenly
found a new growth of revanchism’, ‘militarism’, and ‘neo-Nazism’ in the
Federal Republic. Whereas accusations of the West German government
had until then been based only on guilt by association, that is, on the idea
that Bonn was supporting or at least not resisting the policies of the Rea-
gan administration, it was now held directly responsible for the sharp dete-
rioration in East-West relations and for an increased risk of war in Europe.
In particular, Soviet propagandists attacked Bonn and the decision by the
Western European Union (WEU) to lift the restrictions, imposed on West
Germany when it entered NATO in 1955, on the production of long-range
conventionally armed aircraft and missiles. They claimed that the WEU
decision had to be seen in the context of the current ‘policy of the mili-
tarist circles’ in NATO, including in West Germany. This policy had en-
tered a highly dangerous phase, they charged, its manifestations being
plans for the deployment of new American missiles in Europe, increased
defense cooperation in WEU and demands by CDU and CSU leaders for
402 On the ideological counteroffensive, see the article by Oleg Rakhmanin, deputy
head of the Central Committee’s Department for Liaison with the Communist and
Workers’ Parties: O. V. Borisov (pseud.), ‘Soyuz novogo tipa’, Voprosy istorii
KPSS, No. 4 (1984), pp. 34-39. The Soviet ideological counteroffensive was sup-
ported by the Czechoslovak Communist Party purged of its reformist and ‘revi-
sionist’ members. An example is the article by party officials Michael Stefanak
and Ivan Hlivka, ‘Narodni a internacionalni v politice KSC’, Rude pravo, 30
March 1984.
403 Izvestiia, 21 April 1984.
Chapter 3: The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire
200
the creation of a European nuclear force.404 Although the Soviet campaign
against Bonn is on public record, the question arises why it took so long –
almost half a year after the Bundestag vote on missile deployment – to get
underway. Several reasons may explain the time lag.
First, the Soviet leadership may not have foreseen the likely evolution
of West German domestic politics after the November 1983 Bundestag
vote and regarded the position of the SPD on international security issues
as promising. In fact, a considerable transformation of the SPD had taken
place in the period from 1977 to 1983. In 1977, chancellor Schmidt had
commented on the need to maintain a balance between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact countries in the ‘gray weapons’ area, that is, the realm be-
tween the strategic and tactical nuclear levels. He had been one of the
principal architects of NATO’s dual-track decision in 1979. But there was
wide-spread opposition to his defense policies within the party. It re-
mained to be seen, from Moscow’s perspective, whether majority opinion
in the party would distance itself further from NATO and move towards
neutralism or return to the political centre in West German politics.
Second, in the immediate aftermath of the stationing of the missiles, no
one could predict with certainty the reaction of the West German ‘peace
movement’ and its future influence. The Central Committee’s Internation-
al Department still assumed or at least hoped that major sections of the op-
position outside parliament would continue to demonstrate against the sta-
tioning of missiles and draw upon the impressive strength of the more than
one million people that it had been able to muster in the fall of 1983. In
Moscow it seemed unlikely that the ‘peace movement’ would decline so
quickly to political insignificance in the West German body politic.405 The
probable degree of success or failure of Soviet military pressure and selec-
tive détente, therefore, may not have been clear in the arteriosclerotic col-
lective mind of the Soviet leadership.
Third, the Politburo may have hesitated to impose a new line on West
Germany because, as noted, the Eastern European countries were quite
averse to a deterioration of political and economic relations with Western
Europe. Party leaders and propagandists in these countries had no illusion
404 Danil Proektor, ‘Wenn die letzten Limits fallen’, Neue Zeit (Moscow), No. 19
(May 1984), pp. 18-21; see also V. Nikanarov, ‘Indul’gentsiia militarizmu: NATO
pooshchriaet narashchenie voennoi moshchi FRG’, Krasnaia zvezda, 18 May
1984.
405 Interview with Zagladin.
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about the great difficulty to make a new ‘revanchism’ and ‘militarism’
campaign against West Germany appear credible. Thus, the Soviet Polit-
buro may initially have wanted to act behind the scenes in order to avoid a
damaging public dispute in the bloc and to force the issue only after the
failure of attempts at persuasion.
Fourth, the Kremlin may not have realized until the first months of
1984 that vigorous efforts needed to be made to restore the credibility of
the Soviet threat posture. Beginning in early 1984, the West German gov-
ernment began to claim triumphantly (but perhaps unwisely) that neither
the Soviet countermeasures at the military level nor the dire political con-
sequences threatened by Moscow in the end amounted to much. The ‘new
ice age’ of which the Kremlin had warned, had failed to come about.
Above all, as West German officials pointed out in private as well as in
public, intra-German relations and the status of Berlin had remained unaf-
fected. West Germany’s economic relations, too, had not suffered, neither
with the USSR nor with other Comecon countries. Such manifestations of
‘business as usual’ may have increased the pressure on the Soviet leader-
ship to demonstrate that it did, indeed, mean business.
Finally, Chancellor Kohl’s political philosophy and the evolution of in-
tra-German affairs had become an irritant in Moscow. In July 1983, when
Kohl had visited Moscow, he had forcefully portrayed reunification as a
major foreign-policy goal of the West German government. Subsequently,
after his return to the Federal Republic, he had insisted that the German
problem was still eine offene Frage – an unresolved question – and that, as
codified in the 1972 Basic Treaty, ‘special relations’ existed between the
two German states. In principle, this was nothing new. Officials in the So-
viet foreign ministry and the Central Committee’s International Depart-
ment, however, thought they had detected a new stridency on the German
problem by what, after all, was no longer a government coalition led by
social democrats but by conservatives.406
Thus, given the persistence of the traditional paradigm in 1984, the So-
viet Union’s relations with both East and West Germany were becoming a
problem. But the relationship with its recalcitrant and obstructionist gu-
bernator in East Berlin had to be dealt with immediately. In late July and
early August, the Soviet leadership finally lost its patience. It went public
with its criticism and forced the unruly East German satrap to reappear in
406 Interview with Rykin.
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Moscow to face another round of accusations. This important juncture in
centre-periphery relations in Europe will be described and analyzed next.
Debts, Dependency, and Intra-German Relations
In Haydn’s ‘Surprise’ Symphony (No. 94 in G Major), a possibly slumber-
ing audience is rudely awakened in the andante of the second movement
when, at a second pianissimo, the full orchestra suddenly plays a fortissi-
mo. At this stage in the book, after the tour de force on paradigms and pa-
rameters, the reader may need a jolt to reinvigorate his interest. If so, noth-
ing could serve that purpose better than two Pravda articles that appeared
in the summer of 1984. The sensitivity of the subject matter, the timing of
the articles and their high-level political backing converged to catch the at-
tention of political leaders and slumbering Sovietologists. The articles also
tell a fascinating story of empire and ideology.
Perhaps paradoxically for the uninitiated in the defunct (but now again,
in the Putin era, again relevant) art of Kremlinology, the articles were pri-
marily about West Germany but nevertheless infuriated the East Germany
leadership. Equally paradoxically for the untrained eye, the first article
was written by a certain Lev Bezymensky who – in contrast to the
pseudonyms often used by the editors of Pravda to lay down the party line
– actually existed but who was almost unknown beyond a small circle of
specialists in both the Soviet Union and the West.407 Nevertheless, the arti-
cle was also published in Neues Deutschland, the East German party
newspaper. The second article did not have a by-line, and the East German
party newspaper failed to publish it.408 However, the issues it dealt with
were considered serious enough by both Soviet and East German party
leaders to break off their vacations and hurry to a hastily arranged secret
meeting in Moscow. According to widespread Western opinion, it was the
advent of perestroika and glasnost that caused a deep political rift between
the CPSU and the SED and personal animosity between Honecker and
Gorbachev. It can be argued, however, that the chasm between them
opened earlier, with the publication of the two articles and the subsequent
emergency meeting in Moscow.
7.
407 Lev Bezymensky, ‘Pod sen’iu amerikanskikh raket’, Pravda, 27 July 1984.
408 ‘Na lozhnom puti’, ibid., 2 August 1984.
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Before analyzing the content of the articles, the background for their
appearance will be presented first.
First and foremost, their origins are to be found in the extension of two
major government-guaranteed credits by the government in Bonn to East
Berlin and the Kremlin’s conviction that the GDR was dangerously drift-
ing into West Germany’s orbit. The first credit, granted in July 1983,
amounted to 1 billion German marks (Milliardenkredit); the second, al-
most in the same amount – 950 million marks – was extended in July
1984. Since credit to communist countries in one form or another, for in-
stance, to Poland, was to become a normal part of East-West interaction
and had already played a part in Soviet-American relations in the period of
détente, it is easy to overlook the significance of the dramatic measure.
Except for ‘swing’ credits to facilitate intra-German trade, credit to East
Germany was unprecedented. Furthermore, the political sensitivity of the
arrangements was heightened by the fact that they did not occur in a peri-
od of renewed détente but rather in one of unabated East-West tensions
over the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the Soviet
Union and Western Europe. In addition, the credits were arranged by
Franz Josef Strauß, who in the past had been the bête noire of Soviet and
East German propagandists and had been attacked by them as a rabid re-
vanchist harbouring nuclear ambitions. For the Soviet Union the main is-
sue was whether East Germany was carelessly embarking upon a slippery
path that would lead from economic to political dependency and ultimate-
ly to erosion of its socialist foundations.
Günter Mittag, the chief architect of the New Economic Mechanism un-
der Ulbricht and the leader responsible for economic affairs under Ho-
necker, was to acknowledge in retrospect that there had indeed existed a
close linkage between politics and economics. At the beginning of the
1980s, he wrote, the GDR had no longer been in a position ‘to achieve on
its own the necessary qualitatively higher level of labour productivity’.
The CMEA could not be relied upon to provide new impetus either. On
the contrary, in his view, this organization ‘relied on the GDR for the de-
velopment of new technologies’. Thus, the only thing that remained was
ever ‘closer cooperation and closer rapprochement’ with West Germany
although ‘we implicitly had to accept the fact that the Federal Republic al-
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ways granted assistance under the premise of preparing for future reunifi-
cation’.409
Soviet-East German controversies over the issue began in earnest at the
beginning of the 1970s. The deteriorating performance of the centralized
command economies, including that of the GDR, threatened to erode liv-
ing standards and political stability. In order to avert that danger, Honeck-
er developed an ambitious sozial-politisches Programm that was to pro-
vide not only for the continuation of subsidies for cheap food, rent, health
care, education, and transportation but also the expansion of housing con-
struction and social benefits, such as old-age pensions, child-care benefits,
maternity leave, and a reduced work week. Laudable as the program may
have been, the question was how to finance it. If severe cuts in investment
were to be avoided, an increase in borrowing was the answer. When the
possible risks of such a strategy were pointed out to Honecker at a Polit-
buro meeting as early as in February 1972, he made it clear that he accept-
ed these risks and that borrowing from the West presented no problem
since, as he said, ‘We do not have the intention to repay the debts of the
GDR in two years.’410
The ‘oil shock’ with its substantial price increases for that commodity −
oil prices more than doubled between April 1979 and April 1980 − signifi-
cantly increased the GDR’s borrowing requirements. For whereas the So-
viet Union profited immensely and thereby managed to postpone the ulti-
mate hour of reckoning, that is, its collapse, by huge windfall profits, East
German economic specialists estimated that the price explosion for oil and
raw materials on the world market would ‘lead to an enormous additional
burden for the national economy of the GDR, amounting to an estimated
25-30 billion [East German] marks’. That, precisely, was the sum that Ho-
necker had intended to spend on the core of his sozial-politische Pro-
gramm, the construction of housing.411
East Germany’s level of indebtedness subsequently began to rise. This
did not go unnoticed in Moscow. In the mid-1970s, prime minister Kosy-
gin told Mittag that East Germany should refrain from increasing its level
409 Günter Mittag, Um jeden Preis: Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme (Berlin: Auf-
bau Verlag, 1991), p. 83.
410 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. II, p. 49.
411 Ibid., p. 54. The East German mark was officially valued at parity with the West
German Deutsche Mark. However, on the black market, one DM was traded for
five or more GDR marks.
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of Western indebtedness above 6 billion Deutsche Mark.412 To put this fig-
ure in perspective, according to the head of the GDR Staatsbank, even this
limit would have been ‘3.6 times higher than the total export volume’ of
the GDR and meant that ‘the national income consumed [would have
been] higher than the national income produced’.413 But Honecker and
Mittag ignored all warnings and considerations of economic rationality
and went far beyond this level. In fact, at that time, GDR hard currency
indebtedness was already well over 6 billion Deutschmarks. In 1979 the
total debt stood at about 30 billion Deutschmarks.414
Werner Krolikowski, a Politburo member and CC secretary for econo-
mic affairs in 1973-76, later revealed that ‘at every meeting with Honeck-
er the Soviet party leaders – Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gor-
bachev – warned of the great danger of indebtedness to the West’.415 At
one of these meetings in East Berlin, in October 1979, on the occasion of
the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the GDR, ‘Brezhnev pounded
his fist on the table and, in front of the assembled [SED] Politburo, ac-
cused Honecker of leading the GDR into bankruptcy’.416 The East German
party leader pretended to take the criticism seriously and had proposals put
before the Politburo to halve the total debt of the GDR in the 1980s. But
these proposals were as unrealistic as his previous policies. No serious at-
tempt was made to fulfil the plans, and the level of debt continued to in-
crease.
Honecker and Mittag then began to use an extensive business network
under the auspices of Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, a shrewd and
shadowy figure, to raise as much hard currency as possible. The network
went under the name of Kommerzielle Koordinierung (Coordination of
Commerce), referred to by insiders as KoKo, which Schalck also used to
amass a private fortune. One of the avenues he pursued was the export of
weapons, a scheme that began in earnest in 1982 and earned the GDR
about 300 million Deutschmarks in that year.417 KoKo expanded commer-
412 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, [Vol. I], p. 325.
413 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. II, p. 50. Grete Wittkowski was the head of the
GDR state bank. Her figure of 3.6 is calculated on the basis of a projected debt of
DM 5.9 billion (rather than DM 6 billion) for the end of 1973.
414 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. I, p. 327.
415 Hand-written notes by Krolikowski, dated 16 January 1990, ibid., Doc. 22, p.
327.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid, Vol. II, p. 63.
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cial exports, too, even if it meant engaging in transactions that would yield
only 0.10 Deutschmarks per commodity unit at a production cost of 1 East
German mark. Schalck finally used KoKo to exchange East German for
West German marks at commercial banks in West Berlin. Since the banks
kept each other informed about the volume of such exchanges, Schalck’s
operatives synchronized their transactions in order to avoid a precipitous
fall in the exchange rate.418
The imperial centre was apparently well informed about Honecker’s
economic strategy and, indeed, about internal SED concerns and opposi-
tion to the increasing level of indebtedness. One of the informants was
Krolikowski, who told the Kremlin in March 1983: ‘The deliveries in the
export plan with the Soviet Union have not yet been specified up to the
necessary 100 percent. Products in the amount of 1.3 billion marks are still
missing.’419 He commented that this state of affairs ‘unmasks [the fact]
that the most important task [of planning] is the balancing of trade with
the NSW [non-socialist world] through [an increase in] exports’. Further-
more, according to Krolikowski, it also showed the GDR’s intention "to
sell to the Soviet Union such commodities as cannot be sold in the NSW
and in that way to fulfil the plan for exports to the Soviet Union’.420 Such
reports in all likelihood confirmed the Soviet leaders’ worst suspicions. In-
deed, since politics and economics are linked, they could not have been
very surprised about a further observation in Krolikowski’s report to the
effect that ‘the attitude by E[rich] H[onecker] to the Soviet Union and
CMEA is characterized by great cunning’. Honecker avoided open criti-
cism of Andropov, but everything he had to say about the new Soviet lead-
er was said with ‘cool sobriety, without personal involvement and dedica-
tion; [there] wasn’t a word of praise’. He merely ‘adopted an attitude of
watchful waiting to events in the Soviet Union’.421
Western estimates of the GDR’s debt, too, became more ominous. The
Wall Street Journal, which had calculated the GDR’s debt to the West as
being $11.8 billion at the end of 1980, estimated that this amount would
rise to $18-20 billion by the end of 1985. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung pro-
vided a figure of $12 billion in July 1982. The United Nations calculated
418 Ibid.
419 Ibid., Vol II, p. 65. Krolikowski by then had already been demoted (in 1976) to
the position of deputy prime minister.
420 Ibid. (italics mine).
421 Ibid. [Vol. I], Doc. 25, p. 351.
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an even higher figure. However, none of these estimates included East
German obligations to West Germany in the amount of approximately 3.4
billion Deutschmarks at that time, which were not counted as foreign
debt.422 Forty percent of these debts had a payment period of less than one
year. This required that half of all hard currency receipts be used for the
repayment of principal and interest. But these obligations could only be
met by raising new credit. To compound matters, the deterioration in the
terms of trade as a result of the huge increase in the world market price for
oil and raw materials made it more difficult to acquire hard currency.
Therefore, to repeat, ever new credits were urgently required.
In June 1983, Honecker sent Schalck as his personal emissary to a se-
cret meeting with Franz Josef Strauß. In a personal letter, which Schalck
handed to the Bavarian prime minister and head of the CSU, the East Ger-
man leader revealed economic and financial information that he had with-
held even from his own government and party.423 He effectively bared his
soul and confessed to Strauß the GDR’s economic predicament. As Strauß
later wrote, Honecker told him that he ‘could ask for CMEA’s help, which
for all practical purposes meant Moscow’s, but Western assistance was a
[preferable] alternative, since he intended to cooperate with [the West]
more closely on economic matters’. The letter culminated in the plea to
Strauß to use his good offices in Bonn in order to break the barriers which
had thus far stood in the way of the realization of his wishes.424 Schalck
insisted on having the letter returned to him to take back to East Berlin.
Secrecy, evidently, was of the highest order. Only Schalck and Mittag
knew of Honecker’s plans. If the wheeling and dealing with Strauß had
been discussed in the Politburo, his associates would probably not have
dared move against Honecker but someone would undoubtedly have in-
formed the Soviet leaders, and this would most likely have spelled the end
of his plans.425
Another important part of the background to the Pravda articles was
Honecker’s unbending determination to visit West Germany. Chancellor
Schmidt and foreign minister Genscher, as noted above, had paid an offi-
cial state visit to the GDR in December 1981 and had invited Honecker to
422 Wolfgang Seiffert, ‘Zur Verschuldung der DDR und ihren Konsequenzen’,
Deutschland-Archiv, Vol. 15 (December 1982), p. 1241.
423 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. II, p. 63.
424 Franz Josef Strauß, Die Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1989), p. 524.
425 Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro, Vol. II, p. 67.
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visit the Federal Republic. Consultations with the government in Bonn
had advanced far enough by the summer of 1984 to make it seem quite
realistic that the visit would take place sometime in the autumn. Given the
divergence of Moscow’s and East Berlin’s Westpolitik, the impending visit
assumed supreme symbolic significance. The Pravda articles for obvious
reasons did not refer to it. But, as will be seen, whether or not the visit
should take place was a hotly contested issue in the August 1984 emergen-
cy meeting in Moscow.
Pravda Articles of Faith
To turn to the Pravda articles themselves, the diatribes by Bezymensky
appeared just two days after the announcement of the second credit. The
author attacked Bonn for ‘using economic levers as well as political con-
tacts’ in order to gain concessions by the GDR on matters of sovereignty.
He reminded his readers that the Federal Republic had still not responded
favourably to any of the four demands that Honecker had put forward in
Gera, East Germany, in October 1980, that is, during a period of – in
Moscow and in East Berlin – perceived risks of East German infection by
the Polish Solidarity bacillus. The demands had deliberately been de-
signed to be unacceptable to Bonn. They comprised (1) West German
recognition of and respect for a separate East German citizenship; (2) up-
grading of the permanent representations in Bonn and East Berlin to the
status of embassies; (3) abolition of the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle (central
registration office) in Salzgitter for criminal acts committed by East Ger-
mans for possible later prosecution; and (4) delineation and readjustment
of the East-West German border at the Elbe river.426 Bezymensky also re-
minded his readers of statements made by Honecker prior to the stationing
of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe to the effect that
good-neighbourly relations cannot flourish ‘in the shadow of the mis-
siles’.427
The second, unsigned, article appeared a few days later. It was even
more blunt in its attack on Bonn and drew the connection between the new
credit and East German concessions more sharply. It warned that the ‘eco-
8.
426 For the text of Honecker’s speech in Gera, see Neues Deutschland, 10 October
1980.
427 This, in fact, is the title of Bezymenksy’s article.
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nomic lever has frequently been used in the past for the disruption of the
post-war peace order in Europe and above all for the destruction of the sta-
bility of the GDR’. The lever at present was the ‘credit agreement between
the Deutsche Bank and the foreign trade bank of the GDR’. With the help
of the credit and its deliberate linkage with demands, such as an increase
in the number of West German visitors to East Germany and of the vol-
ume of printed material imported by the GDR, Bonn attempted ‘to gain
new channels of political and ideological influence’. Finally, according to
the editorial, West Germany tried, ‘under the pretext of “damage limita-
tion”, to achieve its long-standing revanchist plans’ in Europe.428
Before focussing on the Moscow emergency meeting and providing an
analysis of the Soviet-GDR controversies, three brief observations are in
order. First, although the articles were ostensibly directed against Bonn,
they were pointed to an even greater degree at East Berlin. Simply put,
they outlined how Bonn had more or less skilfully laid a trap and East
Berlin had stepped into it. From this perspective, the crucial question con-
cerned the reason for the SED’s ill-advised behaviour. Was it a mixture of
stupidity, naïveté and overconfidence with a dose of pan-German illu-
sions? Or was it conscious and deliberate policy to construct a ‘special re-
lationship’ with the other Germany at the expense of the special − ‘eter-
nal’ and ‘fraternal’ − Soviet-East German relations?
A second observation concerns the forum of the attack. Ordinarily, in-
ter-party controversies were carefully shielded from international public
scrutiny so as not to detract from the appearance of unity and cohesion of
the ‘socialist community’. The Sino-Soviet rift is a perfect example of
this. Soviet criticism of China, for instance, was first voiced in the late
1950s behind closed doors. Moscow then moved to indirect attacks (osten-
sibly against Albania, but Beijing was the actual target) and finally to open
polemics. This pattern strongly suggests that public criticism was a proce-
dure that was only adopted as a matter of last resort when all other av-
enues of redress had been exhausted. In the specific example at issue here,
therefore, the Soviet initiative clearly indicates the prior existence of a pat-
tern of conflict and controversy in Soviet-East German relations, not a
mere collective quirk of temper or bad mood in Moscow.
428 ‘Na lozhnom puti’, Pravda, 2 August 1984.
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These interconnections and inferences can be drawn inter alia on the
basis of Honecker’s remarks at the high-level secret meeting in Moscow,
where he directly referred to the articles and took his critics to task:
As regards the first article, I was informed about it and I decided to have it
published because it shows the position of the GDR in its controversy with
the FRG. We did not print the second article because it was directed against
some of the positions of the CC of our party. We are of the opinion that open
polemics do not conform to the norms in the relations between our parties.
We are against polemics [in our relationship] with the CPSU; all questions
that arise can be solved among ourselves. I called you [Comrade Chernenko]
on Monday [12 August] to make clear that there should be no public attacks
since they only harm us and the whole [socialist] community.429
The third observation concerns the author of the attack. Bezymensky was
known by CC International Department insiders as being a close confidant
of Falin.430 Honecker was perfectly aware of this.431 Thus, there could not
have been much doubt in the mind of anyone familiar with Moscow power
politics that the signed article had the backing of the most senior officials
in the CC’s International Department involved in policy making on the
German problem. Similarly, the unsigned article published subsequently
merely reinforced the importance of the matter since this form of publica-
tion was usually adopted by the chief editors of Pravda authoritatively to
enunciate party policy. In fact, Konstantin Rusakov, the head of the CC
department for relations with the ruling communist parties, explicitly ac-
knowledged in the Moscow meeting with Honecker that the articles ‘did
not pass me by’ and that he had ‘consented’ to their publication.432 But
they also appeared to have the high-level support of the foreign ministry.
Gromyko had frequently warned the East German comrades not to overes-
429 The source for this exposé and analysis of the Honecker-Chernenko meeting in
Moscow is the verbatim East German protocol (Niederschrift) of the discussion;
as usual, there is little doubt that the record of the proceedings was kept with cus-
tomary German bureaucratic accuracy; see SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J
IV 2/2.039/280, transcript of meeting, p. 59 of typed original (italics mine).
430 Interviews with Grigoriev. Later, Falin and Bezymensky appeared as co-authors
of an orthodox Soviet version on the origins of the Cold War; see Pravda, 29 Au-
gust 1988.
431 Interviews with Krenz.
432 Transcript of meeting, p. 73 of typed original.
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timate their role and in their relations with West Germany not to let them-
selves be drawn into economic dependence.433
A final observation is related to the previous point. The articles unques-
tionably not only had to have high-level backing in the Politburo but also
that body’s approval. However, when such authorization would have had
to be given, Chernenko was on vacation. The second in command in
Moscow was Gorbachev, and it is precisely he whom Honecker suspected
of having been responsible for clearance of the articles. This suspicion
was fully confirmed in the East German party leader’s mind at the August
1984 emergency meeting in Moscow. According to what Honecker later
told Krenz, Gorbachev, in the car from the airport to the Kremlin and in
the meeting in the Kremlin itself, showed himself well informed about the
content of the articles.434
The Chernenko-Honecker Emergency Meeting in Moscow
The record of the meeting which took place on 17 August 1984 provides
instructive insights into the reality of ‘fraternal relations’ behind the
façade of harmony and consensus. It provides a vivid example of what in
communist parlance euphemistically went under the name of ‘open’ and
‘frank’ exchanges – in other words, the blunt expression of serious dis-
agreement.435 It clearly brings into focus the state of relations between the
Soviet Union and East Germany, the sharp differences in their interpreta-
tion of international affairs, the sources of conflict between the two coun-
tries and their leaders, the personalities of the top leaders and the origins
of the personal animosity and alienation between Gorbachev and Honeck-
er.
The character of meetings and their outcome are usually predetermined
by the participants. This was no different at the Moscow conference. The
participants included on the Soviet side the most senior representatives of
empire and ideology: Chernenko, the party chief; Gorbachev, the second
9.
433 ‘Mauerbau mit Genehmigung Moskaus: Kwizinskij als Zeuge im Keßler-Prozeß‘,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 July 1993.
434 Interview with Krenz; Gorbachev, at the August 1984 emergency meeting with
Honecker in Moscow, refers to having talked to Honecker in the car; see tran-
script of the meeting, p. 64 of the typed original.
435 The terms were used several times by the participants to characterize the meeting.
Chapter 3: The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire
212
in command; Dmitri Ustinov, Politburo member and defense minister;
Viktor Chebrikov, Politburo member and head of the KGB; and the afore-
mentioned Rusakov, Central Committee secretary in charge of relations
with the ruling communist parties. The foreign ministry was represented
only by Georgi Kornienko, one of its first deputy ministers. As the pro-
ceedings would show, his presence amounted to little more than token par-
ticipation: the meeting was evidently intended to be an exercise in ‘prole-
tarian internationalism’ and the reassertion of communist party discipline
in the bloc rather than a matter of diplomacy.436 On the German side, the
delegation similarly included the most senior and powerful figures of the
party and security hierarchy – Honecker as chief of the delegation; Polit-
buro members and party secretaries Kurt Hager, responsible for ideology,
and Hermann Axen, the party secretary for international affairs; Erich
Mielke, Politburo member and chief of state security; and Günter Sieber,
the head of the CC department for international relations.437
The tone of the meeting was set by Chernenko’s terse welcoming re-
marks and his disingenuous observation that ‘the leadership of the GDR
[sic] has apparently seen the need to achieve clarity concerning certain im-
portant questions in our relations’ and that this ‘coincides with the wish of
the Soviet party leadership’. It was, of course, obvious to everyone in the
room what this ‘need for clarity’ was all about. Honecker was first given
the opportunity to outline the East German position. He did so without the
slightest trace of regret or remorse. On the contrary, in what must have
been at least one full hour of presentation, he vigorously defended his
point of view and policy.438 In the process, at least from the perspective of
an impartial debating judge, he effectively destroyed the Soviet argument.
Honecker initially made three technical and procedural points to under-
cut the Soviet position. First, ‘in the name of the Politburo of the CC of
the SED’, he extended ‘cordial greetings to Comrade Chernenko and the
other comrades of the Soviet party leadership’ and reported: ‘On Tuesday
436 The reader does not need to be troubled with the enumeration of the other partici-
pants mentioned in the verbatim record. They included V.V. Sharapov, a personal
assistant to the general secretary; A.I. Martynov, sector head in one of the CC de-
partments; and A.N. Tarasov, another CC official, as translator.
437 Also included in the talks was Bruno Mahlow, Sieber’s deputy; he acted as trans-
lator.
438 His opening statement amounted to a total of 42 double-spaced pages. To deliver
one page of text would probably have taken about one and a half minutes.
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[13 August], a session of the Politburo of the CC of the SED took place
which dealt with several questions arising from some articles in Pravda.’
In accordance with ‘instructions of the Politburo’ of the SED, he wanted
to respond to the questions at issue. He thus conveyed the idea that he had
discussed his response to the Soviet attack with his colleagues in the Polit-
buro and that he had their full backing. He had apparently anticipated So-
viet criticism to the effect that his policies were ‘subjectivist’, that they
perhaps did not have the backing of the SED leadership and that he was
trying to conceal from them the extent of the rift between him and the So-
viet leadership. Indeed, later in the meeting, Chernenko pointedly asked:
‘Do the members of the Politburo of the CC of the SED actually proceed
from [the assumption] that everything that happens in the relations be-
tween the GDR and the FRG, including the preparation of the visit [of Ho-
necker in West Germany] is coordinated in advance with the Soviet Union
and that there is mutual agreement about that?’ He had his doubts about
that and did, indeed, convey them to Honecker: ‘[Y]our comrades are
[perhaps] not properly informed about our positions’.439
A second procedural issue raised by the East German party leader was
that of the form and venue of the Soviet attack. He flatly denied that there
was anything to talk about concerning East Germany’s relations with West
Germany. ‘For the SED, [West German] revanchism and the necessity of
unmasking it is not at issue. In the struggle against revanchism, the SED
has always taken a firm position.’ At issue in reality were ‘speculation and
efforts made in the West to drive a wedge between our two parties’. The
SED, Honecker claimed, based its policies on the view that one should not
allow public rifts, ‘not even one millimetre’, in the relations between the
GDR and the USSR to come out into the open since that only benefitted
the class enemy. The CPSU in his view did not act in accordance with that
principle. He made this perfectly clear later in the acrimonious exchanges
when he said that he thought ‘that there should be no newspaper articles of
this kind without prior’ consultation and coordination and that such a pro-
cedure should be no problem.
Surely, it should be possible without much difficulty for the chief editor of
Pravda to call the chief editor of Neues Deutschland over the VCh [top se-
cret] line [linking the Warsaw Pact countries] ... to say, ‘Listen, Günter [Sch-
abowski, chief editor of the East German party newspaper and a candidate
member of the Politburo in 1984], we are planning this or that. We should talk
439 Transcript of the meeting, p. 52 of the typed original.
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about it and coordinate things and we could jointly consider what formula-
tions are the most appropriate.’
Such coordination had not occurred, Honecker implied.
On a third technical point, although he had already insinuated that, on
matters of substance, everything in the Soviet-GDR relationship was per-
fectly in order and that there was really nothing to discuss, he attempted to
deflect in advance possible Soviet criticism of complacency by reminding
his hosts that he had ‘cut short’ his vacation (something that any German,
East or West, would do only in a true emergency) ‘to deal with these ques-
tions’.
On substantive issues, the East German party leader embarked upon a
broad tour d’horizon. He referred to the summit conferences of the War-
saw Pact countries in Prague (January 1983) and Moscow (June 1983) and
the foreign ministers’ conference in Budapest (April 1984) and claimed
that a common line had been agreed upon. In essence, it consisted of the
idea that ‘the struggle for peace is the most important question of the con-
temporary era’. This struggle and the consistent application of the princi-
ples of peaceful coexistence by the Warsaw Pact had not failed to impress
the political leaders in the capitalist states. For instance, it had ‘put the ad-
herents of a confrontational course in the USA government on the defen-
sive’. Furthermore, he asserted, ‘one could not overlook a process of dif-
ferentiation’ in these countries. This was an important point because ‘dif-
ferentiation’ was seen by the Soviet leadership as part of a pernicious
Western policy directed against the cohesion within and among socialist
countries. Honecker thus reminded his Soviet critics that the tables could
be turned, with the member states of the Warsaw Pact playing on the dif-
ferences within and among the countries of the Western alliance.
He then dealt with the enhanced role of the GDR in world affairs. The
country’s international stature was portrayed by Honecker – more implicit-
ly than explicitly – as one of the more important results of the activist,
peace-oriented policies of the GDR. Almost in passing he mentioned that
the SED had had the opportunity recently to explain its approach to inter-
national affairs not only ‘in talks with the representatives of the commu-
nist and workers’ parties and the national-liberation movements’ but also
with the chiefs of government of Canada, Sweden, Greece, Italy, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria, Finland, Spain,
9. The Chernenko-Honecker Emergency Meeting in Moscow
215
the Netherlands, India, Syria, Egypt, Nicaragua, Mexico and Malta as well
as ‘to the parliamentary presidents of numerous countries of the world’.440
To look ahead briefly at this stage, in the subsequent months of its con-
tinued defiance of Moscow, the SED was to emphasize even more strong-
ly the theme of the enhanced international recognition, status and influ-
ence of East Germany. For instance, in an internal report on the visit of
British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe to East Berlin in April 1985, the
SED Politburo adopted the by then typical posture of self-congratulation
and confidence. It thought that the visit had ‘clarified’ the fact that Britain
in its European policies had ‘to take into account more strongly than be-
fore the growing international position of the GDR and its authority as a
political and economically stable state’. The visit had further ‘strength-
ened the international position of the GDR and the international influence
of its peace policy’.441 Even more importantly, the SED leadership went
beyond the idea of differentiation as a useful concept for the socialist com-
munity’s approach to the West. It commented favourably on Great
Britain’s alleged aim of reducing the ‘evident lag’ in her relations with the
socialist countries and that she was now ‘actively taking part in the [West-
ern] policy of differentiation among the member states of the Warsaw
Treaty’."442 This assessment flatly contradicted the Soviet line to the effect
that, as mentioned, Western policies of differentiation were considered
detrimental to Warsaw Pact cooperation and cohesion.
The next move in Honecker’s justification of his policies was a bow in
the direction of the USSR. It came in the form of an endorsement of the
Soviet Union’s military strategy and doctrine. He criticized the United
States for wanting to ‘increase its first-strike capability’ against the coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact by deploying nuclear missiles in Western Europe,
including West Germany. He charged that the United States ‘de facto re-
fuses to accept the principle of military parity and equal security’, ‘strives
for military superiority’, and is ready to ‘start a new, extremely dangerous
round in the arms competition, connected above all with the militarization
of space and the creation of anti-missile and anti-satellite systems’. He re-
minded his Soviet hosts that the United States had used nuclear weapons
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and had not renounced the future use of these
440 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
441 SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Politburo meeting of 16 April 1985, J IV 2/2A/
2748.
442 Ibid. (italics mine).
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weapons despite the fact that the USSR had already done so. Finally in his
review of strategic matters, he lashed out against Washington for intensi-
fying war preparations in Asia and the Pacific and intervening in Central
America, the Near and Middle East as well as in southern Africa. For all
of these reasons, he went on, the GDR was determined to contribute to
‘maintaining the military-strategic balance under any circumstance’. After
the beginning of the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in
Western Europe it had for that reason ‘taken the appropriate countermea-
sures agreed upon with the USSR’.
On the surface, this seemed to be a mere confirmation of Soviet view-
points. However, one of Honecker’s central points was his insistence on
the advantages of a balanced approach, consisting of both military coun-
termeasures and a peace offensive. Turning specifically to Germany, he
asserted that the ‘peace movement in the FRG is far from exhausted’. It
actively continued its struggle and had to be taken seriously by all the po-
litical forces in the FRG, also by the government. There was consequently
'every reason on our part to encourage this struggle by an offensive, for-
ward-oriented activity’. This should include reiterating that the military
countermeasures of the Warsaw Pact would be rescinded if the West were
to stop and reverse its stationing decision.443
Continuing with the diagnosis of political and socio-economic forces in
West Germany and the plea for a flexible response, Honecker adopted the
traditional Marxist-Leninist view as to the ‘contradictory nature’ of devel-
opments in that country. He asserted that Kohl and Genscher conducted
policies even more strongly focussed on the United States than those pur-
sued by the previous left-liberal government of Schmidt and Genscher.
Nevertheless, it saw itself confronted with the necessity to continue Ost-
politik and, in essence, to adhere to the treaties concluded earlier. Further-
more, after the government of SPD and FDP under Chancellor Schmidt
had so resolutely advanced NATO’s dual-track decision and the stationing
of missiles, the social democrats had now changed their tune. They now
opposed the stationing of these weapons and supported a number of War-
saw Pact proposals on international security. This change of heart had, in
his view, been the result of (1) the ‘peace policy of the socialist countries’,
443 The beginning of Honecker’s review of the importance of the ‘peace movement’,
the SPD and the labour unions is on p. 9 of the original transcript and continues
on pp. 19-23. For reasons of coherence, the two parts are presented in conjunc-
tion by this author.
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(2) the ‘pressure exerted by the peace movement’, (3) the past ‘electoral
results’ in West Germany and (4) ‘future electoral decisions’ in that coun-
try. From this he derived a central point of his argument and justification
of his policies. The SED had ‘used the altered state of affairs as an oppor-
tunity significantly to expand its contacts with the SPD at all levels’.444
East Germany, in Honecker’s summary, had to conduct policies towards
West Germany that would meet four criteria. The policies had (1) ‘to be
understood and supported by the popular masses in our country’ and also
(2) ‘by the greatest possible number of citizens in the FRG’; (3) ‘to [con-
tribute] to mobilizing the forces of peace and opposition in the FRG rather
than letting them fall into a state of resignation’; and (4) ‘to make it more
difficult for the Kohl government to ally [itself] to the Reagan administra-
tion’.445
After this review of East-West relations and the principles of East Ger-
man policy vis-à-vis West Germany, Honecker finally dealt with the first
of the two most important issues in the Soviet-GDR controversy – his im-
pending visit to West Germany. (The other issue, it will be recalled, was
credit and dependency.)
Concerning the question of my visit to the FRG, we let ourselves be guided
by the inevitable task of the mobilization of all forces for peace, against the
USA course of confrontation and against the destruction of the European
treaty system. When the question is being posed when this visit shall take
place the answer should be ‘Now’, and [it should take place] in conjunction
with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the GDR [on 7 October], when we will
demonstrate the strength of our socialist GDR.446
He (needlessly) reminded Chernenko and the other CPSU Politburo mem-
bers that the idea of the visit was nothing new. The invitation was issued
‘three years ago by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. It has been renewed by
Chancellor Kohl. A corresponding invitation has also been issued by Pres-
ident [Richard von] Weizsäcker’.
The following arguments, in Honecker’s view, supported the idea that
the visit to take place ‘now’.447 First, it would enhance the standing and
444 Transcript of the meeting, p. 23 of the original (italics mine).
445 Ibid., p. 33.
446 Ibid., p. 38 (italics mine). As a matter of nuance, the record has Honecker saying
that the visit soll (shall) rather than sollte (should) stattfinden (take place). This
reinforces his point that there was no doubt that the visit should and would take
place.
447 The numbering and sequence of the arguments are mine.
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prestige of East Germany relative to West Germany. Honecker explained
that he would travel in his capacity as the head of state of the GDR. His
counterpart, the federal German president, ‘has assured me that he will
treat me in the same way as Todor Zhivkov [the Bulgarian president] who,
as is known, will visit the FRG before me’. This, he boasted, would
‘demonstrate that the socialist German worker and peasant state is a
sovereign and independent state that conducts relations with the FRG on
the basis of international law’.
Second, the visit would strengthen East Germany’s influence in West
German politics; it would affect the orientation of the political parties and
the outcome of elections scheduled in several of the West German Länder
in autumn 1984. Almost all the political parties in West Germany wel-
comed the idea of his visit, Honecker told his critics. This applied first and
foremost to the Greens and to the ‘peace movement’. But it was true also
for other political parties and forces. The FDP supported the visit because
it saw it as improving the party’s electoral prospects in the upcoming par-
liamentary elections. As for the SPD, their leaders
have let us know that they place great value on the visit to take place in the
next few weeks. The chairman of the SPD, Willy Brandt, recently again ad-
dressed himself directly to me and expressed his hope that he will [be able to]
meet with me. He let it be known that he expected me to have dinner with
him in Bonn. Similar statements have been made by [SPD leaders Hans-
Jochen] Vogel, [Egon] Bahr, [Horst] Ehmke, and others. Vogel told me at the
beginning of August that the SPD has a special interest in the visit because it
[the party] expects from it a strengthening of its position in view of the up-
coming elections. [Johannes] Rau, SPD prime minister of North Rhine West-
phalia, and [Oskar] Lafontaine, the SPD chairman of the Saarland, have ex-
pressed themselves in the same way. Elections will take place in both of these
federal states. If the SPD were to win, the correlation of forces in the Bun-
desrat would be changed. On the whole, the leadership of the SPD expects as-
sistance from my visit and the propagation of our policy so that it [the SPD]
will be able to create in the FRG a new majority against the CDU-CSU.
Even in the conservative party there were circles that supported the visit,
Honecker claimed. The CDU, as everyone knew, was ‘connected with im-
portant groups of the West German economy’ for whom the continuation
of trade relations with the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries
was an important matter.
Third, Honecker argued, the visit would improve the international
standing and prestige of East Germany. In this context, he once again re-
ported that in the past months he had met with the heads of government of
Sweden, Greece and Italy. Soon he would travel to Finland, and in late fall
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he expected the French prime minister and the chancellor of Austria to
visit East Germany. The French president, François Mitterrand, had sent
him a message. And Egon Krenz, his deputy, was at present on a visit to
Greece. His own visit to West Germany, therefore, ‘would be part of a se-
ries’ of visits and exchanges and would ‘underline that the relations of the
GDR with the FRG are of the same quality under international law as
those with other capitalist countries’.
Fourth, the visit would contribute to a normalization of East-West rela-
tions in Europe. Not too long ago, he reported, Chancellor Kohl had visit-
ed Budapest. Zhivkov was getting ready to travel to Bonn. Comrade
Chnoupek, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, had visited Bonn and is-
sued an invitation to the German chancellor to visit Prague. Representa-
tives of other socialist countries were planning to have meetings in Bonn.
‘In this context, my trip to the FRG would be a normal occurrence, where-
as if this visit were not to take place this would create the impression of an
extraordinary event.’
Finally, the visit could serve as an opportunity for more effective coor-
dination of Soviet-GDR and Warsaw Pact policies toward West Germany.
At the moment, there were no coordinated proposals on the details of the
visit, otherwise, of course, the East German foreign ministry would al-
ready have entered in consultations with its Soviet counterpart. There was
still time and the opportunity for the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact
countries to provide inputs. East Berlin was ready for consultation and co-
ordination with its partners.
Honecker completed the explanation and justification of his policies by
saying that
All in all, after consideration of all factors, we have arrived at the conclusion
that the visit in the FRG would be right and beneficial for our joint policy of
struggle for lessening the danger of war and against the arms policy of the
USA and NATO. ... We have, of course, also considered the question of can-
celling the visit. A cancellation, [however], if it were not explained convinc-
ingly to the population of the German Democratic Republic as well as the
peace forces of the FRG and the international public, could really satisfy only
the extremists in the FRG and the USA who are intent on preventing the vis-
it.448
In other words, by opposing the visit, the Soviet leaders were objectively
aligning themselves with the worst elements of the class enemy.
448 Ibid., pp. 38-44 (italics mine).
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Before turning to the rebuttal by the ‘Soviet comrades’, it is necessary
to observe that up to that point Honecker had studiously avoided raising
the very subject that had been central to the Pravda attacks: the allegedly
successful West German strategy of undermining the political reliability
and stability of the GDR by using the ‘economic lever’. The implication
of this – no doubt deliberate – omission was apparently that the Soviet ar-
gument was so wide of the mark that it was unworthy of serious consider-
ation.
Chernenko’s Response: The Empire Strikes Back
The Soviet Politburo had obviously discussed and formulated the line to
be taken in response to its unruly German satrap. Chernenko graciously
made a few polite references to the ‘great respect’ the Soviet comrades felt
for the ‘achievements of the GDR’ and even asserted that ‘we are learning
from the experience of the German comrades’. But he then ungraciously
replied to Honecker’s lecture: ‘Much of what you, Comrade Honecker,
have just told us, is well known to us, but your account confirms the ne-
cessity of a timely and open talk.’449
Almost predictably, he began by adopting the time-honoured approach
used by Stalin and his successors in order to enforce bloc discipline: the
portrayal of a dangerous world that required vigilance. He claimed that the
main cause of increased tension in the world lay in US imperialism and
the ‘striving of the USA to unite the Western countries in the struggle
against socialism’. Europe remained the main arena of the East-West com-
petition. ‘Here lies the main border between the two systems, here is the
most forward line of the controversy between socialism and capitalism,
and exactly here can be found the main direction of the attacks by the
West against us.’
What about West Germany, then? Chernenko called it Reagan’s Euro-
pean bailiff, the ‘main force militarily, economically, and ideologically’
carrying out Reagan’s policies ‘on our continent’. Continuing, the Soviet
party leader did not mince words.
The [speaking with a] forked tongue [in international relations] and the mili-
tarist tendency in the policy of the FRG [today] are comparable to Bonn’s ac-
449 Transcript of the meeting, p. 45 of the typed original.
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tions under Adenauer. Bonn and Washington act in full accord with each oth-
er. The USA is stationing new missiles in Europe, calling for a crusade
against socialism and calling in question the realities of post-war develop-
ment. Bonn has declared the German problem to be unresolved, has officially
demanded [reestablishment of] the borders of 1937 and speaks of special Ger-
man relations. More vigorous efforts are being made to undermine the social-
ist order in the GDR. That can be recognized by the naked eye.
The second club used traditionally by Soviet leaders to enforce bloc disci-
pline was the assertion that disobedience threatened common security in-
terests. This, too, was argued by Chernenko. For him, the relations be-
tween the GDR and FRG directly affected ‘the security of the Soviet
Union and the socialist community as a whole’.450 The conclusions to be
drawn were unambiguous:
The policy of revanchism is a policy of war. I talked about this on 14 June
1984 [when you visited Moscow for talks with us] and I said that we couldn’t
really understand why the GDR is exercising such restraint towards the revan-
chist and nationalist policy of the FRG. To respond favourably at present to
[the West German desire for a] broadening of relations with the FRG means
to provide it with additional channels for ideological influence in the GDR.
The state of affairs itself and Bonn’s positions dictate the necessity of a line of
delimitation. What is required is stubbornly to put to the FRG the principled
demand for the strengthening of the sovereignty of the GDR and the uncondi-
tional respect of this sovereignty by Bonn. [It is] in this context that one
should put the question of your visit in the FRG.
A third club used in the past by Soviet hard-liners and interventionists in
the bloc was the charge that the satraps had in previous meetings promised
to mend their ways but had subsequently reneged on their promises. This
approach was also used by Chernenko and put squarely in the credit-and-
erosion-of-socialism context.
You, Comrade Honecker, in our talks in June, did not voice any doubt and
said that the GDR completely agreed with the Soviet Union on all internation-
al questions. Putting it mildly, the state of affairs after our talks has not im-
proved. Nevertheless, declarations have been issued concerning new mea-
sures for facilitating contacts and the improvement of possibilities for visits of
citizens and children from the FRG. These measures, from the point of view
of internal GDR security, are dubious and constitute unilateral concessions to
Bonn. You receive financial benefits as a result. But these are in reality only
450 Ibid., pp. 48, 50.
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illusory advantages. The point here is [the danger of] additional financial de-
pendencies of the GDR on the FRG.451
As if the warning had not been clear enough, Chernenko added: ‘The
events in Poland [in 1980-81] are a grave lesson from which one should
draw conclusions.’452
The Soviet party leader denied that the process of East-West German
rapprochement in any way enhanced the status of the GDR relative to
West Germany. On the contrary, he asserted, ‘Whereas the positions of
Bonn in the affairs of the GDR and West Berlin have been strengthened,
the GDR has not made progress on any of the vital questions.’ This ap-
plied, for instance, to the recognition of a separate East German citizen-
ship, the borders, the change of the status of the GDR representations to
embassies and the recognition of Berlin as an inseparable part of the GDR.
What, then, was Chernenko’s response to the alleged opportunities for
exploiting differentiation in the West German body politic and influencing
the orientation of political parties and public opinion? What about the pos-
sible benefits of ‘damage limitation’ after the stationing of the missiles
and the presumed advantages of constructing a ‘coalition of reason’ across
the East-West divide? His reply was unequivocal: ‘Yes, in the FRG there
are some anti-missile and anti-war sentiments. In the ruling circles there
are also some politicians who proceed from sober positions.’ However, all
of that ‘does not provide any rationale for the slogan of an all-German
coalition of reason. This slogan is being used by those who are attempting
to camouflage their policy and to deceive the people by phraseology with-
out class content.’453
Another part of the party leader’s rebuttal in closed circle reveals more
about the basic conceptual approach adopted by party leaders Brezhnev,
Andropov and Chernenko than anything else they may have said publicly.
The whole matter really came down to this, Chernenko explained. It was
necessary ‘not to convey the impression that the hard line of the Reagan
administration is producing results because conciliatory responses lead to
even stronger and more brazen pressure’.454
Within this frame of reference, Chernenko returned for the third time in
his rebuttal to the issue of the impending Honecker visit to West Germany.
451 Ibid., p. 48 (italics mine).
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid. p. 51.
454 Ibid.
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Incongruously, he mused that this was, ‘of course, a matter that has to be
decided by the SED’. However, the Soviet comrades believed ‘that they
[the SED leaders] would collectively and mutually, taking into account the
considerations expressed by us, re-examine this question ... We also would
like to tell you that we Soviet communists would react positively if in the
circumstances that have arisen you were to cancel the visit.’455
Just in case, so that the point of Soviet displeasure would not be lost,
Chernenko concluded by thanking Honecker for his invitation to attend
the thirty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the foundation of the GDR and
informed him that ‘we have taken the decision to send a representative
delegation led by Comrade Gromyko’ to East Berlin – a clear affront since
such a delegation ordinarily would be headed by the party chief or his
deputy.
In essence, this completes the effort at extracting nuggets from the gold
mine of the Moscow secret meeting. But there are two sets of exchanges
that are of special interest here, one between Defense Minister Ustinov
and Honecker and the other between the East German leader and Gor-
bachev.
The Ustinov-Honecker Exchanges
Ustinov’s participation in the proceedings confirms the notion of him as a
leader of narrow intellectual ability. In his interjections he twice repeated
the Chernenko theme on West Germany as the main executor of Reagan’s
policies in Europe. He then moved on to explain to Honecker the nature of
the Bundeswehr as the ‘main strike force of NATO’. Honecker predictably
and disdainfully brushed off Ustinov’s attempt at lecturing him on a topic
he thought he knew more about.
Honecker: Comrade Ustinov, we are very well informed about what you are
saying. Just recently I decorated two female comrades who worked in NATO
staffs. We know very well how things are going. Concerning the FRG and the
role of NATO in US policy, I’ve also made clear our view to Comrade
Ceaușescu who didn’t want to believe it. You can forget about any further re-
marks on that issue.
Ustinov: It would be good, Comrade Honecker, if you were to remind
[Ceaușescu] of this during your visit to Romania. There are other facts. The
455 Ibid., p. 53 (italics mine).
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Bundeswehr provides 50 percent of all land forces of NATO and 30 percent
of the air forces. I only mention this here in order to make it clear what this is
all about. You shouldn’t take it the wrong way.
Honecker: I know all this, Comrade Ustinov, and have to deal with it daily. ...
Ustinov: I know that you know this, Comrade Honecker. What we are talking
about here is unmasking the FRG – the NATO – line. It’s important for that
reason to work with the facts such as, for instance, the existence of refugee
organizations with 2.5 million members, soldiers’ associations with 4 million
members, 80 Nazi organizations, associations of reservists, etc.
Honecker: Well, all that is obvious, Comrade Ustinov, and we don’t mutually
have to convince ourselves [that these things exist]. However, as for the ques-
tions we are dealing with, I think that we can arrive at the conclusion that it is
up to the SED to decide on the question of the visit in the FRG.
Ustinov: We would like to point out that with the greater opportunities for
citizens of the FRG to enter the GDR the danger of espionage is rising. We
also ask whether, when the gates are opened more widely, the [reliability of
the] soldiers will not be affected negatively.
Honecker: First, we haven’t opened the gates more widely. Second, there is
no linkage between credit and the easing of travel. Naturally, we have to con-
tinue ideological work on this problem. There are only very few citizens in
the GDR who do not have any relatives in the FRG. We have to be aware of
this. And concerning the children from the FRG who come to us, they won’t
be able to push us around. And the pensioners who go from [the GDR] to the
other side – they all come back.456
The théâtre absurd of ‘I know that you know, comrade’ and the reflections
on the potentially disruptive behaviour of capitalist kids on the socialist
block need no further comment. But to complete this insight into the inner
workings of centre-periphery relations and the further evolution of Soviet
policies on the German problem, it is necessary to look at Gorbachev’s
participation in the proceedings.
The Gorbachev-Honecker Exchanges
Gorbachev’s role in the meeting amounted to a reinforcement of the pres-
sure on Honecker to cancel the visit and toe the Soviet line. Yet his perfor-
mance was typical for him in several respects. It demonstrated his appar-
ent proclivity for compromise and consensus, his notion that persuasion is
456 Ibid., pp. 69-72 (italics mine).
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preferable to coercion, and that one only needed patiently to explain one’s
own point of view for the adversary eventually to relent and agree to a
common position. As ‘history’ – the collapse of empire and the implosion
of the Soviet Union – was to underline, serious problems with noble and
laudable approach arise when there is a serious clash of interest and the
opponent is unwilling to change his mind. This is precisely what happened
in the Moscow meeting.
Gorbachev began, in effect, by assuring the unrepentant sinners in the
dock that the Soviet comrades were well-meaning. He ‘would like to state
unambiguously that our common opinion proceeds from the view that
what is at issue here is not a crisis situation in our relations’ but certain
questions needed some ‘clarification’, and this, indeed, should be, as he,
Honecker himself, had stated earlier in the car, the main purpose of the
meeting. But even more than that: ‘Our meeting should lead to reconcilia-
tion and bring about trust.’ Having thus cast himself in the role of a lenient
judge, he nevertheless lashed out against the culprits on the banc d’ac-
cusés, telling them that the rift that had opened up in Soviet-East German
relations needed to be repaired and harmony to be restored so as to pre-
clude the adversary from exploiting the differences. He joined Chernenko
and Ustinov in their scathing criticism of East German gullibility and sus-
ceptibility to the Western strategy of differentiation, quoting an unlikely
source in his support:
Even the Italian ambassador in Washington, in his talks in the State Depart-
ment, has – in connection with the [planned] visit by Comrade Honecker in
the FRG – drawn the conclusion that new processes are developing in Eastern
Europe which needed to be watched carefully and that the [Western] policy of
differentiation was producing results. We proceed from the view that this will
be taken into consideration [by you].
He also reiterated the Soviet Politburo line that a more dangerous state of
international affairs had developed ‘as a result of the policy of the Reagan
administration’ and that West Germany acted as its ‘main ally’. As proof
of the enhanced dangers, he referred to President Reagan, who had tested
a microphone before giving a speech, jokingly counting down to zero for a
hypothetical missile launch against the Soviet Union. Gorbachev took or
pretended to take the countdown seriously. ‘As we say [in Russia], what
the sober person keeps in his head, the drunk betrays by his tongue.’ (Ho-
necker agreed or pretended to agree, adding that the East German press
had published the TASS statement that had decried the apparent Reagan
outrage.) Gorbachev pressed on relentlessly on this theme: ‘In its draft
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party platform, the Republican Party states that the course of confrontation
and pressure has to be strengthened. The Soviet Union is portrayed there
as an unnatural state and as the central danger for the USA.’
Turning specifically to the German problem, Gorbachev demonstrated
that he had done some homework prior to coming to the meeting. He used
the commemoration of the building of the Berlin wall on 13 August, held
in West Berlin, to attack the very ‘people by whom you would be received
if you were to visit the FRG’. He charged that in their speeches at the
commemoration
President [Richard von Weizsäcker], [Intra-German Affairs Minister Hein-
rich] Windelen and [Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry Alois] Mertes
have issued declarations to the effect that Berlin is the capital of Germany.
They spoke of the German problem as being unsolved. They criticized [Hans]
Apel [the leading SPD candidate in the Berlin city council elections] and his
statement to which you just referred [that the German problem was no longer
open].
He then looked at the problem through the lens of the traditional Politburo
paradigm and the alleged necessity of having to punish West Germany for
having consented to the stationing of missiles.
When the missiles were put up and the social democrats consented to the sta-
tioning, we stated that if nothing were to happen [to reverse this], a new ele-
ment would be created, things could not go on as before, and there would be
repercussions also on the relations between the two German states. And what
is happening now? The contacts are being broadened, the visit is being pre-
pared and credits are being extended. This does not match up with our decla-
rations.
In light of the changed circumstances, Gorbachev summarized, it was nec-
essary to ‘think carefully about all this’. And as for the controversial Prav-
da articles, he claimed that ‘each and every one of the arguments [made
there] can be supported’.457
To conclude, once the Soviet leaders had made public their opposition
to Honecker’s planned visit to West Germany, the trip became a test of
wills that a dutiful ally could not afford to win. On 4 September, East Ger-
many’s permanent representative in Bonn announced that the date for the
trip was ‘no longer real’ − in plain English, that the trip was cancelled.458
457 Ibid., pp. 64-66.
458 Evaldt Moldt, who announced the East German decision; see Neues Deutschland,
5 September 1984. A new date for the visit was not set.
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In justification of the cancellation, East German spokesmen cited remarks
by CDU parliamentary leader Alfred Dregger to the effect that West Ger-
many’s future ‘does not depend on Herr Honecker doing us the honour of
a visit’.459 Todor Zhivkov was to follow suit and also excused himself.
Summary
The following conclusions and lessons can be drawn from the period
stretching from the end of the 1970s until the beginning of the Gorbachev
era. First, the controversies between East Berlin and Moscow, like Bonn’s
differences with Washington, were not about adherence to the alliance per
se but about the direction of alliance policies. This concerned first and
foremost the Warsaw Pact’s relationship with the West. But as will be seen
in the next chapter, the differences pertained to global affairs, including re-
lations with China. Nevertheless, the Moscow meeting and the cancella-
tion of the Honecker visit served to demonstrate the as yet limited scope
and purpose of the East German deviation from the Soviet line. It was cer-
tainly preposterous to assert that an attempt was made by both Germanys
to ‘try reunification on the sly’; that a decade later, the world would ‘learn
of secret negotiations in these years that took place between Germans who
put Fatherland ahead of ideology’; and that this attempt ‘should not be a
surprise’ because it was ‘only natural’.460 Even then it was evident that the
‘natural’ political inclination of a party leader like Honecker was to
strengthen the political and economic viability and international standing
of his régime. He had made his career in the pursuit of these objectives,
not least by taking charge of security during the building of the Berlin
wall. The improvement of intra-German relations and a search for more
leeway in the GDR’s relations with the Soviet Union were quite compati-
ble with these objectives. But as the great number of applications for exit
visas to West Germany showed, the legitimacy and viability of the régime
remained in doubt. The political system of the GDR still very much de-
pended upon Soviet support and so did its economy under conditions of
high prices for energy and the limited competitiveness of East German in-
dustrial products on the world market. Whatever the objective conse-
459 As quoted by Neues Deutschland, 25-26 August 1984.
460 William Safire, ‘The Germanys: Trying Reunification on the Sly’, International
Herald Tribune, 14 August 1984.
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quences of his policy, Honecker had no intention to destroy the Soviet-
East German relationship.
Second, despite the fact that the overt controversies in East-West rela-
tions of the late 1970s and early 1980s were very much about international
security issues, such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the threat
of intervention in Poland, and the stationing of nuclear missiles in Europe,
economic factors were becoming an increasingly important part of East-
West relations. The Soviet leaders could not escape this reality, notwith-
standing their vigorous and vicious criticism of West Germany and its al-
leged strategy of undermining the political and ideological foundations of
the GDR. This was proven, for instance, by the fact that 1984, the year of
the Soviet punitive countermeasures to the missile deployments, was also
the year in which Soviet-West German trade, with the amount of 25 billion
Deutschmarks, reached a new record.
Third, the Soviet-East German differences neither stemmed from nor
did they result in Soviet pressures on the GDR or on other CMEA coun-
tries to sever their economic and credit links with West Germany. The
June 1984 summit meeting of the East bloc’s economic organization sup-
ported the maintenance and expansion of such links. It did so with good
reason, for if the economic fortunes of the GDR and other members of the
bloc had declined or declined further, the Soviet economy, too, would
have suffered. Soviet interests would have been even more negatively af-
fected if economic stringencies in Eastern Europe had led, as in Poland, to
political upheaval and the erosion of party control. Soviet criticism of East
Berlin, therefore, concerned the scale of East German indebtedness and
had a primarily political rather than economic rationale.
Fourth, it was predictable that there would be a shift in the GDR’s ap-
proach after the cancellation of the planned visit. Hans Modrow, the party
secretary of the SED for the Dresden district, clarified this in December
1984: ‘The “separate German track” has come to an end, at least for the
time being.’ Henceforth, ‘we will be very active in seeking to broaden our
contacts with all Western countries, ... not only with West Germany’.461
The final and most important point about this period, however, is the
comprehensive nature of the crisis that the Soviet empire was facing. The
central features of the crisis, as described here in detail, were the transfor-
461 Hans Modrow, in an interview with US correspondent Henry Tanner, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 14 December 1984.
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mation of ideology from an asset to a liability; the inability to transform
military power into political influence; the failure effectively to compete
with the Western industrialized countries in the scientific-technological
revolution; and the inability to provide effective political leadership either
for a revitalization or for a fundamental change of the Soviet domestic
system. Cutting through all of the fog of innuendos, charges and counter-
charges on the German problem, both within the Soviet bloc and between
East and West, the central problem for the Soviet leaders from Stalin to
Chernenko was their inability to ‘digest’ the part of Germany it had ac-
quired in the Second World War. They remained caught in a dilemma that
became acute in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were incapable of
providing legitimacy for their control of Eastern Europe or of making it
cost-effective. Yet imprisoned by the parameters of the Ideological and
Imperial paradigm, they were as yet unprepared to divest themselves of
the imperial burden in the centre of Europe. It took a new leader and an
entirely new approach to international relations to make possible the solu-
tion of the seemingly intractable German problem.




Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking
The Paradigm of New Thinking
The ‘Gorbachev revolution’ began with only minor revisions of theory but
ended in the complete replacement of the Ideological and Imperial
paradigm. The then party leader and his chief advisors have acknowledged
the gradual and essentially unplanned progression of change. ‘It would be
a great exaggeration to say that we envisaged from the very beginning the
scope and difficulties of perestroika’, Gorbachev has explained in retro-
spect. ‘Its initial designs, furthermore, did not go beyond the framework of
the system, neither ideologically nor politically. For us it was then a matter
of improving the existing society, “forcing the system to work”’.462 Simi-
larly, Yakovlev remembers that ‘at the beginning, we had little idea where
events would take us.’463 There was only a general ‘understanding of what
needed to be cast aside’.464
This general understanding, however, is precisely what explains the
progressive, in its ultimate scope unintended, dismantling of the Ideo-
logical and Imperial paradigm and its replacement by the New Thinking.
As in the Left and Right dichotomy of traditional Marxist-Leninist ap-
proaches, an inner logic existed that linked a set of policies of either one
or the other orientation in domestic and foreign policy.465 To illustrate this
abstraction by an example, Brezhnev’s approach to détente was bound to
fail because of a dual violation of the logic of interconnectedness. A re-
pressive policy at home contradicted an ostensible policy of opening in
foreign policy. In the foreign policy realm, rejection of ‘interference in the
Chapter 4:
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462 M. S. Gorbachev, ‘Mir na perelome’, Svobodnaia mysl, No. 16 (November
1992), p. 10.
463 Lecture at Harvard University, 7 November 1991.
464 Alexander N. Yakovlev, Muki prochteniia bytiia. Perestroika – nadezhdy i re-
al'nosti (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), p. 330.
465 This logic was best described by Alexander Dallin, ‘Linkage Patterns: From
Brest to Brezhnev’, in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet For-
eign Policy (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1981), pp. 344-47, and earlier in his ‘sovi-
et Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework of Analysis’, Journal of
International Affairs, No. 2 (1969), pp. 250-65.
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internal affairs of socialist countries’, notably in Eastern Europe, a vigor-
ous arms build-up and support for ‘national-liberation movements’ did not
square well with attempts to improve East-West economic exchanges and
gain access to Western technology, credits and know-how. The theoreti-
cians of the new paradigm recognized such deficiencies and realized that
the effectiveness of the new approaches depended upon coherence and
consistency.
What, then, were the main ingredients of Gorbachev’s New Thinking?
The new paradigm included the following major principles:466
1. The use of military power, geopolitical expansionism and empire
building are outdated forms of international conduct. They impose sig-
nificant costs and impede socio-economic development.
2. Status and power in international affairs are determined by qualitative
indicators, such as effectiveness of the political system, economic effi-
ciency and the ability to adapt to rapid scientific-technological
progress.
3. The internal resources of a nation, including a high level of education
and technical skill of the population as well as the country’s quality
and way of life, are important factors of international influence.
4. Interests in world affairs are to be promoted through multilateral ap-
proaches and participation in international institutions. This also ap-
plies to security, which cannot be safeguarded unilaterally through the
application of military-technical means but only politically and cooper-
atively.
466 On the origins, content, and evolution of the new paradigm through the eyes of
their architects, see M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei
strany i dlia vsego mira (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988); Shevardnadze, Moi vybor;
Yakovlev, Muki prochteniia bytiia; and Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym.
For Western analyses of the new paradigm, see Falk Bomsdorf and Hannes
Adomeit, ‘Das “Neue Denken”: Grundzüge und Verwirklichung’, in Hannes
Adomeit, Hans-Hermann Höhmann, and Günter Wagenlehner, eds., Die Sowjetu-
nion unter Gorbatschow (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990), pp. 261-296; Seweryn
Bialer, ‘New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy’, Survival, Vol. 30, No. 4 (July/
August 1988), pp. 291-309; Stephen M. Meyer, ‘The Sources and Prospects of
Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Security’, International Security, Vol.
33, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 124-63; and Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution:
Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on For-
eign Relations, 1993). In the present chapter, only a summary of the New Think-
ing will be provided. For more detail and the practical application of the theory,
see Chapter 6.
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5. Although the nation state continues to be an important organizing prin-
ciple in the international system, nationalism is one of the many forms
of unilateralism that needs to be replaced by processes of integration.
6. The main actors and factors of stability in the international system are
the industrialized countries (G-7), which adhere to a common system
of values, laws and norms.
7. The main factors of instability and threats to world peace are national-
ism, ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism, political extremism, mi-
gration, terrorism and environmental catastrophes.
To explain and provide some detail about the evolution of the new
paradigm, the first and foremost realization was that of a close interrela-
tionship between domestic and foreign policy and, as time went by, the
priority of domestic over foreign policy. Statements made by Gorbachev
himself reflect this progression of viewpoints. In an interview with Time
magazine in September 1985, he remarked that
somebody said that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. If that
is so, then I ask you to ponder one thing: if we in the Soviet Union are setting
ourselves such grandiose plans in the domestic sphere [perestroika], then
what are the external conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domes-
tic plans? I leave the answer to that question with you.467
In February 1987, at an international peace forum in Moscow, he went one
step further when he said that
our international policy is determined more than ever before by our domestic
policy, by our interest in concentrating on creative work for the perfection of
our country. For that very reason we need a more stable peace, predictability
and a constructive direction of international relations.468
There is another aspect of significance to the relationship between domes-
tic and foreign policy in the Gorbachev era. That is the idea of learning by
trial and error in both dimensions of policy. Reflecting in his memoirs on
the felt necessity at the beginning of his tenure in office to embark upon a
467 Gorbachev interview with Time, 9 September 1985 (italics mine). The ‘some-
body’ Gorbachev referred to may have been Lenin, who is on record as having
stated: ‘There is no more erroneous or harmful idea than the separation of foreign
from domestic policy’; V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 4th (Russian) ed., Vol. 15
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1948), p. 67.
468 Izvestiia, 17 February 1987. In April, in a dinner speech in London, he reiterated
that ‘Our foreign policy, to a greater degree than ever before, stems directly from
our domestic policy’; Pravda, 1 April 1987 (italics mine).
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fundamental change in foreign policy, he explains that ‘perestroika in do-
mestic [affairs] and in the foreign policy realm took shape only gradually;
success in one area had a positive impact on the other, whereas, corre-
spondingly, failures put a brake on the development in both areas’.469
A central point to be made at the outset, however, is that the trial-and-
error process had its limits. Gorbachev was not much of a conceptual
thinker. To the extent that he adhered to abstractions, he remained wedded
to utopian ideas, ‘reform socialism’ and ‘socialism with a human face’ in
the political realm, and, in economics, the ‘harmonization’ of the plan
with the market. Fundamental re-conceptualization, both in domestic and
foreign policy, was urged upon him, in part by events and in part by advis-
ers who had a keener intellectual bent and greater analytical potential.
Re-conceptualization of domestic and foreign policy meant not simply
‘creatively adapting’ but abandoning Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ne-
cessity for taking such a momentous decision was understood by hardly
anyone in a position of responsibility at the beginning of the Gorbachev
era. But it was clearly stated in the midst of change by Soviet dissidents
who had emigrated to the West. ‘Ideology is that hard core of the Soviet
system that does not allow the country to deviate too far for too long’, they
wrote in March 1987. Unless the central ideological tenets were changed,
‘soviet strategy would remain imprisoned by its assumptions’. If the Sovi-
et leadership was really serious about radical change, they concluded, it
‘would have to begin by discarding the ruling ideology’.470
In the process of discarding Marxist-Leninist ideology, Vadim
Medvedev, the CPSU CC secretary responsible for ideological questions,
told his colleagues from the Warsaw Pact countries assembled in East
Berlin in September 1989 how damaging Marxism-Leninism had been. He
admitted that, ‘When we ideologized foreign policy in an unbalanced fash-
ion, it often harmed the prestige of the Soviet Union as well as socialism
as a whole’. It did not at all contribute to the normalization of relations
‘but at times even [achieved] the very opposite’.471 Shevardnadze, in ret-
469 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), p. 7.
470 ‘The Time has Come Now to Reject the System Itself’, International Herald Tri-
bune, 24 March 1987. The dissidents in question were Vasili Aksyonov, Vladimir
Bukovsky, Eduard Kuznetsov, Yuri Lyubimov, Vladimir Maximov, Ernst
Neizvestny and Alexander Zinoviev.
471 Speech by Vadim Medvedev, the CPSU CC secretary responsible for ideological
questions at the conference of the ideological secretaries of the socialist coun-
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rospect, confirmed this point. The notion of peaceful coexistence as a form
of class conflict had inevitably led to perceptions of the ‘world as an arena
of a perennial struggle between systems, camps, and blocs’. It had blurred
the difference between ideological competition and psychological warfare
and ‘erected insurmountable barriers on the road towards mutually benefi-
cial cooperation between countries with different socio-economic struc-
tures’.472 According to Medvedev, the emphasis on ideology in interna-
tional affairs had also ‘furnished a pretext to our opponents to accuse us of
expansionist and aggressive designs and of wanting to “export revolu-
tion”’. It had ‘contributed to the enhancement of “enemy images”’.473
The problem with such realizations in the Gorbachev era, however, was
that the seeming or real abandonment of one ideological tenet or another
was accompanied by qualifications and counteracted by euphemisms and
ambiguities. Gorbachev’s speech at the seventieth anniversary of the 1917
Bolshevik revolution provides a glaring example of this.
Despite its many departures from ideological orthodoxy, the speech
brimmed with Stalinist or, if one prefers, neo-Stalinist rationalizations.474
‘Under the conditions at that time [the 1930s]’, Gorbachev asked, ‘was it
possible to choose a course [of action] other than the one adopted by the
party?’ ‘No’ he unequivocally replied, ‘it was not possible.’ He correctly
considered collectivization as a ‘fundamental alteration of the whole way
of life of the main mass of the population in the countryside’ but he gave a
positive spin to this generalization by saying that it had ‘created the social
basis for the modernisation of the agricultural sector’. He then continued
with blatantly Stalinist euphemisms such as that one should not overlook
the ‘complicated nature of this period’ and that there were such deplorable
things as ‘excesses’ – a term used by Stalin when he began to comprehend
the enormous cost of forced collectivization. But then he turned
Khrushchevian by saying that ‘There were also – I say this openly – real
crimes because of the abuse of power. Thousands and thousands [sic] of
tries, on 21 September 1989 in East Berlin; SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J
IV 2/2A/3248.
472 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, pp. 95 and 101.
473 Medvedev speech in East Berlin, 21 September 1989.
474 Text in Pravda, 3 November 1987.
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party members and non-party people were subjected to mass repres-
sions.’475
Contrary to what was nothing more than a mere repetition of what
Khrushchev had said at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956,
Gorbachev’s treatment of Stalin’s foreign policy remained firmly stuck in
the orthodox mold. He chastised the ‘ruling circles of the West’ for distort-
ing the truth and attempting to show that ‘the Soviet-German non-aggres-
sion pact of 23 August 1939 had provided the starting shot for the attack
of the Nazis on Poland and thus for [the beginning of] the Second World
War’. Nothing was said about the secret protocols. There were no regrets
and apologies about the occupation and treatment of the Baltic States.
There was no hint about the Soviet deliveries of strategically important
commodities right up to the beginning of the invasion in June 1941 that
helped Nazi Germany build up its war machine.
Apart from all the specific euphemisms and distortions of Soviet histo-
ry, the most noteworthy general feature of Gorbachev’s anniversary
speech is the absence of any moral consideration. Typically, it was left to
Yakovlev to address this very issue. At the above mentioned meeting of
communist party secretaries for ideological questions in Varna he ex-
pressed his regret that adherents of both socialism and capitalism had
convinced themselves by the trial-and-error method that there are more urgent
factors and necessities than the abstractions that have turned into dogmatic
clichés, that have nothing to do with morality and that have led to deafness
and blindness towards good and evil.476
Gorbachev’s speech is a sorry example of such blindness.
Marxism in its Leninist and Stalinist application was to prove a funda-
mental aberration that had led Russia into comprehensive crisis. The
archival record of secret meetings and private conversations Soviet party
leaders, including Gorbachev, clearly shows that for them ‘socialism’,
whatever its precise meaning, still had a future. As Medvedev told another
gathering of party secretaries for ideological questions in East Berlin, it
was an ‘illusion’ of the forces inimical to perestroika to assert that ‘our so-
475 For more realistic data on the number of party and non-party members who fell
victim to mass repressions see infra, xxx pp. 444-45.
476 Speech by Alexander Yakovlev at the conference of communist party secretaries
for ideological questions, held in Varna (Bulgaria), 26-28 September 1989, in-
cluded for agenda item 8 of SED Politburo meeting of 17 October 1989; Central
Party Archives, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/3247.
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ciety could evolve in the direction of capitalism and abandon socialist val-
ues’. Such speculation was ‘built on sand’.477 Yakovlev adopted a similar
stance at the Varna meeting a few days later. No matter how one looked at
it, whether ‘from a political, ideological, or simply a pragmatic point of
view’, it was ‘absurd’ for both the ‘conservatives of conviction and the
conservatives of privilege’ to charge that perestroika was tantamount to
the abandonment of the ‘principles and ideals of socialism’.478
What explains the retractions and reservations and the continued adher-
ence to utopian goals? First, outright rejection of Marxism-Leninism
would have destroyed the very basis on which power and legitimacy of the
political leadership rested. Second, in the perceptions of the perestroichni-
ki, retreat from utopia would have provided the orthodox elements in the
party apparat with the ammunition they needed to mount a political coun-
teroffensive with the aim of ousting the new leadership. Third, many of
the supporters of New Thinking, including Gorbachev, remained inca-
pable of ridding themselves of the ideological baggage accumulated in the
seventy years of travel that was intended to lead to a bright future. ‘Why
do I sit surrounded all the time by Lenin’s works?’, Gorbachev had asked
rhetorically in July 1986. ‘I leaf through them, I look for solutions ... be-
cause it is never too late to consult Lenin.’479
Who, then, was this man who embodied such contradictory attitudes but
who had such an enormous impact on world history?
Gorbachev: A Political Profile
Gorbachev was born in 1931 in the small village of Privolnoe in Stavropol
krai (region or territory), a fertile agricultural area in southern Russia.480
2.
477 Speech by Vadim Medvedev, the CPSU CC secretary responsible for ideological
questions at the conference of the ideological secretaries of the socialist countries
on 21-22 September 1989 in East Berlin; Central Party Archives, SED Politburo,
Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/3248.
478 Yakovlev in Varna, xxx see fn. 476.
479 Speech to members of the Soviet Union of Writers, Kremlin, 19 July 1986; ex-
cerpts as published in Détente, No. 8 (Winter 1987), pp. 11-12.
480 A krai in both past Soviet and current Russian definitions refers to a large admin-
istrative entity located in strategically important borderlands (krai literally means
edge). In practical administrative terms, there is no difference between a krai and
an oblast' (region or province).
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His outlook on life and his career in the communist party, as his own
memoirs and testimony from relatives, friends, and acquaintances show,
were shaped by the rural character and agricultural base of this region.481
‘Privolnoe’ means the expanse of land that was steppe when the first peas-
ants came, and it also means freedom.482 The customs and traditions of the
Cossacks – soldiers and peasants who, at the Czars’ orders, settled the
frontiers of the empire and pushed them south and east – have helped to
mold the area. Peasants from Russia and Ukraine fled to this area from
serfdom. ‘Later’, as Gorbachev explains, ‘they were forcibly settled here –
a human drama that claimed many victims. My family on the paternal
side, the Gorbachevs, settlers from the Voronesh province (guberniia) but
also my ancestors on the maternal side, the Gopkalos – settlers from the
Chernigov province – had arrived here in this way.’483
His childhood was overshadowed by three major political and socio-
economic events: collectivization, the purges, and World War II.
Concerning the first major influence, his maternal grandfather had been
one of the first after the Bolshevik revolution to help establish a coopera-
tive, a voluntary organization of peasants who kept and farmed their own
land. His grandmother and mother also worked there. ‘In 1928’, Gor-
bachev writes tersely, ‘grandfather entered the CPSU. He participated in
the foundation of our kolkhoz, named Khleborob [Wheat Farmer], and be-
481 This sketch of Gorbachev’s political profiles draws to a considerable part on his
memoirs, which first appeared more or less simultaneously in both Russian and
German; Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995)
and Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995). The
memoirs are by far the best source for a political profile of Gorbachev. Where
there are discrepancies between the two editions – there are some that are mean-
ingful – they will be pointed out. His own portrayal will be critically evaluated
and checked against facts as well as the opinions provided by close associates. –
Some of the best treatments of the Gorbachev phenomenon are Robert G. Kaiser,
Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and his Failure (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1991); Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1996); Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical In-
terpretation, exp. ed. (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1991);
Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); John Miller,
Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993); and Gerd Ruge, Gorbachev: A Biography (London: Chatto & Windus,
1991).
482 Ruge, Gorbachev, p. 13.
483 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.
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came its chairman. ... In the 1930s grandfather took over the leadership of
the collective farm Krasnyi Oktiabr [Red October] in a neighbouring vil-
lage, located twenty miles from Privolnoe.’484
Whether because of idealism or a sense of self-preservation, the Gopka-
los became active supporters of Stalin’s collectivization drive. The Gor-
bachevs, in contrast, initially refused to submit to Stalin’s plans. ‘[Pater-
nal] grandfather Andrei’, as the grandson remembers, ‘did not participate
in the collectivization [campaign]; he did not enter a collective farm but
remained a [private] farmer’. He was arrested in 1934, convicted as a
‘saboteur’ and sent to do hard labor in the Irkutsk region. He was released
after two years, before he had served his full sentence, and returned from
camp ‘with two documents which certified him as an activist of labor, …
immediately joined a collective farm and, because he worked assiduously,
he soon rose to become head of the pig farm of the kolkhoz’.485
What about the human and material costs of collectivization, the meth-
ods used and the moral problems involved? The approach Gorbachev
adopts to deal with these issues in his memoirs is essentially the same he
had used in his above-quoted speech on the seventieth anniversary of the
Bolshevik revolution. The portrayal has the same euphemistic and apolo-
getic quality, is devoid of moral opprobrium and follows the typically Gor-
bachevian ‘on the one hand but on the other hand’ pattern. He acknowl-
edges that ‘In 1933, a famine erupted in the Stavropol region ... The
famine was terrible. In Privolnoe, at least one third if not half of the vil-
lage population died. Whole families perished and long thereafter, essen-
tially until the beginning of the war, [many] cottages stood there aban-
doned, near collapse, like orphans. Three [of the six] children of grandfa-
ther Andrei also perished of hunger’.486 Yet he also thinks that ‘historians
argue until this very day about the origins [of the famine] and whether it
was perhaps organized deliberately so as to finally subdue the peasants. Or
did adverse weather conditions after all play the most important role in it?
I don’t know what things looked like in other regions but we [in the
Stavropol area] were indeed visited by a terrible drought.’ Did the famine,
then, have natural causes? No, essentially, it didn’t. ‘The calamity did not
lie in [the weather] alone. Mass collectivization ... in my view tipped the
484 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
485 Ibid., p. 42.
486 Ibid.
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balance.’487 Was mass collectivization, then, gratuitous mass murder orga-
nized by the communist party, a heart-rending tragedy that could and
should have been avoided? No, it wasn’t. He fails to understand ‘what
“golden age” of the Russian village the current advocates of peasant hap-
piness [who are these advocates?] are talking about. These people either
know absolutely nothing, or they knowingly do not tell the truth or they
have lost their memory.’488
The refusal unambiguously to condemn mass murder is also evident in
his treatment of Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s, the second major devel-
opment in Soviet history that shaped his life. No one, he writes, was im-
mune from denunciation, arrest, and execution. This was true also for his
grandfather Gopkalo. He was arrested in 1937, accused of sabotage,
charged with being a member of a ‘counterrevolutionary, right-wing Trot-
skyite organization’ and severely tortured in order to extract a confession.
The arrest, according to Gorbachev, produced ‘the first [major] upheaval
in my life’ and ‘ingrained itself forever in my memory’. This was in part
due to the fact that ‘enemies of the people’ were shunned by society. ‘I
still remember today that after grandfather’s arrest, the neighbors passed
by the house in a wide circle as if we had the plague and that our relatives
only stopped by secretly at night.’ Gopkalo was fortunate to be released in
December 1938 and reinstated in his job as collective farm chairman in
1939. His wife’s grandfather, however, was not so fortunate. He was ar-
rested, also in 1937, in the Altai region in southern Siberia and shot.489
What is also lacking in Gorbachev’s published recollections, despite the
traumatic experience of the arrest of his maternal grandfather, is a reflec-
tion on Stalin’s personal responsibility, the function of the communist par-
ty in the Soviet system, and his own willing participation and guilt by as-
sociation with a criminal régime, rising rapidly in the party: In 1963, at the
age of 32, he became Head of the Department of Party Organs in the
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid., p. 38. He adds that he certainly remembers the vestiges of the ‘way of life
that was characteristic for the Russian village before the revolution and before
the foundation of collective farms’. This characterization as well as the treatment
of the subject on the seventieth anniversary of the October revolution implies that
collectivization was not only ‘objectively necessary’ but improved life on the
farm. The ‘in principle’ positive assessment of collectivization may provide one
of the explanations why Gorbachev, until the very end, refused to contemplate
major changes in agriculture in the direction of private farming and the market.
489 Ibid., pp. 38-42.
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Stavropol Regional Committee, and in 1970, he was appointed First Party
Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, a body of the CPSU, be-
coming one of the youngest provincial party chiefs in the nation. It was
only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when he was asked when he
had begun to understand the role played by the NKVD and its successor,
the KGB, that he said that he had begun to comprehend it long ago, from
the time his grandfather was under arrest, but that there was much that had
remained obscure to him, adding that even his grandfather had said of his
arrest: ‘I am sure Stalin does not know.’490
The third major influence on Gorbachev’s life was the Second World
War. For the purpose of reconstructing Gorbachev’s attitudes towards Ger-
many, it is particularly appropriate to try to assess its impact.
‘My generation, he wrote, ‘is a generation of the children of war. The
war has left an imprint on us and shaped our character, even our world
view.’491 During his talks with chancellor Kohl in Moscow in mid-July
1990, he reminisced that, when the German offensive began in June 1941,
he was ten years old, and that he could remember very well what had hap-
pened.492 The events he remembers, as described in detail in his memoirs,
were his father’s temporary deferment because he was needed as a kolkhoz
technician (the summer harvest had to be brought in) and his subsequent
call-up for service at the front in August 1941; weary Red Army soldiers
passing through Privolnoe after the evacuation of Rostov on the Don in
August 1942; the occupation of the village by German troops for four and
a half months; the collaboration of villagers with the occupation regime;
and the restoration of Soviet control in January 1943.493
In the first phase of the German offensive, in the summer and fall of
1941, the southern army group (Heeresgruppe Süd) under General von
Rundstedt made rapid advances, the Red Army retreating in disarray.
Kiev, Kharkov, and the Donbas came under German occupation and, for a
short time, so did Rostov. In the second phase, beginning in the summer of
1942, German offensives were launched in two directions, one towards
Stalingrad to cut the communications lines between North and South Rus-
490 Interview with Gorbachev, Komsomol’skaia pravda, 7 November 1992; as quoted
by Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 30.
491 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 51.
492 Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag,
1991), p. 320.
493 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 42-51.
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sia, and a second towards Grozny in the North Caucasus and Baku on the
Caspian Sea. ‘On 27 July 1942’, to return to Gorbachev’s recollections,
‘our troops evacuated Rostov. Completely disorganized they embarked up-
on retreat; somber looking and tired soldiers passed through. Their faces
betrayed bitterness and feelings of guilt.’494 Stavropol was bypassed by
both offensives, and the steppes to the north of the town where Privolnoe
was located never became a major battle zone.495 In August, however,
German forces entered Privolnoe and established an occupation regime,
initially consisting of regular German units, which were ‘later exchanged
for other units of which I only remember the stripes on their sleeves and
that they spoke Ukrainian’.496
Several villagers collaborated with the occupation authorities, mostly
people who had deserted the Soviet army and hidden for months. They
were now cooperating with the Nazis, mainly as policemen. Gorbachev’s
grandmother was interrogated at the police station because her husband
was a member of the communist party and chairman of a collective farm
and because he, her son and her son-in-law were all serving in the Red
Army. The house was searched. Rumors abounded about mass executions
of Jews and communists. ‘We were conscious [of the fact] that the mem-
bers of our family would be among the first on a list [of suspects] and thus
my mother and grandfather Andrei hid me in a livestock compound behind
the village. The action was to take place on 26 January 1943. But on 21
January 1943 Soviet troops liberated Privolnoe.’497
According to Valery Boldin, later Gorbachev’s chief of staff and one of
the conspirators in the August 1991 coup attempt against him, he (Gor-
bachev) ‘did not witness the kind of atrocities the Germans committed in
Belorussia and many of the western regions of Russia’.498 This may be a
fair observation. Later, however, Gorbachev did become quite conscious
of the war’s consequences and the large-scale destruction it had brought to
Russia. He remembers that
I travelled by rail from South Russia to Moscow [in 1950] to begin [universi-
ty] studies. With my own eyes I saw the ruins of Stalingrad, Rostov, Kharkov,
494 Ibid., p. 45.
495 Medvedev, Gorbachev, p. 31.
496 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 45.
497 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
498 Valery Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World (New York: Basic Books, 1994),
p. 81.
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Orel, Kursk and Voronezh. And how many other cities had been destroyed?
Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Sevastopol, Smolensk, Bryansk, Nov-
gorod ... Everything was in ruins, hundreds and thousands of towns and vil-
lages, factories and enterprises. The most precious cultural monuments – art
galleries, palaces, libraries and cathedrals – were plundered and destroyed.499
Such accounts are, indeed, personal reflections. No effort is made to deal
with the broader issues of Russian-German relations and European securi-
ty. The next section will attempt to reconstruct Gorbachev’s thinking on
these problems.
There were other important factors that shaped Gorbachev’s outlook on
life and politics. These include the ethnic diversity of the region in which
he grew up and where he worked most of his life before being called to the
center. In his memoirs, he asserts that Soviet patriotism was multifaceted
and based on multiculturalism, multilingualism, and multiethnicity. He
writes that in Stavropol krai, 83 percent of the population were Russian;
other nationalities included Karachai, Cherkessians, Abasins, Nogai, Osse-
tians, Greeks, Armenians and Turkmen. He also mentions the region’s
Karachai-Cherkessian Autonomous Region and its radio and television
programs as well as newspapers and books in five languages. ‘Life among
so many nationalities made us tolerant as a matter of habit, and it taught us
to meet each other with respect.’500 On the whole, then, he paints an idyl-
lic picture of ethnic harmony.
On closer inspection of this picture, however, some blots do appear.
One reads that starting with the rule of Catherine the Great, ‘border
strongholds’ were constructed in the northern Caucasus; that ‘in the not all
too distant past, [many] years of Caucasian wars cost numerous human
lives’; and that society during the Civil War ‘was split not only in accor-
dance with the class principle but also along national, religious, and terri-
torial lines, at times even within individual families’.501 Such admitted
blemishes, however, cannot dispel the impression that the artist, having
first painted a picture of ethnic harmony, is either unaware of Russia’s
colonial and imperial past or deliberately attempting to ignore it. He ap-
499 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 38; similarly Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 57. The
date Gorbachev gave for his train trip in Perestroika is ‘the late 1940s’. However,
his studies at university began in 1950. Hence, the insertion in square brackets
provides the correct year.
500 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 35.
501 Ibid., pp. 32 and 36.
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pears to be immersed in nineteenth century romantic nostalgia, referring to
novels by Mikhail Lermontov and verses by Nikolai Ogarev. Russia is not
seen by him as a conqueror and a continental colonial power like the Eng-
lish, French. Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch maritime imperialist powers
but as a benevolent, civilizing power preventing conquest: ‘The more the
Russian state strengthened, the more insistent did the Caucasian peoples
seek salvation in the relations with Russia from conquerors of all kind.’502
Although such notions may say little about Gorbachev’s understanding of
nationalism in Eastern Europe, they reveal much about his lack of sensi-
tivity to nationality problems in the Soviet Union. They also provide an
important explanation of his inability effectively to deal with the issue
when it became acute during his reign.503
To return to Gorbachev’s career, the remainder of his teenage years was
spent helping his father at the kolkhoz’s machine-tractor station (MTS) and
finishing high school. He then applied to Moscow State University to
study law. He could not ‘claim that this decision had matured [sufficient-
ly] ... but the rank of judge or prosecutor impressed me’.504 The choice
was consistent with his ambition and outlook on life. In the Soviet era, and
least of all under Stalin, there was no independence of the judiciary. Tor-
ture had become the usual method of obtaining grotesque confessions that
served as formal accusation in secret, closed trials. Millions of people
were sentenced without due process of law to execution or to the labor
camps. Lawyers were needed to provide a legal veneer for these proceed-
ings.505 Not objectivity and impartiality were required of them but parti-
inost' – behavior in accordance with the interests of the party. But Gor-
bachev’s image of the party and its policies as well as that of Stalin was
essentially favorable. He had, as mentioned, no problem with the principle
502 Ibid., p. 32.
503 To take one of the many examples of Gorbachev’s insensitivity to nationality
problems: In 1984, upon the retirement of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, a Politburo
member from Kazakhstan, Gorbachev ignored the tradition of naming a Kazakh
to the post and instead appointed Gennadii Kolbin, a Chuvash, whom the Kaza-
khs regarded as Russian; see Robert G. Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened: His
Triumphs and His Failure (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 150-151. As
his three-day visit to Lithuania in January 1990 revealed, he also subscribed to
the idea that it could be possible to assuage nationalism by appeals to economic
rationality; see xxx below, p. 285.
504 Ibid., p. 59.
505 Ruge, Gorbachev, pp. 33-34.
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of collectivization, and he preferred not to probe too deeply to understand
the rationale or ascertain the scale of the purges. He was by that time a
candidate member of the CPSU. He had worked hard at the MTS and re-
ceived the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. He had done well at school.
With such achievements and his peasant background, he was accepted by
the university.
In retrospect, Gorbachev discerns both positive and negative aspects of
his university experience. The first three years of his studies, that is, the
period from his enrolment until Stalin’s death in March 1953, ‘coincided
with a new wave of repression – with the notorious campaign against
“rootless cosmopolitanism”’. Teaching amounted to nothing less than
‘ideological drill’.
It seemed as if from the very first day the learning process was designed to
put shackles on the young spirit, to inculcate in the young heads a set of in-
alienable truth and to save them from the temptation of reasoning indepen-
dently, analyzing and thinking. The iron brackets of ideology, therefore, were
always felt, in lectures, seminars, and discussions, sometimes more, some-
times less.506
A stifling atmosphere, then, that accurately reflected the comprehensive
assault on creativity? Not quite. Gorbachev explains that the readings cov-
ered a broad range and included Western classics on constitutional law and
government. He even goes so far as to say that ‘many problems notwith-
standing, the democratic traditions of the Russian university remained
alive. ... The spirit of scientific and creative work and sound criticism was
maintained, even if for the most part this was without much awareness.’507
In reality, of course, only traces of the broad-mindedness and openness of
the pre-1917 university had survived. Encouragement of independent
thinking did not occur during Gorbachev’s first years as a student but only
after Stalin’s death, as a thaw set in and political, cultural, and scientific
conditions in the country eased.508
At the university, Gorbachev continued to pursue his political ambi-
tions. He became leader of the law department’s Communist Youth
League (Komsomol) group and was granted full membership in the party.
Fredrik Neznansky, an émigré Russian living in the West who attended
some of the same courses as Gorbachev at university, remembers him as a
506 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 61-62.
507 Ibid.
508 Ruge Gorbachev, p. 33.
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hard-liner who made speeches scolding the shortcomings and impropri-
eties of fellow party members and recalls ‘hearing the steely voice of
Komsomol secretary Gorbachev, demanding expulsion from the Komso-
mol for the slightest offense’.509 Other students saw him and his behavior
quite differently. Zdenek Mlynář, for instance, thought that Gorbachev ex-
ercised ‘informal and spontaneous authority’;510 Vladimir Kuzmin regard-
ed him as ‘helpful and good-natured’,511 Vladimir Liberman as ‘mod-
est’,512 and Rudolf Kolchanov as ‘intellectually curious’, ‘tolerant’ and not
displaying ‘any signs of radicalism’.513 One of his professors thought that
‘he was a good companion, always ready for a joke’ and that ‘he never re-
ally showed off, and even when he became the [department’s] Komsomol
chairman, he never gave himself airs’.514
Gorbachev did retain some independence of judgment and show
courage. In one instance in 1952, when one professor was reading page af-
ter page from Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Gor-
bachev sent him a note, complaining that the students had read the book
and that failure to discuss it showed a lack of respect for the students.
When the faculty member ridiculed the anonymity of the note, Gorbachev
admitted that he had written it. He was called to the dean’s office but was
probably saved from expulsion by his position at the time of deputy Kom-
somol secretary responsible for ideological questions.515
His courage is demonstrated also by the fact that among his closest stu-
dent friends were Zdenek Mlynář, a foreigner, and Vladimir Liberman, a
Jew. Another incident involved the latter. About a month after the newspa-
pers had reported the arrest of a group of doctors who had allegedly tried
to kill Stalin, most of them Jewish (the ‘doctors' plot’), Liberman was at-
tacked in class by another student. Everybody was silent. Gorbachev,
509 Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 160.
510 Zdenek Mlynár, ‘Il mio campagno di studi Mikhail Gorbaciov’, L'Unità, 9 April
1985. Mlynář was to become one of the leading reformers of the Prague Spring.
511 As quoted by Ruge, Gorbachev, p. 37.
512 Ibid.
513 As quoted by Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 159.
514 Ibid.
515 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 64; the incident was reported earlier by Remnick,
Lenin’s Tomb, p. 160.
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however, angrily came to his friend’s defense, calling the perpetrator a
‘spineless animal’.516
Gorbachev’s friendship with Mlynář is of particular interest. The Czech
student was to become one of the leading reformers of the Prague Spring
and one of the authors of the Charter 77, which formed the basis of orga-
nized dissent in Czechoslovakia during the last twelve years of communist
rule. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that Gorbachev and
Mlynář, in their student days, developed concepts of reform socialism
which they would later attempt to put into practice. Gorbachev, however,
fails to confirm such inferences. He only goes as far as to say that ‘The
more thoroughly I immersed myself in the works of Marx, Engels and
Lenin, the more deeply I thought about [the problem of] congruence be-
tween their notions of socialism and our reality.’517 Mlynář recalls that
Gorbachev gained a greater awareness of the discrepancies between the
glowing portrayals and the sordid reality of Soviet life. This concerned in
particular rural life and the enforcement of discipline on the collective
farm through common violence.518 The notion that the two students de-
veloped reform socialist ideas at this stage in their life must be doubted
also because of the fact that ideological orthodoxy under Stalin and even
the limited relaxation after his death were not at all conducive to the de-
velopment of such ideas. It was really only after Khrushchev’s ‘secret
speech’ at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 that a more
wide-ranging discussion of the Stalin era became possible. ‘Stalinism’, as
another of Gorbachev’s student friends has observed, ‘was something deep
inside us. We were only lucky that we were young and flexible enough to
change later on.’ It is also for this reason that he thinks that Mlynář’s in-
fluence on Gorbachev has been ‘overrated’. 519
516 Liberman reported this incident to Ruge; see the latter’s Gorbachev, p. 41. In his
memoirs, Gorbachev does not mention the incident. He does say, however, that
Liberman failed to appear in class one day because he was too upset to attend.
People had ganged up, cursed, and maligned him, and finally thrown him out of a
tram. Gorbachev was ‘shaken’ by the incident; Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 65.
517 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, p. 64.
518 Mlynář in L'Unità, 9 April 1985. Archie Brown, who interviewed Mlynář, pro-
vides additional information and competent interpretation of the relationship be-
tween Gorbachev and his Czech student friend; see Brown, The Gorbachev Fac-
tor, pp. 30-31.
519 Rudolf Kolchanov, as quoted by Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 159-60. Gorbachev
mentions in his memoirs that, in 1967, Mlynář visited Moscow and then came to
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At university Gorbachev met his future wife, Raisa Maximovna
Titorenko. The daughter of a Ukrainian father and a Russian mother, she
was born in the small town of Rubtsovsk in the Altai region of southern
Siberia. Her family, too, had suffered greatly during collectivization and
the purges. Her grandfather, as mentioned, had been arrested and shot. Her
grandmother, as Raisa Gorbachev recalled, ‘died of grief and hunger as
the wife of an “enemy of the people”’ and her four children ‘were left to
the mercy of fate’.520 The couple had more in common than the legacy of
an ‘enemy of the people’ family history. Like her husband, Raisa was in-
telligent, hard working, did even better in school than he (she received the
highest mark in high school in every subject and was awarded a gold
medal) and was accepted at MGU to study philosophy, because of her
achievements, not as many other students because of party connections.
She lacked Gorbachev’s political ambition but added to the relationship by
her interest in philosophy, art and literature. She also added to his aware-
ness of problems of agriculture and rural life by her empirical sociological
studies of the peasantry in the Stavropol region.
Upon completion of university studies, for Gorbachev the question of
what to do next then arose. He returned to his native region and, in August
1955, began working in the Stavropol region’s prosecution office (proku-
ratura), but only for ten days. To his wife, who was still in Moscow and
arrived in Stavropol shortly thereafter, he wrote that ‘working in the prose-
cutor’s office is not for me’.521 One of the reasons why he decided to
abandon law enforcement was the ‘unscrupulousness with which the
USSR prokuratura officials were proceeding’.522 Yet as if more sensitivity
and compassion or less party tutelage could be expected there, he joined
the Communist Youth League. He himself notes: ‘Essentially, the political
youth organization had no autonomy whatsoever; in practice, it acted as a
“recipient of instructions” of the CPSU.’ He also observes that ‘any at-
tempt of the Komsomol to act independently was not only regarded [by
see him in Stavropol’. ‘Zdenek asked me about the situation in the Soviet Union,
in the Stavropol' region, and about our life. He in turn told us a lot about the pro-
cesses going on in Czechoslovakia.’ Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. I, p. 119. Gorbachev
doesn’t say that this conversation had any impact on his thinking.
520 Raisa Gorbachev, I Hope: Reminiscences and Recollections (New York: Harper
Collins, 1991), p. 14.
521 Ibid., as quoted by Brown, Gorbachev, p. 36.
522 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 79.
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the CPSU] as undesirable but as dangerous.’523 However, he makes no ef-
fort to explain why it would be preferable to work for one party-controlled
institution rather than for another.
Gorbachev’s rise in the Komsomol and party apparat was fast by Soviet
standards after Stalin’s death. In 1956, at the tender age of twenty-five, he
became first secretary of the Komsomol for the city of Stavropol and
quickly rose to the highest post in that organization for the entire
Stavropol krai. In only fifteen years, at the age of thirty-nine, he became
the most powerful person in the Stavropol region. His career in the party
apparat began in 1962 and was advanced by Fyodor Kulakov, the first sec-
retary of the Stavropol regional party committee, an association that was
to last until 1978, when Kulakov, then a full Politburo member, died in of-
fice.524 His initial position was that of party regional organizer and then,
from 1963, head of the party organs department for the administration of
collective and state farms, a new office created by one of the many admin-
istrative reforms under Khrushchev. ‘An outside observer’, he wrote of his
function, ‘may regard cadres work as scheming and paper shuffling, as
dealing with intrigues in the apparat or as another dishonorable or unpleas-
ant occupation, and up to a point this was true. In the [party] organs de-
partments, intrigues were often spun and the fate of human beings decid-
ed.’525 He, however, had set himself a higher task, which consisted in the
attempt at promoting the best people in order to improve the performance
of agriculture in the Stavropol region. Not a problem for him: ‘I met hun-
dreds of communists who were faithfully doing their duty’.526
Kulakov evidently considered his protégé’s work to be effective. In
1966, at the age of thirty-five, Gorbachev was promoted to first secretary
of the Stavropol city party organization and now had to deal primarily
with urban problems. His next advancements occurred two years later,
when he was moved to the position of second secretary of the party orga-
nization of the entire Stavropol krai, and in 1970, when he became region-
al first secretary. Since important regional party positions carried with
them a seat in the Central Committee, Gorbachev was elected to that body
523 Ibid., p. 82.
524 For the at first rocky Kulakov-Gorbachev patron-client relationship, see Gor-
bachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 99-101. Later, shortly before Kulakov was relieved of
his duties by Brezhnev, the relationship again became difficult.
525 Ibid., p. 101.
526 Ibid., pp. 101-6; 118.
2. Gorbachev: A Political Profile
251
at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, held in 1971, just one month after
his fortieth birthday.527 At the same congress, Kulakov had become a full
member of the Politburo and was able to continue to act as a patron for
Gorbachev. When Kulakov died in 1978, Gorbachev moved into his place
as CC secretary in charge of agriculture. Two years later, he became a can-
didate member of the Politburo, and in the following year, in October
1980, at the early age of forty-nine, a full member of that body. For the
Soviet Union under Brezhnev, this was a remarkable career.
This sketch of Gorbachev’s political profile would be incomplete with-
out consideration of his attitude towards the reform efforts undertaken by
Khrushchev and Andropov. In one of his few reflections on fundamental
problems of the Soviet system contained in his memoirs, he argues that the
failure of Khrushchev’s reform attempts was due to the fact that
the system did not encourage innovation – even more than that, it resisted it.
One should have assumed that Khrushchev’s experience would have rein-
forced him in his recognition that a transformation was not to be achieved by
operating on individual limbs. The framework of the system should have been
ruptured instead so that one could have made more progress. But Khrushchev
himself was a prisoner of outlived structures and ideological dogmas, which
made it impossible for him to transgress the narrow confines of the system.
This dilemma may also have been the root cause of his style of leadership, his
emotional fluctuations, and his impulsive upswings. Khrushchev’s intellectual
potential could not flourish in this environment.528
This, it would seem, is an accurate characterization not only of the basic
dilemma that Khrushchev was facing and his shortcomings and failures in
dealing with them but also an apt description of Gorbachev’s dilemmas
and deficiencies.529 A similar reasoning can be applied to Gorbachev’s
views of Andropov’s failed reform efforts. ‘He [Andropov] knew the situ-
ation in our country better than anyone else and he also knew how much
our society was threatened but he shared the belief of many [communists]
527 Brown, Gorbachev, p. 39.
528 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 103.
529 To that extent, one would have thought it appropriate for Gorbachev’s observa-
tion to be included in both the Russian and the German edition of his memoirs.
This, however, is not the case. The Russian edition contains only the first sen-
tence about the Soviet system’s aversion to innovation (Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol.
1, p. 98) but omits the criticism of Khrushchev’s shortcomings. Irredeemably sus-
picious Kremlinologists may be excused for assuming that the parallels between
Khrushchev’s and Gorbachev’s failures were too close for comfort to be present-
ed to Russian readers.
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that one only had to take care of the cadres and create discipline, and ev-
erything would be fine.’530 Gorbachev was an Andropov disciple and
protégé but during his tenure in office as General Secretary he was unable
to shed such beliefs and acted accordingly.
Most of Gorbachev’s career before he assumed the top Soviet leader-
ship position was concerned with agriculture and organizational matters in
the party. There are a few instances in his life and career, however, which
can be said to have had some influence on his later conduct in foreign pol-
icy. Such instances are his visits abroad, including trips to East Germany
in 1966, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in 1969 and 1970, Italy in 1971,
Belgium, with a side trip to Amsterdam, in 1972, West Germany in 1975,
France in 1976, Canada in 1983 and Britain in 1984. Gorbachev’s visits to
East Germany (which, as his trip to West Germany, will be dealt with lat-
er) and Bulgaria apparently did not contribute anything to awakening any
awareness of the imperial nature of the relationship between the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. His visit to Czechoslovakia was different.
The intervention of the Warsaw Pact had occurred only fifteen months
prior to the arrival of a Soviet party delegation, which included Yegor Lig-
achev, then first secretary of the Tomsk region, and Boris Pastukhov, the
CC secretary responsible for the Komsomol. Wherever the Russian visi-
tors came into contact with ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, they were met
with hostility. ‘If I were to say that we felt uncomfortable this would be an
understatement’, Gorbachev remembers. ‘We felt deeply that the people
condemned and indignantly rejected this action [the intervention].’
Prague, he thought, ‘appeared paralyzed and numb. [Our Czech] col-
leagues did not consider it possible to get us together with workers' collec-
tives; they themselves decided not to meet with them’. In Brno, the dele-
gation visited a large enterprise but ‘the workers did not return our greet-
ings and demonstratively turned away. In August 1969, mass actions had
flared up again against the new régime and the Soviet intervention ...
[The] situation was extremely tense and the delegation had to be guarded
around the clock’. In Bratislava, he observed that ‘almost all the buildings
in the center of the city had bullet marks, and everywhere anti-Soviet slo-
gans were written on the walls’. When a member of the CPSU delegation
pointed out in a meeting with party officials that Lenin had supported fed-
eralism in principle but not in the communist party, the first secretary of
530 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 151; Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 148.
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the Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak communist party rose and left. On
the following morning, no one from the Slovak leadership appeared. He
also recognized that there was a direct connection between the August
1968 events in Prague and events in Moscow. ‘The developments in
Czechoslovakia and the dynamics which it developed frightened the Sovi-
et leaders – and to such an extent that they immediately abandoned their
modest economic reform intentions and, in politics and ideology, hastened
to tighten the screws.’531
It would be inconsistent with Gorbachev’s political philosophy and per-
sonality for him unambiguously to condemn the intervention. He again
finds extenuating circumstances and bends history to underpin his ratio-
nalizations. ‘During the years of the Cold War’, hw writes, ‘the parties to
the conflict looked at much of what was happening through the prism of
bloc interests and acted accordingly, not shrinking from the adoption of
extremely harsh measures.'532 These, in the Soviet case, were apparently
justified because of a drift in Czechoslovakia to leave the Warsaw Pact.533
There is even a whiff of ‘all is well that ends well’ in his treatment of the
intervention: ‘When I was in Czechoslovakia in the following year, good
relations had been established between the people in the countryside and
our soldiers.’534
Gorbachev’s experience in the Western industrialized countries, as he
acknowledges, also shaped his perceptions. The first and foremost realiza-
tion was that Soviet propaganda had painted a skewed picture of life under
capitalism. ‘Irrespective of their purpose, the visits were instructive for me
above all because [they underlined] the fact that the information we re-
ceived from abroad was meager and also carefully filtered.’535 He was sur-
prised by the absence of border controls between Belgium and the Nether-
lands.536 And he was completely unprepared for the openness of Western
society and politics and the huge discrepancies in the standard of living
531 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 157-59.
532 Ibid., p. 157.
533 ‘The fact that, in the press of the ČSSR in mid-1968, there began to appear re-
ports on the possible exit of the country from the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation] was the expression of the position of certain political forces, in other
words, a result of the internal political development’; ibid., p. 158.
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid., p. 168. Incongruously, however, he makes the West responsible for ‘lower-
ing an “Iron Curtain”’ on the exchange of information; ibid., p. 157.
536 Ibid., p. 165.
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and in the level of economic and technological development between East
and West. His ‘a priori belief in the advantages of socialist as compared
with bourgeois democracy was shaken’. He also thought that ‘perhaps the
most important thing which I brought back with me from my trips abroad
was the realization that people there live in better conditions and have a
higher standard of living [than in the Soviet Union]. Why do we live
worse than the other developed countries? This was a question which was
persistently to occupy me.’537
To sum up, the contours which emerge from the lines of Gorbachev’s
background and experiences before his becoming General Secretary add
up to a very contradictory personality profile. The problem is not so much
that the observer is faced with a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde phenomenon but
that he has to struggle with several Dr. Jekylls. One of the clues to under-
standing his personality can be found early in his memoirs where he re-
members that in his maternal grandfather’s house,
in a corner in the living room hung an icon with an oil lamp in front of it,
because grandmother was deeply religious, and under the holy picture, on a
small table made at home, [the room was] beautified by portraits of Lenin and
Stalin. This ‘peaceful coexistence’ of the two worlds did not at all embarrass
grandfather.538
His approval of the allotment of equal space to icons Lenin, Stalin and Je-
sus is typical of his own attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Such at-
tempts have had a positive and a negative dimension. Their positive fea-
tures are his proclivity for compromise, his reluctance to condemn or rush
to judgment, his preparedness to let things ripen and get more mature, his
preference for persuasion rather than pressure and his abhorrence of vio-
lence. Their negative qualities lie in his refusal to engage in iconoclasm,
firmly to take sides, his aversion to commitment, his proclivity for pro-
crastination and his tendency to talk rather than to act decisively.539 These
537 Ibid., p. 169. Nothing, of course, as has by now become obvious, is ever unam-
biguous. He finds a few things to criticize in the West and things that the Soviet
Union does better. This concerns, for instance, the treatment of ‘immigrants’ (he
probably meant the Gastarbeiter, or guest workers): He also thought that ‘public
education and the provision of health services at home are built on more equi-
table principles’ and that ‘public transportation in the cities [in the Soviet Union]
was preferable’; ibid., pp. 165 and 169.
538 Ibid., p. 38.
539 ‘The only thing that is moving in the Soviet Union are Gorbachev’s lips’, was the
memorable response by a (non-licensed) taxi driver on the way from the centre of
2. Gorbachev: A Political Profile
255
deficiencies were felt particularly acutely by those who expected effective
political leadership in a difficult period of transition.
Gorbachev’s disinclination to commit himself and act decisively is con-
nected with his almost invariably indeterminate and inconsistent analysis.
At university, as he writes in his memoirs, he felt attracted to the probing
discussions with intelligent, open-minded classmates but until the very
end of his career he defended the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and
socialism. In his search for a profession, he turned his back on the proku-
ratura because the state attorneys were so unscrupulous and the judiciary
lacked autonomy but he joined the Komsomol, another Soviet institution
without scruples or autonomy. Dwelling on Russian history, he acknowl-
edged past Russian colonization of the northern Caucasus but simultane-
ously discerned contemporary interethnic harmony in this region. Con-
cerning collectivization, he decried its excesses but justified the changes in
the countryside as objectively necessary. He saw no necessity for the
purges but de-emphasized their scale. He took Khrushchev and Andropov
to task for remaining shackled by obsolete ideological beliefs and trying to
reform the system without rupturing its framework but, when in office, he
embarked on the same road of ‘acceleration’ and ‘perfection’ of the sys-
tem, exhortations and an (utterly disastrous) anti-alcoholism campaign.540
In the political realm, as a Western biographer observed,
As President he, in effect, dismissed a Politburo whose composition he could
not control fully and substituted for it a Presidential Council, wholly appoint-
ed by himself – yet he did as good as nothing to build up his political support
in place of the CPSU he had abandoned. He deprecated those who ‘claim the
role of the messiah’, yet there was an impatience of teamwork here, a deliber-
ate self-isolation that suggests delusions of irreplaceability, if not vulnerabili-
ty.541
Moscow to Sheremetevo airport in early October 1988 to this author’s question
as to what changes he had seen.
540 ‘Noble intentions, deplorable results’ is the apt title of the chapter in his memoirs
on his anti-alcoholism campaign – a characterization that may well be applied to
domestic politics and economic affairs as well. In foreign policy, the epitaph
could be ‘noble intentions, unintended consequences’.
541 John Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 72-73. Gorbachev’s attack against those who ‘claim
the role of the messiah’ as published, according to Miller, in Izvestiia, 1 Decem-
ber 1990.
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In the economic area, in 1990, when he finally appeared ready to abandon
the framework of the system by seemingly endorsing the Shatalin plan for
the transformation of the Soviet economy to a market economy within 500
days, he reneged on his promises and demanded the plan’s ‘harmoniza-
tion’ with prime minister Ryzhkov’s tired ideas for the retention of the
centrally planned economy.
In Boldin’s view, based on his observations as Gorbachev’s chief of
staff in charge of party affairs in 1987-91, there was no limit to his chief’s
vacillation and contradictory attitudes and behavior.
Gorbachev advocated democracy ... yet he decided people’s fate as he alone
determined the membership of the Central Committee and the Politburo,
choosing first secretaries of republican parties, obkoms, and kraikoms accord-
ing to his personal likes and dislikes. [He] fought to expand glasnost, yet he
withheld from the people, the party, and even his own associates, vital infor-
mation ... and threatened to dismiss newspaper editors who published material
not to his liking, making good on his threats in several cases. ... He fought to
protect the independence of the judiciary but instructed the procurator general
on how to pursue certain investigations. [He] fought against administrative
command methods of management, while keeping a tight grip on ministries
and committees and setting policy on all economic issues from the center.542
Valentin Falin concurs with this view of Gorbachev’s double standards
and, coupled with the indecisiveness and incompetence he discerns in his
former chief’s personality, reflects on the consequences such features are
likely to produce:
One cannot be a democrat and at the same time fear democracy. One cannot
pledge allegiance to freedom of thought and be intolerant of the opinion of
others. One cannot with one hand abolish totalitarianism and with the other
assert one’s own authoritarian style of leadership. And, finally, one cannot
make numerous promises without taking the time and care seriously to ad-
dress the matters at issue.543
Both Boldin, a co-conspirator in the August 1991 coup attempt, and Falin,
for reasons which will be explained below, cannot be considered unbiased
observers. But even some of those close confidants and advisors who re-
mained loyal to Gorbachev throughout his tenure in office and even be-
yond have expressed frustration about their inability to fathom his genuine
thoughts and convictions at any given time. Chernyaev, for example, has
542 Valery Boldin, Ten Years that Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed
by His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. 298-99.
543 Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), p. 44.
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admitted to having felt ‘bitter about the discrepancy between the views he
[Gorbachev] expressed and his actions’ and about the fact that, ‘at times,
his [public] declarations and actions deviated from what he told some of
us close to him who sincerely sought to understand him, and even more so
from what he told foreigners’.544
Gorbachev’s foreign policy notions were and on many issues till are to-
day characterized by the same discrepancy between public and private
views, and reveal the same mixture of candor and caveat, insight and igno-
rance as well as admission and retraction. He was sensitive to the Hitler-
Stalin pact as a causal factor for the outbreak of World War II but defend-
ed the non-aggression treaty as necessary, preferring to ignore the secret
protocols. He disapproved of the restrictive Soviet policy on the exchange
of ideas between East and West and lamented the skewed selection and
scarcity of information in the Soviet Union prior to the advent of glasnost
but charged that it was the West that had lowered the Iron Curtain on the
free flow of ideas and persons. He realized the deep humiliation and injus-
tice inflicted upon the Czechoslovak people in August 1968 but failed to
question the legitimacy of Soviet imperial rule and, a year after the inter-
vention, was able to see that things were going well in the relationship be-
tween Russians and Czechs.
There are, however, important differences in Gorbachev’s approach to
domestic as compared to foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that almost
throughout his tenure in office he was regarded with much reservation by
the population, resented by many reformers and despised by hard-liners in
Russia but generally well respected and often enthusiastically celebrated
in the West.545 There are several reasons for this discrepancy. First, his
policies abroad were characterized by relatively more consistency in con-
ceptual approach and more congruence between theory and practice than
those in domestic affairs. This is true despite all of the linkages and inter-
connections between the two policy areas.
Second, consistency in new thinking and practice – the reduction of
global commitments, deceleration of the arms competition, withdrawal of
forces and equipment, lowering of the Soviet threat profile and abandon-
ment of ideological stereotypes– paid off in the form of benevolent West-
544 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 316.
545 An indication of the low popular esteem in which he is being held in Russia are
the results of the first round of the June 1996 presidential elections. Gorbachev
received a mere 0.51 percent of the vote.
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ern attitudes and policies towards Soviet imperial contraction. It set in mo-
tion a process of positive reinforcement in international affairs. There was
nothing equivalent domestically.
Third, his internal policies, particularly in the economic realm, were of-
ten indecisive and ineffective and produced a large and, after January
1987, rapidly widening rift between promise and achievement. This rein-
forced rather than detracted from the need to curtail imperial over-commit-
ment and overengagement but did nothing to endear him to the Soviet
public.
Fourth, whereas fundamental change in domestic affairs required a sub-
stantial redistribution of power and resources, change in foreign policy
tended to affect personnel and resources to a lesser degree, and structural
impediments were more easily overcome.
Fifth, it is easier to destroy and dismantle than to construct. In interna-
tional affairs, the removal of the huge asymmetries in intermediate-range
nuclear forces and conventional military power as well as the termination
of ill-advised imperial entanglements were instantly applauded. In domes-
tic politics, deconstruction was bound to be resisted, and reconstruction
could only be a long-term and much more difficult endeavor.
After this description of the basic features of Gorbachev’s personality,
his political philosophy and difference in his approach to domestic as op-
posed to foreign policy, it is possible now to turn to his perceptions and
policies on the German problem.
Gorbachev’s Perceptions of the German Problem
In his memoirs, Gorbachev acknowledged that he was surprised by the
course of events in Germany in the late 1980s.
I would be lying if I claimed that I had foreseen the way in which the German
problem would be decided and the problems that would arise in this connec-
tion for Soviet foreign policy. I doubt in this connection whether any politi-
cian, in the East or in the West, would have been able to envision one or two
years beforehand what would happen [in 1989-90]. After the precipitous
changes in the GDR, events developed at such a breathtaking pace that there
was the danger that they would spin out of anyone’s control.546
3.
546 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 150; similarly Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 700.
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He moves on to criticize the approach adopted by his predecessors, saying
that
Brezhnev and Gromyko committed an error when they allowed themselves to
be spoon-fed by the leading politicians in the GDR and, in the early 1970s,
began to accept the official versions of events, which were impressive in their
‘simplicity’. These myths were that there were two German nations, that the
German problem was ‘closed’ and that it would make no sense to reopen it.
But the point was not Ulbricht’s and Honecker’s theoretical constructs on the
national question. The main issue lay in the sincere conviction of the Soviet
leadership that the security interests of the Soviet Union necessitated a perpet-
uation of the division of Germany at any price.
In fairness, Gorbachev does not claim that when he assumed office he was
determined to change well-established policies or that he should even alter
what he now criticizes as the simple myths and categorical imperatives of
the past.
I must confess that I, too, accepted these categorical imperatives, although I
had doubts as to whether any circumstance can be preserved in perpetuity.
The world is always in a state of flux, and if man ignores this objective law, it
can only lead to defeat and loss. When I embarked upon high politics, the ex-
istence of two German states was a fact and the question of reunification sim-
ply did not arise.547
It is not surprising that Gorbachev, as he admits, shared the preconcep-
tions of Brezhnev and Gromyko on the German problem. He had practi-
cally no exposure to the study of international relations at Moscow Uni-
versity. One of the subjects he took was diplomatic history but the teach-
ing of the subject conformed to standard notions about the entirely peace-
ful character of Lenin’s and Stalin’s foreign policy.548 Even Khrushchev,
in his ‘secret speech’ to the Central Committee in February 1956, had –
with the exception of Stalin’s failure to anticipate the German attack of
June 1941 and his post-war policy towards Tito’s Yugoslavia – exempted
this realm from criticism. Gorbachev not only seems to have believed and
probably still believes the standard Soviet interpretation of the origins of
World War II but also the Soviet version of the division of Germany. This
547 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, pp. 150-151; Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 701 (ital-
ics mine). The Russian kategorichnost’ has been rendered here as ‘categorical
imperatives’.
548 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 61. He also lists German language as one of his
courses. There is no record, however, that he ever used any of it on his trips to
East or West Germany or in his talks with German political leaders.
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is evident, among other things, in a conversation he had when he visited
West Germany as a member of a CPSU delegation, led by his mentor Ku-
lakov, in May 1975, on the thirtieth anniversary of the capitulation of Nazi
Germany.
The visit apparently made a big impression on him. In particular, a brief
and sharp encounter with a German citizen engraved itself deeply in his
mind. He mentioned the encounter several times to high-ranking West
German visitors, including West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher in July 1986 and president Richard von Weizsäcker in July
1987. This is what happened, according to his own description:
At a filling station [at Mannheim] near Frankfurt, I talked with the owner. He
told me: ‘stalin declared: The Hitlers come and go. But the German people
remains. But then, at the end of the war, Stalin seized and divided the German
people.’549
A discussion ensued, Gorbachev remembers, in the course of which he at-
tempted to set the historical record straight. The plans for the division of
Germany, he explained,
had been worked out during the war years by Churchill and American politi-
cians. We opposed these plans and advocated the creation of one single,
sovereign, and democratic German state. [However] ... the Western powers
supported the creation of a separate West German state, and only later did the
GDR come into existence. We also advocated the creation of a single,
sovereign, and above all peaceful German state on the basis of the de-Nazifi-
cation, democratization, and demilitarization of Germany. However, there
were forces in the West which took the matter to where it is today. The Soviet
Union, therefore, was not to be blamed (ne vinovat) for the division of Ger-
many; one had to look elsewhere for the responsibility.550
549 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 210. When Gorbachev told this story to Genscher, the
German foreign minister smiled. He (Gorbachev), Genscher thought, had been
lucky that his German interlocutor was apparently not much of a historian. Stal-
in’s statement not only referred to the German people but also to the German
state: ‘The Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German state re-
main.’ See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), p.
500. ‘The experience of history shows that the Hitlers come and go but the Ger-
man nation, the German state, remains’ is the version in J.V. Stalin, The Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 5th edition (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub-
lishing House, 1950), p. 84.
550 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 210. Gorbachev’s report of this encounter can be
found not only in Perestroika but also, with some variations, in his memoirs
(Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 166; Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, pp. 167-168).
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The ordinary German citizen was apparently just as unconvinced by these
arguments as the West German president more than a decade later.551
There is, however, an important unreported sequel to the Mannheim ex-
change. Gorbachev continued the discussion privately with Viktor Rykin,
the accompanying translator, a German expert with a doctorate in German
history and at that time a junior official in the Central Committee’s Inter-
national Department. Prompted by the conversation, Gorbachev predicted
that the day would come when Germany would be reunified.552 He was
challenged on this point by Rykin. German unity, he told his chief, was a
phenomenon of relatively recent origin. Several German states like Prus-
sia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hessia and others had existed separately, some of
them for centuries. Furthermore, Austria – a much more homogenous
country ethnically than, say, Switzerland – had evolved separately from
the two Germanys after the Second World War and had developed a dis-
tinct national consciousness. Everyone seemed to accept this, including
the Germans. So why shouldn’t there be the possibility of the development
of a separate East German national consciousness and the acceptance of
two German states by the international community and by the Germans
themselves?
Gorbachev stuck to his point. In his view, the difference between the
two Germanys, on the one hand, and Austria and Germany, on the other,
lay in the fact that German unity had been achieved at great cost. The div-
ision of Germany was artificial and considered to be so by most Germans.
One only needed to think of the Berlin wall to understand the complete ab-
surdity of the state of affairs in the center of Europe. But the wall could
not and would not be there forever. It was only a temporary device. How,
one had to ask, would the Russians react to a wall right through the heart
of their capital? Would they put up with such a thing? Surely not.
Chernyaev was to say later that Gorbachev had an intuition ‘deep
down’ that the reunification of Germany was ‘inevitable’.553 But what was
551 Unlike his book Perestroika (p. 210), which is neutral on this point, his memoirs
suggest that his German interlocutor was inclined to accept what he (Gorbachev)
considered to be the ‘historical truth’, that is, that ‘the plans for the division of
Germany had not at all been hatched in Moscow’ (Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1,
p. 166; Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, pp. 167-68). However, Viktor Rykin, his
translator, remembers the attitude of the German citizen as being less agreeable
and accommodating to the Soviet point of view. Interview with Rykin.
552 Ibid.
553 Interview with Chernyaev; see also Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 304.
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the significance of this intuition for top-level decision making on the Ger-
man problem? Are historians or political scientists justified in drawing a
straight line from Gorbachev’s 1975 perceptions of the artificiality of the
division of Germany and the inevitability of German unity to his 1990 ac-
ceptance of German unification? This would be inappropriate. As he him-
self clearly acknowledged, as quoted above, he was still mired in conven-
tional preconceptions and saw no need and also no possibility to change
policies. Indeed, at no time during his tenure in office as party chief and
executive president did he actively promote German reunification. On the
contrary, the evidence is overwhelming that from 1985 through 1989 he,
other chief policy makers and the most prominent experts on German af-
fairs were quite opposed to putting it on the agenda.
The May 1975 visit to West Germany produced other impressions
which may have had a bearing on how Gorbachev was to deal with the
German problem when it became acute. In his memoirs, he writes that he
was ‘struck by a powerful anti-Fascist demonstration in Frankfurt, in
which 250,000 people participated – communists, social democrats, repre-
sentatives of the CDU, Bundeswehr soldiers, members of labor unions,
and delegates from youth and veterans organizations’. In meetings with
professors and students, he ‘did not notice any hostility’ toward the Soviet
Union. He and his colleagues thought that ‘overall, the attitude of the Ger-
mans towards the Soviet Union was [further] changing in a positive direc-
tion and that a profound change was taking place in German thinking’.554
This reconstruction of his experience appears credible and, in addition to
many meetings with leaders of West Germany’s government, political par-
ties and business in 1985-89, may have made it easier for him to abandon
the deeply engrained Soviet stereotypes on the German problem.
Yet it would seem that, upon assuming office in 1985, Gorbachev did
subscribe to time-honored stereotypes and shared many popular Russian
notions about Germany and the Germans. Such notions, as amply reflected
in Russian literature and Russian sayings, include the idea that Germans
are characterized by organizational ability, dedication to work, technologi-
cal skill, punctuality, rationality and efficiency but that they are often
overly meticulous, stuffy and lack compassion as well as a sense of hu-
mor. He appears to cling to traditional images of the German national
554 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 168; slightly different in the Russian edition – the
‘positive direction’ is missing but the ‘profound change’ is duly noted; Gor-
bachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 167.
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character as contrasted with presumed Russian national traits. Russian folk
wisdom, for instance, holds that ‘The Germans arrive at things by their
brains, the Russians through their eyes.’ (Nemets svoim razumom
dokhodit, a russkii glazami). As for economic prowess and technological
skills, another Russian proverb holds that ‘For everything the Germans
have an instrument.’ (U nemtsa na vsë instrument est’.) Another quips:
‘Next to a church, there is a priest; next to a machine, there is a German.’
(Gde tserkov', tam pop, a gde mashina, tam nemets.) In the post-war peri-
od, such images were applied also to East Germany. A standard Soviet
joke explained the German acronym of DDR, or GDR in English, as
meaning; Davai, davai, rabotat’. (Hurry up, hurry up and work.)
Gorbachev’s recollections of his first trip to East Germany in June 1966
conform to such images. In that period, he writes, Soviet ‘party officials
were being sent [there] in order to study the [East German] experience in
the implementation of reforms’, that is, the harmonization of ‘new meth-
ods of planning and administration [with] a system of incentives and more
economic leeway for enterprises’.555 The Soviet delegation appears to
have been impressed because, after the completion of the trip, a memoran-
dum was sent to the CC with the recommendation to study closely the
East German reform efforts. ‘However’, Gorbachev deplores, ‘the memo-
randum ended up no differently than many others during those years.’556
On that occasion, he also met Honecker who was then a full member of
the SED Politburo and only a few years away from the top leadership pos-
ition and who, according to Gorbachev’s recollections, ‘already acted in a
very self-confident manner’.557
Twenty-two years later, in private conversation with Honecker, he was
to reiterate his impressions of the 1966 visit. The visit had been for him ‘a
very important journey’ and one that had ‘aroused deep emotions’.558 The
reason for this emotional experience, he explained, lay in a comparison of
555 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 155.
556 Ibid.
557 Ibid. Gorbachev, in contrast, was at that time only a junior party official and un-
likely to have caught Honecker’s attention.
558 Protocol (Niederschrift) of talks between Gorbachev and Honecker on 28
September 1988 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/1/685 (indirect speech; this is to indicate hereafter that the origi-
nal transcripts of the private conversations between Soviet and East German lead-
ers are in indirect speech but that for better readability in the text direct speech
was used. The transcripts sometimes alternate between the two forms).
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the economic reform processes that had ‘begun at the same time in the So-
viet Union and the GDR’ (his reference was apparently to the reforms in-
troduced by prime minister Kosygin). The ‘main question’ which at that
time had occupied both countries had been the problem as to ‘how one
could avoid remaining behind the pace of scientific-technological progress
in the world’. East Germany, contrary to the Soviet Union, had looked at
the highest world levels of production, drawn the appropriate conclusions
for its own research and development, and succeeded ‘in rapidly increas-
ing labor productivity’ and also ‘catching up in the quality [of production]
in comparison with the advanced [industrialized] countries’.559
What he didn’t tell Honecker, of course, is what he noted in his mem-
oirs. Although his meetings and conversations with East Germans had
proceeded in a pleasant atmosphere, ‘they lacked warmth’.560 Specialists
on Germany in the CPSU Central Committee thought that, while Gor-
bachev felt a ‘certain affinity’ with Poland and the Poles, and consequent-
ly had cordial personal relations with president Jaruselski and prime mini-
ster Mieczyslaw Rakowski, his attitude towards East Germany and its offi-
cial representatives was characterized by ‘indifference’ and ‘psychological
distance’.561 This was bound to affect the personal and political relation-
ship between the two leaders – a factor that needs to be examined in the
context of East Germany’s importance and its role in the Soviet Union’s
European strategic glacis.
559 Ibid. (indirect speech). – Gorbachev’s regret to the effect that the Soviet Union,
unlike the GDR, had failed to utilise the ‘scientific-technological revolution’ and
had allegedly been able to ‘catch up with’ the Western industrialized countries is
important because it serves to put into context the often quoted statement about
countries or people ‘who are late, will be punished by history’. That statement,
quite contrary to conventional wisdom was not meant by Gorbachev to apply to
the GDR but to the Soviet Union. [delete the xxx.] Myths, however, die hard.
Even reputable academic specialists on Russia continue to disseminate the view
that ‘There was no love lost between the inflexible East German leader and
Mikhail Gorbachev, who used every occasion … to remind his German counter-
part of the need for political change.’ Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr.
Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2013), p. 119 and,
based on their book, id., ‘How the 1980s Explains Vladimir Putin’, TheAtlantic,
14 February 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/
how-the-1980s-explains-vladimir-putin/273135/. For further clarification of the
origins of Gorbachev’s dictum see below, xxx pp. 503-504.
560 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 156.
561 Interviews with Tsipko and Rykin.
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East Germany: Strategic Ally but Waning Economic Asset
Gorbachev inherited East Germany as an integral part of the Soviet em-
pire. But his consent in 1990 to German unification meant abandoning a
‘strategic ally’, as he called the GDR, and handing it over to what used to
be an adversary alliance.562 How could such, according to orthodox com-
munist and Russian nationalist perspective, vile treachery occur? Part of
the answer lies in the fact that, in the period from 1985 to 1990, individual
leaders had a major impact on history. The alienation, animosity, and an-
tipathy that pervaded the personal relations between Gorbachev and Ho-
necker contributed to the Soviet leader’s sense of imperial malaise and his
view of the Soviet possessions in Eastern Europe as a source of embar-
rassment and a burden rather than an asset.
As in a marriage gone sour and drifting inexorably towards an uncivi-
lized divorce, in the relationship between Gorbachev and Honecker insin-
uations alternated with reproaches. Charges were met by countercharges.
For some time, cutting remarks and cryptic allusions became the order of
the day. However, contrary to the acrimonious exchanges in July 1984
over the Pravda articles, Honecker’s planned visit to West Germany and
the GDR’s economic dependency,563 as the personal and political differ-
ences proved irreconcilable, open controversy and argument that might
have cleared the air disappeared from the public and private discourse.
Presumably in the interest of self-preservation, to impress foes and to reas-
sure friends and neighbors, the two antagonists pretended that nothing was
wrong. ‘Outwardly, everything looked normal: the embraces, the kisses,
the awarding of medals, the cordial receptions, attendance of congresses
… the ritual procession of the chosen’ but beneath the surface there was
smoldering suspicion, resentment, and scheming.564
It is probably true that even with the best of intentions and good will a
cordial relationship was probably not to be expected. The personal chem-
4.
562 Gorbachev referred to East Germany as a ‘strategic ally’ of the Soviet Union as
late as December 1989, in his speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU after
his return from the Soviet-American summit conference at Malta; see Pravda, 9
December 1989.
563 See above, xxx pp. 205-11.
564 Shevardnadze in general terms about the relations between the reformist leader-
ship in Moscow and the conservative leaders in Eastern Europe; Moi vybor, p.
199.
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istry of the two leaders was too different for this to happen. Gorbachev’s
flair, his spontaneous, outgoing, radiant, optimistic, often unconventional
attitude and sense of humor contrasted sharply with Honecker’s prim and
proper appearance, the petty demeanor of a petit bourgeois and miserly
bureaucrat, the impatience and intolerance, and the penchant for utterly
humorless, schoolmasterly lecturing performed in an unpleasantly high-
pitched voice. The personalities of the two leaders couldn’t have been
more mismatched. In the past, such mismatches between Warsaw Pact
leaders had, of course, not been an obstacle to cooperation. However, in
the present case, the personality problem was exacerbated by the political
dimensions of psychology, notably Honecker’s acute loss of a sense of re-
ality concerning the true state of economic and political affairs in East
Germany and Gorbachev’s overestimation of the chances for a successful
introduction of ‘democratic socialism’ in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Another source of alienation lay in Soviet suspicions about Honecker’s
putative pan-Germanic, albeit socialist, pretensions. Honecker, as men-
tioned in the previous chapter, was born in 1912 in Neunkirchen, a town in
the Saarland, one of the smaller German Länder, situated close to the Ger-
man-French border. His career began with tasks in the communist youth
organization and party work in the Saarland in the 1920s, continuing with
agitprop training in Moscow in the 1930s. It was interrupted by a long
prison term under the Nazis in World War II, resumed when Honecker be-
came youth secretary and security chief of the SED Central Committee in
the 1950s and 1960s, and culminated with his appointment as party chief
in 1971. Not surprisingly, in the preparations for his visit to West Germany
in 1987, Honecker insisted on returning to his birthplace in the Saarland
and visiting the grave site of his father. As it happened, one of leaders of
the West German Social Democratic Party, Oskar Lafontaine, was not only
active in promoting the burgeoning SPD-SED exchanges but was also
SPD chairman and prime minister of the Saarland. No wonder, therefore,
that the germanisty in the International Department of the CPSU Central
Committee thought that Honecker represented the pan-German communist
party tradition and that for him his contacts with the West German social
democrats were a potentially fatal attraction.565
565 Interview with Rykin.
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Differences in education may also have played a certain role in fueling
misunderstanding and distrust between the two leaders. Whereas Gor-
bachev, as described above in detail, had an extensive university educa-
tion, Honecker barely managed to finish basic education and never began
an apprenticeship. His only work experience before becoming an appa-
ratchik in the youth organization and in the party was that of a farmhand
in Pomerania and helper to his uncle, a roofer, in the Saarland.
Further seeds for mutual suspicion and distrust were laid during the
emergency meeting of Soviet and East German leaders in August 1984.
Although the record, as noted, shows that Gorbachev merely adhered to
the adamant position of the Politburo, Honecker returned from Moscow
reportedly convinced that Gorbachev was a ‘scharfmacher’, that is, that he
had taken a particularly hard line.566 In Honecker’s perceptions, that line
seemed to continue when he was in Moscow on 12 March 1985 to attend
the funeral ceremonies for Chernenko. Chancellor Kohl, who was also in
Moscow on that occasion, had let it be known that he was keen to meet
with the East German leader. Since Gorbachev’s suspicions of special in-
tra-German relations had not been alleviated, several of his advisors were
trying to dissuade the SED chief from agreeing to such a meeting – to no
avail. Kohl and Honecker met in what was an extraordinarily, perhaps
demonstratively, cordial atmosphere.567
Nevertheless, the two general secretaries seemed prepared not to start
out their relationship as top leaders of their countries on a sour note. Gor-
bachev, in particular, wanted to reassure Honecker that there would be no
major policy changes. After the arrival of the SED delegation at the airport
in Moscow, he briefly talked with Honecker on the telephone and told him
that the CC plenum, at its meeting of the previous day, had ‘decisively
come out for the consistent continuation of our political course. There is
no necessity to change it. This concerns questions of domestic as well as
foreign policy.’568 Similarly, the April 1985 CC plenum, which later as-
sumed an almost mythical quality as having ushered in perestroika, did not
provide any better clues as to what Gorbachev might have in mind. As
566 Interview with Krenz.
567 Ibid.; see also Egon Krenz, ‘Honecker und Gorbatschow’, Neues Deutschland, 25
January 1993.
568 Gorbachev – Honecker telephone conversation, 12 March 1985, 3.35 p.m., SED
Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2739 (italics
mine).
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Chernyaev, then still deputy head of the CC’s International Department,
noted in his diary, on internal issues Gorbachev made some personnel
changes and emphasized the need for ‘discipline, law and order, and de-
centralized decision making’. On questions of foreign affairs, he was ‘flat,
commonplace and conventional’ as if he ‘didn’t want to touch the subject’
or, worse still, he ‘deferred to Gromyko’. Overall, therefore, it did not
seem that ‘Gorbachev had a more or less clearly defined concept as to how
to advance the country to world levels’.569
Business as usual in the ‘socialist community’ and Soviet-East German
relations seemed to be indicated also in other fora. These included the
meeting on 13 March 1985 of the first party secretaries of the Warsaw
Pact countries held also on the occasion of the Chernenko funeral celebra-
tions in Moscow; the extension of the Warsaw treaty for another twenty
years at a meeting of the leaders of party and state of the alliance in War-
saw on 26 April; and the celebrations in Moscow and East Berlin on 8
May commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over
Nazi Germany.
There were only a few tenuous indications of change in Soviet policy
towards the West. These concerned Gorbachev’s announcement of a mora-
torium on the stationing of intermediate range nuclear missiles and the
halting of the ‘countermeasures’ adopted after the deployment of INF in
Western Europe.570 But these announcements were not a problem for Ho-
necker. They could be regarded as indicating that Moscow would now fol-
low the course which he had charted earlier and for which he had been so
severely reprimanded.
The first opportunity to talk in detail about international issues occurred
on 5 May 1985 during Honecker’s visit in Moscow. The transcripts of the
Gorbachev-Honecker meetings show that the Soviet party leader now did
have more specific ideas about the directions and the methods to be em-
ployed to achieve change. They also demonstrate that up to a point he was
intent on mending fences with his East German counterpart. Finally, they
reveal an important paradox in Gorbachev’s attempt at restructuring the
Soviet system in 1985 and 1986. The fence-mending notwithstanding, the
Soviet leader (mildly) criticized his East German counterpart despite the
fact that the ideological basis and the foreign policy and economic strate-
569 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 42-43.
570 As announced by Gorbachev in an interview with Pravda, 7 April 1985.
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gies of perestroika were at first quite in conformity with East German
preferences and practice.
Concerning the first, the ideological aspect of the paradox, Honecker
could only have been reassured by the talks. The ideological basis of pere-
stroika looked traditional, even orthodox. This was evident in Gorbachev’s
remarks to his East German counterpart on the tactics to be adopted by the
communist parties in their struggle against imperialism:
The fraternal countries charge ahead and often pose themselves new ques-
tions. There are differences in tactics, and in the solution of concrete prob-
lems. All the more necessary [therefore] is a more intensive exchange and
closer coordination. Failing that, everyone looks for his own model. What
would remain of socialism if everyone were to withdraw to his own national
apartment? Imperialism would then pick off one [socialist country] after an-
other. ... There is only one model, Marxist-Leninist socialism.571
Honecker couldn’t have put it more succinctly.
As for the foreign policy aspect of the paradox, Gorbachev’s shift to a
more flexible and conciliatory approach to the West, which was to bring
him in line with previous East German approaches, was noted above. It is
the economic aspect of the paradox that warrants analysis in more detail.
The GDR in Gorbachev’s Economic Strategy
In May 1985, Gorbachev assured Honecker: ‘Between the Soviet Union
and the GDR there is the broadest [possible] agreement on planning and
guidance and on economic mechanisms.’572 Furthermore, he was ‘able to
state with pleasure, after having listened [to you], that [we both] think
along the same lines not only on general but also on specific questions.’573
Did the GDR really fit into Gorbachev’s economic scheme?
In Gorbachev’s view, the GDR, because of its scientific and technologi-
cal potential, could make a significant contribution to the revitalization
and modernisation of the Soviet economy. In the confidential talks be-
tween the two leaders less than a year later, in February 1986, Gorbachev
571 Transcript of the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev in Moscow on 5 May
1985 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Reinschriftenprotokoll, Central Party Archives,
J IV 2/1/631 (indirect speech, italics mine).
572 Ibid. (indirect speech).
573 Ibid. (indirect speech).
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lamented in reference to the Soviet Union that ‘one should have begun
with it [the utilization of science and technology for production] twelve to
fifteen years earlier, and one would be much further along. Now it is much
more difficult to solve these tasks.’574 Honecker agreed and attempted to
impress Gorbachev (successfully, it seems) with the first in an apparently
never-ending series of East German progress reports on the improved rela-
tionship between science and production, the expansion of microelectron-
ics and production automation in the GDR as well as the development of
new processes and materials in the GDR – all of which undertaken under
the heading of creating in that country a ‘computer-based society’.575
One of the best indications of what the two leaderships specifically had
in mind can be found in the materials relating to the coordination of Soviet
and East German national economic plans for the period 1986-90. The
planning institutions of the two countries agreed on measures for the ‘ac-
celeration of scientific-technological progress’ and the ‘broadest applica-
tion of the most modern results of science and technology in the produc-
tion process’, the ‘rapid acceleration of labor productivity’ and the ‘more
effective and sparing use of material and labor resources’.576 Particular at-
tention was to be given to the coordination of plans in microelectronics
and computer technology and to ‘cooperation in the development of new
basic technologies, the creation and production of electronic building
blocks and microprocessors as well as the necessary technological equip-
ment and materials necessary for that purpose’.577 The plans for Soviet-
East German trade were to reflect these priorities.
574 Transcript of the talks between Gorbachev and Honecker on 27 February 1986 in
Moscow, SED Politburo, Reinschriftenprotokoll, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/2/2156.
575 Ibid.
576 The basis for all this were decisions adopted at the June 1984 CMEA summit
conference in Moscow and the draft of a Long-Term Program on the Develop-
ment of Cooperation between the GDR and the USSR in Science, Technology
and Production until the Year 2000, agreed upon on 6 October 1984.
577 Protocol on the Results of Coordination of National Economic Plans of the GDR
and the USSR for 1986-1990 and Beyond, Attachment No. 2, SED Politburo, Ar-
beitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2/2127.
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GDR-USSR Trade Projections, 1985-90 (in billions of roubles)
 1985 1990 Annual Growth in %
Volume 14.80 17.80 3.70
    
GDR Exports 7.40 9.10 4.20
of which:    
Machinery 5.20 5.60 1.50
Chemical products 0.35 0.46 5.60
Consumer goods 1.10 1.60 7.80
    
USSR Exports 7.40 8.70 3.20
of which:    
Machinery 0.90 1.90 16.1
Energy, raw materials and chemical products 5.80 6.00 0.60
These and other data clearly reveal the intentions of the economic planners
until the year 1990 and beyond. East German exports of microelectronic
equipment were to increase more than twofold and those of microelectron-
ic products almost fourfold. Moscow officials, as indeed Gorbachev, ex-
pected a significant breakthrough in the modernisation of machine build-
ing in the USSR.579 They thought it possible to decrease East German ma-
chinery exports to a growth rate of only 1.5 percent per year and hoped
that Soviet exports of this type of commodity would increase by 16 per-
cent annually.580 Under the conditions of a ‘policy of increasing aggres-
siveness, boycott and discrimination by the imperialist states’ the two
planning authorities of the two countries also agreed upon measures to re-
duce their dependency on the world market and to draw up a list of such
products as were currently being imported and to substitute them by in-
digenous products.581 Finally, in Gorbachev’s opinion, East Germany
could play an important role in countering Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ initiative,
or SDI.
Table 3:
579 In fact, one of the most noteworthy features of the Soviet Union’s five-year plan
(1986-90) was that the planned average annual growth of investment in the ma-
chine-building sector was to amount to no less than 12.5 percent.
580 Protocol on the Results, Attachment 2.
581 Ibid.
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East Germany and SDI. The perceived seriousness of the challenge of
SDI can vividly be demonstrated by a letter Gorbachev sent to Honecker
on 12 September 1985.582 The Soviet party leader wrote that the ‘necessity
of an intensification of socio-economic development’ lay not only in the
internal tasks which the CPSU had set itself. The ‘external factor’ was
also increasing in importance. ‘The West has emphatically embraced sci-
entific-technological progress and in the struggle against socialism is
putting [the emphasis] above all on technological warfare.’ He contended
that SDI had ‘not only military but also great economic significance’.
Based on a policy of export restrictions, the ‘leadership of the USA is con-
ducting a policy of a pre-programmed technological lag of the socialist
countries’.583
He also deplored the Reagan administration’s attempt to enlist the sup-
port of the Western European countries and Japan for such a strategy. The
West Europeans, he pointed out, had responded to SDI with Eureka, ‘a
comprehensive program of coordinated efforts in the area of high technol-
ogy’. He admitted that ‘we are as yet unsure as to the balance between
[its] military and civilian, that is, peaceful elements’.584 He also was am-
biguous on the question as to whether the socialist countries should re-
spond favorably to the invitation issued by the West Europeans to partici-
pate in the Eureka technology programme.
Irrespective of how the issue of participation in Eureka was going to be
resolved, it was clear that the United States' strategic design ‘poses in all
sharpness the necessity for the member countries of CMEA [Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance, hereafter, Comecon] to accelerate scientific-
technological progress’ and, in a foreseeable time frame, ‘to assume lead-
ing positions’ in that sphere. He therefore suggested advancing the date
for the adoption of CMEA’s Comprehensive Program for Scientific-Tech-
nological Cooperation and, even before details of the program could be
agreed upon, embarking immediately upon large-scale joint projects of
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scientific-technological cooperation and the creation of a common fund
for the financing of such projects.585
Gorbachev also impressed upon other party leaders the gravity of the
challenge. At the October 1985 summit meeting of the member states of
the Warsaw Pact in Sofia, he told the assembled party chiefs that ‘we
clearly recognize the dangerous military-political consequences of
SDI’.586 He again regarded Reagan’s initiative as an ‘attempt to secure a
permanent technological superiority of the West over the socialist commu-
nity and, by the way, not only over it but also over the [United States’]
own allies’. Returning to a dialectic Marxist approach to the relationship
between the United States and Western Europe, he interpreted Eureka both
as a European response to SDI and an integral part of an ‘overall line of
the West’, with military industry in the United States and Western Europe
seeking to maximize profit. Furthermore, he said: ‘We cannot but recog-
nize [the fact] that the imperialist states create their own scientific-techno-
logical programs which are in many ways subordinated to the tasks of
struggle against the socialist community.’ Again he saw the necessary
Warsaw Pact response as consisting in ‘the fastest possible development
of scientific-technological integration. We have to solve these problems
more effectively than the capitalists’.587 The GDR and, to a lesser extent,
Czechoslovakia were called upon together with the Soviet Union to play
the most important part in countering the military-technological challenge
emanating from the United States.
Deficiencies in the Economic Relationship. It was, of course, a serious
error of judgment to assume that East Germany could play a significant
role in countering SDI. It was equally erroneous to think that technologi-
cal progress could be accelerated in Comecon in accordance with its Com-
prehensive Program. As Soviet prime minister Ryzhkov was to tell his
Comecon colleagues in July 1988, ‘We have now been working for more
than two years on the realization’ of the programme but ‘we cannot claim
that we have made much progress’; the share of highly advanced techno-
585 Ibid. In keeping with Western word usage of the time, CMEA will be rendered as
Comecon (communist economies). In communist sources, CMEA will be re-
tained.
586 Gorbachev’s speech at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative
Committee on 22 October 1985 in Sofia, SED, Central Party Archives, J IV,1/2A/
2811 (italics mine).
587 Ibid.
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logical products in CMEA economic exchanges remained ‘most insignifi-
cant’.588 The same applied to the expectation that the GDR could mean-
ingfully contribute to the modernisation of the Soviet economy. Soviet-
East German economic exchanges were plagued by many problems, some
of them specific to the bilateral relationship, others associated with the
structural deficiencies of the Comecon’s planning system, the deteriorating
overall performance of the economies, the burden of the arms competition
and other growing costs of empire.
A first set of problems concerned exchange of information in science
and technology. In his talks with Gorbachev on 20 April 1986, Honecker
styled himself as an advocate of glasnost and dwelled on its virtues. He
raised the subject by asserting that scientific-technological cooperation be-
tween the USSR and GDR should be improved by ‘de-bureaucratizing
things’ and by ‘solving certain questions of secrecy’. Gorbachev replied
that according to his information ‘some matters are being kept secret from
the Soviet Union, too’. Honecker rejected the charge but Gorbachev did
not relent. He knew how much Honecker had done for the development of
Soviet-East German scientific and technological cooperation. Yet a joint
committee for economic relations established for the purpose of better in-
formation exchange had become an ‘amorphous and ineffective institu-
tion’. He reiterated that he was ‘repeatedly receiving information to the ef-
fect that the comrades in the GDR keep this or that secret from the S[ovi-
et] U[nion]’. In his concluding remarks on this topic, Honecker professed
some understanding for the Soviet need for secrecy in military affairs.
‘The thing, however, is that eminent GDR scientists often find it impossi-
ble to exchange information with their partners in the S[oviet] U[nion] and
that their wishes are not being accommodated to the same extent as they
would be in the GDR.’589
A second set of problems was associated with the commodity composi-
tion of Soviet-East German trade. Major asymmetries existed and were
confirmed in the national economic plans for 1985-90. The share of fuel
and raw materials in the total East German imports from the Soviet Union
588 Quoted from the speech by Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet prime minister, at the
5-7 July 1988 meeting of CMEA, that is, the 44th council meeting, SED, Central
Archives, J IV 2/2A/3141.
589 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech). – For the respective uses of CMEA and Comecon see xxx fn. 276.
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was to amount to 70 percent in the planning period. This percentage would
also be the share of metallurgical products, including technologies, in the
total East German exports to the Soviet Union. As the GDR planning doc-
ument stated, the ‘supply of the country with raw materials and fuel to a
large extent has to be paid by increasing GDR exports of machinery and
equipment’.590 But Honecker complained to Gorbachev that ‘The Soviet
Union is not prepared to import important machinery products from the
GDR.’ The state of affairs in the coordination of plans thus far showed
that ‘GDR machinery exports [to the USSR] in 1986 will decrease by 665
million roubles as compared to 1985’.591 This downturn could not be ex-
plained ‘by a lack of demand in the USSR or insufficient GDR production
and delivery capacity’.592 He did not advance a theory as to the reasons for
the decline but economic planners in Moscow and East Berlin had a fairly
good idea. Soviet officials had repeatedly protested against the East Ger-
man practice of delivering industrial goods of low quality to the Soviet
Union and of higher quality to Western industrialized countries. Moscow
was also beginning to show a greater preference for more advanced and
reliable Western technology and attempting to expand indigenous machin-
ery production. Mutual recrimination did not end here. In the 1970s and
early 1980s East Germany had become accustomed to both lavish supplies
and the low cost of Soviet oil. In the second half of the 1980s, however,
the Moscow cut supplies and raised the price with the consequence that
East Berlin alleged and complained about the ‘violation of agreements’.593
590 Decision Concerning the Coordination of Plans with the USSR for the Period
1985-1990, adopted at its meeting of 27 August 1985, SED Politburo, Arbeit-
sprotokolle, J IV, 2/2/2A/2785. Attachment No. 7.
591 Protocol of the talks between Gorbachev and Honecker in Moscow on 5 May
1985, SED Politburo, Reinschriftenprotokoll, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/1/638 (italics mine). Honecker’s complaint about the 1986 figures is to the
point and consistent with the five-year, 1985-1990, plan coordination, according
to which GDR machinery exports were to grow on average by 1.5 percent per
year. See Table 3 above.
592 Ibid.
593 East German protests continued until 1989; for one of the many examples, see
Politburo meeting of 10 January 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central
Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3186. The Soviet Union, in turn, had repeatedly called
upon the GDR to participate more extensively in the construction of gas
pipelines; see, for instance, [Politburo] Directive for the Preparations of the Par-
ticipation of the GDR in the Construction of the Natural Gas Pipeline Yamburg-
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Third, hard currency was an issue. East Germany was contractually en-
titled to repair Soviet weapons systems, notably MiG aircraft, helicopters,
jet engines, radar systems and missiles in the armories of the Warsaw Pact
and in several developing countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and
Libya. The latter countries had to pay the GDR in hard currency. In top
secret draft agreements, the Soviet Union now claimed a share of that
money and began to demand full payment in hard currency for the Soviet
spare parts to be used in the repair services in developing countries. It then
lowered its demands to a share of 60 percent in hard currency, but this,
too, was rejected by the SED Politburo.594
A fourth problem pertained to technology export controls. In what
looked like a mirror image of Reagan’s approach vis-à-vis his European
allies to ensure compliance with economic sanctions towards the countries
of the Warsaw Pact, in May 1985, Yuri Maslyukov – a first deputy head of
the state planning committee and chief of its military department – at-
tacked GDR export policies. He told a high-ranking East German delega-
tion in Moscow that the United States, its NATO allies, and Japan had
strengthened their policies of ‘economic aggression and embargoes’ and
their attempts at ‘inflicting damage’ on the socialist economies. The War-
saw Pact countries, on the other hand, were deliberately or unintentionally
exporting strategically important ‘results of scientific research, advanced
technologies and scarce materials’. The Soviet Union considered it neces-
sary, therefore, ‘to unite the efforts of the Warsaw Pact member states for
the protection of their military economic and scientific-technological po-
tential’.595 To the amazement of the East German economic delegation,
Maslyukov produced a detailed list of technological manufactures and sci-
entific processes subject to export control to non-socialist states but re-
fused to hand it over, ‘pointing to its not yet final character’. In its report,
the East German delegation characterized the document it had seen as un-
acceptable because it was ‘unilaterally directed towards global export con-
Western Border of the USSR, SED Politburo, Reinschriftenprotokoll, Protocol of
15 January 1985, Central Party Archives, J IV, 2/2/2094, Attachment No. 7.
594 Directives for the Bilateral Coordination with the USSR on the Shaping of For-
eign Economic and Scientific-Technological Relations with Capitalist and Devel-
oping Countries, SED Politburo, Reinschriftenprotokoll, Protocol of 2 July 1985,
Attachment 2, Central Party Archives, J IV, 2/2/2119.
595 Top secret agenda item prepared for the SED Politburo session of 2 July 1985,
SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV, 2/2A/2774.
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trol’. The Politburo agreed. It rejected the Soviet approach and in subse-
quent negotiations insisted on a ‘limitation [of export controls] to such
products and technologies as are of strategic significance’.596 Neverthe-
less, at the end of the year, a Warsaw Pact convention on technology ex-
port controls was signed.597 As was true of many other agreements, it
failed to produce meaningful results.
Finally, there was a problem with a commodity that to both administra-
tors and victims of empire provided relief and escape – alcohol. As all So-
viet institutions, the Soviet armed forces in Germany were unable to evade
the rigors of Gorbachev’s anti-alcoholism campaign. The forces anticipat-
ed a reduction of 8,700 hectolitres of hard liquor, 3,100 hectolitres of
wine, as well as 800 hectolitres of champagne and, therefore, sensibly re-
quested substitution of these products by clothing, shoes, industrial prod-
ucts and foodstuffs. This was apparently an item of utmost importance to
be dealt with by the SED Politburo, which it did in its session of 27 Au-
gust 1985. The deliberations were to provide yet another telling example
of the absurdities of central planning and damaging interdependence on
the basis of inflexible quotas. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was
to be told that, unfortunately, the national economic plan had been com-
pleted and that, therefore, ‘additional provision of these products was im-
possible’.598 The end result was, one might have guessed, neither booze
nor shoes.
Whatever the number and scope of Soviet-East German problems, they
were probably in no way greater or smaller than those which the Soviet
Union had with other Comecon countries. The main point here, however,
is that the GDR was the most important country of the bloc to provide
substance to Gorbachev’s emphasis on science and technology as growth
factors and his intended shifts from extensive to intensive development,
from quantity to quality, and from coercion to incentives in economic
management. Given Gorbachev’s ideas about modernisation of the econo-
my, acceleration of growth, and improvement of scientific-technical coop-
eration, the last thing he would have wanted at that stage was for anyone
to rock the rickety boat of the socialist community on the shoals of the
596 Ibid.
597 For the text of the agreement, see SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2A/2964.
598 Agenda item No. 34, Politburo meeting of 27 August 1985, SED Politburo, Ar-
beitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2786.
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German problem. He himself was to do so later for reasons which had as
much to do with economics as with politics.
Political Aspects of Soviet-East German Relations
In preparation for his departure for East Berlin to attend the Eleventh SED
Congress, from 17 to 21 April 1986, Gorbachev agreed with the approach
suggested by Chernyaev. His aide had proposed that
in our talks with Honecker in Berlin we should not convey the impression that
we want to ‘straighten him out’ or influence him but we should [find ways]
how jointly – philosophically and theoretically – to approach the problem of
the ‘two Germanys’ in the context of current world development.599
In private, as demonstrated above and as will be explained further below,
this was not quite how the Soviet leader chose to proceed. But publicly, at
the Eleventh SED Congress, he certainly reassured the East German lead-
er. He reiterated his concern that ‘the ruling class of the FRG has not re-
nounced its revanchist dreams and continues to speak of an “open German
question”’. The Soviet Union, he then went on to say,
attaches much importance to the development of relations with West Ger-
many as a major European state. What is more, we are prepared to develop
these relations on an equal basis and for mutual benefit. But this first and
foremost calls for Bonn’s policy to meet in practice the interests of peace and
security. We want to stress in that context that we unconditionally support the
legitimate demand of the GDR to West Germany that relations between them
be fully brought into accordance with the commonly recognized norms of in-
ternational law.600
But differences in political perspective between Moscow and East Berlin
existed on several major foreign policy issues. These included (1) Chi-
nese-East German party relations; (2) East German criticism of Soviet do-
mestic developments; (3) the political aspects of East Germany’s econo-
mic relations with West Germany; (4) Honecker’s refusal to inform his
colleagues in the Politburo about emerging differences with Gorbachev;
and (5) Honecker’s persistent intention to pay an official visit to West Ger-
many.
599 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 83.
600 Gorbachev’s speech to the SED Congress, 18 April 1986, Pravda, 19 April 1986.
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The Chinese Connection. The triangular relationship of Moscow-Bei-
jing-East Berlin was one of the many factors putting strain on the difficult
relationship between Gorbachev and Honecker. After Gorbachev’s acces-
sion to power in March 1985, the process of rapprochement in Sino-Soviet
relations had received a new impetus. In a speech to the CC, Gorbachev
had assured the Chinese of his ‘serious interest’ in an improvement of the
relationship, listed China again as one of the ‘socialist states’ and re-
nounced the ‘third party’ argument, that is, the theory according to which
Moscow could not conclude agreements with China at the expense of oth-
er countries. What was meant in the circumstances was obvious. Beijing
was constantly citing ‘three obstacles’ which the USSR would have to re-
move before a normalization of relations could take place. Specifically,
Moscow would have to reduce its military presence along the Chinese bor-
der to the level of 1964; end its support of Vietnamese expansionism in
Southeast Asia, including in Cambodia; and withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan. In previous Soviet interpretations, meeting any of these de-
mands would have affected the interests of ‘third parties’, notably Mongo-
lia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Afghanistan.
The Chinese reacted swiftly to the Soviet overtures. In their congratula-
tory telegram to Gorbachev upon his election as first secretary, and for the
first time since the rupture of party relations in March 1985, they again ad-
dressed a Soviet party leader as ‘comrade’. Chinese vice premier Li Peng,
who headed the Chinese delegation at Chernenko’s funeral, even handed a
message to Gorbachev from the Chinese party chairman, Hu Yaobang.601
But all these gestures were mere harbingers of a possible spring in the
Sino-Soviet relationship. It was not until after the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan in 1989 that a breakthrough in the relationship
was achieved.602
East Germany, on the other hand, had already begun the ‘normalization’
of its relations with China in 1983 and 1984 at both the state and the party
level. Some of the momentum driving the improvement of Sino-East Ger-
man relations derived from Honecker’s previous close contacts with Hu
601 See Dieter Heinzig, ‘Soviet Policy Towards China’, in Federal Institute for East
European and International Studies, ed., The Soviet Union 1984/85 (Boulder, Co-
lo.: Westview, 1986), p. 288.
602 Ibid., pp. 286-287.
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Yaobang.603 The Chinese, like the East German, party leader had made his
career in the communist youth organization and in June 1981 had been
elected party chief. The GDR media commented favorably on the Chinese
‘four modernisations’ and other reform measures adopted by Hu Yaobang
and Deng Xiaoping. This was surprising given the SED’s domestic ortho-
doxies and even more so because of its consistent criticism of Hungarian
economic reforms. Thus, East German observers found ‘remarkable
progress made by the People’s Republic of China in its economic and so-
cial development’ and noted the ‘visible improvement in living condi-
tions’ for the Chinese farmers,604 who were raising their living standards
more quickly than people in the cities, buying everything from washing
machines to private cars.605 The only reference to the ideological implica-
tions of the liberalizing agricultural and industrial reforms were quotations
from Chinese decrees stating that China would ‘seek to counter the intru-
sion of bourgeois ideology’.606 Honecker seemed to believe that in China
the dangers of ‘revisionism’, let alone a restoration of capitalism, were
slight.
Soviet-East German controversies over the Chinese issue after Gor-
bachev’s accession to power in April 1985 started with a visit by East Ger-
man planning chief and deputy prime minister Gerhard Schürer to Beijing
in July 1985, and his favorable report on the state of affairs in China. A
copy of the report had been dutifully transmitted to the CPSU. At the be-
ginning of August 1985, Politburo member and secretary for security
questions Egon Krenz received the first deputy chief of the Soviet em-
bassy in East Berlin, who stated that he had a personal message from Gor-
bachev to Honecker. To Krenz’s surprise, the Soviet envoy wanted to read
out the message but retain the written text. Since the content of the mes-
sage thus promised to be highly sensitive, Krenz insisted on having a
603 Honecker was to point out to Gorbachev that he ‘knew him [Hu Yaobang] from
the youth movement and the WFDY [World Federation of Democratic Youth]’
and agreed with the Soviet party leader that Hu had ‘more positive views than
Deng Hsiaoping’, SED, Central Party Archives, IV 2/1/638.
604 Christa Runge, writing in Horizont (East Berlin), June and September 1984.
605 Werner Micke, a confidant of Honecker, writing in Neues Deutschland, 7-8 July
1984. The author was also deputy editor of the newspaper.
606 Article by Fritz Verner-Osten (pseud.) in Horizont (East Berlin), December 1984;
for detail, see B.V. Flow, ‘Orthodox East Berlin Reacts Favorably to Major Re-
forms in China’s Economy’, RFE / RL Soviet and East European Report (Mu-
nich), Vol. 2, No. 12, 1 February 1985.
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stenographic record taken.607 Posterity, therefore, became privy to yet an-
other bizarre occurrence in the ‘fraternal’ discourse.608
Gorbachev first politely thanked the SED for the Schürer report but im-
mediately came to the point. Motivated by the importance of formulating
coordinated actions by the socialist countries towards China, he wished to
convey some considerations about certain aspects of the policy of the Chi-
nese leadership. He charged, in essence, that Chinese policies were char-
acterized by duplicity. As Chernenko had done previously concerning the
GDR’s policy towards West Germany, Gorbachev now implicitly accused
Honecker of gullibility and naïveté on East Germany’s policies towards
China. He noted that ‘the Chinese in the talks with Comrade Schürer pro-
fessed full understanding for the special relations’ existing between the
GDR and other socialist countries on the one hand, and the Soviet Union
on the other. They had ‘said that “We will never have insidious inten-
tions”. However, Gorbachev wanted to tell his German friends ‘that there
are reasons for doubting the sincerity of such assertions’. Deng Xiaoping,
for instance, one of the main architects of Chinese domestic and foreign
policy, had stated that China’s strategic interests ‘required that the Soviet
Union be considered “a political opponent”’; that the ‘Warsaw Pact and
CMEA should “not be strengthened but weakened”’; and that ‘a harsh pol-
icy of “separating the socialist countries of Eastern Europe from the Soviet
Union”’ should be adopted. Chinese premier Zhao Zi-yang had made es-
sentially the same points when he had visited Turkey.609
Gorbachev also charged that ‘Hu Yaobang attempts to give assurances
that China is pursuing a consistent line in support of the GDR on the so-
called “German problem”’. Such declarations would be welcome, Gor-
bachev continued, if they corresponded to the real state of affairs. In actual
fact, however, the Chinese leaders had ‘several times publicly advocated
the “unification of Germany”’. As evidence for this allegation, he pointed
to a visit by premier Zhao Zi-yang to West Germany in June 1985 where
he had assured his hosts that ‘China has “understanding for the striving of
the German people for unification”’. This position, the Soviet leader re-
gretted, was not much different from what the G-7 leaders had stated at
607 Interview with Krenz.
608 Stenographic record of the Gorbachev message to Honecker, as transmitted by
Popov [first deputy chief of the Soviet embassy] to Krenz, SED, Central Party
Archives, Büro Krenz, IV 2/2.039/280.
609 Ibid.
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their meeting in Bonn in May 1985, namely, that they wanted to achieve a
state of affairs ‘that would permit the German people to create “unity by
free self-determination”’. After mentioning several other examples of Chi-
nese double-dealing, he denounced Beijing for supporting Bonn’s position
on the allegedly unsolved German question.610
Quite in accordance with the Ideological and Imperial paradigm, Gor-
bachev thought that the West German class enemy was elated by such ex-
pressions of Chinese support. He reproached the East German leadership
for having failed to realize that Chancellor Kohl had ‘declared during his
visit to Beijing in October of last year [1984] that for the FRG “it is of
special significance that the Chinese People’s Republic advocates the uni-
ty of Germany”’. He also indicted the SED for not realizing that, ‘in June
1985, Bavarian prime minister Strauß warmly thanked the Chinese gov-
ernment for its constant support of the “right of the divided countries to
self-determination”’. In view of all this, Gorbachev said, there could only
be one conclusion, namely, that ‘the position of Beijing contradicts the vi-
tal interests of the German Democratic Republic as a socialist state’.611
How is one to interpret these ‘confidential considerations’ – in essence,
blunt criticism of East German foreign policy draped in thinly veiled
charges of East German inexperience, ignorance and gullibility? Their
purpose evidently was , to restore the proverbial but perennially elusive
‘unity and cohesion of the socialist community’. To that extent, Gor-
bachev’s attacks on GDR-Chinese relations were also a clear indication
and confirmation that there was as yet no deviation of the new Soviet lead-
er from previous patterns of Soviet foreign policy. More fundamentally,
they underline the deep foreign policy crisis in which the Soviet Union
still found itself in 1985 but also the inability of the new leader effectively
to deal with it.
To conclude this episode of imperial pressure on a strategically impor-
tant actor at the periphery, Honecker found Gorbachev’s information im-
portant or, more correctly perhaps, interesting enough to write on top of
the document: ‘To the members and candidates of the Politburo.’ He also
initialled the document (‘EH’) and dated it ‘2 August 1985’. But this is ap-
parently where the matter ended. In a personal conversation between Gor-
bachev and Honecker at the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Sofia later
610 Ibid.
611 Ibid. (italics mine).
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in the year, the East German party leader gave his critic the chance to ex-
pound on the theme of alleged Chinese duplicity on the German problem
by reminding him, in the context of a discussion of Chinese developments,
that ‘we gave [you] the protocol on G. Schürer’s trip to China’.612 Gor-
bachev, however, did not react. There is no further trace of any repercus-
sions produced by the document. It thus remains buried in the archives, a
sorry landmark on the road to the dissolution of empire.
Soviet and East German Domestic Policies. When Gorbachev visited
East Berlin in April 1986 to attend the SED’s Eleventh Party Congress,
the still carefully concealed rift in his relations with Honecker was to
widen. This occurred in private conversation between Gorbachev and Ho-
necker on 20 April. The meeting got off to a bad start. After the usual
opening formalities, invocation of the ‘vital necessity for the CPSU, the
SED, the people of the two states, and the General Secretaries personally
to underline unity’ and appeals not to allow ‘even the most minute cause
for ambiguity’, Gorbachev expressed displeasure. Although the ‘Twenty-
seventh Party Congress of the CPSU [25 February - 6 March 1986] was
supported by the party and people of the GDR’, he had the impression that
‘Comrade Honecker was irritated by something’. He felt that the East
German leader had ‘displayed a certain reserve’ and had ‘reservations’
concerning domestic developments in the Soviet Union.613 For instance,
he (Honecker) had ‘spoken very extensively about international problems
[and] how they had been dealt with at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress
but not about their significance for socialism’.614 He had also ‘failed to
612 Protocol (Niederschrift) on the meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev at the
Warsaw Pact summit conference in Sofia on 23 October 1985, SED Politburo,
Reinschriftenprotokoll, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/1/638.
613 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech, italics mine). − Based on conversations with Honecker, the Soviet am-
bassador in East Berlin, too, concluded that the East German party leader ‘sup-
ported without qualification the international course’ charted by the Twenty-sev-
enth Party Congress but ‘concerning the assessment of our concept for domestic
development, he remained distant’; Wjatscheslaw Kotschemassow, Meine letzte
Mission: Fakten, Erinnerungen, Überlegungen (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994), p.
51 (italics mine).
614 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech). Gorbachev apparently referred to what Honecker had said in his report
to the Eleventh Congress of the SED. – Gorbachev’s laudatory remark about the
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mention anything about the fact that we are now [following the East Ger-
man example] and pursuing the course of the unity of economic and social
policy’.615
Gorbachev evidently referred to the emphasis Honecker, after he had
taken office in 1971, had put on the social dimension of the SED’s pol-
icies, including an ambitious housing program and the ‘quality of life’ as
an important factor of production but also to what under Ulbricht and in
the first years of the Honecker era had been an important feature of econo-
mic and social life in East Germany: small-scale commodity production
and the activity of private traders and craftsmen. However, another para-
dox in Soviet-East German relations is to be noted here. Gorbachev was
apparently ignorant of the fact that, in the second half of the 1970s, small-
scale commodity production and private economic activities had signifi-
cantly been curtailed in conjunction with the establishment of large pro-
duction associations, the Kombinate. This had occurred under the headings
of rationalization, automation, standardization, and intensification of pro-
duction.616 This change in East German economic policy may have been
the very reason why Honecker failed to compliment Gorbachev on his
supposed imitation of the East German example and why the Soviet leader
stubbornly continued to adhere to an outdated view of East German devel-
opments. It also raises the question of what it was that the Central Com-
mittee’s specialists on East Germany, to the extent that they existed, were
telling Gorbachev or whether he was interested in listening to them.617
If Gorbachev’s complaints were meant to impress Honecker, they failed
to achieve their purpose. The East German leader denied the Soviet allega-
tions. He only went as far as to acknowledge, without further comment,
that ‘the question is being posed, for instance, why Comrade Honecker
‘unity of economic and social policy’ refers to the GDR’s concept of the Einheit
von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik adopted at the Eighth SED Congress in June
1971.
615 Ibid. (indirect speech). This was added by hand with a preface that the remark
was made ‘in the car’.
616 Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, ed., DDR Handbuch, 2nd
edition (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979), pp. 175-85.
617 Concerning the persistence of Gorbachev’s erroneous notions about small-scale
private production and trading in the GDR, including the idea that these features
of East German life were ‘more democratic’ than what existed in the Soviet
Union, see infra, p. 291, n353.
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previously said, “To learn from the Soviet Union means to be victorious”
but no longer says this today.’618
The effectiveness of Gorbachev’s criticism was undermined further by
his deference to Honecker and his praise for what he considered to be
achievements of socialism in the GDR and deficiencies in other socialist
countries. He deplored increasing dissension in the socialist community:
Even when jokingly certain remarks are being made as, for instance, who
ought to be considered the doyen among the General Secretaries in the social-
ist community, [I] am thinking about what may lie at the root of this. Are cer-
tain ambitions at issue here or efforts to appear infallible? Certain models [of
socialism] are always being emphasized.
These remarks could have been taken as applying squarely to Honecker’s
pretensions. Yet Gorbachev exempted the East German leader from criti-
cism. He deplored ‘discussions of the Hungarian model’ and ‘discussions
in that direction also in Bulgaria’ but complimented Honecker by saying:
‘In essence, only the Soviet Union and the GDR rest on firm foundations
of socialism – and perhaps also the ČSSR.’619 He further undercut any
case he might have wanted to make against East Germany by repeating
what he told Honecker the previous year: ‘If one wants to talk about any
model of socialism at all, there is only one, and only one: the Marxist-
Leninist model.’620
Honecker’s ‘certain reserve’ and his ‘reservations’ concerning domestic
developments in the Soviet Union, in essence, did not yet play a big role
in the increasing alienation between the two leaders. Quite another matter
is the controversy over East Germany’s increasing indebtedness to West
Germany.
Debts and Dependency. The controversy was carried over from before
Gorbachev’s appointment as party chief. It concerned, as noted, West Ger-
man credits and alleged East German political dependency – an issue that
had sharpened in the spring and summer of 1984. In keeping with his gen-
618 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech). The slogan reads in German: Von der Sowjetunion lernen, heißt siegen
lernen. To add insult to injury, in October 1989, when Gorbachev visited East
Berlin as the personal embodiment of reformism, but Honecker continued to
cling to communist orthodoxy, banners could be seen in the large-scale demon-
strations reminding the SED of its time-honoured slogan.
619 Ibid. (indirect speech).
620 Ibid. (indirect speech).
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eral proclivity not to address contentious issues openly, Gorbachev raised
the problem of debt and dependency but failed to discuss it in detail. He
prefaced the topic by a review of ‘worrying’ developments in Eastern Eu-
rope.621 Poland was ‘lying flat on its back’, Gorbachev thought, and it was
difficult to predict ‘when it would get up again’. Hungary had recently re-
ceived a letter from the International Monetary Fund reminding the coun-
try of its obligations to pay principal and interest coupled with the ‘repres-
sive demand that otherwise no [more] credit would be extended’. As for
East Germany, he had talked with prime minister Ryzhkov who had re-
ported that ‘the FRG is attempting to buy up the GDR’s obligations to-
wards [foreign] countries in order to bind the GDR to the FRG’.622
Honecker, as previously, vehemently objected to the insinuation that the
GDR was financially vulnerable. Indeed, ‘intensive efforts’ had been
made by the West to ‘cause difficulties’ for the GDR but these efforts had
been unsuccessful. This was due to the fact that the GDR had reduced its
imports from hard-currency countries with the result that it now had ‘a
surplus in its balance of trade amounting to between $3 and $6 billion per
annum’. He sought further to undercut Gorbachev’s argument by saying
that only a small portion of the foreign trade credit in the amount of 850
million Deutschmarks available to the GDR had been called up: ‘only 170
million DM [Deutsche Mark] in the first quarter of the year’. Finally, cit-
ing data released by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, he as-
serted that the Soviet Union and East Germany were ‘considered to be
among the financially most stable countries in the world’, the latter’s net
debt amounting to only $3.5 billion.623 The conclusion that Honecker
wanted Gorbachev to draw was simple: the subject of political dependen-
cies created by financial strings, at least in the East German case, was sim-
ply not worth discussing.
Secrecy and Lack of Trust. Another factor contributing to alienation in
the relationship between the Soviet Union and the GDR, as well as Gor-
bachev and Honecker at the personal level, was the fact that Honecker
kept important matters not only from the ‘soviet comrades’ but also from
the SED Politburo. In particular, in order not to weaken his position in the
party leadership, he systematically suppressed information about Soviet-
621 Record (Information) of the meeting between Gorbachev and Honecker on 20
April 1986 in East Berlin, Central Party Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666.
622 Ibid. (indirect speech).
623 Ibid.
4. East Germany: Strategic Ally but Waning Economic Asset
287
East German differences. This was well known in Moscow party circles
long before Gorbachev’s accession to power.624 Kvitsinsky, speaking
about the second half of the 1970s, has described the problem and the in-
ability of the Soviet leaders to solve it:
Since it had been reported to us that Honecker filed away all reservations and
warnings conveyed to him from Moscow in his safe without informing even
the Politburo about them, Gromyko expressed the wish that the other com-
rades also be given notice of the Soviet standpoint. Honecker gave the reply
that this would be the last thing he would do. After all, he did not want to ‘un-
dermine’ the standing of the Soviet comrades in the eyes of the Politburo. The
insinuation could not have been any clearer: ‘Your remarks, esteemed Soviet
comrades, bear witness to such a lack of expertise that it is within your own
interest that no one finds out about them.’625
In the August 1984 Soviet-East German emergency meeting in Moscow,
as noted, Chernenko had voiced his suspicion to Honecker that ‘your com-
rades are not properly informed about our positions’ on matters of foreign
policy.626 In the private talks with Honecker in April 1986, Gorbachev (as
noted) complained about the lack of information exchange between the
Soviet Union and East Germany on scientific-technological matters. How-
ever, on this point at least, he adhered to the line agreed upon in advance
with Chernyaev that it would be better not to give the impression that he
was attempting to ‘straighten’ Honecker out. He refrained from extending
the discussion of secrecy in the scientific-technological sphere to the polit-
ical realm. Yet from Honecker’s perspective, the transcript of the meeting
would apparently contain too much evidence already of the emerging dif-
ferences in the relationship between the two leaders for his colleagues in
the Politburo to know about it. The transcript was, presumably for that
reason, not included in the materials submitted to the SED Politburo for
consideration at its session of 29 April but transferred to his (Honecker’s)
private files.627
624 Interviews with Tsipko and Maksimychev.
625 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 262-63.
626 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the August 17, 1984, meeting, SED, Central
Archives, J IV 2/2.039/280; for the context and the full quotation see above, xxx
p. 216.
627 Büro Honecker, 41666; interview with Krenz; see also Egon Krenz, ‘Honecker
und Gorbatschow‘, Neues Deutschland, 25 January 1993, and Küchenmeister,
Honecker – Gorbatschow: Vieraugengespräche, p. 78.
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The lack of glasnost in the political relationship between the GDR and
the USSR and in the personal exchanges between the two leaders deep-
ened mutual suspicions and undermined trust even further. Gorbachev, in
retrospect, has acknowledged the existence of these interconnections:
Soon after [in 1986], we began to address each other with the familiar form of
‘you’. Yet a really open relationship, one of mutual trust, never did develop
between us. Honecker, it seemed to me, was somehow tense and couldn’t
abandon the official manner. I was taken aback most of all, however, by [the
fact] that he informed his colleagues about our talks only sparingly and selec-
tively, whereas I always saw to it that the transcript of the notes of our meet-
ings was transmitted without cuts to all the members of the Soviet leader-
ship.628
Honecker’s Plans to Visit West Germany. Another serious controversy,
and one directly addressed by the two leaders, concerned yet again Ho-
necker’s persistent desire to visit West Germany. It was Gorbachev who
introduced the issue in the context of a review of Soviet-West German re-
lations. He made it clear that he himself had absolutely no intention to vis-
it West Germany at this stage. This adamant position was, in part, based
on the argument that the ruling coalition of conservatives and liberals
would be rewarded for its policies and the chances of the social democrats
in the upcoming state elections in Lower Saxony at the beginning of July
would be hurt. In what can be considered a telling indication of the influ-
ence of the SPD in Moscow, Gorbachev admitted to Honecker that SPD
presidium member Egon Bahr had ‘called upon [me] to promise not to go
to the FRG this year. [I] thereupon communicated to Willy Brandt that [I]
would not go this year’. He concluded by claiming that both ‘the SPD and
the Greens do not want Gorbachev and Honecker to go to the FRG’.629
Honecker flatly contradicted Gorbachev on that point. Brandt and the
prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia, Johannes Rau, had ‘proposed
to [me] that I go to the FRG in May [1986]’. He conceded that it might
perhaps not be a good idea to visit West Germany before the elections in
628 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, pp. 407-408. It is not entirely clear from the context
whether the use of the second person singular in the conversations between the
two leaders occurred ‘soon after’ Gorbachev had attended the Eleventh SED
Congress in April 1986 or after a visit by Honecker to Moscow in October of that
year.
629 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech, italics mine).
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Lower Saxony (not least, one might add, because this would not have fit
his own schedule, which included his involvement in the East German
parliamentary elections on 8 June, participation in the Warsaw Pact sum-
mit conference in Budapest 10-11 June and a visit to Sweden at the end of
June). But to visit the Federal Republic at some time ‘between the begin-
ning of July and 12 July’, he thought, would ‘be useful for the SPD’.630
The tug of war continued, with mutual irritation and annoyance increasing
in the process. Honecker, at one point in the conversation, snapped that
‘the games that are being played [in Moscow] in connection with [my]
visit to the FRG have finally got to come to an end’. At another point he
insisted that it would be ‘good to accept the invitation now in order to get
the thing off the table’.631 In a huff, he also refused to accept Gorbachev’s
invitation for dinner, only to relent shortly thereafter.632
On the day after the official end of the party congress, Gorbachev told
the SED leadership that he had asked Honecker what would happen if he
were to travel to the FRG but he (Gorbachev) would not: ‘How should
[we] explain this to the Soviet communists and to the Soviet people? This
also would have to be explained to the party and the people of the
GDR.’633
Gorbachev, to sum up, made it quite clear that he thought that the visit
would not serve a useful purpose. Honecker, on the contrary, felt that the
visit should be scheduled as soon as possible but again did not dare over-
ride the Soviet opposition. The plans for the visit were canceled accord-
ingly, but the episode strongly reinforced Honecker’s negative disposition
towards Gorbachev.
630 Ibid. (indirect speech).
631 Ibid. (indirect speech).
632 Interview with Krenz; see also Egon Krenz, ‘Honecker und Gorbatschow’, Neues
Deutschland, 25 January 1993.
633 Transcript of the meeting between Gorbachev and the SED Politburo on 22 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech, italics mine). According to Krenz, on 22 April, at the meeting with the
SED Politburo, Gorbachev adopted a ‘jovial’ tone and, to Honecker’s consterna-
tion, reported ‘full agreement between the two parties’ on the main lines of poli-
cy, including ‘abandonment of comrade Honecker’s plans for visiting the FRG’.
Honecker considered this to have been inexcusable double-dealing and never for-
gave Gorbachev for this (interview with Krenz and id., ‘Honecker und Gor-
batschow’, Neues Deutschland, 25 January 1993). The official transcript of the
22 April meeting, however, does not note the ‘full agreement’.
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One of the reasons why the new Soviet leader, like his predecessor, was
so adamant on the issue of Honecker’s visit had much to do with Gor-
bachev’s negative attitude towards Kohl and the West German govern-
ment.
West Germany: Troublesome Tenant in Gorbachev’s ‘Common House
of Europe’
In his memoirs, Gorbachev glosses over Soviet-West German relations
during the first two years of his tenure in office. This is perhaps because of
some embarrassment. An honest appraisal would have necessitated ac-
knowledging that, in essence, he was continuing the stale approach of ‘in-
sulted giant’ and ‘bear in hibernation’ that Chernenko had adopted vis-à-
vis Bonn. West Germany, he writes, ‘was our number-one trading partner
in the West but in the military-political ranking order it figured as one of
our “potential adversaries”’. Furthermore, contrary to the grand fanfare
about the Common House of Europe, in the period from his accession to
power in March 1985 until October 1988, Gorbachev concentrated on the
reordering of relations with the United States.634 Western Europe played a
subordinate and subsidiary role in Soviet policy towards the West. West
Germany fared even worse: it was given the cold shoulder. The ‘new
page’ in the book of Soviet‑West German relations, a phrase used fre-
quently by both Soviet and West German political leaders and analysts,
failed to be written.635 Moscow, in essence, continued the previous policy
of attempting to isolate and circumvent West Germany or, more specifical-
ly, the ruling center-right coalition in Bonn, and ‘punish’ it for its role in
legitimizing the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Eu-
rope and supporting the idea of strategic defense.
In detail, it was no accident of diplomacy that in Western Europe, Gor-
bachev first visited Paris, not Bonn. Shevardnadze, in 1985 and 1986, held
5.
634 ‘In the conditions of a general increase in tension’, Gorbachev wrote, ‘the course
of the FRG was primarily considered in Moscow in the context of Soviet-Ameri-
can conflict’; ibid. The emphasis on Soviet-American relations will be dealt with
separately in the following section.
635 The metaphor was used for the first time by Gorbachev during West German for-
eign minister Genscher’s visit to Moscow in July 1986; see Genscher, Erinnerun-
gen, p. 501, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 July 1986.
5. West Germany: Troublesome Tenant in Gorbachev’s ‘Common House of Europe’
291
talks in Washington, Tokyo and a number of European capitals but he, too,
studiously avoided the West German capital. It took one visit of the presi-
dent of the Federal Republic (July 1987), three visits by Chancellor Kohl
(July 1983, March 1985, and October 1988), five by Foreign Minister
Genscher and one each by the prime ministers of Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg (December 1987 and February 1988) to Moscow as well as
Honecker’s visit to West Germany against unabated Soviet opposition
(September 1987) for Gorbachev to feel that the time had finally come to
abandon his reservations.636
The lack of congruence between Gorbachev’s rhetoric about the Com-
mon House of Europe and his policies towards West Germany is touched
upon in his memoirs.
My meetings with Reagan in Geneva and Reykjavik were already history, and
we were in an active political dialogue with France, Italy and Great Britain,
but our relations with the FRG essentially remained unchanged. The abnor-
mality of this situation finally became apparent for both sides, and it was be-
coming ever more evident to me that we would not be able, in the long term,
to pursue a serious European policy without Germany. I spoke of this fact on
several occasions during Politburo meetings and in the small circle of like-
minded colleagues.637
Who was to blame for the ‘abnormal’ state of affairs? In Gorbachev’s
view, the fault lay with Bonn. ‘The relaxation of Soviet-West German re-
lations begun by Willy Brandt in the years of Ostpolitik’, he writes in his
memoirs, ‘gave way to stiffening of positions at the beginning of the
1980s.’638 The extent to which this was, indeed, true will be examined lat-
er. At this stage, it may suffice to argue that the lack of progress in Soviet-
West German relations had more to do with Soviet stereotypes and clichés,
inertia and objective difficulties of management of the contradictions in
the Soviet empire than with West German intransigence. The argument
can be supported by what Gorbachev told Honecker in private conversa-
tion on 20 April 1986.
636 For a detailed treatment of the Gorbachev’s failure to respond to West German
overtures, see the series of articles by Hannes Adomeit, ‘Gorbatschows Westpoli-
tik: “Gemeinsames europäisches Haus” oder atlantische Orientierung?’, Osteu-
ropa, Nos. 6, 9, and 12 (1988).
637 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 152 (italics mine). The precise moment as to when
both sides realized the ‘abnormality’ of the situation remains unspecified.
638 Ibid., p. 151.
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In that conversation, the Kremlin leader introduced a discussion of So-
viet-West German relations by saying that the federal government vacillat-
ed between acting insulted and attempting to blackmail the Soviet Union.
Representatives of the ruling coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, with
Helmut Kohl as chancellor and Genscher as vice chancellor and foreign
minister, had repeatedly argued that the government was going to be in of-
fice for a long time and that the Soviet Union would be making a mistake
if it ignored that fact of life and continued to cultivate its relationship with
the social democrats.639 But Gorbachev showed himself unimpressed by
these pleas. He clarified that the social democratic channels would be
maintained. Furthermore, he contended, it would be pointless to take any
initiatives and useless to pay a visit to West Germany because one would
only be hearing in Bonn what one was told in Washington. The German
chancellor was so wedded to American policies, Gorbachev claimed, that
‘he [Kohl] has already overtaken [British prime minister Margaret]
Thatcher. He not only moves in the wake of the USA but behaves like a
lackey of the USA and completely associates himself with Reagan and the
SDI plans’. In the final analysis, the question arose: ‘Are we not facing
here a cross breed of FRG revanchism with the course of social revenge
pursued by the USA?’640
One could argue that Gorbachev’s hard line vis-à-vis Bonn was moti-
vated by his determination to dissuade Honecker from visiting West Ger-
many. The argument may be valid but only up to a point. The fact is that
the Soviet leader did not deviate much from the tough line, neither at the
Warsaw Pact summit conference in Budapest in June 1986 nor in his talks
with Genscher in July of the same year. At the summit conference, Gor-
bachev adopted the traditional two-pronged approach in Soviet relations
with West Germany. On the one hand, he acknowledged the ‘importance
the role the FRG plays in Europe and in the world. Our relations with the
FRG are based on the positive experiences which significantly contributed
639 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666. Gorbachev’s
point of departure was a visit by Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl’s foreign poli-
cy advisor, to the Soviet embassy in Bonn. In interviews with the author,
Teltschik has confirmed that this is an argument he had made in talks with
Kvitsinsky.
640 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech).
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to détente in the 1970s’. He also saw ‘great opportunities which could
open for the development of a political dialogue on broad problems as
well as for the development of stable economic, scientific-technological
and other relations’. On the other hand, however, he regretted that in the
last few years the FRG government had made the realization of these pos-
sibilities difficult to achieve.
You know Kohl’s policy. If it had not been for the support extended by the
FRG, US missiles would not have been stationed in Europe. As regards SDI,
the West German government not only associates itself with the American
position but supplements it by a European variant of the militarization of
space. Not to speak of the continued fanning of revanchism.641
After having taken note of the fact that parliamentary elections were soon
(January 1987) to be held in West Germany and that the outcome of the
elections was uncertain, he furnished one major rationale for his policy of
watchful waiting on the German problem: ‘Our approach is the following:
In our contacts with the Kohl government for the time being [we will] not
undertake anything beyond the necessary.’ As if in justification of his op-
position to the Honecker visit, he applied this policy of deliberate distance
to the question of a personal visit to West Germany:
It is obvious what purpose the West Germans have in mind when they rather
steadfastly are striving for a summit conference with us. They need it in order
to improve their electoral chances. We [therefore] have arrived at the conclu-
sion that it is better not to proceed with such a meeting this year. We do not
want to support Kohl; on the contrary, it is necessary to let him and the West
German public feel our [negative]attitude to his policy.642
In continuation of the traditional policy of differentiation among the socio-
economic and political forces in West Germany, he concluded that it was
‘useful to continue our active work with the Social Democrats, the Greens,
and other circles of the opposition – perhaps also with Genscher’.643
In the more restricted session of first party secretaries only, Gorbachev
was even more blunt. He said that he was of the opinion that ‘the socialist
countries have a proven policy of pressure on the Kohl government’. The
Soviet Union, in essence, had communicated to Kohl the following mes-
641 Text of Gorbachev’s speech at the Budapest PCC meeting, attachment for 18
June 1986 Politburo session, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2A/2897.
642 Ibid.
643 Ibid.
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sage: If Bonn had anything new to say, then and only ‘then should one be
thinking about inviting [sic] Kohl and talking with him about current
problems’. Kohl had reacted by ‘cursing a lot’ and complained that Gor-
bachev was ‘meeting with [French president François] Mitterrand, the
demagogue, and with [Italian prime minister Bettino] Craxi’. But he (Gor-
bachev) refused to meet with him despite the fact that Kohl was advocat-
ing the continuation of German Ostpolitik and dynamic relations with the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev also reported that he had answered Kohl that we
‘would talk with him if he, as chancellor, were to show his own political
profile’. Gorbachev concluded his account by telling his East European
colleagues that he thought that ‘the FRG government had been given a les-
son’ and that this would be useful ‘with regard to the upcoming elections
and public opinion’.644
Gorbachev’s outline of the approach to be taken by Warsaw Pact coun-
tries towards Bonn did not remain unchallenged in the closed room. Ho-
necker confirmed that he had talked about the German problem with Gor-
bachev. But he gave a different spin to the content of his meeting, evident-
ly one that suited his unabated desire to visit West Germany. He had al-
legedly told Gorbachev that when one attempted to ‘create the Common
House of Europe, one had to be careful not to shunt the FRG to a siding. It
is playing an important role in the EC [European Community] and NA-
TO’. Attempts at isolating West Germany policy ‘could create an unwel-
come effect of solidarity’ in the West.645
Hungarian party leader János Kádár supported the Honecker line. He
(like Honecker) thought that ‘the explanations on the FRG provided by
Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev [should be put] into an all-European con-
text’. He elaborated that it was appropriate that Gorbachev had made his
first international appearance in Paris. The fact that he had given hope to
the Italian government for a visit and his contacts with Britain and the
FRG also had to be seen in a positive light. He asked the Soviet Union not
to rupture the relations with West Germany because experience showed
that it was difficult to restore them later. Gorbachev, obviously taken
644 Gorbachev’s remarks to the restricted meeting at the Budapest summit confer-
ence; see protocol on the restricted meeting of the party chiefs of the Warsaw
Pact member countries, attachment to 18 June 1986 Politburo meeting, SED
Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2896 (italics
mine).
645 Ibid.
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aback, remarked that the Soviet Union ‘did not have such an intention and,
of course, one could not approach the FRG like that’. Kádár, undeterred,
continued that ‘if a summit meeting with Kohl were not to take place it
would be important to clarify that this was not the Soviet Union’s fault’.
Gorbachev (contrary to facts) countered that on the issue of visits, ‘the
FRG was playing games. Erich Honecker was being invited to the FRG
but others [among Warsaw Pact countries] were not’. But he did agree yet
again that one had to ‘take into consideration the weight of the FRG in in-
ternational politics’.646
It was in the circumstances of a clearly defined Soviet policy towards
Bonn that Genscher paid his first visit to Moscow after his attendance of
the funeral celebrations for Chernenko. In comparison with visits by other
foreign ministers, the date of the visit (21 July 1986) in itself was a telling
indication of the abnormal state of Soviet-West German relations. Gor-
bachev, with Shevardnadze, Kvitsinsky and Chernyaev present, told his
visitor that the Soviet leaders did not always find West Germany’s policy
comprehensible.647 A discrepancy existed in their view between Bonn’s
peaceful declarations and its actions. The federal government had been the
most active advocate of the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles. More importantly, it had tried to dictate terms to the Soviet Union
and issue ultimatums. Efforts were now being made to search for solu-
tions. He (Gorbachev) was able to understand why the United States had
an interest in the stationing of missiles in Europe but the strong German
pressure for the deployment was difficult to comprehend.648 The German
foreign minister’s explanations of the rationale of the coalition govern-
ment’s policies fell on deaf ears. Genscher even formed the impression
that Gorbachev had wanted to end the talks after he had rehashed the Sovi-
et argument on INF and had been told that his ideas about West Germany
rested on misperceptions.649
The discussion revived when it turned to Europe and the German prob-
lem. Gorbachev provided the West German foreign minister with an open-
646 Ibid.
647 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 495-496. German participants included the ambas-
sador to Moscow, Jörg Kastl, and the Political Director in the German Foreign
Office, Gerold von Braunmühl, who was assassinated by the Rote Armee Frak-
tion (RAF) only three months later.
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid., p. 498.
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ing when he asked what one should think of a recent statement by Reagan
to the effect that the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam had occurred a long
time ago and that it was now time for Europe to be unified. Genscher
replied that the federal government had adopted a clear position on the in-
violability of borders. But he could hardly imagine that the General Secre-
tary, when he was speaking of the Common European House, wanted to
preserve a divided house. President Reagan had wanted to clarify this. The
Germans, because of the division of their country into two states, thought
exactly the same way.650
Genscher had brought into the open a central contradiction in Gor-
bachev’s conceptual approach. The continued existence of two separate
German states, was part of the Soviet leader’s design for Europe. Only the
forms of the division could be altered. East Germany, according to Gor-
bachev’s thinking, should introduce reform socialism, West Germany
would return to social democracy, and both states would establish a modus
vivendi in their relations with each other in some mkixture of reform so-
cialism and social democracy. Although the Federal Republic, in a sepa-
rate Letter on German Unity to the 1970 Soviet-West German agreement,
had declared for the record that its objective was still for ‘the German peo-
ple to regain its unity, based on the principle of free self-determination’, in
Moscow’s interpretation, the treaty was not designed to overcome the div-
ision of Germany but to make it more acceptable.651 For that reason, Gen-
scher was misreading Gorbachev’s intentions when he, in his memoirs,
quoted the Soviet leader as having stated: ‘Let us open a new page in our
relations’ and when he considered this to be a ‘decisive sentence’ in the
conversation, the implication being that his interlocuteur had in mind a
comprehensive reassessment of the German problem.652 In the Soviet per-
spective of the mid- and late 1980s, one has to conclude, there could be
650 Ibid., p. 499.
651 In more detail, the letter was handed by the German Foreign Office to, and was
accepted by, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the signing of the 1970
Moscow treaty. It stated that ‘in connection with today’s signing of the treaty’ be-
tween the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, the West German government
declared that it interpreted the treaty ‘as not being in contradiction to the political
goal of the Federal Republic of Germany to strive for a state of peace in Europe,
in which the German people, in free self-determination, [can] regain its unity’.
Dokumentation zur Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung: Verträge und Vereinbarun-
gen, 11th edition. (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Office, 1986), p. 15.
652 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 501.
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new pages in Soviet-West German relations but the book of divided Ger-
many had to remain closed.
The Soviet book on censorship rules also was not touched. The central
newspapers expunged practically all the paragraphs and sentences from
Genscher’s dinner speech that described the German vision of the Com-
mon House of Europe. They deleted his assurance that, ‘through regular
contacts with its eastern neighbors, including in the current year, the fed-
eral government has demonstrated its interest in a positive development
between East and West’. They omitted his statement that Bonn advocated
an end to the division of Europe and was, therefore, aiming at a state of
affairs that ‘would make it possible for all the European peoples to shape
their destiny autonomously without fear of threat and the use of force, that
is, a Europe in which the right of self-determination will be safeguard-
ed’.653 Typically, as indicated by the controversy over the deletions of text
from the speech of visiting West German president von Weizsäcker almost
exactly one year later (see below), in such cases of censorship, high-level
political approval was required. If so, a closer look at Gorbachev’s concept
of the Common House of Europe is warranted.
Before doing so, it is appropriate briefly to point to the reverberations
of Genscher’s visit in Soviet-East German relations. On 3 October 1986,
in the round of talks between Gorbachev and Honecker in Moscow, with
West Berlin communist party leaders Herbert Mies and Horst Schmitt
present, the East German leader reported that, in talks with Otto Reinhold,
the Dean of the SED Central Committee’s Academy of Social Sciences,
Genscher had ‘talked very respectfully about the meeting that he had had
here in Moscow’. The West German foreign minister had emphasized that
a new page had been opened in the relations between Bonn and Moscow.
And he had stated that he would do everything possible in order to exert
influence in Washington to improve the chances for successful Soviet-
American negotiations.654 In a reply reflecting superpower arrogance Gor-
bachev said that when Genscher was in Moscow ‘[w]e made him sweat a
lot’. He had brushed aside Genscher’s declared preparedness to use his
653 For the full text of Genscher’s speech, see Bulletin des Presse‑ und Information-
samts der Bundesregierung, No. 89, 24 July 1986; for the Soviet version, see
Pravda, 23 July 1986.
654 Verbatim record of the meeting between Gorbachev and Honecker (as well as
Mies and Schmitt) on 3 October 1986 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitspro-
tokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2937.
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good offices in Washington with the remark that ‘in our relations with the
FRG, we don’t want any translation of the policy of the USA into German.
What we have to say we will say directly, in Russian, to be translated into
English’.655
The Common House of Europe
On his visit to London in December 1984, in a speech before the House of
Commons, Gorbachev, for the first time in his tenure in office, referred to
Europe as ‘our common house’ (nash obshchii dom).656 Soviet leaders had
done so before. Brezhnev had used the term in November 1981 in a dinner
speech during his visit to Bonn.657 Gromyko, the Politburo member and
foreign minister, had taken it up in January 1983 at a press conference in
Bonn. ‘The Federal Republic of Germany as well as the Soviet Union’, he
said, ‘live in one common house, under one roof.’658 Traditionally, the
term was reserved almost exclusively for Western European audiences.659
It also had a decidedly anti-American connotation, its implication being
that the United States, as a trans-Atlantic power, really had no business in
that house. ‘Washington’, as a Pravda editorial accordingly put it, ‘is a
stranger in that house.’660
Gorbachev initially subscribed to such notions. In his speech to the
House of Commons, he evidently had in mind the controversy about the
stationing of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe when he
said that the continent should not be regarded simply as ‘a theater of mili-
tary operations’.661 In the same vein, in a speech before the elections to the
655 Ibid.
656 Pravda, 19 December 1984.
657 Ibid., 24 November 1981.
658 Sowjetunion heute, No. 2 (February 1983), Supplement, p. xiii.
659 To the author’s knowledge, it was never used in any of the private conversations
between Honecker and Gorbachev. It was Krenz who finally, on 1 November
1989, asked Gorbachev how he saw the role of the GDR in his Common House
construct. The details will be discussed in the next chapter.
660 Literally, for Washington it is a ‘khuzhoi dom’, that is, a house that belongs to
others; ‘Evropa – nash obshchii dom’, Pravda, 13 November 1985.
661 Ibid., 19 December 1984; similarly, the above-mentioned Pravda editorial claims
that, for Washington, Europe is ‘a battlefield on the maps of [its] strategists’;
ibid., 13 November 1985.
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Supreme Soviet in February 1985, he said the Soviet Union considered a
normalization of relations with the United States to be important. How-
ever, he continued, ‘we are not forgetting for a single moment that the
world is not limited to that country alone’.662 A few weeks later, in an in-
terview with Pravda, he asserted: ‘The relations between the USSR and
the USA are an extremely important part of international politics. But we
are far from seeing the world through the prism of these relations.’663
What was the framework of reference Gorbachev used in his overtures
to Europe? One set of ideas was historical and cultural, the other political
and ideological. Concerning the former, Alexander Bovin, one of Gor-
bachev’s foreign policy advisers and a frequent member of the party lead-
er’s entourage abroad, raised the theme of Europe linked by ‘historical
ties’ and a ‘common foundation of European culture’.664 Such an interpre-
tation could have and, as it turned out, did have disastrous consequences
for the ideological foundation of the bloc and Soviet imperial control. The
ideas of a Common European Home and common European cultural tradi-
tions were quite compatible with the Westernizing tradition in Russian his-
torical development but incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist notions of
antagonism and their manifestation in the division of Europe along ideo-
logical, socio-economic, and military-political lines.
The problem was made more acute by the fact that European political
theorists objected to the notion that Russia, and hence the Soviet Union,
belonged to a common European tradition. In their view, there had been
three major European currents of thought: the Renaissance, the Reforma-
tion, and the Enlightenment. These had led to the emergence of a civil so-
ciety and the codification of human and citizenship rights in the western
and central parts of the continent. Russia and, mutatis mutandis, the Soviet
Union, according to this argument, did not form part of this tradition.
Moscow had rejected the three major Western currents and embraced the
Byzantine tradition: religious orthodoxy, absolutism, and despotism. Euro-
pe, as an idea, therefore, did not stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific
662 Ibid., 20 February 1985.
663 Ibid., 8 April 1985. Similar formulations were used by Gorbachev in his speech
to the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in February 1986.
664 Izvestiia, 25 September 1985. The term ‘political culture’ is used in his
‘Evropeiskoe napravlenie’, ibid., 20 July 1986.
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and not even to the Urals but extended only from Brest (in Brittany) to
Brest (at the border of Belorussia/Belarus with Poland).665
In a speech in Prague in April 1987, Gorbachev attempted to reconcile
the irreconcilable and align the Soviet Union with European culture. ‘In
the Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals”’, he said, ‘world civilization
was enriched by the ideas of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and
the humanist tradition and the teachings of socialism experienced a power-
ful development.’666 The replacement of the Reformation by ‘socialism’
was apparently meant to put Russia and, by extension, the Soviet Union,
firmly back into the camp of European culture and civilization.
Perhaps even more harmful to Soviet ideology and imperial control in
‘Eastern Europe’ was the resurrection the idea of a special common Cen-
tral European culture and tradition – the Mitteleuropagedanke. The con-
cept geographically included Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, the Baltic States, and the ‘Hapsburg’, that is, the west-
ern part of Ukraine and, thus, cut across the post-war boundaries in central
and eastern Europe and its organizational manifestations such as the War-
saw Pact and Comecon. It excluded Russia and, by extension, the Soviet
Union, as well as Bulgaria.
‘What do the borders that were drawn in Europe after the Second World
War have to do with the historic areas and the [borders] that arbitrarily tear
them apart or no less arbitrarily put them together?’, an eminent German
historian asked in 1986. But what did the historical Mitteleuropagedanke
have to do with current politics and policies? It should, in his perspective,
‘constitute the Archimedean point and act as a lever with which something
can be achieved against the preponderance of the superpowers’.667
665 The fundamental differences of political culture were to be explored and elevated
to a general theory in a global context by Samuel P. Huntington in his The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996).
666 Pravda, 11 April 1987 (italics mine).
667 Karl Schlögel, Die Mitte liegt ostwärts: Die Deutschen, der verlorene Osten und
Mitteleuropa (Berlin: Siedler, 1986), as quoted by Klaus Bednardz, ‘Die
Wiedergeburt Mitteleuropas’, Die Zeit, Online-Archiv, http://www.zeit.de/2002/3
2/Die_Wiedergeburt_Mitteleuropas. − Other influential advocates of resurrecting
the historical and cultural interconnections and current political importance of the
Mitteleuropagedanke were Austrian Erhard Busek, Czech Václav Havel and Mi-
lan Kundera , Polish Czesław Miłosz, and Hungarians György Konrád and
György Dalos. − The Mitteleuropa discussion that was taking shape beginning in
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Washington was keen to apply that lever – although, of course, not to
itself but to the adversary superpower. In a speech to the Austrian Associa-
tion for Foreign Policy and International Relations in Vienna on 21
September 1983, Vice President George H.W. Bush expressly used the
term Mitteleuropa and sharply turned it against Moscow. ‘It has often been
remarked’, he said, ‘that of the three great evens in European history – the
Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment – Russia took part
in none.’ He then goes on to quote from Czesław Miłosz’s book, The Cap-
tive Mind, in which he emphasizes the differences between the European
countries that developed under the influence of Rome and those, like Rus-
sia, that followed the tradition of Byzantium and decries the current state
of affairs that requires ‘surrendering to the hegemony of a nation which is
still wild and primitive [Miłosz means the Soviet Union, obviously], and
to concede the absolute superiority of its customs and institutions, science
and technology, literature and art’. Bush then goes on the propagandistic
offensive and charges that
Over a hundred years ago, some Tsarist historians spoke with contempt of the
‘decadent West.’ One example of such decadence was, no doubt, the music of
Frederic Chopin. In a recent essay, the Czechoslovak author, Milan Kundera,
tells of how, fourteen years after Chopin’s death, Russian [sic] soldiers on the
loose in Warsaw, hurled the composer’s piano from a fourth-floor window.
‘Today,’ writes Kundera, ‘the entire culture of Central Europe shares the fate
of Chopin’s piano’.668
The renaissance of the Mitteleuropagedanke was bound to be regarded
with suspicion if not alarm by Soviet thinkers still stuck in the orthodox
ideological framework of the ‘irreconcilable contradictions’ among the
‘imperialist power centres’. Europe was conceived of in terms of one of
these power centres. Ideology took precedence over political culture. In
accordance with the former’s precepts, even Gorbachev’s main theoreti-
cian of the New Political Thinking, writing in Pravda in March 1984,
claimed that the current economic and political condition of the capitalist
world system was characterized by a ‘sharpening of the imperialist contra-
dictions between the USA, the Western European countries and Japan, un-
the early 1980s and continued unabated until the fall of the Berlin wall can best
be retraced in a special issue of Daedalus (Winter 1989); see esp. Timothy Gar-
ton Ash, ‘Mitteleuropa?’, ibid., pp. 1-21.
668 Text in U.S. Wireless Bulletin, No. 175, 22 September 1983. In his speech, Bush
expressly used the German term Mitteleuropa.
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precedented in the post-war period’. The dynamics underlying this sharp-
ening, in his opinion, resulted from a ‘counteroffensive’ conducted by the
United States to regain the positions lost in the past decades. The means
utilized by that ‘power centre’ to achieve this purpose was, above all, its
predominant role in the military affairs of the Western alliance.669
Gorbachev, too, propagated such views. In December 1984, in an im-
portant speech on ideological matters, he noted ‘a general but increasingly
pronounced loss of the previous economic and political preponderance of
the United States and an erosion of its positions in comparison with the
new power centres, above all the Western European region and Japan’.670
When Gorbachev made that speech, and for the first few months after
having assumed office as General Secretary, he may still have been con-
scious of the intense controversies that had raged between the United
States and Western Europe. These had concerned the ‘neutron bomb’; the
stationing of INF; the scope of modernisation of NATO’s theatre nuclear
forces; the utility of arms control; burden sharing; East-West trade; the di-
visibility or indivisibility of détente; and the utility of sanctions in re-
sponse to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the imposition of
martial law in Poland.
What were the policy implications of the view that the conflicts be-
tween the United States and Western Europe were more pronounced than
the interests that bound them together? One was sounded by Gorbachev in
May 1985. In talks with Bettino Craxi, the Italian prime minister, and Gi-
anni Cervetti, the chairman of the communist section of the European par-
liament and member of the presidium of the Italian communist party, Gor-
bachev advocated the expansion of economic contacts between Comecon
and the European Economic Community as well as the establishment of
official relations between these two organizations. While this approach
was not new, he extended it by saying that ‘to the extent to which the
states of the EEC were to act as one single unit’, he would be ready ‘to
search for a common language with them on specific international prob-
669 Alexander Yakovlev, ‘Imperializm – sopernichestvo i protivorechiia’, Pravda, 23
March 1985. At the time of his writing, Yakovlev was head of the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Similarly at that time
also the Soviet ambassador to Washington under Yeltsin and human rights com-
missioner under Putin, Vladimir Lukin, ‘Tsentry sily': Kontseptsii i real’nost’
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1983).
670 Pravda, 12 December 1984 (italics mine).
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lems’.671 Gorbachev, for the first time in Soviet attitudes and policies to-
wards the European Community, therefore, was signalling a Soviet interest
in some arrangement with that organization at the political level.
For the most part, however, Gorbachev’s theme of the Common Euro-
pean Home found very little practical political application. In 1985-86, it
had decidedly instrumental purposes. This was clearly stated by Bovin. He
was ‘not revealing any secrets by saying’, he wrote in September 1985,
‘that Soviet policy takes into account the differences of view between
Western Europe and the United States. But it does so by no means in order
to squeeze the United States out of Europe and gain political control of the
continent. ... Our objective is much more modest. We would like to utilize
Western Europe’s [intellectual and political] resources to make good, via
the trans-Atlantic channel, the obvious shortage of common sense in the
incumbent US administration’.672 In other words, the preferential treat-
ment of selected European countries, political parties and movements was
to serve the purpose of changing the direction of American foreign policy.
Similarly, in his speech to the French National Assembly in October 1985,
Gorbachev declared as ‘absurd’ the allegation that the Soviet Union want-
ed to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the USA. He strictly de-
nied any ‘anti-American’ direction of Soviet policy toward the West and
any Metternich-style ‘balance of power’ tactics aimed at ‘inciting one
state against the other’.673 ‘We are realists’, he avowed, ‘and know how
stable are the historical, political, and economic relations between Western
Europe and the USA.’674
Indeed, at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in February-March 1986
and the Tenth Congress of the Polish communist party in June 1986, Gor-
bachev continued the line of inducements and persuasion vis-à-vis Europe.
At the latter occasion, Gorbachev said:
The ancient Greeks have a myth concerning the rape of Europe. This fairy
tale subject unexpectedly has received new significance in the modern age. Of
course, Europe remains untouched in the geographical sense. But the impres-
sion arises that the independent policy of certain Western European states has
been abducted and deported across the ocean and that the national interests of
671 In his talks with Craxi, Pravda, 30 May 1985; see also the report on his discus-
sions with Cervetti, l'Unità, 22 May 1985.
672 Izvestiia, 25 September 1985.
673 Pravda, 4 October 1985.
674 Ibid.
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the peoples as well as the destinies of the 700 million inhabitants of our conti-
nent and the civilization which originated here a long time ago are being
mortgaged under the pretext of safeguarding security.
No one should misinterpret us: We do not intend to drive a wedge between
the USA and its NATO allies. ... At the time [in the 1970s], the socialist coun-
tries welcomed the participation of the USA in the all‑European process. ...
But now it looks as if the American administration wants to pursue goals dia-
metrically opposed to it [the CSCE process]: acceleration of the arms race and
confrontation. Who can profit from this? Are the European peoples really in-
terested in such a development of events?675
In 1985-86, to sum up, Gorbachev’s slogan of Common House of Europe
had nothing to do with an attempt at resurrecting a common European cul-
ture and civilization. The Mitteleuropagedanke, a concept cutting across
the ideological and military-political borderlines in Europe, was anathema
and so explosive that it failed to be mentioned. The purposes to be
achieved by the Common House of Europe campaign were quite limited.
The appeals were directed to Western Europe with the idea in mind that
improved relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe would
induce the latter to exert influence on US policies and, in turn, make the
United States more amenable to compromise with the Soviet Union. ‘For
us’, as he put it in retrospect, ‘the European direction was not only an in-
dependent good; it was also an important factor in the dialogue with the
Americans.’676 It is for that reason and also because he regarded Kohl as
Reagan’s European bailiff that a closer look at the American dimension of
Gorbachev’s policies is warranted.
Priority for the Relations with the United States
Attempts to change American foreign policy were to assume top priority
in Gorbachev’s international designs. This endeavour was evident at and
after the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986 and
characterized by astounding persistence. It was reflected in concessions to
Washington and several reversals of positions to which Brezhnev, An-
dropov and Chernenko had tenaciously clung. It was demonstrated by the
unprecedentedly high number of Soviet-American summit conferences, a
total of seven in five years, and even more frequent meetings at the minis-
6.
675 Ibid., 1 July 1986.
676 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 152.
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terial level between Shevardnadze, on the one hand, and George Shultz
and James Baker, on the other. And it manifested itself in the rise of the
amerikanisty, Soviet experts on American affairs, to influential posts in
the central decision-making apparatus.
Foremost among them were Anatoly Dobrynin, former ambassador to
the United States, who became secretary of the Central Committee, re-
sponsible for relations with non-communist parties and states;677 Georgi
Kornienko, a former first deputy foreign minister and formerly Dobrynin’s
right hand in Washington, who was appointed Dobrynin’s new deputy in
the Central Committee; Yuli Vorontsov, former deputy ambassador in
Washington, who succeeded Kornienko in the foreign ministry and Viktor
Karpov in his post as chief negotiator at the arms talks in Geneva; Alexan-
der Bessmertnykh, also a former deputy ambassador to Washington, who
was named deputy foreign minister; Alexander Yakovlev, a former student
at Columbia University, ambassador to Canada, and director of the Insti-
tute of World Economy and International Relations, who was elevated to
the post of secretary of the Central Committee responsible for propaganda;
and Georgi Arbatov, who remained director of the Institute for the United
States and Canada. As is particularly apparent in the case of Yakovlev and
Arbatov, the impressive array of amerikanisty in influential positions did
not at all mean that Soviet policies were bound to move in a pro-American
direction. What it did mean, however, was that the relationship with the
United States was considered the main issue in Soviet foreign relations.
In his memoirs, Gorbachev is quite specific on this point.
My supporters [favoured] a forward movement in international affairs but I
thought that we had to begin with the United States. It was, after all, not only
a superpower but also the recognized leader of the Western world. Without its
consent any effort to achieve a turn in East-West relations was impossible; [if
we had acted otherwise] we would have been accused of attempting to ‘drive
wedges’ [between the United States and its allies] or of engaging in ‘in-
trigues’.678
Shevardnadze agreed. He has acknowledged in retrospect that, ‘by 1985,
the situation was extremely gloomy’ and ‘we in the Soviet leadership were
acutely aware of the need for fundamental changes in policy and a quest
677 As his visit to Kabul with foreign minister Shevardnadze in January 1987
showed, he also actively involved himself in policy towards communist states as
long as the matter at hand was considered to be of vital interest.
678 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 11 (italics mine).
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for alternatives. Naturally, Soviet-American affairs were our central con-
cern.’679 He also provided the reasons why this was the case: (1) ‘Ameri-
can sanctions, which had been imposed because of our involvement in
Afghanistan, were having their effect.’ (2) ‘The question of political dissi-
dents in the Soviet Union and human rights practices in general was a sore
point.’ (3) ‘Negotiations on nuclear weapons in space were stalled’. (4) ‘A
major controversy over the fate of the ABM Treaty’ had flared up, with
accusations flying that the Soviet Union had violated the agreement on
strategic arms limitation. (5) ‘No solution was in sight concerning the de-
ployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.’680 Shevardnadze
then aptly summarized: ‘No matter where we turned, we came up against
the fact that we would achieve nothing without a normalization of Soviet-
American relations.’681
At the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Sofia in October 1985, Gor-
bachev painted the same gloomy picture as Shevardnadze. In open ses-
sion, he said there was a fairly widespread opinion that the situation in the
world was changing for the better and that everything was all right. One
talked about a remarkable invigoration of the political dialogue between
East and West. This was correct up to a point. Changes were obvious, and
these had been achieved by the efforts of the socialist community for the
support of forces and countries opposed to the aggressive course of the
imperialist powers. However, one had to admit that, ‘without wanting to
dramatize the situation, the state of affairs in the world continues to re-
main tense and in some aspects even explosive’.682
In the closed session of the first party secretaries, he was even more
blunt and gloomy. He discerned ‘massive pressure by imperialism, con-
nected with its attempts at blackmailing us politically and economically
and taking social revenge’. The Soviet leadership had information to the
effect that ‘everything in the current USA policy was aimed at achieving
in one or another socialist country of Europe, or if possible in several of
them, a political destabilization’. The United States was endeavoring to
‘create constant sources of unrest in the Soviet Union and other socialist
679 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 146.
680 Ibid., p. 147.
681 Ibid.
682 Gorbachev’s speech at the PCC meeting in Sofia, on 23 October 1985, SED
Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2811.
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countries’.683 The remedies suggested to counter this threat, however,
were not of the traditional Soviet variety. The struggle against imperial-
ism, in Gorbachev’s opinion, rather than calling for a redoubling of efforts
in the military sphere, posed the ‘necessity of an acceleration of our devel-
opment’. It required ‘the growth of [our] economic potential, the improve-
ment of the life of the people and the maintenance of the military balance’.
The main and general line of the CPSU to meet these challenges was the
‘economic strategy of the CPSU’ and the ‘comprehensive intensification
of the national economy on the basis of scientific-technological progress
and its acceleration’. For these purposes to be achieved, implementation of
the five-year plan for 1985-1990 would be decisive.684
In his private talks with Honecker half a year later Gorbachev was still
mesmerized by the ‘question as to what one could expect from the main
adversary. Will it be possible to drive him into a process of disarma-
ment?’685 He thought that the CPSU and the SED were in ‘complete
agreement’ on how to assess the nature of American foreign policy. In
vivid testimony to the persistence of outdated Leninist concepts on the na-
ture of the opposed socio-economic system, he stated:
Analysis in the Soviet Union proceeds from the principle that US imperialism
cannot exist without the military machine. One-third of the national product
of the USA derives from the exploitation of the Third World. In order to
maintain this level, American imperialism cannot dispense with its military
machine.686
Political logic would have it that if systemic imperatives really drove
American arms production and foreign policy, the chances for the United
States to change course without a systemic transformation would be non-
existent. Logic would also have it that if it were true, as he asserted, that
the ‘economic state of affairs in the United States is becoming ever more
tense’, tendencies for American expansion in the Third World would, for
683 Statement by Gorbachev at the closed session of first party secretaries at the PCC
meeting in Sofia on 23 October 1985, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV
2/2A/2811.
684 Protocol on the closed session of first party secretaries at the PCC meeting in
Sofia on 23 October 1985, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/2811
(italics mine).
685 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech).
686 Ibid. (indirect speech).
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systemic reasons, be strengthened rather than weakened. Whatever the
logic, Gorbachev advocated adopting a dual approach – to combine a con-
ciliatory and accommodating stance vis-à-vis the United States with de-
fense efforts, while at the same time maintaining the course on domestic
economic development. He felt that it was necessary
to conduct a realistic policy. Voices are being heard, especially in the USA,
which demonstrate that Reagan will not last forever and that other forces will
be at the helm. It is [therefore] definitely important to act serenely and sensi-
bly, to keep a cool head, to develop initiative, if necessary, to give a rebuff to
certain forces and, naturally, constantly to strengthen our defensive might.687
He also thought: ‘One cannot leave the fate of the world to Reagan and at
the same time one should not yield to provocation.’688
Gorbachev had consented to the summit meeting in Geneva in Novem-
ber 1985 despite his previous insistence that he would attend such a con-
ference only if it were a serious and well prepared matter and clear before-
hand that agreements in one or two important areas of arms control would
be signed. In reality, the summit was held according to an American agen-
da, no arms control agreements were concluded and the United States sub-
sequently adopted uncompromising and unyielding policies that could eas-
ily be characterized as provocative by critics in the Soviet Union. Such
policies included the continuation of strategic modernisation programs;
the announcement by the Reagan administration in May 1986 that it no
longer felt bound by the SALT II treaty; the apparently unshakable support
by Reagan and other leading administration officials not only for conduct-
ing research, development and testing of space-based defensive weapons
but also for their deployment; the refusal to consent to a comprehensive
nuclear weapons test ban and limitation of anti-satellite systems; the adop-
tion of a more assertive, militarily oriented policy of countering Soviet ad-
vances in the Third World, with money and weapons provided to the Con-
tras in Nicaragua, the National Union for the Total Independence in Ango-
la and the mujaheddin in Afghanistan; the dispatch of US naval vessels in-
to the 12-mile zone off the Soviet Black Sea coast in March 1986; air at-
tacks against Libya in April 1986; persistent demands for the curtailment
of Soviet embassy, consular and United Nations personnel; continued re-
striction of East-West technology transfer; pressure on the Western allies
687 Ibid. (indirect speech).
688 Ibid. (indirect speech, italics mine).
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to curtail their credit relations with Eastern Europe; opposition to
most‑favoured nation status for the USSR and to Soviet membership in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Some of Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisors and propagandists did
claim that they considered such policies ‘provocative’. However, such
challenges were portrayed by them and by Gorbachev at the Twenty-sev-
enth Party Congress in February-March 1986 as a trap laid by the imperi-
alists to induce the Soviet leadership to break off the dialogue with the
United States rather than as a valid reason to do so.689 As if in preparation
and justification for the next Soviet-American summit meeting, Gor-
bachev reminded Honecker that, in May 1972, even as the United States
had imposed a blockade on North Vietnamese harbors and ‘were dropping
bombs on Haiphong, Nixon was in Moscow’.690 Conciliatory responses
were still the order of the day in June 1986. Talking about Soviet-Ameri-
can relations in a session restricted to the first party secretaries at the War-
saw Pact summit conference in Budapest, he reiterated that the fraternal
countries were ‘not to be nudged from political dialogue, irrespective of
what the other side does’. He also reasserted: ‘Our constructive course
will be continued.’ In sharp contrast to the negative and condescending at-
titude adopted vis-à-vis Kohl, he spoke almost warmly of Reagan and
even showed himself well informed about the latter’s health. He continued
by saying that he had recently received another personal message from the
American president and, although it had contained nothing new, it had
struck ‘a calm and casual tone’. He had again been invited by Reagan to a
summit meeting. This, too, was ‘characteristic’ for Reagan’s conciliatory
approach. The Soviet Union was ‘still considering’ accepting the invita-
tion but the main line was clear. He would accept the invitation if it were
possible ‘to consult about matters of substance’.691
689 In his closing remarks to the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, Gorbachev briefly
mentioned the lack of progress on arms control and other aspects of Moscow’s
relations with Washington. He spoke of the alleged fear by ‘someone there’ in
Washington of a radical, long-term improvement in Soviet-American relations.
He then went on to say: ‘What are we to do comrades? Slam the door? It cannot
be ruled out that this is exactly the sort of thing they want us to do’; Izvestiia, 7
March 1986.
690 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666.
691 Gorbachev’s remarks to a closed session of first party secretaries at the June 1986
Budapest summit conference; see the protocol on the restricted meeting of the
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The October 1986 Gorbachev-Reagan summit meeting in Reykjavik did
not produce any agreement on conventional, intermediate-range, or strate-
gic nuclear weapons, and to that extent it could be considered a failure.
Gorbachev, however, was intent on making the summit appear to have
been successful. In a press conference in Reykjavik and two radio and
television addresses in Moscow, Gorbachev called the meeting an ‘impor-
tant stage’ in the negotiating process that had created a ‘qualitatively new
situation’, deepened mutual understanding, and shown that ‘agreements
are possible’.692 Dobrynin, on the contrary, in a meeting with a group of
representatives from a number of peace committees from Britain on 26
October 1986, stated that ‘it seems that the extremists are taking over in
the U.S. administration, and they will do ... everything they can to negate
and undermine the positive things that were achieved in Reykjavik. We
will have to revise all aspects of our cooperation with the United
States.’693 Arbatov similarly was to claim: ‘Attempts are being made to
provoke us so that we will rupture the dialogue with our own hands, to
bury the negotiations which have become an embarrassment to them [the
Reaganites].’ However, he continued, ‘the Soviet Union has learned some-
thing in the past years. There can be no doubt that the American adminis-
tration will fail in provoking M.S. Gorbachev and the Soviet leader-
ship.’694
It is in the light of, in essence, negative American responses and opera-
tional problems in the Soviet Union that Gorbachev’s overtures and con-
cessions are of particular interest. They underline his determination funda-
mentally to change Moscow’s relations with Washington. Moves of this
kind in the arms control sphere in 1986 and 1987 included, at the Stock-
holm Conference on Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe
(CDE), the abandonment of previously deeply ingrained and unwavering
Soviet objections to on‑site inspection by foreign observers of military
party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact member countries, SED Politburo, Arbeitspro-
tokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2896 (indirect speech, italics mine).
692 The press conference of 13 October as reported by Pravda, 14 October 1986; the
radio and television addresses of 14 and 22 October 1986 in ibid., 15 and 22 Oc-
tober 1986. The direct quotes are from the latter sources.
693 Notes from personal diaries of Sergei Grigoriev.
694 Georgi Arbatov, ‘Ne ot khoroshei zhizni’, Pravda, 21 November 1986. Arbatov
went on to say that he, too, had not allowed himself to become provoked when he
wrote the article, even though he had felt like expressing himself more drastical-
ly.
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moves and maneuvers. On the subject of strategic arms control, the Soviet
Union was prepared to make the ‘deep cuts’ in offensive strategic missiles
that Carter had proposed in 1977 and that Reagan had demanded in
START; agree to count neither the US forward based systems (FBS) nor
the French and British missiles and bombers against the total American
strategic arsenal; accept rules for counting strategic bombers and cruise
missiles that were advantageous to the US; and consent to the setting of
sub‑limits on heavy ICBMs. On intermediate-range nuclear systems,
Moscow relinquished its demands for the full inclusion of the US Posei-
don force and US forward based systems as well as the French and British
INF in the overall tally. Final agreement on the INF issue, so hotly con-
tested in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, was reached at the
summit conference in Washington in December 1987. The noteworthy fea-
tures of the accord were its applicability to both Europe and Asia; the ex-
clusion of the British and French nuclear forces from its provisions; the
scrapping of an entire category of modern weapons; the acceptance of sig-
nificant asymmetrical cuts; and a comprehensive régime of on-site verifi-
cation.
On other matters, too, Gorbachev was determined to change the rela-
tionship with the United States. Concerning human rights issues and the
development of contacts and communications between the East and the
West, Moscow reduced the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the
Soviet Union. After the resolution of the controversy over American cor-
respondent Nicholas Daniloff, who had been imprisoned on false charges
of espionage, it granted exit visas to dissidents Yuri Orlov, David Gold-
farb, Viktor Flerov and Irina Ratushinskaya. Finally, Andrei Sakharov was
allowed to return to the Soviet capital from his exile in Gorky.
In addition to the arms competition and human rights, regional conflicts
had been another major bone of contention in Soviet-American relations.
On this issue, too, Gorbachev made significant concessions. Moscow
agreed in the April 1988 Geneva accord to withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan within nine months. In July 1988, it concluded a framework
agreement with Washington providing for the withdrawal of an estimated
50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, the pull-back of about 3,000 South
African troops from the south of the country and the establishment of a
timetable for the implementation of a ten-year-old United Nations plan for
the independence of Namibia. It induced Vietnam to begin the withdrawal
of troops from Cambodia. Its stance in the war between Iraq and Iran in
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the summer of 1988, including its support in the U.N. for a cease-fire, con-
tributed to the cessation of hostilities between the two countries.
Given Gorbachev’s determined and increasingly successful attempts to
place Soviet-American relations on a new footing, it would seem that the
stage was now set for a return to the Common European Home and the
inclusion of West Germany in an overall improvement of East-West rela-
tions. This, however, did not occur until October 1988. In addition to the
more general reservations about Germany and the Germans, aversion to
touching the German problem, suspicion about the budding intra-German
contacts and concern about rising West German influence in Eastern Euro-
pe there were several specific reasons for the long delay in the alignment
of Soviet-American and Soviet-West German policies. One of these was
the interview Kohl gave to Newsweek in October 1986.
German Unification in a ‘Hundred Years’
In the interview, published in Newsweek on 27 October 1986, Kohl had
said: ‘I don’t consider him [Gorbachev] to be a liberal. He is a modern
communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels, who was
one of those responsible for the crimes in the Hitler era, was an expert in
public relations, too.’695 This was a serious gaffe that should never have
been allowed to appear in print. But it did. In the embarrassing circum-
stances, all the usual efforts at damage-limitation were made. The chancel-
lor’s office paraphrased Kohl to the effect that his remark had ‘not been
rendered correctly’; that ‘erroneously, the impression has arisen that he
had compared the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, with Goebbels’; and that it had not been his ‘intention to insult
the General Secretary’.696 But the damage was done. When Genscher in
7.
695 Newsweek, 27 October 1986, p. 29. As is customary with such interviews, the
transcript of the tape recording was submitted to the interviewee for verification
and, if necessary, revision. Kohl’s press spokesman, Friedhelm Ost, had received
the transcript. He made things worse. Rather than recognizing the seriousness of
the comparison and suggesting to delete the Goebbels remark, he inserted – pre-
sumably for the benefit of the American public – the clarification of Goebbels as
being ‘one of those responsible for the crimes of the Hitler era’; see ibid., 17
November 1986, p. 58.
696 The ‘clarification’ was provided in Kohl’s interview with Die Welt (Hamburg), 2
November 1986. On 4 November, the German foreign minister read the full text
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Vienna on 4 November dutifully conveyed the chancellery’s authorized
explanations to Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister replied that
Moscow had initially believed that the remarks lacked a factual basis and
that the matter had been a provocation. It had, therefore, made inquiries
with Newsweek. On the basis of its tape recordings, the journal had con-
firmed the accuracy of the quote. Furthermore, after the chancellor,
through a spokesman, had distanced himself from the remarks, Moscow
had contacted the editor-in-chief of the weekly, who also had rejected the
German contention that he had been misquoted.697
No matter how many times one may re-read, twist and turn the remark,
one is left to conclude that Kohl did believe, or profess to believe, that a
fundamental political change had not taken place in Moscow; that some or
all of Gorbachev’s initiatives were exercises in propaganda; and that the
Soviet leader was quite skillful at that game – as skillful, indeed, as
Goebbels. One could, charitably, interpret the remark as having been di-
rected at a domestic rather than an international audience.698 This notion
could be regarded as being supported by his barb, also published by
Newsweek, about the Social Democrats being ‘more Russian than the Rus-
sians’. But the interview was granted to an American, not a German news
magazine. The unkind characterization of both Gorbachev and the SPD
could be regarded as an expression of his frustration at the Soviet leader’s
apparent view of the West German government as a disagreeable and un-
cooperative tenant in the Common European Home and his annoyance
with Gorbachev’s preferential treatment of the opposition. The matter was
made worse by the impression that was being conveyed, or by the fact,
that Kohl was too proud and stubborn to express regret and too keen to
brush things aside with ‘taken out of context’ and ‘wrong impression’ ex-
cuses.699
of the chancellor office’s explanations, including the reference to the interview in
Die Welt, to Shevardnadze; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 518.
697 Ibid.
698 The idea that Kohl’s remarks were related to the German electoral campaign has
been expressed by David H. Shumaker, Gorbachev and the German Question:
Soviet–West German Relations, 1985-1990 (Westport, Conn.: 1995), p. 36.
699 Speaking to the Bundestag in November 1986, Kohl insisted that the printed por-
tion of the interview ‘does not correctly reflect the meaning or the context of the
one-and-a-half-hour conversation ...’ He also said that he had not intended to
compare Gorbachev to Goebbels: ‘I regret that this impression was given and dis-
tance myself from it emphatically.’ (Newsweek, 17 November 1986, p. 58.) In his
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What was the impact of Kohl’s blunder in Moscow? Most of all, the re-
marks were met with incomprehension among the German experts at the
Central Committee and the foreign ministry. The authenticity of the re-
marks having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the assumption
of the officials was that there must have been a purpose behind them.
However, no one could convincingly explain what it was.700 Publicly, Gor-
bachev chose not to react to the remarks. But Chernyaev has credibly stat-
ed that the Soviet leader felt ‘deeply offended’ by them,701 and Shevard-
nadze charged that they ‘angered us to the depth of our souls’.702 They re-
inforced Gorbachev’s negative predisposition toward Kohl and the
CDU/CSU as well as his tendency to differentiate between the chancellor
and Genscher. And although the remarks did not change Moscow’s policy
towards Bonn – as mentioned, the course towards ‘minimum contact’ had
already been set – they delayed even further the inclusion of West Ger-
many in Moscow’s evolving efforts to improve relations with other West-
ern European countries and the United States. ‘Gorbachev’, to quote his
foreign policy advisor, ‘intensified contacts with Britain, Italy and the
United States, and in that way wanted to “teach the Germans a lesson”’.703
Several visits by West German cabinet ministers to Moscow had to be
canceled. Even more demonstratively than before, Moscow’s representa-
tives were by-passing Bonn by in a wide arc, and the Soviet ambassador in
Bonn was instructed to avoid talks with the chancellor.704 The remarks
also revealed internal controversies about Moscow’s relations with Bonn.
Based upon talks with Gorbachev, deputy foreign minister Yuli Vorontsov
recommended to the Soviet ambassador in Bonn (Kvitsinsky) that he try
memoirs, perhaps too tactfully, Genscher merely reiterates the lame excuses of
the chancellor’s office; Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 517-522. President Richard
von Weizsäcker apparently was more blunt. Honecker had reportedly mentioned
to Dobrynin, who was in East Berlin in January 1987, that in a conversation with
the permanent representative of the GDR in Bonn he (Weizsäcker) had called
Kohl a ‘fool’ (Dummkopf); Record (Niederschrift) Talks Between the General
Secretary of the SEC Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, with the
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade A.F. Dobrynin, on 20 Jan-
uary 1987, in the Central Committee Building, SED Politburo, Central Party
Archives, J IV/2/2A/2976, pp. 36-37 of the typed transcript (indirect speech).
700 Interview with Rykin.
701 Interview with Chernyaev.
702 TASS, 10 November 1986.
703 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 261.
704 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 416.
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gradually to bury the issue. ‘After all’, Vorontsov asked, what is Kohl sup-
posed to do now, ‘get a rope and hang himself?’705 Kvitsinsky took this to
mean that there was a struggle in Moscow between two points of view and
that Gorbachev himself appeared to be wavering.706
In Moscow, the gaffe also brought into sharp focus the question as to
who should be the proper partner in Bonn. This concerned in particular the
problem of the appropriate status and role to be allocated to the SPD. In
East Berlin, on 20 January 1987, Dobrynin (in his capacity as head of the
Central Committee’s International Department) in private conversation
with Honecker agreed that all the support one had attempted to give to the
SPD in the electoral campaign had been in vain. ‘We wanted to help them
but they can’t be helped. No one really seriously believes that they want to
govern. They are a true social democratic party; they are afraid of govern-
ment responsibility.’707 The chances of that party in the elections, then on-
ly a few days away, looked bleak. ‘The danger exists’, Honecker lament-
ed, ‘that the SPD will not receive 40 percent of the votes but only 37 per-
cent’.708 Dobrynin, too, thought that the ‘sPD is playing a weak game’.709
The CDU, in contrast, had the upper hand. Many representatives of that
party, as he acknowledged, now wanted to visit the Soviet Union. ‘No one
was willing to admit that they would be acting as an envoy of Kohl, but
they were asking what could be done in order to rectify what has hap-
pened.’710 Dobrynin then revealed his own and perhaps a more widespread
dissatisfaction in Moscow with the negative and unproductive approach
taken vis-à-vis West Germany by saying: ‘After the elections [we have] to
approach [the relationship with West Germany] differently.’711
705 Ibid.
706 Ibid.
707 Record (Niederschrift) Talks Between the General Secretary of the SEC Central
Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, with the Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, Comrade A.F. Dobrynin on 20 January 1987 in the Central Commit-
tee Building, SED Politburo, Central Party Archives, J IV /2/2A/2976 p. 35 of the
typed transcript (indirect speech).
708 Ibid., p. 36 of the typed transcript (indirect speech).
709 Ibid., p. 34 (indirect speech)
710 Ibid., pp. 34-35 (indirect speech).
711 Ibid., p. 35 (italics mine; indirect speech). Nevertheless, Dobrynin cautioned that
one should not be too much in a hurry to alter the approach because ‘if change
were to take place too rapidly, the impression would be conveyed that [we] had
not expected an electoral victory by Kohl’.
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The CDU, as Dobrynin had correctly observed, was intent on changing
Gorbachev’s mind about the West German government’s policy. Its deter-
mination increased almost in direct proportion to the progression of his
New Thinking after the important January 1987 Central Committee
plenum, which introduced demokratizatsiia. It also began to subscribe to
the (erroneous) belief that the New Thinking would spawn a major Soviet
initiative on the German problem. One of the earliest examples of this be-
lief was expressed in a working paper by CDU parliament member
Bernard Friedmann and presented to the party for discussion in early
1987.712 More senior representatives of the governing coalition took up
the topic, including FDP presidium member Otto Graf Lambsdorff; the
prime minister of Rheinland-Palatinate, Bernard Vogel; and the chairman
of the CDU parliamentary party, Alfred Dregger. They argued that the fed-
eral government should not simply sit back and wait for a Soviet proposal
on German unification, and then improvise a response, but that it should
take the initiative itself and propose a new security architecture in Central
Europe.713 In September 1987, in a speech to the Kurt Schumacher Foun-
dation, the secretary of state for intra-German relations, Ottfried Hennig
asserted that there were ‘reports in Moscow’ according to which Gor-
bachev had told ‘top party officials [Valentin] Falin, [Georgi] Arbatov,
[Danil] Melnikov and [Nikolai] Portugalov’ to prepare new policy options
on Germany. On the basis of these studies, the leadership in Moscow
wanted to formulate a concept that it would then present to the Western
powers as a draft basis for a solution of the German problem.714
712 See the report on the working paper in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 May
1987.
713 Ibid.
714 Kurt Schumacher Foundation, press release, as quoted by Fred Oldenburg, ‘sow-
jetische Deutschland-Politik mit neuen Perspektiven? Mutmaßungen über
Moskauer Studien und Dobrynins Antworten’, Aktuelle Analysen, Bundesinstitut
für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne), No. 37 (1987).
Only three of the four persons mentioned, that is, Falin, Mel’nikov and Portu-
galov could be considered experts on Germany but none of them qualified as a
‘top party official’. Falin was head of the foreign correspondents' office at the
Novosti press agency, Portugalov a consultant for the propaganda department of
the Central Committee, Mel’nikov a researcher at the Institute of World Econo-
mic and International Relations (IMEMO) and Arbatov director of the Institute
for USA and Canada. For more data on these officials and their possible role in
the intra-Soviet discussions on German policy, see below, the chapter on Soviet
domestic politics and the German problem.
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The impression in Bonn about impending policy changes in Moscow’s
German policy was reinforced by remarks made by CPSU Central Com-
mittee advisor and German expert Portugalov. The parliamentary elections
in West Germany in January 1987, in his view, had revealed a ‘concrete
and dynamic process of [rising] national self-confidence among the West
Germans’.715 This process was taking place ‘not only among revanchist,
chauvinist, and military circles and a hard-line steel helmet (Stahlhelm)
faction in the CDU/CSU alliance. It could also be noted among left and
liberal forces.’ In their view, ‘West German national confidence and legiti-
mate national pride should be in harmony with the postwar realities of Eu-
rope.’ Portugalov even called the representatives of this view ‘patriots’,
who recognized that today’s Germans still had to bear responsibility for
Hitler’s crimes. He de facto rejected the idea advanced by Honecker at the
East German SED Party Congress in 1971 that the GDR had become a se-
parate German nation. ‘Certainly, for all Germans, including socially pro-
gressive West Germans’, he argued, ‘the people of the GDR will always be
Germans who belong to one and the same nation.’716
Portugalov, however, was far from diagnosing, let alone advocating, re-
unification. He attributed to ‘left and liberal Germans’ the idea that ‘life of
the Germans as one nation could only be achieved within the context of
two independent and sovereign states with different political systems’. In a
follow-up article, he predicted the expansion of German-German relations
within this framework and finally the construction and completion of the
Common European Home. One could, for example, ‘imagine without any
difficulty that the citizens of both of the sovereign and independent “Ger-
man apartments” would live in their own way yet maintain close relations
with one another, particularly since they speak a common language.’ He
predicted that ‘the time will finally come to terminate the foreign military
quartering in the apartments of the central part of the home.’717
There was also no change in the Soviet position on the Berlin problem
– Gorbachev’s ruling on ‘minimum contact’ was extended to that city. As
if in preparation for his twice-postponed visit to West Germany, Honecker
appeared keen to accept an invitation by the West Berlin senate to take
715 Moskovskie novosti, 2 February 1987; Portugalov’s views on the German issue
were cited in the German press, including Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23
February 1987.
716 Ibid. (italics mine).
717 Neue Zeit, No. 22 (May 1987), pp. 10-12.
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part in the city’s 750th anniversary celebrations. Shortly before the visit
was to take place, in April 1987, the East German party leader declined
the invitation.718 Did Honecker yet again yield to a Soviet veto? There is
no direct evidence to that effect. However, Vadim Medvedev, the head of
the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat responsible for relations with the
ruling communist parties, clarified what he at least thought of the celebra-
tions. Speaking at the party congress of the Unity Party of West Berlin
(SEW) in mid-May 1987, he deplored that the events in West Berlin were
being ‘abused for propaganda purposes to spread outdated slogans and re-
vanchist ideas’ and that Bonn and West Berlin apparently regarded the city
as a ‘kind of Trojan horse of the West in the socialist East’.719 Surely, no
decent person would have wanted to lend support to such purposes.
As the attacks against Bonn and West Berlin demonstrated, Gor-
bachev’s professed desire to see a ‘new page’ opened in Soviet-West Ger-
man relations was counteracted and contradicted by phraseology from the
rubbish bin of Soviet history. He himself failed to open a new page when
President von Weizsäcker, accompanied by Genscher, visited the Soviet
Union from 6 to 11 July 1987.
German Unity: ‘In a Hundred Years’?
In the year after Genscher’s talks in Moscow, Gorbachev had refused to
receive any high-ranking representative of the Federal Republic. Given the
federal president’s high international standing, his sensitivity to the dam-
age done to Germany’s image because of the Second World War and his
commitment to German-Russian reconciliation, the opportunity presented
itself to break the ice in Soviet-West German relations. The chance was
used only up to a point. To the extent that cordiality characterized the con-
versations between Gorbachev and von Weizsäcker, this was probably a
tribute to the visitor’s reputation and an indication of the mutual compati-
bility of personality rather than the ‘opening of a new page’ in Soviet-
West German relations. There is a reflection of this in Gorbachev’s mem-
oirs where he acknowledges that the German president had ‘very cautious-
718 Honecker’s refusal to attend the anniversary celebrations was ‘approved’ by the
SED Politburo on 14 April 1987 (see SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV
2/2/2214) and published in Neues Deutschland on the same day.
719 Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 May 1987.
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ly and tactfully touched upon the question of the unity of the German na-
tion’.720 Yet Genscher’s account is also credible. ‘The conversation be-
tween Federal President von Weizsäcker and General Secretary Gorbachev
was occasionally quite pointed, in fact, at times harsh.’721
Genscher’s characterization of the talks is to some extent confirmed
also by the account Gorbachev has provided in his memoirs. In reply to
von Weizsäcker’s evident wish to raise the topic of German unity, he (Gor-
bachev) had said:
Today, the two German states are a reality from which one must proceed. The
[1970] Moscow treaty and [West Germany’s] treaties with Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia and the GDR as well as with other states are also a reality. It is on this
basis that the effective development of political, economic, cultural and hu-
man contacts is possible. Any attempts to undermine these treaties, however,
must be sharply condemned. The Soviet Union respects the post-war realities
and respects the German people in the FRG and the Germans in the GDR. It
is on this basis that we intend to build our relations in the future. History will
give its judgment in the future.722
What is missing in the memoirs – understandably, given the achievement
of German unification within little more than three years – is what Gor-
bachev thought about the likely time-frame in which history might decide
the question of German unity. That time frame was ‘a hundred years’. So-
viet ambassador Kvitsinsky and German ambassador Blech both confirm
that this was indeed the time horizon that was mentioned by Gorbachev.723
Von Weizsäcker expressed disappointment about the relegation of the is-
sue to an almost indefinite future.724 A TASS report issued after the meet-
ing also contains the reference to a hundred years, and it conveys the
harshness remembered by Genscher.725
720 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 152.
721 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 543. The terms Genscher used were deutlich and
hart.
722 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 152 (italics in original). The term used is nas rassu-
dit, literally, history ‘will judge between us’ or ‘will judge who is right’. Erro-
neously, the memoirs refer to June as the month in which Gorbachev made this
statement.
723 Interviews with Kvitsinsky and Blech; see also Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p.
421.
724 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 544.
725 According to the report by the Soviet news agency TASS, when the West German
president raised the issue of ‘one German nation’, Gorbachev replied that he did
not wish to ‘theorize’ about the topic. To him, only ‘the political aspect, the exis-
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How is one to interpret Gorbachev’s remarks to von Weizsäcker? One
way is to emphasize that Gorbachev considered the German problem to be
unresolved − eine offene Frage, as the German adherents of the interpreta-
tion of a significant change in the Soviet stance went on record. In their
assessment, by saying that history would decide, Gorbachev proceeded
from the idea that there was something to be decided – an obvious devia-
tion from the position the Soviet Union had stubbornly adhered to from
Khrushchev to Chernenko and apparently a basis for talks and even nego-
tiations. This fit squarely into Genscher’s overall approach towards the
new Soviet leader and his new foreign policy slogans. The West had no
reason meekly to shun talks and negotiations, the West German foreign
minister stated in a speech in Davos on 1 February 1987.
Our motto can only be: Let us take Gorbachev seriously; let us take him at his
word. ... Let us not sit there with folded arms and wait what Gorbachev will
present to us! Let us rather try to influence developments, to advance and
shape them.726
In July 1987, however, Gorbachev’s glass was not even half full regarding
the German problem. It contained only a few drops of stale political
rhetoric. By handing to impersonal and unpredictable ‘history’, and in a
ridiculously long time frame, the responsibility for solving what he, at
least openly, did not even recognize as a problem, he de facto rejected the
idea that any initiative was required. European statesmen in that view
could comfortably sit back and see what might happen in a century.
tence of two German states with different socio-economic systems’, was relevant.
What things would look like ‘in a hundred years, history will decide’. If, further-
more, one could ‘hear time and again’ that the ‘”German problem” remains
open’, this gave rise to doubt as to whether the Federal Government was still
thinking about adhering to the 1970 Moscow treaty; TASS report, as published in
Pravda, 8 July 1987. − The tougher, that is, the Genscher and TASS version of
what the Soviet party leader told von Weizsäcker, is also contained in his book,
Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie, pp. 208-10. The elaborations there,
however, are not characterized as a direct response to what the West German
president had said but as general reflections arising from the conversation. –
Falin asserts that ‘I recommended to the General Secretary to delete the half a
century [sic]. The reference to history would have been enough. He did not ac-
cept this advice.’ Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, pp. 483-84. There is, however,
no confirmation by anyone that the time frame of fifty years had ever been men-
tioned by Gorbachev.
726 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 527.
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This interpretation is corroborated by the possible origin of Gor-
bachev’s ‘history will decide’ phrase. In April 1986, Gorbachev had told
Honecker about a conversation he had had with Egon Bahr. The SPD lead-
er, according to Gorbachev, had stated that ‘today’s existence of two Ger-
man states is advantageous for peace’ and that everything else would ‘be
decided by history’ – a phrase which to the Soviet leader showed how
‘cunning’ the social democrats really are 727 but which he found conve-
nient enough to adopt as his own position.
Gorbachev’s book Perestroika, which went to the publisher in June
1988, confirms the interpretation that he was averse to taking any initia-
tive on the German problem. Even in retrospect, taking the conversations
with von Weizsäcker as a point of departure, he scathingly called ‘all these
declarations on the restoration of “German unity” far removed from Re-
alpolitik, to use the German term.’ No matter what Reagan and other polit-
icians were saying, the West could
not make the FRG a realistic offer on the so-called [sic] “German problem”.
What had developed historically should also be left to history. [The crux of
the matter was] the existence of two German states with different social and
political systems. ... Both [states] could make a contribution to the cause of
Europe and the world. What would be in a hundred years, history would de-
cide.728
Gorbachev’s unwillingness substantially to revise Moscow’s position on
the ‘so-called’ German problem was underscored also by scathing Soviet
press reports729 and by Soviet leaders other than the Kremlin chief. Per-
haps predictably, the attitudes of disapproval and condescension were
most pronounced in the treatment of the von Weizsäcker visit by
Gromyko, who by that time had been shunted from the post of foreign mi-
nister to the largely ceremonial position of president of the Soviet Union.
Putting West Germany on the defensive on moral issues, at a diplomatic
reception on 8 July 1987, he charged that Bonn was guilty of sheltering
war criminals who had committed atrocities in the Soviet Union, handed
to the German president a corresponding list of such persons ‘still living in
freedom’, demanded their extradition and expressed his hoped that would
727 Transcript of talks between Gorbachev and Honecker on 20 April 1986 in East
Berlin, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, Büro Honeck-
er, 41666 (italics mine).
728 Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie, p. 209.
729 For instance, Pravda, 8 July 1987.
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take appropriate action. Regarding the Berlin problem, he asserted that
there were countries that wanted ‘to use West Berlin as a detonation
charge and a source of provocation in Europe’; the Federal Republic ap-
parently had to be admonished so that it would strictly adhere to the exist-
ing ‘agreement on West [sic] Berlin’. Concerning military affairs, he still
decried Bonn’s position on intermediate range nuclear missiles and
warned the coalition government not to insist on the stationing of Pershing
missiles on its soil. Finally, concerning Bonn’s stated desire for an im-
provement of political relations and cooperation in economic, technical,
and cultural matters, Gromyko expected the German side to show the
same ‘spirit of favorable disposition with due observance of mutual inter-
ests’ as displayed by the Soviet Union.730
The von Weizsäcker visit, then, was not a turning point in Soviet-West
German relations. Gorbachev confirmed this publicly. In reference to Gen-
scher’s visit in the preceding year, he said that agreement ‘seemed [sic] to
have been reached on “opening a new page” in the relations between the
two countries”. However, the page had ‘remained empty’. Alluding to the
Goebbels remark, he continued that ‘at one time there was even a threat
that [the book] would be closed. Fortunately, this did not happen.’731
Privately, too, Gorbachev had not revised his negative image of West
Germany. His attitude of superpower arrogance and condescension toward
that country persisted. This can be demonstrated, among other things, by
the following event: Gromyko had invited von Weizsäcker to an official
luncheon. Speeches were given on that occasion. When Pravda and
Izvestiia appeared on the following day, however, important sections of
the West German president’s speech had been excised. This included von
Weizsäcker’s references to Kant and Königsberg; the existence of an all-
German national consciousness; the wish of the Germans to be united in
free self-determination; and pleas for liberalized emigration procedures for
ethnic Germans living in the Soviet Union.
Thus, the pattern of censorship set during Genscher’s visit one year ear-
lier was repeated and, as on the previous occasion, it was decidedly not the
result of standard operating procedures but occurred upon authorization by
the top political leadership. Immediately after the banquet, Gromyko, She-
730 Pravda, 9 July 1987. As for Gromyko’s warning on the Berlin problem, an agree-
ment on West Berlin was never concluded. All four-power agreements applied to
Berlin as a whole.
731 Pravda, 8 July 1987.
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vardnadze, Yakovlev, and Ryzhkov had discussed the problem. The latter
three advocated publication of the full text. Earlier speeches by Thatcher
and Mitterrand had, after all, been published unabridged. But Gromyko
disagreed and left the meeting, sulking. He then called Gorbachev and
successfully persuaded him to authorize the cuts. Gromyko then gave am-
bassador Kvitsinsky instructions ‘to delete those parts which “the Soviet
people dislike”’. Chernyaev was courageous enough to call Gorbachev
and tell him that the cuts had been a mistake. Gorbachev answered angri-
ly: ‘I don’t care. You have to treat the Germans that way. They love order
– Ordnung!’732
Until October 1988, in accordance with Gorbachev’s persisting nega-
tive perceptions of West Germany, examples of change in Moscow’s pol-
icies continued to be scarce or lacking altogether. In 1987, the number of
emigrants of German descent from the Soviet Union did rise considerably
as compared to the previous year, from less than 1,000 to 14,000 persons.
At the beginning of that year, cooperation agreements on nuclear energy,
health care, and research in agriculture were signed by German cabinet
ministers Heinz Riesenhuber and Rita Süssmuth, and Soviet deputy prime
minister Vsevolod Murakhovsky. When agreement was reached in Wash-
ington in December 1987 on the dismantling of intermediate range nuclear
weapons, Moscow was polite enough to praise West Germany for its con-
tribution to that success.733 The prime ministers of Bavaria, Franz-Joseph
Strauß, and Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, visited Moscow in De-
cember 1987 and February 1988, respectively. There was some, although
not much traffic in the other direction. Dobrynin visited Bonn at the begin-
ning of October 1987, as did Shevardnadze in mid-January 1988. On the
latter occasion, some more agreements were signed. These applied to po-
litical consultation at governmental level, the establishment of consulates
general in Kiev and Munich, and long-term economic cooperation.
Yet the ambiguities and contradictory attitudes towards Bonn also con-
tinued. In his meeting with Späth, Gorbachev provided the usual rationale
for the necessity of change in the Soviet approach to West Germany – and
vice versa. Moscow, he claimed, had reconsidered its relationship with
732 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 155 (italics mine).
733 Gorbachev intimated this for the first time in his article about world security in
Pravda, 17 September 1987; see also Shevardnadze’s press conferences in Wash-
ington, 18 November 1987, BPA Ostinformationen, No. 179, 21 November 1987,
and Geneva, ibid., 26 November 1987.
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Bonn because, without an independent European role, international rela-
tions could never be freed ‘from the military strategic constraints of secu-
rity’ and, in turn, a new role for Europe could not be imagined ‘without
the FRG and an improvement in its relations with the USSR’. It was en-
couraging, therefore, that the time of ‘hostility and estrangement’ between
the two countries was receding into the past and that ‘the century-old link-
ages between our peoples and cultures are being restored’. But he also
warned Bonn that it would commit a grave mistake if it tried to circum-
vent the Washington agreement on the removal of intermediate range
weapons by arms ‘compensations’ – an obvious reference to the Pershing
IA issue.734 Furthermore, he reproached the German government for hav-
ing reacted with ‘hesitation and vacillation’ to appeals from Moscow for
more extended cooperation.735
But hesitation and vacillation were more characteristic of Moscow’s at-
titudes. Thus, Dobrynin’s speech on 8 October 1987 in Bonn at the
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a research foundation under the auspices of the
SPD, contained nothing more than relatively general and noncommittal
phrases on German issues. As if the notion of the Common European
House had not remained diffuse enough, it was blurred even further by his
wish for cooperation in ‘our common home, the planet earth’!736 To the
disappointment of those who had expected Dobrynin’s visit to produce an
announcement concerning a visit by Gorbachev to Bonn, nothing was said
on that matter. In January 1988, in talks between Chancellor Kohl and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze a ‘possible meeting’ between the chancel-
lor and the General Secretary was discussed again. But to little avail. Bonn
acknowledged that any decision on the visit would be taken only ‘in the
second half of the year’.737
Disregarding customary diplomatic protocol and considerations of pres-
tige, the German chancellor nevertheless took the initiative and visited
Moscow in October 1988. On that occasion, the Soviet position of princi-
ple was again stated without ambiguity. Gorbachev rejected the West Ger-
734 The Pershing IA missile was considered to be a short-range nuclear system and
its deployment, so the argument went, would not have been a violation of the INF
treaty.
735 xxx Gorbachev, see fn. 377. 
736 Text of his speech according to the official press release by the Soviet embassy in
Bonn.
737 Information provided to this author by government officials in Bonn.
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man idea that the status of (West) Berlin should be improved and that it
should be made the touchstone of Soviet-West German relations. Regard-
ing larger issues, he complained that he had already ‘spoken several times
about the so‑called [sic] “German problem”’ but that the matter apparent-
ly still needed clarification: ‘The current situation is the result of history.
Attempts at overturning what has been created by it or to force things by
an unrealistic policy are an incalculable and even dangerous endeav-
or.’738
Kohl’s visit nevertheless was a time when Gorbachev realized that the
relations with West Germany could not remain forever at the ‘minimum
contact’ level. Chernyaev even thought that a ‘turning point’ in the rela-
tionship had been reached.739 On 23 October, when Gorbachev and
Chernyaev had discussed the materials for the upcoming summit meeting,
the latter had expressed the following concern:
I assess the situation as follows. ‘The country (FRG) is willing to support us
energetically but he (Kohl) is not.’ Gorbachev answered: ‘It is the opposite
with us. The leadership is willing but the country is not.’740
Personality factors played a large role. The chemistry between the two
leaders ultimately turned out to be more compatible, and Kohl appeared
much more flexible and sensitive to Soviet interests than Gorbachev had
expected. Soon after the meeting, in Chernyaev’s opinion, ‘mutual trust
[between Kohl and Gorbachev] increased rapidly and they moved to a first
name basis.’741 Equally important, the leaders’ personal aides, Chernyaev
and Horst Teltschik, had a strikingly similar psychological and political
make-up. Both of them approached politics without ideological precon-
ceptions and stereotypes and both of them were conscious of this very
fact. Writing in reference to the October 1988 talks, Chernyaev observed
in retrospect:
We sat opposite each other [in the Kremlin], and I looked the chancellor’s ex-
traordinary advisor in the eye. He was a man with a sharp practical sense who
played an important role in German politics at the time, in particular with re-
gard to Soviet-German rapprochement. Our press and the foreign ministry of-
738 At the dinner speech of 24 October 1988, Pravda, 25 October 1988 (italics
mine).
739 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 261.
740 Ibid.
741 Ibid.
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ficials [had] painted a rather ‘unpleasant’ picture of this official but as in so
many other cases that proved to be wrong.742
Teltschik, in turn, has attributed the same non-ideological outlook, sharp
intellect, and keen practical sense to his counterpart.743 When the time ar-
rived for Moscow to abandon previous principles and preferences and deal
with the practical issues of united Germany’s status and role in Europe, the
smooth working relationship between these officials proved to be of con-
siderable importance.
Several agreements were signed during the October 1988 visit – on co-
operation in space, environmental protection, prevention of accidents at
sea, food processing, construction of a high-temperature nuclear reactor,
and cultural programs. The most important agreement signed, however,
was that on the extension of a credit of 3 billion Deutschmarks. On 17 Oc-
tober, after five months of negotiations, a consortium of West German
banks led by the Deutsche Bank and the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade
finalized the agreement. The loan was a low-interest commercial credit to
be used for the modernisation of the Soviet light and food industry. De-
spite the fact that the credit was not guaranteed by the West German gov-
ernment, it had encouraged and facilitated the deal. Its political impor-
tance was underlined by the fact that it was officially signed during Kohl’s
Moscow visit.744
742 Ibid., pp. 261-62; interviews with Chernyaev. I very much share these percep-
tions. I've known Teltschik since my student days at the Freie Universität Berlin
in the late 1960s. When he was Kohl’s personal assistant, I was a senior research
associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. During that time, we ex-
changed views on German-Soviet relations and, more specifically, cooperated on
the content and wording of the Soviet-West German Joint Declaration of June
1989.
743 Interview with Teltschik. Despite the friction that was to develop between Gor-
bachev and Chernyaev on the one hand, and Falin on the other, the latter was to
acknowledge in an interview in 1993: ‘Chernyaev was a genius and definitely a
sincere and very honest person [who] developed his own ... ideas in his work [as
advisor to Gorbachev] and made sure that speeches and documents would be
written properly’; interview series conducted by Ekkehard Kuhn, id., Gor-
batschow und die deutsche Einheit, p. 97.
744 Information as supplied by Deutsche Bank officials in Moscow in October 1988;
see also Handelsblatt, 10 October 1988, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 October 1988,
and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 October 1988. It is characteristic for an
emerging pattern of West German and, later, united Germany’s determination to
support economic reform in the Soviet Union but Moscow’s inability to use it
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For reasons to be explained in the next chapter, the credit accord was
connected with a shift in Gorbachev’s perceptions of the relative role of
the two Germanies and the fate of perestroika. Contrary to his praise of the
GDR’s achievements in the private conversations with Honecker, it was
beginning to dawn on Gorbachev that he had gravely overestimated the
importance of East Germany or, for that matter, of the Soviet bloc, for the
modernisation of the Soviet economy.
Gorbachev and Eastern Europe: Decline of the Will to Empire
Chernyaev has described Gorbachev’s attitudes and policies towards East-
ern Europe as follows.
It seems to me that at first subconsciously and then consciously he considered
the role [of the Soviet Union] as the ‘leading and directing force of socialism’
to be a burden. It interfered with his embarking with full sincerity upon a
world policy in line with the New Thinking.745
The only thing that Gorbachev hoped for, he continues, was to be under-
stood and that the East European party leaders would embark upon
changes akin to what he was trying to do in the Soviet Union. He ‘did not
have any particular interest in the socialist community’ and ‘maintained
contacts with the leaders of the socialist countries without any particular
interest, only grudgingly agreed to visits, and was clearly disinclined to
demonstrate a “leading role”’.746
This disinclination increased over time. As Georgi Shakhnazarov, Gor-
bachev’s advisor on East European affairs, has stated, three stages can be
distinguished in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe.747 In the first stage,
in 1985-1966, ‘there were hardly any changes; [our policy] remained with-
in the traditional framework and was carried out by relying on convention-
al and ingrained methods, even though the dynamic personality of the new
8.
productively and efficiently that by mid-March 1989 not a single Pfennig of the
available DM 3 billion had been called up. Leonid Abalkin, one of the chief eco-
nomic advisors to Gorbachev, confirmed this to the author at the first session of
the newly founded German-Soviet Forum, 13-15 March 1989.
745 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 81-82.
746 Ibid.
747 Georgi K. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody. Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego
pomoshchni-ka (Moscow: Rossika, Zevs, 1993), p. 100.
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leader here, too, injected some original elements’. The second stage,
1987-1988, was marked by the impact of perestroika on the relationship.
But this did not occur as a result of a deliberate attempt by Gorbachev to
put pressure on the dependencies and impose his will. ‘On the contrary, ...
he thought that changes were entirely the subject of the sovereign choice
of the parties and peoples.’ The third stage, in 1989, was characterized by
a sharp decline in the intensity of cooperation, the rupture of the bonds of
the socialist community and leading ultimately to the dissolution of Come-
con and the Warsaw Pact. The new governments which replaced the com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe
began to orient themselves towards the West, and the Soviet leadership, in the
conditions of a mounting crisis in the country and occupied by acute forms of
political struggle, had neither the strength nor the means to counteract this
[development].748
To use the present conceptual framework and terminology, it would seem
that Gorbachev’s vision was the restructuring of Soviet-East European re-
lations from the Kremlin’s imperial domination to benevolent and mutual-
ly advantageous hegemony. This vision existed irrespective of whether he
lacked awareness or was purposely denying that he was presiding over a
repressive imperial construct. As mentioned above, Gorbachev – in con-
versation with Havel – resented the characterization of the relationship
with Czechoslovakia as colonial.749 Even in retrospect, his terminology on
Soviet relations with Eastern Europe remained euphemistic and apologet-
ic. Generalizing about the difficulty of restructuring these relations, he
writes:
Stubborn resistance in the system of the socialist community had to be over-
come – a system that, since the Stalin, era had hardly experienced change.
Only the forms, the decorum so to speak, had become more decent. The
essence and the methods, however, with some rare exceptions, had remained
the same. ... The [Soviet] cadres were, after all, used to a certain style. It took
a long time until they renounced arrogance and conceit towards the allies.
He also deplored that ‘the inertia of paternalism made itself felt for a long
time’.750
748 Ibid.
749 On the conversation with Havel see supra, xxx pp. 36-37.
750 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, pp. 312-13 (italics mine).
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As defined earlier, however, an imperial or colonial relationship is more
than an alliance and governed by more than benevolent paternalism. It is
characterized by the penetration of the internal system and control over the
domestic and foreign policy of the dependencies.751 This had been the na-
ture of the relationship between the center and the periphery in the Soviet
bloc prior to Gorbachev’s ascent to power. The major difference between
Gorbachev and his predecessors in the Kremlin was his gradual loss of
will to maintain the imperial relationship. His goal, to use a term much de-
cried in the West in the mid-1970s, was the establishment of an ‘organic’
relationship between the centre and the satellites.752 It was to be a hege-
monial system that would not have to be based on the threat or use of
force in order to keep unpopular communist governments in power.753
Concerning the use of force, Shevardnadze has written that, after the
April 1985 CC plenum that ushered in the Gorbachev era, ‘military inter-
ference [in the socialist countries] was completely ruled out’.754 This deci-
sion raised the question of the continued presence of Soviet armed forces
in the area.
Our military presence in Eastern Europe was questioned long before the start
of events in 1989-90. And it was not just the governments that came to power
in those years that demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but their prede-
cessors [had done so] as well. Some of them told us in strictest confidence,
using very cautious formulations, that the continued presence of Soviet troops
in their countries would create serious problems for them. It would be better
751 See above, xxx pp. 41-45.
752 In December 1975, at a conference of American ambassadors, U.S. State Depart-
ment advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt had stated that the relationship between the
USSR and Eastern Europe was ‘unnatural’. The United States should ‘strive for
an evolution that makes [that] relationship ... an organic one’. Washington should
support the ‘visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous exis-
tence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence’; ‘State Depart-
ment Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeldt’, New York Times, 6 April 1976 (ital-
ics mine). This definition of American policies came to be called the Sonnenfeldt
Doctrine.
753 Support for this assessment can also be found in a conversation between Gor-
bachev and Vadim Medvedev shortly after the appointment of the latter to the
post of chief of the Socialist Countries Department in March 1986. Interference
in the internal affairs of these countries had to stop and a fresh look at the prob-
lems that had accumulated was necessary, Gorbachev told Medvedev; see
Medvedev, Raspad, pp. 7-8.
754 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 206.
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for us to take steps ourselves in this direction, they said, than to be forced lat-
er to move in haste under the pressure of events.755
In the summer of 1987, Yakovlev had specifically raised the question of
Soviet troop withdrawals from East Germany in a conversation with am-
bassador Kochemasov. ‘What do you think, isn’t the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany too large? What would happen if we were to accede to
its – even unilateral – reduction?’756 It is doubtful, however, that a formal
decision was ever taken on the matter of military intervention. It is more
likely that the general aversion to the use of force in Eastern Europe
evolved in conjunction with an emerging consensus among Gorbachev
and his advisors in 1985-88 that the reapplication of such methods would
destroy the credibility of the New Thinking and seriously damage rela-
tions with the United States and Western Europe.757
To provide some detail about the evolution of Gorbachev’s attitudes and
policies in the first phase of the process, there is no evidence that he was
disinterested in the fate of the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, he attempted
to achieve much closer cooperation and coordination among its members.
This was apparent in the line he adopted at the Warsaw Pact summit con-
ferences in the first two years of his tenure of office as Soviet party chief.
This included his role at the meetings of the alliance in Moscow in March
1985, informally convened on the occasion of Chernenko’s funeral; in
Warsaw in April 1985, scheduled in order to renew the Warsaw Treaty for
another twenty years; in Sofia in October; in Moscow in December, to dis-
cuss economic cooperation; and in Budapest in June 1986.
Gorbachev’s intentions were clearly stated at the first ordinary summit
in Sofia, where he emphasized the need for more coordination and ex-
pressed the thought that there was ‘general agreement’ among the partici-
pants that Warsaw Pact summit meetings should ‘take place not less than
once a year’.758 He also suggested that cooperation should be made more
effective by instituting the practice of sessions restricted to the party first
secretaries, the idea being that ‘each comrade could present the considera-
755 Ibid.
756 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, pp. 62-63.
757 Interview with Tarasenko.
758 Gorbachev’s speech at the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Sofia, 22 October
1985, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2811.
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tions dear to his heart’.759 The meetings should proceed ‘without an agen-
da’.760 Kádár agreed and called the meetings a particularly appropriate fo-
rum for the consideration of economic issues, including basic structural
changes in CMEA since its institutions were ‘relatively independent and
not very effective’; if the first secretaries agreed on any particular question
‘this would carry at least as much weight as the decision of any other
body’.761
Gorbachev’s idea reflects a certain amount of naïveté. Considering the
career patterns as well as the psychological and political make-up of the
majority of the participants and the long history of secrecy and distrust
among them, it was strange to assume that glasnost would suddenly arise
and permeate the small circle of the chosen few. Leaders like Jaruzelski
and Kádár did not need the restricted forum because they were prone to
address issues irrespective of the venue in which they appeared. In con-
trast, leaders such as Ceaușescu, Honecker, Husák and Zhivkov, all of
them disinclined to show their cards, would hardly be swayed suddenly by
a new forum and engage in glasnost. In fact, a cursory comparison of the
content of the leaders’ public speeches and their remarks in the restricted
meetings reveals no significant discrepancies between the public and the
private stance. Gorbachev’s presentation at the closed session in Sofia was
even less open and controversial, and more conservative, than his public
statement. Perhaps to the surprise of his colleagues, he declared commu-
nism still to be the goal of the CPSU. The Soviet Union, he told them, was
engaged in constructing ‘mature socialism’ (Brezhnev had invented this
term), and the important thing now was to advance towards ‘the highest
stage, that of the communist social formation’. When exactly this goal
759 Opening remarks at a closed session of first party secretaries at the June 1986
Warsaw Pact summit conference in Budapest; see the protocol on the restricted
meeting of the party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact member countries, SED Politburo,
Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/2896.
760 Protocol of the closed session of first party secretaries at the PCC meting in Sofia
on 23 October 1985, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/2811.
761 Kádár, final remarks at a closed session of first party secretaries at the June 1986
Warsaw Pact summit conference in Budapest; see the protocol on the restricted
meeting of the party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact member countries, SED Politburo,
Arbeitsprotokolle, J IV 2/2A/2896.
Chapter 4: Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking
332
would be achieved, he thought, was difficult to say. This was ‘not a
question of arithmetic but of politics’.762
At the summit meeting in Warsaw, Gorbachev had used the catchwords
for Soviet intervention – the claim that relations in the bloc were ‘based on
the full equality and comradely mutual assistance of sovereign states’ and
the ‘principle of socialist internationalism’.763 In fairness, however, he
cannot be blamed for the notorious article that appeared in Pravda three
months later under the pseudonym of Vladimirov.764 The article, written
by Oleg Rakhmanin, the deputy head of the CC department for the rela-
tions with the ruling communist parties, contained all of the stereotypes of
‘socialist internationalism’, ‘common interests of the socialist communi-
ty’, and ‘observance of the fundamental principles of socialist economic
management’, and it viciously attacked ‘anti-communist theoreticians and
opportunists’, ‘revisionist, nationalist, and clerical concepts’, ‘national
models of socialism’ and ideas about the specific nature and special role
of individual members of the socialist community. ‘Did you know’, Gor-
bachev asked Konstantin Rusakov, the head of the department, in the
Politburo meeting of 29 June 1985, ‘that this kind of article [was] prepared
in your department? The author is Rakhmanin, your second in command.’
Rusakov claimed that he had not known. ‘And you’, turning to Zimyanin,
the CC’s secretary for propaganda, ‘did you know that this article was re-
ceived by Pravda, the central organ of the Central Committee?’ Again the
answer was no. ‘And you’, he asked Yuri Afanasyev, the Pravda editor-in-
chief, ‘didn’t you understand what you were doing? Why didn’t you send
it to the Politburo or at least to the [CC] Secretariat?’ Afanasyev mumbled
something in defense about Rakhmanin’s influence and powers of persua-
sion.765 The editor-in-chief could also have argued in his defense that Gor-
bachev’s own – at least his publicly stated – views on Soviet-East Euro-
762 Statement by Gorbachev at the closed session of first party secretaries at the PCC
meting in Sofia, 23 October 1985, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Par-
ty Archives, J IV 2/2A/2811.
763 Pravda, 28 April 1985.
764 Ibid., 21 June 1985.
765 Politburo proceedings of 29 June 1985, as quoted by Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gor-
bachevym, p. 50. Chernyaev errs concerning the month. The Vladimirov article
was published in 21 June. The Politburo meeting took place on 29 June, not in
July. In his memoirs, Medvedev criticized Rakhmanin as having been ‘hopelessly
wedded to the stereotypes of the past’; Medvedev, Raspad, p. 23.
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pean relations were at that time conservative enough for such an article
not to be out of place.
Gorbachev’s approach of non-interference and disinclination to involve
himself actively in the affairs of Eastern Europe emerged more clearly in
the second stage of the center-periphery relationship. A crucial juncture in
the process of reconsideration of the relations, as he himself has written,
was the Central Committee plenum of January 1987 that introduced de-
mocratization and broadened openness.766 This meeting heralded a funda-
mental and, as it turned out, fateful shift from economic to political reform
in the Soviet Union. It increased differentiation in the bloc or, more to the
point, sharply divided its members. It also shaped Gorbachev’s attitudes
and policies towards individual leaders and countries, depending on the
degree to which they were prepared to follow the Soviet lead.
Honecker, as noted, had made his ‘reservations’ about Soviet domestic
developments known as early as the preceding year; how he reacted subse-
quently will be explored below in detail. Romania’s Ceaușescu, as Gor-
bachev deplored, ‘declared unambiguously that he could agree with what
was said at the [January 1987 CC] plenary meeting; the CPSU was enter-
ing upon a dangerous path’. Zhivkov adopted a contradictory stance. On
the one hand, he rejected the new approach but, on the other hand, thought
that it did not go far enough: ‘Reorganizing the political system of his
country with all its mechanisms of economic administration and manage-
ment [but failing to introduce] real democratization, would require unfet-
tered public opinion.’ Czechoslovakia’s Husák, according to Gorbachev,
‘displayed common sense and circumspection’. His reactions, for the most
part, were positive but ‘the practice of the C[ommunist] P[arty] was deter-
mined mainly by [Vasil’] Bi’lak, [Jan] Fojtík, and [Miloš] Jakeš [party
leader after 1987], who still vividly remembered [the Warsaw Pact inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia in] 1968 and therefore didn’t think about “loos-
ening the reins”’. Contrary to that, Hungary’s Kádár ‘wholeheartedly wel-
comed the changes in the Soviet Union since they presented him with the
opportunity to proceed more consistently’ with reform. Poland’s Jaruzels-
ki, too, endorsed the changes in the Soviet Union because they reinforced
his reformist course in Poland and because ‘he knew very well that the
766 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 318.
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problems of any country cannot be solved by the method of force – at least
not the basic ones.’767
Medvedev has observed in retrospect that the attitudes of the socialist
countries and leaders towards perestroika were ‘the main criterion of dif-
ferentiation in [their] political positions’.768 In turn, Gorbachev’s attitudes
and behavior towards individual East European countries and leaders were
shaped by his awareness of this differentiation, as Chernyaev has ex-
plained.769 The most cordial personal rapport, according to his observa-
tions, existed between Gorbachev and Jaruzelski. This was not only a mat-
ter of personal compatibility but also because of Gorbachev’s conviction
that the Polish leader, by imposing martial law in December 1981, had act-
ed not as a traitor to Poland but as her savior. His policies of ‘socialist re-
newal’ (obnovlenie) preceded and, after Gorbachev’s accession to power,
coincided with perestroika. Gorbachev also had a deep respect for Kádár
and always had great pleasure communicating with him. Concerning his
attitudes towards the Czechoslovak communists, he had ‘a certain amount
of respect only for Husák’. His relations with Zhivkov, too, were difficult,
partly because the Bulgarian leader arrogated to himself the right to act as
doyen of the ‘socialist community’ and partly because of his proclivity for
lecturing Gorbachev on both ideological and political questions. His rela-
tions with Honecker were also strained. The worst rapport existed between
Gorbachev and Ceaușescu, ‘to whom he sometimes referred as the
Führer’. He ridiculed and contemptuously dismissed his manoeuvres as a
nuisance and contrary to Realpolitik.770
The Demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine
In practice, then, ideological Gleichschaltung and military-political coor-
dination in the bloc were being replaced by a colourful but fading patch-
work of bilateral relations. The Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty
was being abandoned in favor of what in 1988 came to be called Freedom
767 Ibid., pp. 318-19. Gorbachev’s laudations of Jaruzelski and Kádár in his memoirs
stand in stark contrast to his bad-mouthing xxx of the Polish and Hungarian re-
form efforts in his conversations with Honecker; see, for instance, below, p. 354.
768 Medvedev, Raspad, p. 34.
769 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 81-82.
770 Ibid.
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of Choice (svoboda vybora), which supplemented the concepts of the New
Thinking and the Common House of Europe and transformed the Soviet
role in Europe. Gorbachev and his closest advisers and colleagues were
later to convey the notion that this principle existed and was communi-
cated to the East European party leaderships and peoples at the very be-
ginning of his rule. This, however, was not the case. The principle began
to take root firmly, and essentially only in the mind of Gorbachev and his
closest advisors, at the second stage of Soviet-East European relations.
Uncertainty about likely Soviet reactions in case of anti-communist and
anti-Soviet upheavals persisted until 1989.
To trace the application of the new principle to bloc relations, at the
Twenty-seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986, Gorbachev re-
frained from mentioning socialist internationalism or any of the other code
words for Soviet interventionism. Instead, he emphasized ‘unconditional
respect in international practice for the right of every people to choose the
paths and forms of its development’ and averred that ‘unity has nothing in
common with uniformity, with a hierarchy’.771 At the February 1988 Cen-
tral Committee plenum, at the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988
and in his speech on 7 December 1988 at the United Nations, Gorbachev
elaborated on the new concept. For the Soviet Union, he said, ‘the obliga-
tion of the principle of freedom of choice is above every doubt. Freedom
of choice is a general principle which does not know any exceptions.’772
Several specialists at the Institute for the Economics of the World Socialist
System and in Central Committee Departments were even more radical in
their break with past approaches, denouncing ‘methods of domination’,
‘great power ambitions’ as well as ‘hegemonial pretensions’ and, in a di-
rect attack against the Brezhnev doctrine, denied that ‘respect for national
sovereignty could be subordinated to some higher principle governing
their relations – that of unity’.773
771 Speech by Gorbachev at the Twenty-seventh party congress, Pravda, 26 February
1986.
772 Speech by Gorbachev to the UN, Pravda, 8 December 1988.
773 Yurii Novopashin, ‘Politicheskie otnosheniia stran sotsializma’, Rabochii klass i
sovremennii mir, No. 5 (September 1985), pp. 55-65. Details about this and other
criticism by academic specialists and Central Committee officials of the imperial
Soviet approach to Eastern Europe and the Brezhnev doctrine as provided by
Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge,
2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 201-205.
Chapter 4: Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking
336
Yet there were several reasons why, in 1985-88, skepticism was war-
ranted among Eastern European leaders, parties and citizens about the
scope and durability of Soviet adherence to the principle of non-interven-
tion.774 First, it was unclear whether Gorbachev would be able to hold on
to power for long. Whereas his supporters in the Soviet Union were con-
cerned that perestroika would turn into perestrel’ka (mass execution by
the firing squad, liberally translated), reactionaries in the bloc like Czech
Politburo member Vasil’ Bil’ak were saying: ‘Let’s wait and see! Ulti-
mately, those who let themselves get carried away by perestroika will
break their necks. New people will then appear.’775
Second, even if Gorbachev were not replaced by a coup, there was no
guarantee that he would not yield to hard-line domestic pressures and re-
verse his permissive stance. Some lessons of the past were perhaps appli-
cable. At the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev,
too, had promulgated such lofty principles as non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of socialist countries, respect for their independence, equality in
inter-state and party relations, and the legitimacy of different roads to so-
cialism. The principles notwithstanding, in November 1965 the Soviet
Union massively used force to suppress the Hungarian revolution.
Third, it was uncertain what Gorbachev really meant by the ‘freedom of
choice’. Did that license pertain to peoples or only to the communist par-
ties? In his speech in Prague in April 1987, it was evident that he meant
the latter: ‘We consider the independence of every party, its responsibility
to the people of its own country and its right to decide the questions of the
country’s development to be unconditional principles.’776 In his program-
matic 1988 book Perestroika, he reiterated that the freedom of choice was
limited to the communist parties and their leaders:
The entire framework of political relations between the socialist countries
must be strictly based on absolute independence. This is a view held by the
leaders of all fraternal parties. The independence of each party, its sovereign
774 An excellent analysis of the ambiguities of Gorbachev’s statements and policies
within the bloc, which has inspired the present discussion, is Charles Gati, The
Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition (Bloomington,
Ind: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 65‑103.
775 Gorbachev told Alexander Dubček in Moscow in May 1990 that Bil’ak had made
this statement. He (Gorbachev) had heard it in connection with Husák’s impend-
ing replacement by Jakeš, which took place in December 1987; Gorbachev,
Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 362.
776 Speech by Gorbachev in Prague, Pravda, 11 April 1987 (italics mine).
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right to decide the issues facing its country, and its responsibility to the nation
are unquestionable principles.777
Fourth, although the traditional code words for Soviet intervention had
been omitted at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, they resurfaced sub-
sequently. This applied to terms such as ‘socialist community’, the ‘com-
mon interests’ and ‘common responsibility’ of the communist parties, and
the requirement of ‘unity’. The ominous flavor of interventionist terminol-
ogy, despite all of the assurances of Soviet non-interference, was con-
tained, for instance, in his speech in Prague.
At the same time [while upholding the right of each party to be independent],
we are of the firm conviction that the community of socialist nations will be
successful only if every party and country is concerned not only about its own
interests and only if every party and country treats its friends and allies with
respect and is sure to take their interests into account.778
The same flavor permeates Perestroika.
We are also convinced that the socialist community will be successful only if
every party and state cares for both its own and common interests, if it re-
spects its friends and allies, heeds their interests and pays attention to the ex-
perience of others.
Awareness of this relationship between domestic issues and the interests of
world socialism [is typical of the countries of the socialist community. We are
united, in unity resides our strength, and from unity] we draw our confidence
that we will cope with the issues set forth by our time.779
Fifth, there was little uncertainty that in Gorbachev’s mind the right of ev-
ery people or party to choose the paths and forms of its development
meant socialist development. But what would happen if anti-communist
and anti-Soviet forces were to become ascendant and wanted to establish a
777 Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie, p. 170 (italics mine). The book had
gone to press in June 1988 and appeared on the bookshelves later in the year.
778 Pravda, 11 April 1987 (italics mine).
779 Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie, p. 170 (italics mine). The text in
square brackets is missing in the Russian version but can be found in both the
English and German versions of his book. In 1985-88, the code words for inter-
ventionism were used quite often. For instance, in his speech commemorating the
seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in November 1987, Gor-
bachev said that ‘we also know what damage can be done by weakening the in-
ternationalist principle of mutual benefit and mutual aid and by a lack of atten-
tion to the general interests of socialism’; Pravda, 3 November 1987 (italics
mine).
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multi-party system, abandon central planning, and introduce a market
economy? And even if political and socio-economic changes transcending
the parameters of Soviet perestroika were deemed acceptable in Moscow,
what would be its reaction to demands for an exit from the Warsaw Pact?
Sixth, about 575,000 Soviet troops were still deployed in Eastern Euro-
pe – more than 400,000 in East Germany, 75,000 in Czechoslovakia,
65,000 in Hungary and 40,000 in Poland – embedded in an offensive mili-
tary doctrine.780 Revision of the doctrine occurred even more haltingly
than that of other aspects of theory. The new concepts included ‘reason-
able sufficiency’ (razumnaia dostatochnost’) of military forces; the supe-
riority, under some conditions, of strategic conventional defense over of-
fense; and the restructuring of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact towards their mutual ‘structural inability’ to launch a surprise attack.
It was not until December 1988, however, that Gorbachev – in his speech
at the United Nations – launched a major initiative that would, for the first
time since the end of World War II, significantly and unilaterally reduce
the huge Soviet preponderance in conventional forces in Europe, curtail
the Soviet Union’s offensive capabilities and impair the role of the Soviet
armed forces as the guardian of Moscow’s imperial position in Eastern Eu-
rope.781
Six tank divisions of the 28 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions
based in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were to be disband-
ed. Fifty thousand troops and 5,000 tanks were to be withdrawn, including
assault landing formations and river‑crossing units which, in the NATO
780 The distribution of troops according to Western estimates; Douglas L. Clarke,
‘Soviet Troop Withdrawals from Eastern Europe’, Report on Eastern Europe,
(Munich, Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe), 30 March 1990, pp. 41-49; Robert
E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Military Presence (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989), pp. 114-15.
781 Pravda, 8 December 1988. Gorbachev had told members of the communist youth
organization only several weeks before his speech to the United Nations that uni-
lateral troop reductions were not on the Soviet agenda. ‘You understand, we can-
not come along just like that and dissolve (rasputit’) our army at a time when all
the others maintain an army and arm themselves. To do that would be wrong. We
will for that reason set out on the road of reducing armies and armaments [only]
together with other states’; Pravda, 1 November 1988.
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perspective, had been designed for offensive operations in West Ger-
many.782 Also to be withdrawn from this region were one in four Soviet
artillery pieces in Europe and one in eight combat aircraft.783 An addi-
tional 5,000 tanks were to be pulled back from the western Soviet Union.
Such measures were a dramatic departure from the prior stubborn Soviet
refusal to contemplate anything but symmetrical reductions. They also en-
hanced confidence that Gorbachev was serious about the achievement of a
military balance at lower levels of armament. But even after full imple-
mentation of the announced measures in the course of 1989, the strength
of the Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe would remain sufficient for
military intervention in the countries concerned if the Kremlin considered
such intervention to be necessary.
Finally, perhaps most importantly, in 1985-88 Gorbachev failed to take
a step that more than any other would have removed doubt that a clean
break with the Soviet Union’s imperial past had been made: a clear and
unequivocal condemnation of the Warsaw intervention in Czechoslovakia.
The opportunity to do so presented itself in April 1987 when the Soviet
party leader visited Prague. In his memoirs, he asked: ‘What, then, did the
year 1968 mean, when [we looked] at it from the perspective of 1987 and
1988? It meant that perestroika had been delayed by twenty years.’784
Thus, he did ask that question, but only in retrospect, not in 1987 or 1988.
In Prague, he said: ‘An honest admission of [our] own errors and mistakes
and the determination to eliminate them strengthen the prestige of social-
ism.’785 Gorbachev made this pertinent observation but only in general.
He did not apply it to the Warsaw Pact intervention.
To look more systematically at the problem of the demise of the Brezh-
nev Doctrine, three possible forms of revision can be distinguished. First,
revision could have been initiated by not only calling the intervention –
euphemistically – a political mistake but inadmissible in principle and rep-
rehensible on moral grounds. Second, since Soviet forces were still sta-
782 As for precise modalities, according to confidential information provided by
civilian Soviet arms control experts, the 5,000 tanks to be withdrawn from East-
ern Europe were to replace older models in the western parts of the Soviet Union;
in this region a total of 10,000 tanks were to be dismantled.
783 The percentages as calculated by Western military experts; see Financial Times, 9
December 1988.
784 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 354.
785 Text of the speech as published in Pravda, 10 April 1989.
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tioned in Czechoslovakia as a result of the intervention, eradication of the
doctrine from the political fabric of the bloc could have taken the form of
denying the legitimacy of the Soviet military presence in that country.
Third, since the doctrine’s main content was that of the postulate of limi-
ted sovereignty of the members of the ‘socialist community’, restoring the
right of the members to decide matters on their own could also have meant
explicitly abandoning the doctrine. Gorbachev failed to address the issue
of the legitimacy of Soviet military intervention and of the presence of So-
viet forces in Eastern Europe. It was only on the third issue where some
movement was noticeable, although – as noted supra – still qualified by
references to ‘general interests of the socialist community’ and the uncon-
ditional right for each ‘party’ (that is, not of the people) to solve questions
of the country’s development.
In politics as in life there are sins of commission and omission. Con-
demnation of the intervention in principle and on moral grounds would
have discredited those Czechoslovak leaders who had come to the top as a
result of the intervention and it would have generated pressures for the re-
instatement of those half a million party members who had been purged.
Gorbachev received reformist prime minister Lubomír Štrougal in
November 1987, but in the following month the predominantly conserva-
tive Czechoslovak Politburo and Central Committee replaced Husák by
Jakeš , one of their own, as General Secretary of the party. Almost imme-
diately thereafter, in January 1988, the new leader went to Moscow. ‘If the
Soviet leaders were to acknowledge that its action [the military interven-
tion] had been a mistake’, he told Gorbachev, ‘the CPČ [Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia] would inevitably be weakened considerably, and the
opposition, on the other hand, would be strengthened.’786 He begged his
Soviet counterpart not to hurry but to delay reassessment of the interven-
tion until the situation in Czechoslovakia had stabilized – a request that
was granted.787 ‘Non-interference’ in this way turned into interference by
omission. It went beyond that to interference by commission, when the
Soviet media joined the Jakeš leadership in condemning demonstrations
against the new regime that took place in mid-January 1989.788
786 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 358.
787 Ibid.
788 The reports and commentary in Pravda, 20 January 1989, are a good example of
this.
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To summarize, the Gorbachev factor in Eastern Europe in 1985-88 was
important in delegitimizing communist rule and a source of intellectual
and political inspiration among the people of the countries concerned. The
enthusiastic popular welcome Gorbachev invariably received during his
visits to Eastern Europe was as much a tribute to his courage for trying to
reform the Soviet Union as a declaration of no-confidence in the conserva-
tive regimes of the bloc. The models of change that inspired intellectuals
and ordinary citizens, particularly in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia
and East Germany, were not ‘reform socialism’ led by the communist par-
ties but the political and economic systems of neighbouring ‘capitalist’
countries such as West Germany, Austria and Finland. The popular motive
forces were not utopian concepts such as ‘socialism with a human face’ or
and ‘market socialism’ but real-world Western-style political pluralism,
social democracy, a law-based sate, market economy with fair competition
and an active civil society. As Moscow’s loss of will to empire became
more apparent and its disinclination to use force in order to uphold conser-
vative regimes in the bloc more credible, it was only a matter of time be-
fore the limits of Soviet tolerance would be tested. But this did not occur
in all seriousness and with repercussions unforeseen by Gorbachev until
the third phase of Soviet-East European relations. In the interim, assump-
tions were widespread in both Eastern and Western Europe that the sparks
of change would spread from Hungary and Poland to Czechoslovakia and
only from there – perhaps –to East Germany. Surprisingly, the sparks re-
mained just that in Poland and Hungary but they ignited and produced
popular flames first in East Germany and were to spread only later to
Czechoslovakia. The following section examines in more detail why this
fateful sequence occurred by reverting to the fateful events taking place in
the GDR and in Soviet-East German relations.
Soviet-East German Relations: Deference versus Defiance
In his memoirs Gorbachev states tersely that after the January 1987 CPSU
Central Committee plenum the differences between the Soviet and the
East German leadership could no longer be concealed.
Honecker personally gave instructions no longer to publish in the GDR any
materials of our [Central Committee] plenary meetings. ... Thereafter, news
and documents from the Soviet Union were subjected to political censorship,
cut extensively, or held back entirely. The distribution of German language
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periodicals published in Moscow, such as Sputnik and Neue Zeit [in Novem-
ber 1988 and February 1989 respectively], was outlawed. Mutual misunder-
standing, in fact alienation, increased.789
He also notes that Honecker, as well as other SED leaders, became ‘criti-
cal of me in the same measure as our perestroika and glasnost unfolded;
and although he visibly displayed moderation in our talks, it was impossi-
ble not to notice his rejection of [our] democratic changes’.790
In ordinary circumstances, that is, in a normally functioning empire,
one would have expected its chief representative to take the recalcitrant
provincial governor to task. In the Soviet empire after 1987, however, this
was no longer the case. A strange anomaly arose and became the order of
the day. As tension between the two leaders increased, and Soviet and East
German policies drifted apart, a reversal of traditional imperial roles took
place: the exponent of the most exposed part of the imperial periphery was
lecturing and admonishing, hassling, harrying and haranguing the head of
the imperial center while the latter reacted to the ignominies with lame ex-
cuses, apologies, disclaimers, retractions and promises to take remedial
action. Passé was the refreshing atmosphere of the August 1984 emergen-
cy meeting in Moscow where both sides had openly and confidently pre-
sented their case and attempted to convince each other of the validity of
their arguments.
To revert to the analogy of a disintegrating marriage, it was almost as if,
after every reasonable effort had been made to achieve reconciliation, the
erstwhile partners felt that there was nothing more to say, with one partner
withdrawing in silence, the other incessantly engaging in gratuitous bick-
ering. Not that there was no opportunity to talk. At the end of May 1987,
Gorbachev attended a Warsaw Pact summit conference in East Berlin,
mainly to discuss problems of European security; Honecker attended the
seventieth anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution in
Moscow in November; and the Soviet party leader again traveled to East
Berlin in December to report on the Soviet-American summit and explain
his rationales for agreeing to the Washington treaty on the abolition of in-
termediate-range nuclear forces. Yet these opportunities failed to be used
for a fresh start.
789 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 408.
790 Ibid.
8. Gorbachev and Eastern Europe: Decline of the Will to Empire
343
To provide some evidence, Dobrynin had been given the assignment by
Gorbachev ‘confidentially to inform comrade Honecker’ about the im-
pending January 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.791 Al-
though the Politburo still had to finalize the proceedings, the main outlines
of a program of political democratization and economic reform had more
or less taken shape. They concerned (1) a new law on enterprises, provid-
ing for more autonomy in the production process; (2) democratization of
the electoral process by allowing choice among several candidates; and (3)
democratization of the party by mitigating the time-honored nomenklatura
system (appointment in accordance with party lists), letting lower-level
entities propose their own candidates and abandoning the practice of de-
termining in advance who would be allowed to speak at Central Commit-
tee meetings. When Honecker – in reference to the third point and con-
trary to fact – interjected that, ‘We [in the SED, already] do it like this’,
Dobrynin repeated the Gorbachev line of admiration for East German ex-
perience and practically apologized: ‘[I] am not saying this [in order to
make recommendations] but rather think that much of what is now intend-
ed in the Soviet Union is already being done in the GDR.’792 But the point
about the CC plenum was precisely the opposite! The CPSU was depart-
ing from the neo-Stalinist model, to which the GDR was tenaciously
clinging. By failing to state that very fact, and stating it strongly, Dobrynin
was handing Honecker the very argument he and other top SED officials
were already making, that is, that everything was fine in the GDR, change
was unnecessary, and that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was embark-
ing on a wrong path with possibly disastrous consequences for its allies.
On behalf of the SED, Kurt Hager was to reiterate this very stance. A
veteran of the Spanish civil war and a long-time friend of Honecker,
Hager was responsible for ideology in the Politburo, where he had sat as a
full member since 1963.793 When he was asked in April 1987, whether the
SED would eventually emulate Soviet-style reforms in the GDR, he
791 Protocol (Niederschrift) of a meeting between Honecker and Dobrynin on 20 Jan-
uary 1987, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/
2976. Also present at the meeting on the Soviet side were the Soviet ambassador
in East Berlin, Vyacheslav Kochemasov, and Viktor Rykin as translator.
792 Ibid., p. 12 of the typed transcript (indirect speech, italics mine).
793 Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Ger-
many, For the American Enterprise Institute (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press,
1992), pp. 56-57.
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snapped: ‘Just because your neighbor puts up new wallpaper, does that
mean that you should feel obliged to do the same?’794 Hager was perhaps
aware of what Yakovlev had told his colleagues in January 1987 at the
conference of CC secretaries for ideological questions in Warsaw.
Moscow had received complaints from some comrades in the fraternal
countries about certain interviews and articles by Soviet citizens, who had
expressed opinions with which they disagreed. The main thing he wanted
to say about this was that
we, too, [sometimes] disagree with such remarks and particularly with the
way in which they are presented in the West. But on this issue there should be
complete clarity. If we are talking about democracy and publicity, one has to
take these [concepts] seriously, not treat them as empty phrases.795
The imperial center’s deference to a recalcitrant satrap at its periphery is
evident also in an extraordinary exchange that took place between Gor-
bachev and Honecker on 3 October 1986 in Moscow.796 The private con-
versation, among other topics, had concerned glasnost and the role of in-
tellectuals in promoting change. Honecker had taken the initiative and
commented about a recently held congress of Soviet film producers. The
Soviet comrades obviously had their problems, he said condescendingly.
However they wanted to deal with them, the problems of the Soviet Union
should not be exported to the GDR. He then exemplified what he meant
by this cryptic comment by two events.
West Berlin television and radio stations [recently] broadcast a question-and-
answer game [sic] with [Yevgeni] Yevtushenko. Yevtushenko spoke of [the
existence] of a single body of German literature. This is also what the official
circles of the FRG are saying. However, the fact is that since the Weimar Re-
public a single body of German literature has never existed, only a bourgeois
and a proletarian body. [I would like to] mention only [Bertold] Brecht,
794 ‘Jedes Land wählt seine Lösung’, interview with Kurt Hager, Stern (Hamburg), 9
April 1987.
795 Speech by Aleksandr Yakovlev at the conference of ideological secretaries of the
Warsaw Pact countries, Warsaw, 23 January 1987, SED Politburo, Arbeitspro-
tokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2976, p. 8 of typed transcript.
796 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev on 3
October 1986 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2A/2937, Supplement No. 2, pp. 35-43 of the typed transcript.
Except for the identification of the speakers at the beginning of the quoted para-
graphs, all italics are mine. The transcripts alternate between direct and indirect
speech; the quotations have been rendered here consistently in direct speech.
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[Willi] Bredel, [Thomas] Mann, [Lion] Feuchtwanger and [Erich] Weinert.
Yevtushenko said he is for German unity. This is a provocation. West Berlin
television is broadcasting, above all, with the GDR in mind. Such a statement
is directed against the GDR. He also talked other nonsense.797
Honecker buttressed his argument against glasnost by a second example of
Soviet provocation:
West Berlin television also broadcast a conversation with three other Soviet
writers. In that broadcast, [Andrei] Voznesensky stated that the writers are the
conscience of the nation. One cannot in the least agree with that. The radio
and television stations in West Berlin, furthermore, are financed by the US
Congress. The appearance by Voznesensky and others is directed against the
general line of the [East German] party and state.798
The criticism betrayed an unreconstructed Stalinist mind-set about the le-
gitimacy of censorship and it provided the Soviet host with a golden op-
portunity to educate his guest about the function of glasnost in the im-
pending program of democratization in the Soviet Union. Instead, Gor-
bachev embarked upon what can only be called an undignified, even de-
grading, apologia. He stated that
Comrade Kochemasov [the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin] reported to the
[CPSU] Central Committee on Yevtushenko’s statements and a discussion
with him. In the discussion, Yevtushenko had said [to Kochemasov] that no
one really could tell the German people anything different than that it is for
unity. Naturally, he had had unity on a socialist basis in mind. Comrade
Kochemasov had then pointed out to him that perhaps he had said one thing
but meant another. As for the above- mentioned writers, they are, in principle,
not bad people.799
In principle they are not, but in practice they are?
Honecker then brought up the biggest gun in the arsenal of communist
invective and fired it directly at Gorbachev: ‘[I] ask for forgiveness, if [I]
have to say this. But the appearance of such writers on television and radio
financed by the USA is counterrevolutionary.’800
The Soviet leader failed to react to this charge.
Comrade M. Gorbachev: We have done everything in the past and will con-
tinue to do so in the future so that the GDR as a state of German workers and
peasants and as an independent socialist state will strengthen and develop.
797 Ibid., pp. 35-36 of the typed transcript (italics mine).
798 Ibid., p. 36 of the typed transcript (italics mine).
799 Ibid. (italics mine).
800 Ibid., pp. 36-37 of the typed transcript.
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Comrade E. Honecker: This is why the comrades of the SED and the citizens
of the GDR have good relations with the Soviet Union and it is also the rea-
son why [we] cannot contradict people who come here from the Soviet
Union. Polemic [arguments] against citizens from the S[oviet] U[nion] can al-
ways be interpreted as anti-Soviet. One should let those people appear in
Siberia but not in West Berlin. What is being said in West Berlin cannot be
irrelevant to us. [But] [w]e don’t have any influence on that.
Comrade M. Gorbachev: When a Soviet citizen commits a lapse and does so
in the GDR [sic], then the comrades in the GDR can also tell him their opin-
ion directly. That is their duty and their right. We will naturally tell this to our
people, too.
Comrade E. Honecker: What was said in West Berlin can’t be helped now. If
it is being said now that the writers in the Soviet Union are the conscience of
the nation, deviationists in the GDR will very quickly use that [for their own
purposes]. That would be consistent with FRG propaganda.801
Later in the conversation, Honecker returned to the subject and com-
plained that the GDR ‘does not want to fight on two fronts’ (that is,
against Western bourgeois propagandists and misguided Soviet intellectu-
als). Gorbachev meekly replied that he would ‘give the highest priority’ to
this question and ‘instruct Yakovlev to talk to Yevtushenko’.802 Finally, he
regretted that
several writers, for a number of years, have not accepted invitations to visit
the GDR. Statements about freedom, censorship, etc. have been uttered by
Yevtushenko for the past thirty years. These people like publicity. [I] think
that one has to talk to them about this [too].803
Honecker’s perceptions of Gorbachev as a politically naïve and ineffective
political leader were most likely nourished by His (Gorbachev’s) failure to
assert himself firmly and decisively in the bloc. This may explain why he
finally decided to ignore the unabated Soviet opposition to his unchanged
desire to visit West Germany.804 In April 1987, he had the SED Politburo
801 Ibid. (italics mine).
802 Ibid., pp. 42-43 of the typed transcript.
803 Gorbachev made these remarks at a dinner conversation with Honecker, Mies,
and Schmitt; SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/2A/2937, Supplement No. 3, p. 41 of the typed transcript.
804 Kochemasov (Meine letzte Mission, pp. 136-37) cursorily describes the history of
the Soviet-East German controversy over the Honecker visit and writes: ‘Finally,
I was instructed [by Moscow] to transmit to Honecker the agreement of the Sovi-
et leadership to an official visit to the FRG.’ No date is provided for the receipt of
the telegram.
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endorse his travel plans.805 At the end of May, a summit conference of the
Warsaw Pact countries took place in East Berlin which produced no record
as to whether Honecker’s plans were approved or even discussed. In
September, the twice postponed (i.e. vetoed) visit to the Federal Republic
finally took place. From Honecker’s perspective, the visit was a resound-
ing success. Although billed by the West German government as a visit by
a head of government, the visit unfolded as a state visit with all the proper
paraphernalia of protocol. Honecker met with President von Weizsäcker,
Chancellor Kohl, the prime ministers of North Rhine Westphalia, Bavaria
and Saarland – Johannes Rau, Franz-Josef Strauß and Oskar Lafontaine
respectively –, the leaders of the major political parties and, not to forget,
rock star Udo Lindenberg.
Perhaps the most symbolic part of his visit was his stay in the Saarland
where, as noted, he was born and had acquired his leftist credentials,
where he still had friends and relatives, and where he now laid a wreath at
his father’s grave. It was to little avail that he reiterated his often quoted
phrase that ‘to unite socialism and capitalism was as impossible as it is to
unite fire and water’. Internationally, suspicions arose that what Kohl and
Honecker were ‘really’ trying to do was to lay the groundwork for the
achievement of ‘reunification on the sly’.806
Apart from real or apparent symbolism, what about the more tangible
results of the visit? To Dobrynin, Honecker had boasted that the GDR ‘an-
nually receives 3 to 4 million Western visitors’ and that in 1986, ‘1.773
million GDR citizens travelled to the FRG and other Western coun-
tries’.807 Such visits, Honecker said, were to be increased and relations be-
tween the two German states to be strengthened in other dimensions of
policy. Indeed, several agreements were concluded between East Berlin
and Bonn. These pertained to the environment; protection from radiation
805 On the Politburo decision see SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2/2214.
806 This suspicion was, in fact, expressed by William Safire, ‘The Germanys: Reuni-
fication on the Sly’, International Herald Tribune, 14 August 1984.
807 Dobrynin was apparently duly impressed and commented: ‘That’s a lot.’ Honeck-
er-Dobrynin talks, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J
IV 2/2A/2976. These figures, however, are misleading. Honecker was using the
term visitors. However, individual visitors were not recorded, only visits. Since
many persons, including functionaries on official business, were travelling to the
West several times a year, the actual number of visitors was less than the figure
suggested by Honecker.
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exposure; scientific and technical cooperation; easing of travel; sister-city
partnerships; the improvement of existing and construction of new train
connections between Berlin and the Federal Republic; and the establish-
ment of a joint electricity network between the two German states.
Despite the fact that the five-day visit received wide international press
and television coverage, officially in Moscow the event was almost com-
pletely ignored. One day after the end of the visit, a short article appeared
in Pravda, written by its correspondent in East Germany, who reported
disparagingly that ‘an interesting event’ had taken place. ‘Official talks’
had been held in Bonn and a ‘joint statement’ had been issued.808 No de-
tails were given about the broad scope of the East German leader’s visit,
including Honecker’s side-trip to his native Saarland and his laying a
wreath at his father’s grave. No statistics were provided about visits by
East Germans to West Germany. Not a word was expended on the easing
of travel restrictions, the joint electricity network, the transportation agree-
ment or the sister-city partnerships.809
Superficially, Soviet-East German business continued as usual, and so
did the rituals. When Honecker visited Moscow in November 1987, on the
occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, he re-
ceived yet another Soviet decoration, the Order of Lenin. In private con-
versation with Honecker on 4 November, however, a new practice was in-
stituted by Gorbachev.810 In what must again be considered highly unusual
in the history of empires, the Soviet leader reported extensively on the
centre’s internal problems and was to continue to do so until the collapse
of the communist regime in the GDR.
Intra-party life was beginning to acquire greater dynamism, he told Ho-
necker. A new consciousness was starting to develop; citizens were be-
coming more active; private initiative was on the rise; cooperatives were
being founded; and much progress was being made in agriculture. How-
ever, on many issues society was more advanced than the party. ‘Scum’,
which had been submerged, was now drifting to the surface. ‘Nationalist
sentiments’ were on the increase. There were ‘certain difficulties in the
struggle against alcohol[ism]’. He then went on to describe at length the
808 M. Podkliuchnikov, ‘Glavnoe – uprochenie mira‘, Pravda, 12 September 1987.
809 Ibid.
810 Notes (Aktennotiz) on the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev on 4 Novem-
ber 1987 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J
IV 2/1/627.
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controversies in the top Soviet leadership. On 21 October, Politburo candi-
date and head of the Moscow city party organization Boris Yeltsin had
severely criticized the slow pace of change and asked to be relieved of his
duties (a request retracted some days later); in the Central Committee,
there had been heated discussions which had lasted approximately five
hours but had failed to resolve matters. 811
Honecker graciously refrained from commenting directly on the Soviet
internal problems. His criticism was indirect and it was contained in his
customary progress report on East German economic affairs. As on previ-
ous occasions, he underlined the GDR’s apparent importance to the USSR
in high technology, telling Gorbachev that every third employee in East
German science and technology was now involved in one or several of the
more than 170 projects agreed upon between the two countries. He
sparkled with data and much new-fangled terminology about micro-elec-
tronic processors, memory bits, lasers, digitalization, image resolution of
satellite photography, precision surfacing of materials, optical sensors,
new measuring instruments in medicine, fermentation in biotechnology
and nuclear fusion. He reminded his host, since he seemed to have forgot-
ten, of the ‘May 1985 agreement for the strengthening of the scientific-
technological positions of socialism against the acceleration of the arms
[race] in space’. He claimed that by the progress the GDR was making
‘we are counteracting the strategic embargo of the United States and other
imperialist states’. He even went as far as asserting that the production of
micro-electronic equipment in the GDR was being organized in such a
way ‘that the requirements of the USSR can be met’. How was all this
possible? ‘Strict state control’ was the answer. This observation reinforced
one of his (very few) earlier responses to Gorbachev’s report on the con-
troversies in the top Soviet leadership: ‘[I] agree with [you] that the de-
cisive question is [how] to increase the role of the party because otherwise
one cannot make progress.’812
To distill the essence from the November 1987 talks, Gorbachev’s con-
cern about domestic problems was beginning to mount. The burden of em-
pire, he realized, was getting heavier but East Germany’s apparent stabili-
ty suggested to him that it would be a mistake to rock the boat of Soviet-
East German relations. ‘[T]he [class] adversary contends that the leader-
811 On 11 November 1987, Yeltsin lost his position as Moscow party chief and in
January 1988 his candidacy in the Politburo.
812 Ibid. (indirect speech).
Chapter 4: Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking
350
ship of the SED and Comrade Honecker allegedly do not understand the
policy of the Soviet Union’, he said. ‘On the other hand, the adversary is
trying to tell the GDR that there is ambiguity in the attitude of the Soviet
Union towards the GDR.’ However, nothing had changed in Soviet-East
German relations and nothing should be changed.
All the sworn commitments are being adhered to. The relations with the GDR
continue to be a [top] priority for the Soviet Union. There will be no deviation
from this whatsoever. If problems arose, one should always discuss them
openly.813
Problems did continue to arise but, for the reasons just outlined, they were
not discussed, neither openly or in private. At their meeting in the Polish
capital in July 1988 on the sidelines of the Warsaw Pact summit confer-
ence, Gorbachev had proposed another meeting with Honecker. It would
be ‘important’, he thought, ‘for Comrade Honecker to come to Moscow
prior to Helmut Kohl’[s]’ planned visit in October.814 Coordination of So-
viet-East German policies towards Bonn seems to have been the rationale
for Gorbachev’s suggestion. However, when hen Honecker visited the So-
viet capital on 28 September, that is, less than a month before Kohl’s visit,
such coordination did not appear to have been an important part of their
talks – at least the transcripts of their private conversation contain nothing
about it. One also might have expected by now to discern an increase in
Soviet criticism of East German policies. There is no evidence of this ei-
ther, but what the transcripts do show is yet again Soviet praise for the
GDR and a continuing pattern of East German assertiveness and Soviet
deference.
First, Gorbachev told Honecker again that, whereas the Soviet Union
under Brezhnev had failed to draw the appropriate lessons from the scien-
tific-technological revolution, the GDR ‘succeeded in rapidly accelerating
813 Ibid. (indirect speech). As these remarks would seem to show, it was Gorbachev
who was trying to avoid controversy. His memoirs (Zhizn’, Vol, 2, p. 409) convey
a different impression. He writes that a ‘temporary “détente”’ occurred in their
relations when Honecker visited Moscow on the occasion of the seventieth an-
niversary celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution, and he attributes this relax-
ation to a change in Honecker’s attitude. ‘After he had familiarized himself with
my speech, he remarked that all differences had now been removed. In fact, the
speech was published shortly thereafter in the GDR, unabridged.’
814 Notes (Aktennotiz) of a meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev on 15 July
1988 in Warsaw, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/2A/685.
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labor productivity and also the quality [of production], catching up with
the advanced countries’.815 Second, ‘the conditions in the economy of the
GDR are also significantly more democratic. There are even private crafts-
men and traders. All this existed in the Soviet Union under Lenin. But lat-
er it was abolished.’816 Third, and most astonishingly, in comparative per-
spective the overall development of socialism in the GDR had much to re-
commend itself. There were ‘many negative and critical facts’ in the so-
cialist development of ‘the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland but far
fewer in the GDR’.817
815 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev on 28
September 1988 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/1/685. (indirect speech).
816 Ibid. (indirect speech). Gorbachev’s favourable view of what in Soviet parlance
was called melko-tovarnoe proizvodstvo, or small commodity production, was
confirmed to me by Aleksandr Tsipko, a Central Committee official in the depart-
ment for relations with communist and workers' parties and a specialist on the
GDR and Poland. In Tsipko’s opinion, Gorbachev’s view played an important
role in the origins of both the January 1987 program of democratization and mar-
ketization of the Soviet economy and the frictions with Honecker. In 1985, the
journal Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia had published an article by Richard Koso-
lapov, chief editor of Kommunist, in which he had sharply criticized small com-
modity production and the SED’s support for that programme. Honecker was of-
fended by that article and even took up the matter in the SED Politburo. In Jan-
uary 1986, Tsipko and Oleg Bogomolov, the head of the Institute on the Econo-
my of World Socialism, wrote a report for Gorbachev, arguing that such ‘leftist’
outbursts as published in Kommunist not only undercut moves towards the mar-
ket economy in the Soviet Union but also soured Soviet-East German relations.
Shakhnazarov supported this argument. When small commodity production be-
came part of the Soviet Union’s reform program in 1987, Gorbachev expected
Honecker to respond enthusiastically to it but was ‘bitterly disappointed’ and ‘ir-
ritated’ when the opposite occurred. This enhanced his ‘psychological estrange-
ment from the GDR and Honecker’, which later turned into ‘hostility’. Interview
with Tsipko. – On Gorbachev’s view that the GDR, contrary to the USSR, had
done things right and xxx that the dictum of ‘Those who are late will be punished
by history’ applied to the Soviet Union, see pp. 354, 503-504.
817 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev on 28
September 1988 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/1/685 (indirect speech, italics mine). The transcripts use the
acronyms of HPR (Hungarian People’s Republic) and PRP (People’s Republic of
Poland). The criticism of the two countries contrasts sharply with what Gor-
bachev was saying in internal discussions in Moscow at the time and later in his
memoirs where he portrays and praises the two countries as being pioneers of re-
form.
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Honecker, as usual, accepted the compliments in good grace and went
on the offensive again, complaining about glasnost. He returned to the
problem of his ideological war on two fronts. It was one thing, he said,
that two dozen radio and ten television stations of the class enemy were
directing their broadcasts against the GDR, spreading hostile propaganda
in German. One could cope with that. But it was ‘intolerable’ that journals
such as Literaturnaia gazeta, the literary journal, and the popular weekly
magazine Ogonek were allowed to carry articles purporting to demonstrate
the failure of socialism as an historical experiment, and that such views
and articles were disseminated in East Germany through Moscow’s Ger-
man language publications Neue Zeit and Sputnik.
Gorbachev, as previously, was apologetic. He knew that ‘the mistakes
that are being made in the Soviet Union worry the comrades in the GDR.
The Soviet comrades, too, are worried when the pace is too fast and ex-
cesses occur’. He could assure Honecker, however, that ‘these negative
phenomena are not being looked upon with indifference’ and one would
‘deal with them’. He extended this promise to cover glasnost. ‘As for the
publications mentioned by Comrade Honecker, we won’t put our hands in-
to our lap, but we will continue to work with these press organs.’ He also
appealed to the East German party leader to keep things in perspective.
The GDR, as he (Honecker) had mentioned, was struggling on the most
forward ideological front and had to cope with bourgeois propaganda
twenty-four hours a day. ‘What difference, then, can a few Soviet publica-
tions, which are met with disapproval also by the Soviet comrades, make
to the SED? They will certainly not cause an upheaval in the GDR, which
has stood fast against more serious attacks.818
Gorbachev’s appeal to Honecker not to worry too much about the ef-
fects of Soviet glasnost on the GDR implied that the problem would not
disappear. Indeed, it erupted again only one month later. Among other ma-
terials offensive to the GDR, the November 1988 issue of Sputnik featured
818 Ibid. (indirect speech). In his memoirs, Medvedev claims that, during his visit to
East Berlin and in his talks with Honecker on 24 August 1988, he had asserted
the Soviet point of view more forcefully: ‘Concerning the measures by the GDR
authorities prohibiting [Soviet periodicals I] had to reemphasize the astonishment
we had expressed earlier and point out again that the limitation of glasnost and
the ban on Soviet periodicals and on the publication of Soviet materials in the
GDR did not serve to strengthen our relations and in my view did not enhance the
authority of the SED’; Medvedev, Raspad, p. 164.
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an article about one of the ‘blank [that is, dark] spots in the history of Ger-
man communism.
The German communists [the author correctly wrote] refused to join the so-
cial democrats in their struggle against Hitler. Had they done so, Hitler would
not have been able to win the [1933] Reichstag elections and European histo-
ry would probably have run a very different course.819
The suggestion that the KPD was co-responsible and culpable for the rise
of Hitler struck a raw nerve of its successor organization, the SED. It
banned Sputnik and adopted other protective measures on the ideological
front. It ordered the withdrawal of five films, among them Tengiz Abu-
ladze’s anti-Stalinist satire ‘Repentance’, from East German movie the-
aters. In December 1988, because of a ‘paper shortage’, it suspended pub-
lication of Freie Welt, the weekly magazine of the (East) German-Soviet
Friendship Society. In February 1989, it stopped distribution of Neue Zeit
because the journal had included an interview with Polish Solidarity lead-
er Lech Wałęsa. And in April 1989, it refused permission to stage an art
exhibition on ‘Glasnost and Perestroika in the Name of Gorbachev’.820
The East German regime found itself increasingly isolated in the bloc.
This was demonstrated, among other events, by the third follow-up con-
ference of the CSCE, held from 4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989 in
Vienna. East Germany was forced to accept, as a basis of discussion and
final agreement, a draft document on human and citizens’ rights submitted
by the neutral and non-aligned countries. The document included many
provisions abhorrent to the East German representatives but, with the ex-
ception of Romania, acceptable to every other delegation in the bloc. As
the GDR delegation lamented in an internal report, the ‘Soviet Union is
increasingly prepared, in the interest of concluding the Vienna meeting
soon, to accept the ... [Western] demands. Hungary and Poland support
this position. The ČSSR and Bulgaria only point to difficulties on reli-
gious and minority issues.’ This only left Romania as the only fraternal
country that, according to the report, ‘continues to reject the draft of the
neutral and non-aligned states and NATO’s supplementary proposals’.821
819 As quoted in Neues Deutschland, 24 November 1988.
820 The above examples of East German Abgrenzung from Soviet glasnost are from
Gedmin, The Hidden Hand, pp. 59-62.
821 SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2/2295.
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The proposals to which the GDR objected pertained to the detailed pub-
lication of balance of payment and trade statistics; unrestricted institution-
al and personal contacts between universities and other educational and re-
search establishments; the right of citizens to freedom of movement; and
the obligation of states to provide written justification for the rejection of
applications for travel and emigration.822 Most objectionable, however,
were two Basket 3 (human rights) draft provisions, which both Honecker
and Ceaușescu, during the latter’s visit to East Berlin in November 1988
in a joint statement, rejected outright: (1) the legalization of Helsinki
Watch Committees that had been formed in Eastern Europe in order to
check on the implementation of commitments made by their governments
and (2) the abolition of requirements for minimum currency exchanges for
visits in CSCE countries.823
Honecker was adamant on these two points. On 5 January 1989, he
warned Yuri Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delegation to the CSCE fol-
low-on conference in Vienna, that even to mention anything about the
Helsinki watch groups in the final document would amount to a ‘legaliza-
tion of counter-revolutionary activities’.824 As for the abolition of mini-
mum exchange requirements, the GDR had no intention to lose money and
co-finance West German ‘capitalist exploitation’. He told Kashlev to in-
form Gorbachev that if these two points were not changed, the GDR
would use its veto and thereby prevent the adoption of a final document.
He certainly had no intention ‘to carry out an agreement on these two
points’.825
The alarm with which Honecker treated the Basket 3 provisions of the
CSCE follow-up conference was commensurate with the threat they posed
to the legitimacy of his regime. In the final analysis, they amounted to the
legitimation of the pernicious influence of transnationalism and external
‘soft power’ in the Soviet empire. They also helped produce an entirely
new phenomenon in the GDR: demonstrations were beginning to occur in
a country where a revolution could allegedly not take place because, as
Stalin had said, people wouldn’t even step on the lawn, and this phe-
822 These and several other provisions were enumerated in the new directives for the
GDR delegation to the CSCE on 15 September 1988; see SED Politburo, Arbeit-
sprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2/2295.
823 SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2/2505.
824 Ibid. (italics mine).
825 Ibid.
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nomenon was to continue and gain momentum in the fall of 1989 despite
the massive presence of the forces of the ministry for state security
(Staatssicherheitsministerium, or Stasi), arrests and intimidation.826
Honecker’s alarm and his futile threat to exercise a veto in Vienna were
contradicted by his characterization of the contrast between stability in the
GDR and mounting instability in other countries of the Soviet bloc. There
were lots of problems in several socialist countries and in Union replublics
of the USSR, he lectured Kashlev. The problems included ‘the unsatisfac-
tory development in Poland, the processes in Hungary and the increasing
controversies in the ČSSR and the unsettled situation in Estonia, Lithua-
nia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia’. East Germany, as opposed to these
countries and Soviet republics, constituted ‘an island of tranquility’.827 He
also reminded Kashlev that, because of its geostrategic location, the
GDR’s stability was ‘important for the socialist world as a whole’.828
Honecker’s alarm was coupled with defiance. The CSCE follow-up
conference had put the spotlight on the main symbol of the division of Eu-
rope, the Berlin wall. In a speech in East Berlin, he repeated some of the
standard arguments that he and Ulbricht had made in defense of the con-
struction of the wall in 1961, including the charge that the West was intent
on ‘plundering’ the GDR by an artificial currency exchange rate.829 The
wall was necessary to prevent the West from exporting its ‘society hang-
ing on drugs’ (Drogengesellschaft) to the GDR. He also discerned a good
deal of hypocrisy in the Western wailing at the wall. West Germany, for
instance, was quite satisfied to see the wall kept in place because it wanted
to safeguard itself against ‘asylum seekers from distant countries’. There-
fore, he concluded, notwithstanding the ‘vehement advocacy’ of the aboli-
tion of the Berlin wall by ‘Herr Genscher and Herr Shultz’ at the final ses-
sion of the January CSCE follow-on conference in Vienna,
826 On 15 January 1989, the same day the CSCE final document was adopted in Vi-
enna, some 190 people demonstrating for democratic change were arrested in
Leipzig. – On Stalin’s dictum see xxx p. 45.
827 Talks between Honecker and Kashlev on 5 January 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeit-
sprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/2310.
828 Ibid.
829 To the extent that there was hypocrisy, it was not limited to the West. Honecker
chose to ignore that the free-market rate of one West German Deutschmark to
seven East German marks was almost precisely the rate applied to West German
consumer goods in GDR chain stores Exquisit and Delikat.
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the wall will remain for as long as the conditions have not been altered which
led to its construction. It will still be there in 50 and also in 100 years if the
reasons for [its existence] have not been abolished.830
At least on the time frame for the abolition of the division of Germany and
Berlin and when, if at all, ‘history’ would decide, there was congruence of
Gorbachev’s and Honecker’s view.
Since the present account has been brought up to the beginning of East
Germany’s terminal illness and established that Soviet policies played a
large role in triggering it, it may be useful to provide a summary of the
rationale of Gorbachev’s perceptions and policies towards the GDR in the
period from his assumption of office as General Secretary in March 1985
until his visit to West Germany in June 1989.
Summary
Gorbachev’s view of the German problem looked at through the lens of
East Germany was the creation of a reform socialist East Germany that
would remain an integral part of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe and continue to be an active member of a reformed Warsaw Pact
and CMEA. The method to be applied in order to achieve this goal was
persuasion rather than pressure. East Germany was not to be forced to
copy Soviet developments. The likelihood of a successful reformist trans-
formation was, in his perceptions, greater in the GDR than in other coun-
tries of the bloc, including in the Soviet Union, because of East Germany’s
high levels of education and scientific-technological development. What
needed to be addressed and prevented, however, was the translation of
West German economic power and GDR indebtedness into West German
political influence in East German affairs because ultimately this could
open the road to the reunification of Germany in accordance with Western
democratic, pluralist and market principles and pose the risk of East Ger-
many leaving the Warsaw Pact and CMEA.
That diagnosis was deficient in several respects. The first was the idea
of reform socialism. Such a system had never existed before, and it is
doubtful that such a model – that is, the harmonious combination of the
830 ‘Schlußbemerkungen Erich Honeckers auf der Tagung des Thomas-Münzer-
Komitees’, Neues Deutschland, 20 January 1989 (italics mine). The Vienna fol-
low-up conference had ended only a few days prior to Honecker’s remarks.
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plan and the market, capable of adapting rapidly to innovation – could ev-
er be realized.
The second fault was connected with the notion that the ruling commu-
nist parties of Eastern Europe could transform themselves into a reform
socialist vanguard. Such a metamorphosis was perhaps possible in a
democratic environment, such as in Western Europe, but hardly in Eastern
societies where civil society had to be rebuilt from the bottom up.
The third deficiency concerned Gorbachev’s belief that the GDR had
taken the direction of socio-economic development that the Soviet Union
belatedly was only beginning to pursue; that it was, as Honecker inces-
santly impressed upon him, in the midst of creating a computer-based, sci-
ence-and-technology, innovative economy and society − a Silicon Valley
write large; and that the GDR politically was a bedrock of stability that
could easily afford reform. Neither the perception of East Germany’s eco-
nomic prowess nor that of political stability conformed to reality. 831
Fourth, Gorbachev was mistaken to assume that West German econo-
mic power and GDR indebtedness translated into political influence. Ho-
necker’s GDR was definitely not moving towards the West German mod-
el, including democratic elections, free speech, political pluralism, a multi-
party system, a market economy and an active, independent (from the
communist party) civil society. Honecker’s concessions to West Germany
were only at the margins of the traditional communist model of the one-
party state, controlled elections, censorship and a command economy.
Fifth, equally wide of the mark was Gorbachev’s idea that Honecker
was leading East Germany onto a path to reunification under capitalist
auspices and renunciation of membership in the Warsaw Pact and CMEA.
The East German leader remained as wedded to the theory and practice of
the long-term existence of two independent and sovereign states as his So-
viet counterpart. Even Politburo member and foreign minister Gromyko,
neither a friend of Germans nor of perestroika, failed to see any deviation
of the GDR from the Soviet line in foreign policy. In private conversation
831 As an extenuating circumstance, Gorbachev with such views was in good compa-
ny. Many Western observers, including specialists on East Germany, were think-
ing along similar lines. And even xxx SED’s Politburo leaders, as will be shown
below (pp. 521-22), were ill-informed and hence unaware of the huge gap be-
tween their confident claims and reality.
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with Honecker in June 1989, he acknowledged that ‘Soviet-GDR coopera-
tion in the foreign policy sphere is especially close’.832
Gorbachev’s misperceptions of East Germany and the essence of the
German problem raise the question as to what his international relations
specialists, including the germanisty, were telling and advising him to do.
More fundamentally, what were the domestic factors that were conducive
to the comprehensive change away from the adherence to the concept of
two separate German states to the acceptance of German unification?
These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.
832 Transcript (Niederschrift) of talks between Gorbachev and Honecker on 28 June
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Policy
The Institutional Setting
The inquiry thus far has been conducted at two levels of analysis. The first
has been that of Gorbachev as a political leader and has focussed on his
personality and political philosophy. The second has treated the Soviet
Union as a ‘rational actor’ in the international system and has been con-
cerned with Moscow’s problems of maintaining and then modifying its
global influence in relation to the scientific-technological revolution, the
mounting costs and difficulties of maintaining influence and control in the
Soviet bloc. The examination in this chapter proceeds at a middle level of
analysis. It is concerned with the question of what was happening inside
the ‘black box’ of decision-making, that is, with the impact of institutions
and elites on foreign policy. It features an analysis of the role of the Polit-
buro of the CPSU and the Central Committee Secretariat with its various
subordinate departments; the Soviet foreign ministry and its subdivisions;
the defense ministry and the armed forces; the KGB; and the academic in-
stitutes specializing in international affairs. This level is particularly rele-
vant in the Soviet imperial context, where internal party politics were typi-
cally transnational, with various leaders and groups of the CPSU maintain-
ing manifold contacts with the communist parties of the dependencies. But
it also raises the question of how the centre’s institutions, with their own
vested interests in confirming the legitimacy and effectiveness of their
German policy, could change course so abruptly and completely.
To provide an overview of the main argument, Gorbachev came to
power with the idea to reinvigorate and revitalize the party, increase its
power and authority, create a strong reformist core, appoint competent and
dedicated leaders at its middle echelons and use it as an instrument with
which to modernize the country. By the end of the Twenty-seventh CPSU
Congress in late February and early March 1986, a nucleus of reformist
leaders had been formed in the Politburo and was beginning to consolidate
its power. There were now twelve new members out of a total of twenty-
seven in the Soviet top leadership, that is, full and candidate members of
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the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee.833 However,
whereas personnel changes at the top were rapid, the transmission of
changes from the top was painfully slow. This was due to half-hearted and
often ill-advised measures conceived at the highest levels of decision-
making, but also to bureaucratic inertia, procrastination and resistance at
the lower and middle echelons of the party.
Beginning with the January 1987 Central Committee plenum, the
paradigm for change was substantially revised. Its central element came to
be demokratizatsiia, the main purpose of which was the supplementation
of change at and from the top with changes from below. The bloated and
inefficient party apparatus was to be put under pressure not only by a re-
formist leadership but also by a politically conscious and socially active
citizenry. Within the party, recalcitrant segments were also to be pressured
by greater openness of discussion, transparency of decision-making and
choice among several candidates for election to party offices. The vivid
and often acrimonious exchanges at the Nineteenth Party Conference in
June 1988, originally conceived of as a forum at which to effect further
personnel changes, were the high point of intra-party discourse but also
the beginning of a new tack decided upon by Gorbachev. This included
the deliberate weakening of the central party apparat, which still constitut-
ed a formidable barrier to radical reform, and the establishment of new
state and legislative bodies to assume some of the CPSU’s functions. What
followed was a comprehensive reorganization of the Central Committee
departments at its September 1988 plenary meeting, which decreed the
merger of the three departments dealing with foreign affairs and created
six Central Committee Commissions. Legislative and executive powers
outside the usual party channels were strengthened by Gorbachev’s assum-
ing the presidency of the Supreme Soviet and by elections to the first
Congress of People’s Deputies from March to May 1989. The democratic
credentials of this ‘outer’ or supreme parliament that was to elect an ‘in-
ner’ parliament, a new Supreme Soviet, were still questionable. One-third
of the 2,250 deputies were to be delegates from various ‘public organiza-
tions’, of which the CPSU and the Trade Unions had a hundred seats each
but the other two-thirds were to elected directly by territorial constituen-
cies. The elections for the vast majority of the latter seats (73 percent ac-
cording to some calculations) were multi-candidate, genuinely contested,
833 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 160.
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by secret ballot, and preceded by vigorous debate.834 The period just be-
fore and after the first Congress was a time of euphoria.
These were the days when radical democrats thought that reform of the
party was not only possible but the only route to change.835
The logic of comprehensive and radical transformation necessitated ac-
tion in six dimensions of policy. The first was the political realm, with the
direction of change to lead from a totalitarian one-party state to a parlia-
mentary democracy. The second lay in the legal system, which had to
move from arbitrary and voluntarist party rule to a system based on the
rule of law. The third was in the economic area and provided for shifts
from a command economy and state ownership of the means of production
to private property and the market. The fourth concerned defense and the
military-industrial complex, the changes in this sphere to encompass the
establishment of civilian control over the armed forces, defense conver-
sion and the curtailment of the power and influence of the military in po-
litics, the economy and society. The fifth was the nationality and federa-
tive problem, the logic of change in this area being the restructuring of the
unitary, centralized state and the establishment of a genuine federation
with new arrangements for power sharing. The sixth concerned foreign
policy, the transformative dynamics in this realm aiming at the replace-
ment of imperialism and the ideology of antagonism by a cooperative
mind-set and institutions attuned to interdependence and integration.
The difficulty and complexity of successfully managing this multi-
faceted transformation were enormous. The time frame in which it could
be achieved would not be years but decades. This, Gorbachev knew per-
fectly well. But the interconnectedness of issues was not always clearly
understood by Gorbachev and, when it was, it was often too late.836 Most
importantly for the ultimate outcome of the process, practically from the
very beginning of ‘radical reform’, he permitted severe imbalances to de-
velop among the various dimensions of the required transformations.
834 Miller, Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power, pp. 114-120; Brown, The Gor-
bachev Factor, p. 156.
835 Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 220.
836 This interpretation is controversial in the literature. Archie Brown, in particular,
has persuasively argued that Gorbachev was quite conscious of the interrelated-
ness of change in all dimensions and that his aim, developed through a learning
process, was social democracy in the Soviet Union. The counterargument here is
that, although Gorbachev used the term, he saw its content differently than, say,
West German social democrats.
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These imbalances concerned a rate of change in foreign policy that was
much more rapid than in the domestic sphere; in internal affairs, political
change that outpaced economic transformation; and evisceration of the
party apparat and its authority that failed to be matched by the establish-
ment and consolidation of new institutions. Most importantly, in an in
principle laudable but in the circumstances ill-advised attempt to build
consensus, Gorbachev declined to split the party, shed the orthodox and
conservative elements, form a new reform socialist or social democratic
organization, and invest his power and authority with a new source of pop-
ular legitimacy. He never campaigned at the head of a new party on a plat-
form of comprehensive and coherent political and economic reform. Until
the end, his position as leader of the country derived not from popular
elections but from the very institution which he was enervating – the CP-
SU.
This book is about the foreign policy dimension of change, rather than
about domestic politics. But that focus requires reconstruction of a dialec-
tic relationship between internal and external change. Its essence rests in
the fact that transformative change domestically was inconceivable with-
out repudiation of the internationalist precepts of Marxism-Leninism and
the imperial legacy and, conversely, that the dismantling of empire and
consent to German unification were impossible without emasculation of
the institutions wedded to the old thinking. What will not be attempted
here is a detailed chronological account of the changes in all dimensions
of policy. Instead the major events and trends in the international dimen-
sion affecting the German problem will be highlighted.
Some explanation of the structure of this chapter may also be appropri-
ate. The structure replicates the process of radical change in the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev. Ideas in that process came first. They were, pre-
dictably, not generated within the party apparat but by academic special-
ists. The latter were first to break new ground, and in many instances were
deliberately asked to do so by members of the small core of reform-mind-
ed political leaders. This had the dual advantage of testing reactions and
the strength of resistance in the party apparat and the military. Once the
philosophical terrain had suitably been prepared, the reformist core would
publicly and authoritatively associate itself with hitherto heretical pos-
itions. Given the fact that the Soviet system was built on ideology and that
power, institutions and ideology were inseparable, conceptual change was
followed by the replacement of personnel, institutional changes and reallo-
cation of resources. It is for this reason that the role of academic institutes
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and specialists will be examined first. Since the unconventional ideas were
first endorsed by Shevardnadze, who was appointed foreign minister early
in the reform process, in July 1985, and disseminated in the foreign min-
istry, his role and that of the ministry will be dealt with next. What follows
is analysis of the declining influence of the major losers in the struggle for
ideas and influence on policy-making, that is, the party apparat, the de-
fense ministry and the armed forces. It is the contention of this book that,
contrary to opinion firmly held by some Western observers and Russians
with a predilection for conspiracy theories, the KGB did not play an im-
portant part in either promoting or resisting change. Its role will be ana-
lyzed last.
The Academy of Sciences: International Relations Institutes and
Specialists
Except perhaps for the Kennedy administration in the United States, it is
difficult to find a political system and time period in which the influence
of academic specialists on foreign policy-making was as significant as in
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. This phenomenon was particularly as-
tounding if measured against past practice. Academic specialists had pre-
viously been constrained by censorship and the narrow parameters of
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Their access to the top political leadership un-
der previous leaders, with the partial exception of Andropov, was practi-
cally non-existent. Such influence as they were able to exert was through
party channels, which often diluted and distorted their input. Nevertheless,
the institutes on international affairs under the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences, with their contacts and exchanges with counterparts in Western
countries, represented ‘oases’ of independent thinking.837
The biggest, most prestigious and best connected of the research insti-
tutes on international affairs was the Institute of World Economy and In-
ternational Relations (IMEMO) at the USSR Academy of Sciences. Niko-
lai Inozemtsev had been its director in the 1970s and early 1980s. After
his death, he was succeeded by Alexander Yakovlev in 1983, followed by
Yevgeni Primakov in 1985. The institute played an important part in the
2.
837 Arbatov, The System, pp. 63-93, used this metaphor to describe the role of aca-
demic specialists of various institutions, including the institutes at the USSR
Academy of Sciences, on policy-making.
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conceptualization of Soviet foreign policy and was invariably involved in
the preparation of the reports of the Central Committee delivered by the
General Secretary to the CPSU party congresses, and it participated in the
drafting of party documents and speeches by party leaders. IMEMO also
spawned several specialized regional institutes, including the Institute for
the Study of the USA and Canada (ISKAN) at the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences, founded in 1967, with many of the researchers transferring from the
former to the latter institute, including its first director, Georgi Arbatov.838
Important and influential as IMEMO may have been, the institute did
not lend itself to a comprehensive reassessment of the German problem.
The ideologically ordained assumption of the division of the world into
two fundamentally opposed socio-economic systems, capitalism and so-
cialism, was reflected in the separation of academic institutes. These dealt
either with the politics and economics of the Western industrialized coun-
tries or with that of the socialist community. IMEMO dealt with the West-
ern world, including West Germany, but it did not have many specialists
on German affairs, and those whom they did have, were politically not
well connected and had no influence on decision-making. This was true,
for instance, for Danil Mel’nikov, affable, competent and well respected in
West Germany, and Danil Proektor, a retired army officer, whose special-
ization were military and security issues with a focus specifically on West
Germany’s role in European security.839
East Germany fell under the purview of the Institute for the Economics
of the World Socialist System (IEMSS), headed by Oleg Bogomolov. This
institute dealt not only with economic but also with political affairs per-
taining to socialist countries. Even well before Gorbachev’s ascendancy to
power it was a repository of unconventional thinking. In 1979, for in-
stance, it issued a report advising against military intervention in
838 Arbatov had worked at IMEMO. In 1967, when he founded ISKAN, he was
working for Andropov at the CC as a member of a Group of Consultants.
839 I had the opportunity to discuss German issues with both researchers – at
IMEMO, at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and at many interna-
tional conferences. Mel’nikov struck me as having a far more independent mind
than Proektor. What was vexing and disappointing was the fact that the latter, in
the frequent discussions, would express understanding for West German views on
European security, while the articles he published subsequently lacked any of
that.
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Afghanistan.840 On its staff were also some of the most radical critics of
Soviet policy on the German problem – Vyacheslav Dashichev, head of
IEMSS’s foreign policy section, and Alexander Tsipko, a specialist on
Poland and East Germany. Their inputs to policy-making on the German
problem will be discussed later.
It was not until January 1988, with Gorbachev’s Common European
Home firmly established as a slogan, that an Institute on Europe was
founded. Vitaly Zhurkin, a specialist on U.S. and arms control matters,
was its founding director and Vladimir Shenayev, an expert on German
economic affairs, was its deputy director, the directing staff later to be
joined by Sergei Karaganov.841 The foundation of the institute presented
the opportunity to integrate research, conferences, and policy advice on
both Western Europe and Eastern Europe as well as on East and West Ger-
many, but the opportunity was missed. The research and policy-making
agenda remained focussed on Western Europe.
Independent minds could be found not only in institutes on international
relations but in some of the Central Committee departments (these will be
dealt with later), as well as in some newspapers and journals. For instance,
the World Marxist Review, with its head offices in Prague, was one of the
breeding grounds of non-conformist thought. Given its intended function –
to spread the CPSU’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in the interna-
tional communist movement – the journal may seem even in retrospect a
rather unlikely place for relative intellectual autonomy. And indeed, the ar-
ticles it published were for the most part uninspiring, rehashing the CP-
SU’s line. But, as occasionally happened in the Soviet system, the special
position it enjoyed depended less on the purposes of its foundation and the
institutional setting than on its personalities and their power and influence.
In this case, its importance as an oasis of independent thought derived in
large measure from Alexei Rumyantsev, its editor-in-chief, who attracted
840 Bogomolov confirmed this in conversation with this author, as did Dashichev and
Tsipko. The point that the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System
advised against intervention, but that the advice was disregarded, was also made
in various articles and interviews by other staff members of the institute.
841 Shenayev wrote his doctoral thesis on the West German currency reform in 1948.
In contrast to Zhurkin, he harboured deft anti-American sentiments. When I visit-
ed the institute in October 1988, I had a heated exchange with him on the role of
the United States in Europe. The discussion ended – abruptly – when he slammed
his fist on the table and exclaimed that the United States had ‘absolutely no busi-
ness in Europe’.
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talented and creative writers to the journal and was not afraid to defend
them.842 Among these were Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov, and Ivan Frolov
(all three were subsequently to become personal assistants to Gorbachev),
and Arbatov (later, as mentioned, head of ISKAN).843
Perhaps even more paradoxically, another oasis in the intellectual desert
under Brezhnev was the Socialist Countries Department under Andropov
in the 1960s.844 The Group of Consultants he gathered around him reads
almost like a Who’s Who of advocates of an improvement in Soviet rela-
tions with the West and of theoreticians of the New Thinking. They in-
cluded the already mentioned Arbatov, Bogomolov and Shakhnazarov;
Fyodor Burlatsky, an eminent political scientist and head of one of the
sub-departments; Alexander Bovin, who later became a well known jour-
nalist writing as political commentator for Izvestiia; Nikolai Shishlin, a
political scientist and publicist; and Gennadi Gerasimov, who later be-
came spokesman for the foreign ministry.845 Since Gorbachev was an An-
dropov protégé, it is not surprising that all of them were to play a role in
one capacity or another when the former came to power.
The outlines of the New Thinking were drawn in the previous chapter.
What is necessary here is to reconstruct in more detail and more precisely
the major departures from old thinking, to associate them with personali-
ties and institutions, and to identify the main institutional targets or vic-
tims of the new thinking. To emphasize the main point of this endeavor,
since ideas and ideology and the Soviet system were intimately connected
with power and resources, the challenge to traditional Soviet thinking on
foreign policy and international security issues was bound to detract from
the power and authority of the institutions that were the mainstays of em-
pire – the party apparatus and the military.
Erosion and Collapse of Ideology. Concerning Marxist-Leninist ideolo-
gy, as on all other major issues, the Gorbachev era began with modest re-
vision, produced a chain reaction that spun out of control and ended in
collapse. This process in the international dimensions of ideology began
with a reinterpretation of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Previous attempts at ex-
842 Arbatov, The System, p. 80.
843 Chernyaev was appointed advisor on foreign policy in February 1986;
Shakhnazarov, to deal with Eastern Europe, in October 1988; and Ivan Frolov, to
advise on ideological issues, in January 1987.
844 Andropov was head of the department from 1962 to 1967.
845 Arbatov, The Soviet System, p. 88.
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panding cooperative relations with capitalist states had been hampered by
the dogma about ‘irreconcilable contradictions between the two world sys-
tems. Even in the era of significant revision of the dogma under
Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence was still regarded as a ‘special form of
class struggle’, and this was also the main emphasis given to the concept
under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. As the Gorbachev era pro-
gressed, it was not capitalism that was ‘buried’ but the very idea of class
struggle. ‘Marxism as such’, Yakovlev claimed, ‘is the understanding of
common interests from the viewpoint of history and the perspective of the
development of all humanity and not just certain of its countries and class-
es’.846 Peace was declared to have priority over the class struggle. The in-
divisibility of international security was underlined, and the way to
achieve security was said to be not by military-technical means but by po-
litical efforts. War in the nuclear age was proclaimed to be ‘inadmissible’
(nedopustimyi), a statement with which the theoreticians of the New
Thinking made short shrift of the previously elaborate distinctions be-
tween ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars.
Formalized perceptions of the basic structural features of the opposed
socio-economic system were also revised. The orthodox Leninist view of
imperialism (‘the highest stage of capitalism’) as inherently and irrevoca-
bly aggressive, structurally incapable of disarming, and therefore attempt-
ing to solve its deepening systemic crisis by militarism, was first put in
doubt and then abandoned. One IMEMO analyst even engaged in the
time-honored practice of nonconformist analysts in the Soviet era to dis-
credit orthodox Marxist-Leninist notions by attributing them to Western
theorists. ‘It is inadmissible’, he wrote, ‘to agree with the assertions by
certain Western [sic] politicians and researchers to the effect that disarma-
ment inevitably leads to economic decline and an increase in unemploy-
ment.’ Past experience had shown that conversion of military resources
was ‘achieved without serious negative consequences both in socialist and
in capitalist countries’.847
Military Power as a Questionable Means to Achieve Political Influence.
On the practical issues of foreign policy, academic specialists expressed
846 Speech in Vilnius, Pravda, 13 August 1988 (italics mine).
847 R. A. Faramazian, Gonka vooruzhenii v stranakh NATO, published under the aus-
pices of the Scientific Council for Research on Problems of Peace and Disarma-
ment at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
(Moscow: Nauka, 1988), pp. 184-85.
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doubt as to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the use of military
power for political ends, and they thereby questioned the rationale of the
Soviet attempt to maintain parity in the military-strategic realm and pre-
ponderance in conventional weapons. They certainly, not least through
their contacts with Western colleagues, were conscious of both the costs of
empire and the ‘paradox of superpower’ – enormous military power but a
weak and declining socio‑economic base. They argued for a better balance
between military and other means of exerting influence in world affairs;
improvement of the Soviet record on human rights; enhancement of the
Soviet Union’s diplomatic, political and cultural presence in countries and
organizations in which it had been underrepresented or not represented at
all; participation at the international economic level in organizations such
as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); and the construction not only of legal, organiza-
tional ties but also of political arrangements with the European Communi-
ty. In order to reduce the costs of empire, contain the political and econo-
mic consequences of conflicts with the United States and lessen the risk of
counter-intervention or counterrevolution supported by Washington, they
advocated scaling down existing international involvements, above all in
Afghanistan, and desisting from making new commitments in the Third
World, in particular in the military sphere. The Soviet Union, as Primakov
argued in June 1988, ‘has taken the firm decision to scale down its mili-
tary presence abroad’.848
Foreign Policy Decision-Making. In accordance with the criticism of
the overemphasis on the military instrument in foreign policy, academic
specialists attacked the previous predominance of military rationales. The
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the decision to station SS-20 inter-
mediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia were mentioned as par-
ticularly glaring examples of such a mistaken approach to international se-
curity affairs.849 ‘Overcentralisation’ in foreign policy-making was as-
sailed as one of the many ‘deformations’ that did ‘great harm to Soviet na-
848 Yevgeni Primakov, ‘USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts’, International Affairs
(Moscow), No. 6 (June 1988), p. 7.
849 A good example of this were the replies to questions from viewers by Nikolai
Shishlin, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee’s propaganda department,
Moscow television service, in Russian, 26 July 1988.
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tional security interests’.850 Decisions, as Dashichev deplored, were made
by a self-declared ‘elite’, by a few leaders in the Politburo, the top deci-
sion-making body − by Brezhnev (party chief), Suslov (responsible for
ideological matters), Gromyko (foreign minister) and Ustinov (defense
minister). ‘Unfortunately, the experts’ voices didn’t have any influence.
And the public received no information at all.’851 Concerning the INF is-
sue, they said that the decision to produce and deploy the SS-20 missiles
and to do so rapidly and in great numbers was motivated by an erroneous
definition of security interests; by a false sense of needing over-insurance
and superiority in numbers (‘the more missiles, the more stable [Soviet]
security’);852 and ‘by technological advances rather than political process-
es’.853
Redefinition of Threats. The theoreticians of New Thinking also rede-
fined the nature of threats facing the USSR. They pointed out that in the
past, notably in the ‘period of stagnation’ under Brezhnev, a number of
factors had contributed to the construction of certain stereotypes of the en-
emy (obrazy vraga). These had included the ‘consideration of the differ-
ences and contradictions between the two social systems and between in-
dividual countries as an absolute given’; the adherence to ‘ideological
remnants of the theory of “world revolution”’; and ‘clinging to secretive-
ness, suspicion and impenetrable “monolithism”’.854
They also asked whether ‘our orthodox social scientists, armed with
quotations, have not painted the world in extreme moralistic colours as an
arena in which “good” and “evil” are struggling with each other’.855 In
their view, it was necessary to dispose of the idea that a competitor invari-
ably had to be considered an ‘enemy’. One had to embark on a ‘radical
departure from the traditions of the past’, on a ‘de-escalation of political
850 Vyacheslav Dashichev, ‘Vostok–Zapad: poisk novykh otnoshenii: O prioritetakh
vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva’, Literaturnaia gazeta, 18 May 1988;
see also his interview with the West German news magazine, Der Spiegel, 4 July
1988, p. 124.
851 Dashichev, interview in Der Spiegel.
852 Igor Malaschenko, ‘Warum bauen wir mehr Raketen ab?‘, Neue Zeit (Moscow),
No. 7 (1988), p. 21.
853 Sergei Vybornov, Andrei Gusenkov, and Vladimir Leontiev, ‘Nothing Is Simple
in Europe’, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3 (March 1988), p. 41.
854 A. Iu. Mel'vil, ‘“Obraz vraga” i novoe politicheskoe myshlenie’, SShA, No. 1
(January 1988), p. 34.
855 Ibid.
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rhetoric … and emancipation from those of its forms which are most
strongly ideological and portraying matters as absolute’.856 Zhurkin admit-
ted that, ‘you, me, us political commentators, scientists as well as the mili-
tary press, we overstated the threat of war ... at a time when a rationally
organized nuclear attack on the Soviet Union was impossible because a re-
taliatory response would have followed’.857
Public opinion polls were one of the important facets of glasnost and
were used to support rethinking in international politics. A case in point
was the publication of a survey of threat perceptions of West Germany and
the Germans conducted in May 1989 (see Table 4).858 The timing is im-
portant since this was a period before discussion about German unification
had begun to affect opinion in the Soviet Union. The survey revealed a
wide discrepancy between decades of hostile anti-West German propagan-
da and public perceptions. Only a small minority felt threatened by the
Federal Republic. To the extent that threat perceptions existed, they were
of a hypothetical and indirect nature, most likely derived from the idea
that West Germany could be drawn into a war by the United States.
Reconsideration of the Content and Importance of the ‘Correlation of
Forces’. Another important change in thinking on security matters was the
strong emphasis on economic components in the ‘correlation of forces’.
Views were expressed to the effect that ‘in our contemporary world the pa-
rameters of world power are determined first and foremost by economic,
scientific, and technical indicators’;859 that after the advent of mutual de-
terrence the imperialist countries, notably the United States and its De-
fense Department, had changed tack and devised a new strategy aimed at
‘economically exhausting the USSR through a lengthy arms race’ and for-
mulating
856 Ibid., pp. 30 and 39.
857 In a discussion on Soviet television with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Petrovsky and V. S. Zorin, political observer of Soviet TV and modera-
tor of the discussion, 30 July 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-148, 2 August 1988.
858 ‘Obraz nemtsa i FRG v SSSR’, Moskovskie novosti, No. 25, 18 June 1989, p. 7.
The poll was conducted by telephone between 12 and 14 May 1989. There were
851 respondents.
859 Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, ‘Vyzovy bezopasnosti –
starye i novye’, Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 47-48; see also their ‘O
razumnoi dostatochnosti’, SShA, No. 12 (December 1987), pp. 13-14.
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Threat Perceptions of Germany
1.  Do you personally feel that the USSR is threatened by West Germany?
 Yes, strongly 3
 Theoretically there is a threat, but for all practical  
 purposes it does not exist 20
 No, I don’t feel that it is 54
 There is no threat whatsoever 17
2.  Do you think that war with West Germany in this century is possible?
 Practically impossible 66
 Not very probable but I don’t exclude such a possibility 29
 The possibility of war with the FRG is quite high 1
3.  From which country or region do you feel the USSR is threatened most?
 USA 19
 FRG 3
 Near East 2
 Asian Countries 2
 Britain, France 0.6
 Don’t feel threatened by any country 54
military programs, ‘to which an effective Soviet response would be sub-
stantially more costly than these programmes,860 so that what was needed
were ‘real results from perestroika and in particular the creation of a bal-
ance between [the application of] military and nonmilitary means in inter-
national affairs’.861 Since the end of the 1970s, the military had warned
that modern, technologically sophisticated armed forces could only be
maintained on the basis of a modern, efficient economy. They had also as-
serted that it was the aim of NATO to redirect the arms race into the tech-
nological sphere and thereby impoverish and defeat the Warsaw Pact
countries.862 But academic specialists and the military had different views
as to how the Soviet Union should cope with such a challenge. The idea of
the civilian specialists was to reform and modernize the economy rather
than to continue pouring resources into the military-industrial sector. Gor-
Table 4:
860 Zhurkin et al., ‘Vyzovy bezopasnosti’, pp. 47-48.
861 Vladimir Lukin in discussion with Alexander Bovin, ‘Na poroge novogo veka’,
MEMO, No. 12 (December 1987), p. 53.
862 For a statement to that effect see, for instance, the Warsaw Pact commander in
chief, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, Doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma. O voennoi
doktrine gosudarstvuchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1988), p. 83.
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bachev and the foreign ministry under Shevardnadze agreed with the civil-
ian rather than the military viewpoint.863
Military Doctrine. The challenge of academic specialists was extended
to one of the most sensitive and most jealously guarded preserve of the
military – military doctrine. Military parity in the past had been measured
against the sum total of the military capabilities of all the major potential
adversaries combined, that is, the USA, Western Europe, Japan, and Chi-
na. Military strategy had to meet the criterion of the armed forces’ ability
successfully to conduct offensive operations and to inflict ‘annihilating
blows’ on the enemy. Civilian analysts explicitly attacked such wide defi-
nitions of security requirements as militarily unnecessary and economical-
ly damaging and advocated instead the construction of military forces that
would meet the requirement of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ (razumnaia dosta-
tochnost’).864 They ventured into the history of warfare and tried to show
that strategic conventional defense often proved superior to offense.865 Vi-
tali Shlykov, a free-lance journalist, engaged in a particularly scathing and
uncompromising attack on military incompetence and the military’s
predilection for quantitative superiority. He chastised as obsolete the ‘pre-
nuclear thinking’ of the military that tanks were a ‘kind of universal
equivalent of military power’ that could make up for the lack of combat
skill.866 The reinterpretation of military history justified force reductions
and emphasis on quality rather than quantity. It also posited as an impor-
tant aim in conventional arms control negotiations the restructuring of the
armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact so that they would have a
mutual ‘structural inability’ to launch an attack, and in particular a sur-
863 See, for instance, Gorbachev’s speeches at a meeting in Vladivostok on 28 July
1986, Pravda, 29 July 1986, and at the Eighteenth congress of the Soviet trade
unions on February 25, 1987, Pravda, 26 February 1987. The MFA’s support of
these views was expressed by Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky in a discussion
on Soviet television on 30 July 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-148, 2 August 1988.
864 See V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, ‘Vyzovy bezopasnosti’ and id.,
‘O razumnoi dostatochnosti’.
865 Andrei A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, ‘Kurskaia bitva v svete sovremennoi
oboronitel’noi doktriny’, MEMO, No. 8 (August 1987), pp. 32-40; id., ‘Protivos-
toianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obespecheniia strategicheskoi sta-
bil’nosti’, MEMO, No. l6 (June 1988), pp. 23-31.
866 Vitalii Shlykov, ‘“Strong Is the Armor”: Tank Asymmetry and Real Security’,
International Affairs (Moscow), No. 12 (1988), p. 39.
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prise attack.867 Movement towards such objectives was clearly reflected in
Gorbachev’s announcement of December 1988, as summarized above, to
withdraw six tank divisions and other forces and equipment from Eastern
Europe.868
To return to the question of why it was possible to put the New Think-
ing to political practice and how it was possible to ignore and overrule the
most powerful vested interests in the Soviet national security bureaucracy,
the communist party and the military, it is useful to refer to the decision-
making process in Moscow resulting in the December 1987 Washington
INF treaty. Policy-making concerning this issue was one of the earliest ex-
amples of the effective interplay between academic specialists and the for-
eign ministry. It set a pattern that was to be repeated on several important
foreign policy and international security issues, including the German
problem. Alexei Arbatov, at the time of the INF negotiations head of
IMEMO’s arms control and disarmament section and member of an advi-
sory group on arms control at the foreign ministry, aptly summed up the
pattern. An initial negotiating position would be formulated by an intera-
gency commission consisting of the Defense Ministry, as represented by
the General Staff; the Central Committee’s Department for Defense; the
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
and the KGB. The first three institutions formed a powerful coalition
whose positions were coordinated from the very beginning and were not
easily reversible by the top party leadership. Indeed, when presented with
a consensus decision by this or other important commissions, Gorbachev
would usually approve it. How, then, was it possible to overcome military
opposition? The answer that Arbatov gives to this question is the close co-
operation between the academic institutes and the foreign ministry and
their ‘back-channelling’.
Shevardnadze very often used the tactic if he could not [openly] oppose the
opinion of other agencies. Being in a minority of one, he would accept [their
opinion] for some time, even knowing that it would not be accepted at the ne-
gotiations. Then he would get reactions from the West, and then he would
bring those reactions back to Gorbachev, and give him his consideration. She-
vardnadze was not permanently at the negotiations and he brought these reac-
tions, and arguments and counterarguments, to the attention of Gorbachev and
Yakovlev. In this process, the Academy of Sciences, with its conferences,
867 Kokoshin and Larionov, ‘Kurskaia bitva’.
868 See pp. xxx.
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which were regularly – actually permanently – going on, either between East
and West or between Americans and Soviets on a bilateral basis, was very ac-
tive. In particular, there were two institutes at the Academy, the Institute on
the Study of the USA and Canada and the Institute on World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO) ... which very closely cooperated with the
Foreign Ministry. I would even venture to say that the Foreign Ministry on its
own would not have been capable of withstanding the pressure of all the other
agencies in the establishment.869
The portrayal reveals that the practice of decision-making by a small circle
of leaders, a practice decried so much by the academic specialists, was not
broken. However, the previous small circle of leaders, such as Brezhnev,
Suslov, Ustinov and Gromyko, was replaced by another, consisting of
Gorbachev and his personal assistants, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. There
were two more differences. In contrast to the preceding period, civilian in-
stitutions – the MFA and the academic institutes – were being involved
more prominently in international security affairs, and the content of poli-
cy was different. Obviously, not all radical advice was deemed acceptable
or practical. Not all academic specialists were equally influential or had
equal access to the top decision-makers. But almost invariably their input
had some impact. This applies even to some of the most controversial ad-
vice on one of the most sensitive topics – the German problem.
An example of this is the role of Dashichev. In January 1987, in his ca-
pacity as head of a research unit (sektor) at IEMSS, he wrote a highly crit-
ical analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s and early 1980s.870 He
radically attacked the whole conceptual basis of Soviet policy and, in par-
ticular, decried the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence by military
means; the pretension to be militarily equal to all other powers; the build-
up of a blue-water navy that exceeded any reasonable definition of securi-
ty needs; the deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles; overemphasis on the ‘peace movement’ in Western Europe; and
869 ‘Policy Formation in the USSR on the INF Treaty: An Interview with Alexei Ar-
batov’, Nuclear History Program (NHP), Oral History Transcript, Center for In-
ternational Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of
Maryland, NHP Transcript No. 3 [n.d]. Alexei Arbatov is the son of ISKAN Di-
rector Georgi Arbatov.
870 Dashichev’s analytical report or memorandum was dated 4 January 1987. The
text was published in German translation in Osteuropa (May 1993), pp. 485-90.
The subsequent portrayal of how Shevardnadze and the MFA bureaucracy treated
the report is based on Wjatscheslaw Daschitschew, ‘Wie das Umdenken in der
sowjetischen Außenpolitik begann’, Osteuropa (May 1993), pp. 482-83.
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risky guarantees to shaky Third World regimes. He also made some policy
recommendations, suggesting democratic legitimation and parliamentary
control of foreign policy and the establishment of foreign affairs commit-
tees that would have both controlling and advisory functions in relation to
the foreign ministry.
The report was forwarded by IEMSS director Bogomolov to Shevard-
nadze. In contrast to the state of affairs under the ancien régime, the report
elicited a positive response. In March 1987, Dashichev was appointed
chairman of the Scientific Advisory Council at the MFA’s socialist coun-
tries' department, a body founded to contribute to the solution of foreign
policy problems and, after Shevardnadze’s appointment, to promote the
New Thinking in the foreign ministry. Upon Dashichev’s initiative, on 27
November 1987 – for the first time since the 1950s! – the Council dealt
with the German problem. Various options for change in intra-German re-
lations were being discussed, including the possibility and desirability of
German unification. Dashichev argued that the division of Germany
harmed Soviet national interests and that it was necessary to change Soviet
policy on the German problem and direct it towards closer relations be-
tween the two Germanys and eventual reunification. This heretical idea
was rejected by the participants in the meeting but a taboo was broken.871
One of the questions that has puzzled Western scholars is Dashichev’s
putative impact on Soviet thinking or, more precisely, that of Gorbachev,
Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. Addressing this issue, Karaganov has ex-
plained that in the Soviet foreign policy establishment there were four
schools of thought on the German problem.872 The first was that of No
Change and Don’t Touch It. The second could be described as Let’s Ap-
pear Flexible but Adhere to the Status Quo, its rationale being that such a
stance would provide the Soviet Union with leverage over West German
and East German policies. The third could be labelled Let’s Be Flexible
and Keep an Open Mind. This openness extended to the possibility of
871 Ibid.
872 Karaganov in conversation with the author (Moscow, May 1990). For the four
schools of thought in the context of four stages in the evolution of Soviet policy
on the German problem, see Sergei Karaganov, ‘Implications of German Unifica-
tion for the Former Soviet Union’, in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany in
the New Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 331-64.
The labels of convenience used here for the schools of thought are my own, not
Karaganov’s.
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eventual German reunification. The fourth was that of Take the Initiative
Now and actively work towards German unification rather than be faced
with unplanned and unmanageable conditions later. Adherents for the first
position could be found in the foreign ministry and the party apparatus.
Majority opinion was that of schools two and three. The last school, ac-
cording to Karaganov, had only one advocate – Dashichev.
Kvitsinsky has dryly remarked that Dashichev ‘elevated himself to the
role of an advisor to Gorbachev, which was untrue but was not refuted by
anyone’.873 It was refuted. When German unification was on the interna-
tional agenda, but its status in European security undecided, MFA
spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh asserted that ‘Professor Dashichev and his
political allies are not members of the expert community participating in
working out Soviet policies.’874 Similarly, Tsipko has confirmed that
Dashichev ‘supported the idea of the German unification and united Ger-
many’s membership in NATO’ but he called the idea that he (Dashichev)
may have had significant influence on Soviet policy-making on the Ger-
man problem a ‘myth’.875 But he has also made an observation that may
shed some light on why it is that so many of Dashichev’s contemporaries
have deprecated his role. Tsipko has stated that, in the period until the fall
of 1989, he read many documents compiled by various institutes at the
Academy of Sciences advocating the idea that we need to support closer
relations between the two German states. ‘However, none of these docu-
ments considered the possibility of German unification and NATO mem-
bership. That was lacking.’876 Dashichev, in contrast, had considered this
possibility and supported turning it into reality. He had, thereby, commit-
ted an offense, serious even in the era of New Thinking. He was right –
but too early.
But why was there no comprehensive reconsideration and implementa-
tion of change in Soviet policy on the German problem in 1985-89? The
reasons for this failure, to be explored further in the following sections,
are not that Gorbachev and his associates were frustrated in any attempt to
embark on new initiatives by a determined party and military opposition,
and not that any advice to depart from previous approaches was lacking.
They themselves and the majority of academic specialists thought it expe-
873 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 13.
874 TASS, 4 April 1990.
875 Interview with Tsipko.
876 Ibid.
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dient to stay the traditional course and were not to be deflected from it by
counsel provided by a minority of one. This interim conclusion can be
confirmed by an analysis of the role of the foreign ministry in policy-mak-
ing on the German problem.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In the period of Soviet imperial construction and decline the role of the
foreign ministry in the Soviet Union, in comparison to that in other com-
munist systems, was an anomaly. Its influence on policy-making was far
greater in Moscow than in other communist capitals. Although the Soviet
Constitution allocated to the CPSU the ‘leading role’ in politics and soci-
ety, including in foreign policy, in practice, in the era of Brezhnev, An-
dropov and Chernenko, the foreign ministry held a preeminent position in
its functional realm. This was due in large measure to the authority and
power that Gromyko had acquired in his almost forty years as foreign mi-
nister. Chernyaev has even characterized Gromyko as having exercised a
‘monopoly’ in foreign policy.877 This was to some extent the result of the
specific features of his career. Gromyko was appointed chief of the Ameri-
can desk at the foreign ministry in 1939. He participated in his capacity as
embassy counsellor and then as ambassador to Washington in the war-time
conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and he headed the ministry
starting in 1957. In these various capacities, he had dealt with each and ev-
ery American president from Roosevelt to Reagan. Given the fact that So-
viet-American relations had been a central concern of Soviet diplomacy in
the Cold War and that Gromyko embodied the institutional memory of the
ministry, he had an important competitive advantage in domestic power
struggles over foreign policy. This is indicated, for instance, by his promo-
tion to full membership in the Politburo in 1973, whereas another long-
serving head of a rival party institution, chief of the Central Committee’s
International Department (ID) Boris Ponomarev, was able to advance only
in 1971 to the position of candidate member. His advancement was
blocked by Gromyko so that he remained ‘perennially first among the sec-
ond’.878
3.
877 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 49.
878 Ibid.
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New thinking or new policies were hardly to be expected from
Gromyko. This was true most of all with regard to the German problem.
He was thoroughly preoccupied with Soviet-American relations and pre-
ferred to deal with European affairs over the heads of the Europeans. The
rising international influence of West Germany he regarded with as much
suspicion and irritation as Honecker’s policy of making political conces-
sions in exchange for West German credits.879 But it was Gromyko’s con-
servative attitudes and policies in general, not his central focus on the
United States or his stance on the German problem, that induced Gor-
bachev in June 1985 to appoint a new head of the foreign ministry. To al-
most everyone’s surprise, the person to succeed him was not one of the se-
nior professional diplomats – Georgi Kornienko, Anatoly Dobrynin or
Yuli Vorontsov – but Eduard Shevardnadze, an ‘outsider’.880 Gromyko
‘initially almost seemed shocked’.881 Shevardnadze, too, was unprepared:
‘To say that I was surprised would be an understatement’, he has written
about the telephone call in which Gorbachev asked him to take the MFA
position. The party leader notes in his memoirs that the appointment ‘na-
tionally and internationally was met with immeasurable astonishment’ and
goes on to say: ‘Many people expressed incomprehension and disapproval
because a non-Russian was given responsibility for this extraordinarily
important function’.882
The ethnic factor, however, was neither a salient criterion for Shevard-
nadze’s appointment nor the primary reason for the consternation and con-
879 Some of the evidence presented here of Gromyko’s uncompromising attitudes on
the German problem and his annoyance and irritation with both West German
and East German policies has included his attempt to force Honecker to inform
his Politburo colleagues about Soviet-East German differences; his criticism of
Honecker on the debt and dependency issue; his hard line towards Bonn on the
stationing of intermediate-range nuclear missiles; his stance in the August 1984
emergency meeting in Moscow on all major issues of both East German and West
German foreign policy; and the catalogue of complaints and grievances handed to
visiting West German president von Weizsäcker in July 1987.
880 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 48-49; Chernyaev also puts Chervo-
nenko on the list of possible replacements for Gromyko. Kornienko, Vorontsov,
and Dobrynin were specifically mentioned by Gromyko when he and Gorbachev
discussed the issue in a Politburo meeting at the beginning of July 1985. The
meeting included Shevardnadze, who had been asked to attend; Gorbachev,
Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 288.
881 Ibid.
882 Ibid.
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cern among MFA officials. Gorbachev justified his choice by claiming
that the party should be in charge of foreign relations.883 After the October
revolution, Soviet foreign ministers had belonged to one of two categories.
In one group were those, like Chicherin, Litvinov, and, at the time of his
appointment, Gromyko, all of whom had relatively little political power
but were chosen for their professional skill. In the second category were
those, notably Trotsky, Molotov, and to some extent Dmitri Shepilov, who
enjoyed a certain stature in the party or had close personal ties to the party
leader. Shevardnadze clearly belonged to the second group.884 In choosing
an outsider as foreign minister and having the Central Committee elect
him as a full member to the Politburo, Gorbachev was applying the same
logic that he would later, in 1989, apply to the CPSU: that it would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for an institution and its personnel with vested in-
terests to embark on fundamental organizational and conceptual change.
There were other reasons for Gorbachev to opt for Shevardnadze: ‘He
successfully contended with difficult circumstances in Georgia; he is
courageous, has a sense of what is new and [is able to] develop new ap-
proaches.’885 Discussing his plans with KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov and
party secretary Yegor Ligachev, he also argued: ‘The future [foreign] mi-
nister should, in my opinion, be an eminent political personality.’886 Expe-
rience in foreign affairs was not a criterion for his choice. This he clarified
in conversation with Shevardnadze. ‘No experience? Well, perhaps that’s a
good thing. Our foreign policy needs a fresh eye, courage, dynamism and
innovative approaches’.887
Gorbachev had developed a favourable opinion of Shevardnadze
through contacts with him dating back to the December 1956 plenary
meeting of the Committee of the Komsomol when he was first secretary of
the Central Committee of the Komsomol in Georgia and Gorbachev first
883 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 49.
884 This categorization was suggested by John Van Oudenaren, The Role of Shevard-
nadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and
Arms Control Policy, Rand Research Report R-3898-USDP, Prepared for the Un-
der Secretary of Defense for Policy, July 1990, p. 4.
885 As quoted by Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 48-49.
886 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. I, p. 288. In his memoirs (ibid., pp. 287-289), Gorbachev
fails to emphasize the aspect of party affiliation and control as a criterion for
choosing Gromyko’s successor.
887 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 81.
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Komsomol secretary in Stavropol.888 ‘At that time’, as he writes in his
memoirs, Shevardnadze ‘did not yet speak Russian fluently’. He was also
‘not a “pace setter for youth”, as it was then called’, and he didn’t seem to
possess many leadership qualities. But there was something in his psycho-
logical and political make-up that Gorbachev found appealing. A relation-
ship of trust was established and confirmed subsequently when they were
party secretaries in neighbouring Georgia and Stavropol’ krai respectively,
and when Gorbachev advanced to the position of secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee.889 They met frequently, not only on official party
business but also privately, at Gorbachev’s dacha at the Black Sea resort
town of Pitsunda, in Abkhazia.
Despite their similarity in outlook, foreign observers have commented
on salient differences in the personality of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.
Based on his many meetings with both leaders, Secretary of State James
Baker described Gorbachev as always beaming with energy and confi-
dence, as someone who had an actor’s gift to fill a stage with his presence,
who exuded an upbeat attitude and optimism, and who was invariably pos-
itive. While the task the reformers faced was daunting, it was not hard to
feel – Baker thought – that Gorbachev’s confidence alone might carry per-
estroika to success. Less kind critics, particularly in the Soviet Union,
were to go one step further and chastise the Soviet leader for naiveté. She-
vardnadze, in contrast, according to Baker,
carried an aura of wisdom and insight into just how difficult the task was be-
fore them. Sometimes it seemed such wisdom carried a psychological cost.
As reform became more difficult, his shoulders seemed to carry the burdens
of the world, his grandfatherly hair made him look older than he was, and the
patches under his eyes seemed to darken and lengthen, reflecting, it seemed,
the true tragedy of Soviet history. The more I would work with these two
men, the more I would see this difference – and the more I came to believe
that Shevardnadze was perhaps the more realistic of the two.890
888 There is a minor discrepancy here between Shevardnadze’s and Gorbachev’s ac-
count. Gorbachev (Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 287-88) writes that he met Shevardnadze
for the first time at the Twelfth Congress of the Komsomol in March 1954. She-
vardnadze (Moi vybor, p. 58) states that they met at a Komsomol Central Com-
mittee plenary meeting in Moscow in December 1956.
889 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 287-88. Similary, Shevardnadze (Moi vybor,
pp. 59-60) speaks about ‘three decades of friendship’ and a relationship of ‘trust’
that existed between them.
890 James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revo-
lution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), p. 79.
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It was Shevardnadze’s status as an outsider that was a source of irritation
and annoyance at the MFA. The mentality pervading this institution was
aptly summed up in its strident slogan of MID dlia midovskikh, or the
‘MFA [is] for foreign ministry officials [only]’.891 His political back-
ground and the reputation that preceded him before his arrival at the min-
istry was for them a cause of apprehension. In Georgia, from 1965 to
1968, Shevardnadze had been minister of the interior and, starting in 1972,
first secretary of the party. In both capacities, he had made valiant and,
considering the firmly rooted racketeering and protection networks and
free-wheeling black market activities in that southern republic, futile at-
tempts to weed out corruption. (These were presumably the ‘difficult cir-
cumstances in Georgia’ to which Gorbachev had referred.) The form that
the attempts had taken were extensive personnel changes and prosecution
for illegal activities. No wonder that the MFA expected Shevardnadze un-
compromisingly to wield the broom to clean up the ministry’s Augean sta-
bles. Kvitsinsky has vividly described such concerns:
At the foreign ministry in Moscow there was an atmosphere of tense expecta-
tion. Hardly anyone of the foreign ministry officials knew Shevardnadze. No
one was able to say anything specific about his foreign policy concepts. Ru-
mours persisted stubbornly to the effect that he would turn the whole foreign
ministry upside down and fundamentally reorganize it. Such prospects initial-
ly terrified and paralyzed the foreign ministry.892
There are different interpretations of the extent to which Shevardnadze, in
his position as first party secretary in Georgia, can be considered to have
steered a ‘liberal’ or ‘reformist’ course. In the party apparat in Moscow,
there were many who looked at him merely as a ‘tough policeman, not as
a man of ideas and certainly not of liberal ideas; some officials made un-
kind allusions to Stalin and Beria as also having been Georgian, and ru-
mour abounded that after the war he had been a commandant of a Stalinist
labour camp’.893 Other observers, mostly Western, regarded him as having
been an ‘unusually successful first secretary in Georgia, improving the re-
public’s agriculture and industry while conducting a quiet but effective
liberalization campaign to loosen political controls’.894 The truth lies prob-
ably somewhere in the middle. Shevardnadze, at the time of his appoint-
891 Interviews with Grigoriev.
892 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 371.
893 Interviews with Grigoriev.
894 Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened, p. 105.
3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
383
ment to the foreign ministry, was in all likelihood someone who looked at
the Soviet system essentially through the same lenses as Andropov and
Gorbachev, and probably would have agreed very much with what the lat-
ter once explicitly asserted, that ‘only 20 percent of the potential of the so-
cialist order is being effectively utilized at present in the areas of the econ-
omy, politics, science and culture’.895 In that view, the Soviet Union could
be transformed into a modern country by setting a personal example of
self-discipline, hard work, honesty and flexibility and conducting a sound
personnel policy to elevate like-minded leaders to responsible positions.
Gorbachev was convinced that he and Shevardnadze were like-minded.
By bringing the latter into the foreign ministry and the Politburo, he acted
on the idea of creating a strong reformist centre in the party and of having
someone at his side whom he could trust and on whom he could rely in the
domestic power struggle.
Looking at Shevardnadze’s tenure as foreign minister from June 1985
to December 1990, how justified was the MFA officials’ anxiety about
large-scale personnel changes? 896 For the most part, it turned out to be
unwarranted. There were some transfers and institutional changes. New
departments and sections were created. New concepts and ideas were im-
plemented in accordance with the New Thinking. However, the vast ma-
jority of foreign ministry officials emerged from the ordeal perhaps
scarred but essentially intact. As in many other institutions, the inertia of
the system was to triumph.897
Institutional impediments to change were particularly strong in the
MFA departments dealing with Eastern Europe and East Germany. In his
memoirs, Shevardnadze laments the mentality of the officials responsible
for this area at MFA headquarters and the type and quality of the ambas-
sadors posted there. He deplores interference of the party in the ministry’s
affairs and decries the congruence of outlook of both party officials and
MFA personnel.
895 Transcript of the conversation between Honecker and Gorbachev on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin, SED, Central Archives, Büro Honecker, 41666 (indirect
speech).
896 Shevardnadze returned briefly to his position as foreign minister in November
1991 but resigned with Gorbachev in the following month when the Soviet Union
was formally dissolved.
897 Interview with Tarasenko.
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Fed on the dogma of the division of the world into ‘coexisting systems’, our
party officials and diplomats could not conceive of any major changes. Practi-
cally speaking, the party official and the diplomat spoke as one person be-
cause the ideological and political ‘kinship’ of party-state hierarchies in the
countries of the former socialist community presupposed unquestioning sub-
ordination of diplomats to the nomenklatura.898
He also regrets a specific feature of Soviet-East European relations: ‘Top
party officials were appointed to ambassadorial posts in Eastern Europe,
and those appointments were made exclusively by the Politburo.’899 The
officials chosen were often first secretaries of important oblasts. This
practice betrayed a deeply rooted imperial mind-set. It indicated that the
working assumption of the Politburo and the message accordingly con-
veyed to local potentates was that Moscow considered the countries in
which its ambassadors would be stationed not as independent and
sovereign states but as administrative entities of the same order as those
existing in the Soviet Union itself.
But this practice had its costs. Communist party transnationalism
severely undercut diplomacy.
The subordination [of diplomats to the nomenklatura] determined the way de-
cisions were made. Former party officials appealed to higher party levels in
all questions, bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And in the countries
where they were posted they would often act in a similar way, going directly
to the top and ignoring the foreign ministries of the host country.900
Transnationalism also worked in the opposite direction. After having es-
tablished relations of trust with the new reformist foreign ministers in
Eastern Europe, Shevardnadze was told by them that ‘a number of influen-
tial people in our countries critically inclined toward perestroika find allies
among your emissaries who come from Moscow or work in your em-
bassies’.901 Confirming the point made here about the paucity of personnel
changes during his tenure in office, Shevardnadze acknowledges that the
way of doing things could not be changed immediately. Ambassadors of a
‘new type and calibre’ were appointed beginning only in 1989, after the
898 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 194 (italics mine).
899 Ibid.
900 Ibid.
901 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
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creation of parliamentary structures in the Soviet Union and the onset of
the East European revolutions.902
The subordination of diplomacy to transnational party interests was also
standard practice in Soviet-East German relations. In 1971-75, Pyotr
Abrasimov was Soviet ambassador in East Berlin.903 But since he had
been, inappropriately from the centre’s perspective, too closely involved in
Ulbricht’s removal from office and too closely associated with the ascen-
dancy of his successor and was therefore regarded as unsuitable to assert
unquestioningly and unconditionally the centre’s interests in the periphery,
he was replaced by Mikhail Yefremov. By making this decision, however,
the Politburo was merely exchanging one problem for another. Yefremov
had been first party secretary of the Saratov oblast’. In that position, ac-
cording to Kvitsinsky, he had acted according to the axiom, advantageous
for his relations with the centre, that in his own area of competence every-
thing was in order.904 Transferring this modus operandi to East Berlin, he
didn’t report a word about Honecker’s deviations from the Moscow’s line.
In reply to concerned inquiries from Moscow, he only said that he had
close contact with Erich, and that there was full mutual understanding.
However, as Kvitsinsky continues,
East Berlin was not Saratov. Yefremov did not take into consideration that,
apart from him, there were still many other Soviet ‘scribes’, through whom
Moscow would find out what was actually happening in the GDR. Among
such ‘scribes’ were members of the GDR’s leadership, who reported to
Moscow via their channels that Honecker practically wrapped our ambas-
sador around his finger. Since Honecker knew only too well that the people in
Moscow were not enthusiastic about his high-handedness and criticized his
German policy, he performed a clever move by sending Paul Markowski, the
head of the Department for International Liaison at the Central Committee of
the SED, to Moscow as an intermediary. In one of those evenings of convivial
drinking with members of the CPSU Central Committee, Markowski lament-
ed that the Soviet ambassador was not very helpful to Honecker regarding
902 Ibid., p. 195.
903 Although Abrasimov had been first secretary of the Smolensk oblast' in 1961-62,
his career was associated more with state than with party institutions. Positions in
the former included, at the beginning of his career, the vice-chairmanship of the
Belorussian Council of Ministers (government), 1948-50 and 1952-55. The latter
part of his career was spent primarily in the foreign ministry, with ambassadorial
assignments in Poland (1957-61) and France (1971-73), and as head of the MFA’s
Department for Liaison with CP’s of Socialist Countries (1973-75).
904 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 263.
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German policy. He repeated [this charge] the next day, in a sober state, and
asked urgently for the replacement of the ambassador.905
Yefremov was duly replaced and the Politburo now adopted a new line of
reasoning. Precisely because his predecessor Abrasimov seemed to have
Honecker’s confidence perhaps he would be able to persuade the recalci-
trant East German leader to heed Moscow’s advice. Predictably, as has
amply been documented here, nothing changed. As Soviet-East German
relations deteriorated, and with it the relationship between Abrasimov and
Honecker, the East German leader in 1983 demanded the ambassador’s re-
call.906
Vyacheslav Kochemasov, appointed by Andropov, became the new am-
bassador. He proved equally unable to assert the centre’s interests but was
able to remain in this post until the collapse of the GDR.907 The continu-
ing ineffectiveness of the relationship between the MFA and the Soviet
party leadership on the one hand, and between Moscow and the embassy
in East Berlin on the other, is indicated by Chernyaev’s reaction to a tele-
gram sent by Kochemasov in preparation for Gorbachev’s participation in
the Eleventh Congress of the SED held on 17-21 April 1986. Chernyaev
told Gorbachev: ‘The ambassador expresses suspicion and enumerates and
exaggerates the dangers of “German-German” relations. But he doesn’t
have a single idea as to how shape the long-term development and how we
should conduct our policy.’908 But the strained relations between the am-
bassador and the East German party leader also undercut the effectiveness
of Soviet policy on the German problem.
To take one of the many examples, in 1989 Soviet embassy official
Mikhail Loginov was called to the propaganda department of the SED
Central Committee and, based on the allegation that he had been in West
Berlin and talked to members of the CDU leadership, was charged by par-
ty officials with ‘interference in the internal affairs of the GDR’. In a tense
exchange with the Kochemasov, Honecker repeated and amplified the ac-
905 Ibid., pp. 263-64.
906 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, pp. 57-58.
907 Prior to his appointment to the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, Kochemasov’s ca-
reer, unlike that of most other ambassadors in Eastern Europe, had been entirely
with state institutions. After various MFA appointments, including counsellor in
the embassy to the GDR (1955-60), he had been deputy chairman of the presidi-
um of the RSFSR Council of Ministers (1962-83).
908 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 83.
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cusation, stating that the official in question had ‘criticized the policy of
the SED’. Unmoved by Kochemasov’s explanations that there had been a
mix-up, that it had not been M. Loginov but O. Loginov, third secretary in
the embassy, who had been on perfectly legitimate business in the western
part of the city, and that one should try to ‘discuss the nature of the
question calmly and objectively’, Honecker threatened in allusion to
Yefremov’s recall: ‘I would like to tell you frankly that the same question
can arise as in the case of your predecessor.’909
To return to the evolution of events at the centre, in his criticism of She-
vardnadze’s stance on the German problem, Kornienko refers to one of his
former chief’s many interviews on the topic. He quotes him as having pre-
dicted as early as 1986 that the problem of German unification would very
quickly be put on the international agenda.910 Kornienko then proceeds to
challenge this assertion. He explains that throughout the post-war period,
the department dealing with German affairs at the MFA was one of the
most important. After the formation of two separate Germanys, all ques-
tions concerning bilateral relations with the two states as well as the Ger-
man problem as a whole were dealt with in a single branch of the ministry
– the Third European Department. In addition to the two Germanys, its
sphere of responsibility included West Berlin and Austria. The depart-
ment’s experts, according to Kornienko, held many different opinions on
the directions the two German states were taking but ‘none of the profes-
sional diplomats doubted that the German question as such was still far
from being closed and that it demanded a complex approach’.911 This was
also the ‘rationale behind maintaining a single department in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs dealing with the FRG, the GDR, and West Berlin’.912
What about the new foreign minister? Did he use the opportunity pre-
sented by the existing institutional structure and its apparent underlying
rationale and link up the common home for German affairs at the MFA
with Gorbachev’s concept of the Common House of Europe? On the con-
909 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, pp. 57-58.
910 Literaturnaia gazeta, 10 April 1991, as quoted by Kornienko in [Marshal] Sergei
F. Akhromeev and Georgi M. Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), p. 262. Kornienko was first
deputy foreign minister from 1977 to 1986.
911 Ibid., p. 263.
912 Ibid. It is doubtful that this was the rationale. The continued existence of all the
German entities under one roof at the MFA was in all likelihood one of the many
examples of bureaucratic inertia.
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trary, to continue with Kornienko’s account, ‘Shevardnadze found it per-
plexing that the same department that dealt with the capitalist FRG also
dealt with the questions pertaining to the communist GDR. He decided to
clean up this “mess”’.913 At the beginning of 1986, he removed the GDR
and West Berlin from the jurisdiction of the Third European Department
and allocated them to a new Department for European Socialist Countries
(analogously, he also established a new department for the socialist coun-
tries of Asia). Alexander Bondarenko, a veteran of the Great Patriotic war
and head of the Third European Department since 1971, remained chief of
the truncated department. Gorald Gorinovich became head of the new de-
partment of European socialist countries.914 Kornienko scathingly com-
ments:
It is not surprising, perhaps, that he [Shevardnadze] himself did not have at
that time (contrary to what he says now) an understanding of the entire com-
plexity and gravity of the German problem. What is unforgivable is that even
in this case he exhibited a complete disregard for the professional knowledge
and opinions of those people who had spent decades studying the German
problem. They – with the exception of those who are always ready to be the
‘yes men’ to any leadership – to a man were against the ‘division’ of the two
German states into different branches at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Minister did not even listen to questions such as how, if this measure
were adopted, one would deal with West Berlin. To leave it in the department
dealing with West Germany politically would not have addressed the goals
which concerned us, since this would have watered down the quadripartite
agreement on Berlin, according to which West Berlin was not to be a part of
West Germany and not to be administered by it. To move West Berlin along
with East Germany to the department dealing with the European socialist
states was also inadequate; the professionals immediately recognized that, in
a practical sense, with regard to questions of West Berlin, Western representa-
tives would not deal with this department.915
913 Ibid.
914 Interview with Bykov.
915 Kornienko in Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata,
pp. 263-264. Other former and current Soviet foreign ministry officials have con-
firmed that there was considerable opposition in the MFA to the proposed organi-
zational changes. These include Kvitsinsky and Bykov (in interviews conducted
by the author) and Kochemasov. The latter wrote: ‘I twice voiced opposition
when this question was being decided by the new minister, who called me twice
in [East] Berlin. I told him that this would be artificially “tearing apart” the whole
German question. One would lose sight of the interconnectedness [of issues] and
lose specialists.’ Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 23.
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Germany was finally ‘divided’ in the foreign ministry. Problems pertain-
ing to relations with East and West Germany were allocated to different
departments. West Berlin was transferred first, along with East Germany,
to the directorate dealing with Eastern Europe. Since this seemed to be a
symbolic gesture of West Berlin’s incorporation in the Soviet bloc, ‘it evi-
dently made the Western states unhappy’. But then, in the summer of the
same year, West Berlin was ‘tacked on to West Germany, as a gift of sorts
to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was coming to Moscow for a visit’.916 It
was only much later, after the transformation of the socio-economic sys-
tems in Central and Eastern Europe and the disappearance of one country
after another from the department’s roster of socialist European states, that
the division at the foreign ministry finally gave way to a ‘common house’:
the Third (FRG, West Berlin and Austria) and the Fourth (Poland and
Czechoslovakia) European departments were merged to form one single
entity.917
The consequences and lessons to be derived from this Quixotic, almost
Khrushchevian, administrative reorganization are perhaps fourfold. First,
Shevardnadze at that time was still insensitive to the rationale of treating
Germany as a whole, most likely because he, too, assumed that German
unity was a thing of the past and that the German problem would not very
soon be put on any international agenda. Second, the reorganization
demonstrated that Shevardnadze was conscious of the need for change in
the foreign ministry but did not really know how to go about implement-
ing it. Third, the reorganization changed nothing in substance. The two de-
partment heads dealing with the German problem – Bondarenko and Gori-
novich – were impediments to rather than agents of change; they both sub-
scribed to conservative positions and were to establish a good working re-
lationship on that basis.918 Fourth, the 1986 reorganization points to a larg-
er problem: the organizational changes were, in essence, not followed by a
comprehensive personnel revirement. As if in a modified game of musical
chairs, a known set of participants was simply rotating among various pos-
itions but staying in the game.919 Bondarenko, for instance, not only sur-
vived the MFA’s reorganizations and revirements but, his conservative
916 Kornienko in Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p. 264.
917 Interview with Bykov, former section head in the Fourth and then the reorganized
Third Eastern Europe Department.
918 Interviews with Kvitsinsky and Bykov.
919 Interview with Tarasenko.
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views on Germany and political differences with Shevardnadze notwith-
standing, was to represent the Soviet position in the Two Plus Four negoti-
ations in 1990.920
But what about Gorbachev? How sensitive was he to the issues of MFA
reorganization? Was he even aware of the strange administrative gyrations
and contortions on German affairs? There is direct testimony to the effect
that he not only knew about but approved of the changes. In remarks to a
closed session of first and general secretaries, who had gathered for the
Warsaw Pact’s summit meeting in Budapest in June 1986, he reported, ev-
idently with some enthusiasm, that a conference had taken place recently
in the Soviet foreign ministry that was ‘unprecedented in the history of
Soviet diplomacy’. The CPSU had recognized that in the foreign policy
sphere ‘a greater degree of party control’ and ‘stronger party spirit’ were
necessary. He himself had spoken for two and a half hours at that meeting,
and an open and very thorough discussion had taken place. Musing about
the background for the meeting, he stated that the ‘main problem’ with the
foreign ministry had been the fact that there was ‘still a lot of inertia and
old thinking’ in the ministry and that Soviet diplomacy was ‘insufficiently
paying attention to the challenges of the current dynamic developments’.
Decisions had consequently been taken to ‘modernize’ this sphere of ac-
tivity.921 As part of this modernisation, what had come to pass was a ‘reor-
ganization of the structure of the foreign ministry and of all the territorial
directions of foreign policy’. That had applied ‘in particular to the Euro-
pean direction, for which a specific structural entity has been created’.
New entities had been also been set up for the ‘Warsaw Pact, CMEA and
scientific-technological cooperation’. He deplored that there was still ‘no
organic link between the foreign ministry’ and the various institutions ‘re-
sponsible for economic cooperation’. However, the functional divisions in
the foreign ministry had been overhauled. A department for arms control
and disarmament had been created because this was an area that ‘requires
professionals with expert knowledge’. New departments concerned with
920 This may have been due in part to the fact that Shevardnadze personally respect-
ed and liked Bondarenko; interview with Tarasenko.
921 Gorbachev’s remarks to a closed session of first party secretaries at the June 1986
Budapest summit conference; see the protocol on the restricted meeting of the
party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact member countries, SED Politburo, Arbeitspro-
tokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/ 2896.
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nuclear energy, space, international economic relations, and human rights
had also been established.922
To return to Kornienko and his criticism of Shevardnadze and, by im-
plication, of Gorbachev. He is almost charitable in his concluding assess-
ment. From the point of view of the subsequent more far-reaching changes
which were to take place in Germany, the episodes he had mentioned
seemed to him almost ‘inconsequential’. What he decries more than the
ill-advised organizational changes is that ‘this kind of unprofessionalism
and improvisation by Shevardnadze on German affairs, as on many others,
became apparent later on as well, when the German question became a
truly critical aspect for our government’.923 The reader might ask, as in-
deed Kornienko realizes, why he and his co-author ‘did not come out ear-
lier with public criticism of those serious miscalculations in our German
policies [committed then, at the beginning of 1986,] at the end of 1989 and
the beginning of 1990’. His reply is that
It is not easy to answer this question. Much can be explained here, first, that
in many cases we as well as others were faced with faits accomplis for, as
time went by, the development of foreign policy became ever more secretive.
Second, we understood the futility of criticism; as in previous times, the lead-
ership paid little attention to anyone’s opinion if that opinion differed from its
own.924
These observations are valid only up to point. They accurately reflect the
evolution of decision-making but are self-serving as to its rationale. The
rapid and unforeseen events in 1989-90 required the very qualities which
were almost entirely lacking in the MFA – new approaches, new thinking,
flexibility and, indeed, improvisation. Similarly, whereas there is merit in
the criticism that the 1986 reorganization of the departments dealing with
the German problem was ill-advised and can serve to refute Shevard-
nadze’s assertion that he had known from the very beginning that the Ger-
man problem would soon be put on the international agenda, if he had lis-
tened to the ‘professionals’ in 1989-90 he would certainly have been
locked into conservative policies, obstructionism, procrastination and de-
lay. Nothing would have changed. It is for this reason that the ‘profession-
als’ were simply ignored and bypassed, and that two major developments
took place as a consequence. (1) The head of the institution would choose
922 Ibid.(italics mine).
923 Kornienko in Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p. 264.
924 Ibid.
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a team of trusted, competent and, in his own understanding of the term,
‘professional’ personal assistants. In the case of Shevardnadze and the
MFA, this process is mirrored by the remarks he made to his two chief
aides, Sergei Tarasenko and Teymuraz Stepanov: ‘I expect you to tell me
the truth. No one else will.’925 (2) Decision-making on important issues
shifted to a small circle of leaders outside the established institution who
would act independently and according to their best judgment. The es-
trangement of the top leader from his institutional base and the transfer of
decision-making away from the institution traditionally empowered to
deal with issues under its purview to outsiders happened not only in the
MFA. It also occurred, and even more so, in the various branches and or-
gans of the Communist Party.
The CPSU: Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee Departments
The role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in both do-
mestic and foreign policy changed radically between 1985 and 1989.
When Gorbachev became General Secretary, the party was the dominant
institution of the country. Both the Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977
and the party rules of 1986 described the CPSU not only as the ‘leading
and guiding force of Soviet society’ but also the ‘nucleus of the political
system of Soviet society, the state and public organizations’. The party,
with the Politburo at its apex and ‘armed with Marxist-Leninist theory’,
was responsible for ‘determining a general perspective on the develop-
ment of the country, including the domestic and foreign policy of the
USSR’.926 Until the September 1988 Central Committee plenary meeting
and in the absence of serious efforts to reorganize the central party appa-
rat, Gorbachev’s approach to party affairs involved mainly personnel
changes at the top.
In the period from Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary until the
September 1988 reorganization of the party apparat, five full members had
been dismissed from the Politburo and eight new leaders appointed – the
4.
925 Interview with Tarasenko, conducted by Lis Bernstein, Russian Research Center,
Harvard University.
926 ‘Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza’, in Vadim Zagladin and Genna-
di Kiselov, eds., Politicheskie partii: Spravochnik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986),
p. 21.
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majority of the total membership of thirteen in that body.927 In the Secre-
tariat, six of the nine members in March 1985 had left and ten had been
newly appointed. More importantly, eight of the thirteen secretaries had
been elected since the Twenty-seventh party congress. By no means could
it be argued, however, that the majority of the new appointees to the Polit-
buro were committed to radical reform. They can most appropriately be
called ‘Andropovian’ in outlook. They included two leaders, Mikhail
Solomentsev and Vitali Vorotnikov, who were promoted to the Politburo
during the brief tenure of Andropov as General Secretary between
November 1982 and February 1984, but also several others who, while
reaching Politburo status later, had their main promotion during the same
period. These were Yegor Ligachev, appointed chief of the party cadres’
department and secretary in 1983; Nikolai Ryzhkov, chief of government
under Gorbachev and selected by Andropov in 1983 to become party sec-
retary in charge of the economy; Nikolai Slyunkov, promoted in 1983 to
become party chief in Belorussia; Lev Zaikov, secretary in charge of de-
fense industry under Gorbachev, chosen by Andropov in 1983 to replace
Romanov in Leningrad; and Victor Chebrikov, appointed KGB chairman
in 1982. Two holdovers from the Brezhnev era were also still in the Polit-
buro – Andrei Gromyko, president of the Soviet Union, and Vladimir
Shcherbitsky, the party chief of Ukraine.
There were, therefore, only three supporters of radical reform in the
Politburo in September 1988 – Alexander Yakovlev, Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee and head of its propaganda department; foreign minister
Shevardnadze; and Alexander Nikonov, the party secretary in charge of
agriculture. Other leaders then considered supporters held important jobs
but were not full Politburo members. These included defense minister
Dmitri Yazov; party secretary Anatoli Lukyanov; and first deputy prime
minister Vselovod Murakhovsky. Before his dismissal as alternate Polit-
buro member and first secretary of the Moscow party organization, Boris
Yeltsin had also belonged to this group. Thus the personnel basis of radi-
cal reform had remained slim. Considering Yazov’s and Lukyanov’s par-
ticipation in the August 1991 coup attempt, the review of personnel
changes at the top also demonstrates that, with the exception of Yakovlev
927 This summary of personnel changes in the Kremlin leadership is based on The
Gorbachev Challenge and European Security, Report by the European Strategy
Group (ESG), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), pp. 85-89. Michel Tatu was the au-
thor of the report’s section on Soviet domestic developments.
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and Shevardnadze, it was difficult to ascertain who would be prepared and
to what degree to support the reform process. The Andreeva affair in
March 1988 had, alarmingly for Gorbachev, underlined this very fact.928
This state of affairs had several consequences.929 First, the revamping
of personnel at the higher and middle levels of the party adversely affected
the expectations and behaviour of the party officials and led to the gradual
erosion of the General Secretary’s authority in that institution. Confronted
with uncertainty and concerned about possible demotion or transfer, many
party executives continued to dispatch distorted information about their
performance to the centre. The internal cohesiveness and effectiveness of
work was disrupted by the practice of the new appointees to bring their
own protégés into the Central Committee Secretariat and departments.
Second, Gorbachev’s growing disappointment with the performance of
the central party apparat induced him, until the publication of the An-
dreyeva letter, to rely on Ligachev to remedy the lagging performance of
the apparat. As informal ‘second party secretary’, Ligachev was in charge
of the day-to-day operations of the Central Committee’s Secretariat, and in
that capacity he maintained close contact with the heads of the various CC
departments and the republican and regional party secretaries. As Andrei
Grachev observed, until the reorganization in autumn 1988, Ligachev ‘re-
mained an unchallenged authority for the whole of the gigantic party appa-
rat, and Gorbachev wanted to believe that, as long as Yegor Kuz’mich
[Ligachev] was with him, he need not be afraid of an organized Fronde or
Vendée’.930 Yakovlev confirmed that ‘Gorbachev still needed Ligachev.
928 The reference is to a letter by an until then unknown lecturer at a Leningrad
chemical institute, Nina Andreeva, and professionally rewritten as an article by a
Sovetskaia Rossiia journalist in consultation with officials in the Central Commit-
tee apparat under the heading of ‘I Cannot Waive Principles’ (Ne mogu postu-
pat’sia printsipami). The letter appeared in that newspaper on 13 March 1988. It
amounted to a vicious attack on the reform process. In subsequent Politburo dis-
cussion, it was in varying degrees supported by full or candidate Politburo mem-
bers Ligachev, Gromyko, Chebrikov, Lukyanov, Nikonov, Solomentsev and
Vorotnikov. The PB members who criticized the letter were Yakovlev, Shevard-
nadze, Ryzhkov and Medvedev.
929 The discussion of the consequences of the slim personnel basis for radical reform
is based on Sergei Grigoriev, ‘The International Department of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s Attempts to
Reform the Party Apparat: A Case Study of Disintegration of Authority’, unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, May 1996, pp. 235-39.
930 Andrei Grachev, Kremliovskaia khronika (Moscow: EKSMO, 1994), p. 120.
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He thought that Ligachev was compensating for the lack of a “strong
hand”’.931
Third, Gorbachev came to put ever more trust in a small circle of asso-
ciates and personal assistants in order to advance the cause of radical re-
form. One of his close associates was Shevardnadze, whose role has al-
ready been mentioned. Another was Yakovlev. His background and impor-
tance for perestroika will be dealt with immediately below. Gorbachev’s
personal assistants were Anatoli Chernyaev, who was appointed foreign
policy advisor in February 1986; Georgi Shakhnazarov, who in October
1988 became advisor on Eastern Europe and from autumn 1989 also on
domestic political and legal reform; and Ivan Frolov, who starting from
early 1987 dealt with ideology and had the unenviable task of trying to
reconcile Marxism-Leninism with the New Thinking. The effect of Gor-
bachev’s reliance on a small circle of aides and associates was a policy-
making process that not only cut across traditional institutional lines but
undercut the authority of bureaucracies and their leaders. Ad hoc policy-
making groups were being formed to deal with urgent business as it arose.
This, as will be argued infra, included the German problem when it be-
came acute.
Fourth, disappointed with the lagging performance of the party apparat
and the persisting conservatism at all its levels, but also faced with deteri-
orating economic conditions and an erosion of his support in the country,
Gorbachev turned to foreign policy as an area in which tangible success
could be demonstrated. The seeds of this development were sown as early
as June 1984, when he visited Italy to participate in the funeral celebra-
tions for Italian communist leader Enrico Berlinguer.932 As Gorbachev ac-
knowledged, the visit made ‘a deep and lasting impression on us’.933 He
was warmly received by the Italian Communist Party leadership and enthu-
siastically welcomed by huge crowds. At one point, when he went out on
the balcony together with CPI leader Giancarlo Paetta, thousands of peo-
ple exuberantly shouted ‘Gorbachev! Gorbachev!’ and ‘Viva Gor-
bachev!’934 Such demonstrative expressions of support for him personally
931 Yakovlev, manuscript (unplished) for Gor'kaia chasha, p. 8.
932 Interview with Zagladin, who was a member of the CPSU delegation to Italy.
933 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 255.
934 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 15, based on what Gorbachev told him
personally at the airport after his return from Italy and on conversations with Za-
gladin.
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and the policies he came to represent were to be repeated when he was
General Secretary and visited other countries in Western and Eastern Eu-
rope and the United States and established close personal contacts in the
plethora of meetings with Western political leaders.
Fifth, the difficulties and disappointments with the party apparat finally
persuaded Gorbachev to reorganize it and weaken its influence on policy-
making. The measures taken in the pursuit of this purpose had a profound
impact on how, institutionally, the imperial legacy in Eastern Europe and
the German problem would be dealt with. The two departments of the par-
ty apparat that were most closely and directly involved with foreign poli-
cy-making were the Central Committee’s International Department (ID)
and the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of
the Socialist Countries. They therefore deserve close scrutiny. Since
Yakovlev was one of the main architects of their reorganization, was in-
volved in determining important personnel changes in the process and was
one of its main beneficiaries, it is appropriate to examine his personality,
political philosophy and relationship with Gorbachev.
Yakovlev and the Party Apparat
Alexander Yakovlev was born in 1923 in the village of Korolyovo, near
Yaroslavl. In the Second World War, he was a marine attached to the
Baltic fleet command, was badly wounded in a battle near Leningrad and
since then had to struggle with the effects of his injuries. After the war, he
became a Komsomol leader and journalist, graduated from Higher Party
School and held a succession of party posts. In 1959, he attended
Columbia University as a mature student, an experience that provided a
basis for a better understanding of the United States but did not transform
him into an ardent admirer of the American way of life and culture.935
The first harbingers of a non-conformist political philosophy in the So-
viet environment became public in the early 1970s, when he was acting
head of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. At a time when
Brezhnev was tolerating or encouraging Soviet and Russian Great Power
tendencies he wrote an article attacking Russian nationalist writers for
935 Conversation with Columbia University alumni who knew Yakovlev when he
was a student there. This author attended Columbia in 1970-73 and received his
Ph.D. from that institution in 1977.
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chauvinism, thereby incurring the wrath not only of Russian nationalists
but also of communist party officials.936 In light of this, he asked for an
ambassadorial posting to an English-speaking country and in 1973 was
sent to Canada.937
In the Soviet political context at the time, the ambassadorial appoint-
ment amounted to a dignified demotion which, however, was to have im-
portant consequences. It marked the beginning of a relationship of trust
between Gorbachev and Yakovlev when the former visited Canada for
seven days in 1983, with ample opportunity provided to exchange
views.938 Yakovlev recalls: ‘We were telling each other that the system
was so rotten that it would be difficult to save it; that the party stagnated;
and that something had to be done, and done urgently.’939 It was also dur-
ing the Canadian trip that Chernyaev and Yakovlev, as the former averred,
realized that they ‘were of the same kind’ (rodnye dushi), and that they be-
came ‘good friends’.940 In the same year Yakovlev, with Gorbachev’s help,
was brought back from ‘exile’ by party chief Andropov, who placed him
in the position of head of the Institute for World Economy and Internation-
al Relations.941 From then on, his contacts with Gorbachev were continu-
936 Brown (The Gorbachev Factor, p. 74) credits Yakovlev with ‘vigorous opposi-
tion’ to the often chauvinistic views of Russian nationalists. This may be some-
what of an overstatement.
937 Ibid.
938 In his memoirs (Zhizn’, Vol. 1, pp. 237-39), Gorbachev does not specifically
mention that a close relationship with Yakovlev was established during his trip to
Canada. He does, however, write favourably about the Canadian trip and its hav-
ing been ‘thoroughly prepared’ by Yakovlev. Chernyaev (Shest’ let s Gor-
bachevym, p. 26) has confirmed that it was in Canada that Yakovlev ‘became
friends with Gorbachev’.
939 Yakovlev, Gor'kaia chasha, pp. 4-5. It is doubtful that Gorbachev at that time
would have agreed with Yakovlev that the system was so rotten that it would be
difficult to save it. Such a view is in stark contrast to Gorbachev’s conviction, ex-
pressed three years later (as quoted in the previous section), that only 20 percent
of the potential of the socialist order was effectively being utilized.
940 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 26.
941 I first came to know Yakovlev or, more appropriately, one aspect of his political
personality, when I participated in the April 1984 Moscow conference between
IMEMO and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. The meetings
were co-chaired by Yakovlev and DGAP director Karl Kaiser. The former
demonstrated on that occasion that he was perfectly able uncompromisingly to
represent the official party and government line of the day. That line was rabidly
anti-American – so much so, in fact, that one of the senior German participants,
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ous, the latter in his capacity as party leader coming to rely increasingly
on Yakovlev’s theoretical abilities and practical organizational skills.
In July 1985, when Shevardnadze was appointed foreign minister, Gor-
bachev elevated Yakovlev to a more influential position. He was trans-
ferred from IMEMO to head the Central Committee’s Agitation and Pro-
paganda Department. In March 1986, he became a member and Secretary
of the Central Committee, and began playing an active role in broadening
Soviet information policy, reinvigorating cultural life, enlightening the
party with the New Thinking, disseminating new ideas in the apparat, and
making sure that they were being implemented in the party’s foreign rela-
tions. He also became involved in the management of a crucial issue
where internal and international dimensions of policy intersected – the na-
tionality problems of the Soviet Union. New Thinking also required ad-
dressing the ‘blank’ or – more appropriately – dark spots in Soviet history,
foremost among them the secret protocols of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the
forcible incorporation of the Baltic states and the ‘liquidation’ of thou-
sands of Polish military officers at Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin and other lo-
cations. This raised sensitive moral and political issues directly impinging
on the legitimacy of the Soviet internal and external empire and Moscow’s
relations with Eastern Europe and the Baltic Union republics. At the same
time, Yakovlev’s responsibilities in this area produced an important fea-
ture of the Gorbachev era. The three closest and most influential asso-
ciates and advisors of the General Secretary – Shevardnadze, Yakovlev
and Chernyaev – were all primarily concerned with foreign policy. To the
at the end of the first day, exclaimed in dismay that, as a social scientist, he had
kept track of the proceedings and could confidently assert that more than 80 per-
cent of what he had heard from the Soviet side had been anti-American innuendo
and slander. Apart from the content, the emphasis on Soviet-American relations
was in complete disregard of the agenda, which was concerned with Soviet-Ger-
man relations. If the following day were to begin on the same anti-American
note, his suitcase was packed and he would leave instantly for Sheremetevo air-
port to take the next available flight to Frankfurt. When I confidentially asked a
senior IMEMO researcher whether he had not been embarrassed by Yakovlev’s
performance and the new head was not doing IMEMO a disservice by engaging
in cheap party propaganda, the reply was that privately Yakovlev was quite dif-
ferent; that he was only doing what was required of him; and that it was much
more important for IMEMO’s role in policy-making to have someone as a direc-
tor who had good party connections than someone who was able to make a good
impression on foreign visitors.
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extent that differences existed among them, they were less severe than
those that separated the three aides from other competitors.
In 1986, Yakovlev’s formal position had still lagged behind his political
influence. This was to change rapidly. In January 1987, he was made a
candidate member of the Politburo and in June 1987 a full member. After
the September 1988 reorganization of the party apparat he replaced Lig-
achev in his role as kurator for the departments dealing with the party’s
foreign relations and thus became responsible in the Politburo for all for-
eign policy issues. By that time, however, the powerful role of the Polit-
buro and the party apparat, including that of the Central Committee Secre-
tariat and Departments, had already been eviscerated, and Yakovlev was
exerting influence on policy-making primarily through his direct associa-
tion with Gorbachev.
A first telling indication of Yakovlev’s unconventional views on the
German problem came in January 1989, when he visited West Germany
on the invitation of the minuscule German Communist Party (DKP) to at-
tend its Ninth Party Congress. The main purpose of his having accepted
the invitation, it would seem, had not been any inclination to lend support
to the party but to get a better grasp of the German problem and to estab-
lish contact with mainstream political forces in West Germany. In fact, he
had scarcely arrived at Frankfurt airport when he treated his ostensible
hosts with a dose of irony and sarcasm. Ignoring, knowingly in all likeli-
hood, the stubborn refusal of the SPD to align itself in any way with the
DKP, Yakovlev claimed that things had much changed for the better since
he had last visited West Germany in 1970 and that this concerned in par-
ticular the improvement of cooperation between the German Communists
and Social Democrats in the struggle for peace and democratic transfor-
mation.
As a tribute to his stature and his influence on Soviet policy-making,
and quite in contrast to previous heads of CPSU party delegations attend-
ing DKP congresses, Yakovlev was received by the German chancellor.
He told Kohl that the Soviet leadership wished speedy and comprehensive
negotiations on the realization of the projects that were discussed during
the latter’s visit to Moscow in October 1988. All agreements reached at
that time were valid ‘in their full scope’. In a lecture at the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP) in Bonn, he addressed the
German problem. He spoke of the political, territorial and historical reality
of the existence of two German states. The New Thinking could not abol-
ish this reality but it could help people to live better with the conditions it
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imposed. As for the future, he repeated the Gorbachev dictum that history
would decide. But most importantly, he distanced himself from the East
German regime and from the Berlin wall and even denied Soviet responsi-
bility for its construction. In private, he asked ambassador Kvitsinksy
whether the wall was really necessary.942 Publicly, when he was asked
whether ‘restructuring’ Europe could be effective despite the wall and the
East German standing orders to shoot at would-be border crossers,
Yakovlev replied: ‘I do not represent a German state, but the Soviet
Union.’943 Even more strongly, on West German television, he said that
the wall ‘was not built by us. That’s not our wall.’ The Soviet Union had
to ‘liberate itself from the illusion of blind allegiance’ to East Germany.944
After this portrayal of Yakovlev, his political philosophy and impor-
tance for perestroika, it is now appropriate to focus on the decline, in
1985-89, of the role of the two main Central Committee Departments di-
rectly involved in the policy-making process on European affairs.
The Central Committee Departments and Commissions
At the Central Committee, the party had organized a twentieth century sur-
realist version of Rudyard Kipling’s ‘East is East, and West is West, and
never the twain shall meet’. In contrast to the MFA’s Third Department
until 1986, the division of Europe was replicated organizationally at Cen-
tral Committee headquarters at the Old Square. After reorganization of the
International Department in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian revolution,
all matters pertaining to Eastern Europe, including East Germany, were
dealt with in the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers'
Parties of the Socialist Countries; subject matter concerning Western Eu-
rope remained under the ID’s auspices.945 There was practically no coop-
eration between the two departments on the German problem – an absurd
state of affairs that de facto did not change for almost a year even after the
942 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 13. Kvitsinsky replied that the existence of the
wall was, of course, unpleasant but that to remove it would mean the end of the
GDR.
943 In the question and answer part at the end of his lecture to the DGAP, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 January 1989 (italics mine).
944 Yakovlev interview with ARD (West German television), Süddeutsche Zeitung,
10 January 1989 (italics mine).
945 Medvedev, Raspad, p. 20.
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merger of the departments in September 1988. It was only in preparation
for Gorbachev’s visit to East Berlin in October 1989 to participate in the
celebrations for the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the GDR that
specialists on the two Germanys cooperated.946
The nature of the functions, the type of official and the organizational
ethos in the two departments were quite different. In the late Brezhnev era,
as CC secretary and head of the socialist countries’ liaison department
from March 1986 to September 1988 stated, the functions of that arm of
the party were to observe and to control the countries under its purview.
Its internal organization was not problem-oriented but country-specific: a
special section existed practically for each and every country. ‘It was
therefore not surprising’, in his view, ‘that its character was shaped by
stalwart apparatchiki and that efforts by independently thinking people
were unwelcome.’947 As described earlier, first deputy head Oleg
Rakhmanin was one of those stalwarts who remained stuck in the ortho-
dox and dogmatic mold.948 The same applied to Martynov, the head of the
section that dealt with East Germany. Since the majority of the party lead-
erships in Eastern Europe, including the Czechoslovak leadership after
1968, had a neo-Stalinist outlook, the department officials received hardly
any impulse in their contacts and exchanges so that they would adapt their
political philosophy to the challenges of the modern world.949 And since
communist parties were in power in Eastern Europe that claimed the same
‘leading role’ in politics and society as the CPSU, the interaction between
them and the socialist countries’ department in Moscow essentially had
the quality of state-to-state relations. Indeed, as Shevardnadze pointed out
in retrospect, from the perspective of the MFA the functions of Soviet
diplomats and Soviet party officials in Eastern Europe were practically in-
terchangeable.950
The beginning of a shift in the balance between orthodox and more in-
novative officials in Moscow began in 1986 when Shakhnazarov was pro-
moted from deputy to first deputy department head and when, in Novem-
ber of the same year, Alexander Tsipko was made konsultant on questions
946 Interview with Tsipko.
947 Medvedev, Raspad, p. 20. The former department head conveys the dubious no-
tion that things were different before the late Brezhnev era .
948 See above, xxx p.
949 Interview with Shakhnazarov.
950 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 194.
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relating to East Germany and Poland.951 Since the latter’s appointment
was characteristic for the process of personnel changes under Gorbachev
and his attempt to transmit new impulses to the established Central Com-
mittee departments, the circumstances of the appointment shall be re-
counted briefly.
Tsipko, an expert on Marxism-Leninism and political philosophy, had
shifted emphasis in the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist Sys-
tem to concentrate on Poland after the eruption of the Solidarity crisis in
1980. In July-August 1985 and January 1986, he had visited the GDR,
commissioned by the All-Union Society for Relations with Foreign Coun-
tries, and lectured on the beginning of perestroika and political develop-
ments in the USSR. To his surprise, SED officials and members of the
GDR-USSR Friendship Society openly told him about the existence of an
ideological crisis in the GDR. On the basis of questions asked at his lec-
tures and subsequent conversations, he concluded that this was indeed the
case. ‘I came to understand that the idea that the GDR was the most reli-
able member of the world socialist system was a myth and that its citizens
lived in two entirely different worlds – mentally in West Germany and
physically in East Germany. In my report, I predicted that this bubble
[GDR] would soon burst.’952 The report made a strong impression on
Shakhnazarov and provoked Martynov’s ire.953 But since it was issued by
the Institute for Economics of the World Socialist System and duly signed
by Oleg Bogomolov, the institute’s head, it was forwarded to Gorbachev.
Furthermore, Shakhnazarov suggested that Tsipko be made konsultant to
deal with East Germany.
Differentiation of outlook and opinion was greater in the Central Com-
mittee’s International Department.954 This was in part due to the fact that
951 The position of konsultant was by no means unimportant. Consultants dealt with
all the main documents and compiled analytical reports relating to the country
concerned, and they prepared memoranda for talks with foreign officials visiting
Moscow and speeches for party leaders going on trips abroad. They were also au-
thorized to see all telegrams about the situation in the country concerned, includ-
ing secret reports by the embassy, KGB, and GRU. Only the telegrams destined
for Politburo members were unavailable to consultants.
952 Interview with Tsipko.
953 Interview with Shakhnazarov.
954 On the role of the International Department see Grigoriev, ‘The International De-
partment: A Case Study’; id., ‘The International Department of the CPSU Central
Committee: Its Functions and Role in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making and Its Rise
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the department’s contacts were with the non-ruling Western communist,
socialist, social democratic and labour parties, so-called ‘progressive
movements’ in Western Europe and the United States as well as with the
communist parties and the ‘national-liberation movements’ in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Yet in 1985, the institutional ethos was still
shaped to a large extent by Ponomarev, who after several decades at the
Comintern and at the helm of the ID since 1949 (!) could hardly be ex-
pected to introduce new thinking and practices in that organization. Per-
haps to a lesser extent, this applied also to Vadim Zagladin, first deputy
head since 1975.
An initial attempt to revamp the organization was made by Gorbachev
in March 1986, when he appointed Anatoly Dobrynin Central Committee
secretary and head of the International Department. The appointment pro-
duced as much consternation in the ID as Shevardnadze’s elevation to the
MFA in the preceding year. (President Reagan was surprised, too. ‘Is he
really a communist?’ he asked when he was told that Dobrynin was leav-
ing Washington for his new position.)955 Several mutually reinforcing rea-
sons can be adduced for Dobrynin’s transfer. First, Gorbachev applied a
logic similar to the one that had pertained to Shevardnadze’s appointment
to the MFA: that an outsider would feel less constrained by institutional
pressures to effect changes in personnel and policy. Second, given Do-
brynin’s background as a career diplomat and his more than twenty years
of experience as Soviet ambassador to the United States, the appointment
held the promise of greater professionalism in the ID and improved coop-
eration between the department and the MFA. Third, the ID would not on-
ly be strengthened by professional expertise and induced to cooperate with
the MFA but also to compete with it by assuming tasks previously in the
exclusive preserve of the foreign ministry. These purposes would also be
served by another transfer from the foreign ministry – first deputy foreign
and Fall Following the Major Reorganization of the Central Party Apparatus un-
der Gorbachev’, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard Univer-
sity, John F. Kennedy School of Government, December 1995; Mark Kramer,
‘The CPSU International Department: Comments and Observations’, ibid.,
pp. 99-122; id., ‘The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet For-
eign Relations and National Security Policy’, Soviet Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July
1990), pp. 429-48; and Robert W. Kitrinos, ‘The International Department of the
CPSU’, Problems of Communism, Vol. 33 (September-October 1984), pp. 47-76.
955 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 594. Reagan was informed of the transfer by Secre-
tary of State Shultz.
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minister Georgi Kornienko, who was made Dobrynin’s first deputy head at
the ID. (The latter’s expertise was in arms control, and he had good con-
tacts with the military and a long-standing friendship with the head of the
General Staff, Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev.)956 Fourth, Yakovlev had
supported Dobrynin’s nomination. One of the reasons for this lay in the
fact that in the ten years that they were ambassadors to Canada and the
United States respectively they had forged good contacts and come to re-
spect each other. With Dobrynin as head of the ID, Yakovlev was hoping
to continue their mutually beneficial cooperation and play a more impor-
tant role in foreign policy-making.957
Dobrynin did introduce some changes. He pioneered the practice of in-
cluding public figures – eminent scientists, journalists, writers, and artists
– in summit delegations. Some staff changes were also made. Two new
sections were added to the ID in November 1986, the section for military-
political problems, headed by Lt. Gen. Victor P. Starodubov, and the sec-
tion for international economic cooperation, chaired by Mikhail Pankin.958
In essence, however, Dobrynin was unable to meet the high expectations
placed on him. This was in part due to the very lack of familiarity with the
organization and its tasks. He failed to take into account that the ID was
integrated in a complicated network of the CC CPSU apparatus where dif-
ferent mechanisms of interaction obtained, and he ignored the basic func-
tions of the agencies run by the department.959 He also, as Chernyaev has
observed, ‘continued to behave like an ambassador’.960 These deficiencies
coincided with Gorbachev’s general disappointment with the performance
of the party apparatus and the shift in the main repository of foreign poli-
cy-making to the Shevardnadze-Yakovlev-Chernyaev axis. The reorgani-
zation of the ID in September 1988, therefore, was not only to be more
956 This was part of abolishing, as Chernyaev put it, the ‘monopoly’ of the MFA in
foreign policy-making that had evolved under Gromyko; Chernyaev, Shest’ let s
Gorbachevym, pp. 35-36. As Grigoriev has pointed out, there may have been a
supplementary purpose for the transfer – to separate Shevardnadze from Ko-
rnienko with his deep roots in the MFA and facilitate the new foreign minister’s
tasks in the MFA; interview with Grigoriev.
957 Ivan Frolov had made this point confidentially (Grigoriev, ‘The International De-
partment: A Case Study’, p. 243).
958 Kramer (‘The Role of the International Department’, p. 454) aptly calls it the
‘arms control section’.
959 Interview with Grigoriev.
960 Interview with Chernyaev.
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fundamental than previous efforts but it was also to form part of an overall
design to enervate rather than invigorate the apparat and its components.
Comprehensive Reorganization of the Party Apparat
The decision to reorganize the party apparatus was taken at a session of
the Politburo on 8 September 1988.961 At the meeting, the Kremlin leader-
ship approved a draft that Gorbachev had presented in a special note on 24
August. The decision of the Politburo was not disclosed to the public until
the special Central Committee plenum on 30 September. No communiqué
was published about the Politburo meeting – an indication of the fact that
only some of its members were present when the decision was made and
that the reorganization plan had been opposed by some members of the
leadership. In his note of 24 August, Gorbachev complained about the lat-
ter:
To be frank, we started to think about how to solve these problems [restruc-
turing of the party organs] immediately after the April 1985 plenum of the
Central Committee in connection with preparations for the Twenty-seventh
Party Congress. We formulated a unanimous standpoint on these issues,
which was outlined as a set of principles on the eve of the Nineteenth All-
Union Party Conference and presented to the conference in a Central Com-
mittee report. These questions were a central theme of discussion in the party
and in society. Nevertheless, it turns out, as we now come to the practical im-
plementation of this task, that there are certain differences about the ap-
proach to the reorganization of the party apparatus. I see this from the notes
by some of the comrades on this question.962
The ‘certain differences’ about party restructuring caused a serious clash
in the Politburo that was resolved in Gorbachev’s favor. At the plenum in
September 1988, Gorbachev removed Gromyko and Solomentsev from
the Politburo and stripped Ligachev of his position as supervisor of the
party apparatus. The departure of Gromyko and Solomentsev and the de-
961 According to material published in the first issue of Izvestiia TsK KPSS, ‘Zapiska
t. Gorbacheva, M.S., “O reorganizatsii partiinogo apparata” ot 24 avgusta 1988
goda’, and ‘Postanovlenie Politburo TsK KPSS ot 8 sentriabria 1988 goda’,
Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 1 (1989), pp. 81-86. Analysis of the origins and conse-
quences of the reorganization of the party apparat here is based on Alexander
Rahr, ‘Who Is in Charge of the Party Apparatus?’, Report on the USSR (RFE/RL,
Munich), 14 April 1989.
962 Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 1, 1989, p. 83 (italics mine).
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motion of Ligachev – the ‘hard core’ of the Soviet leaders who had initial-
ly backed Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary but later lost enthusi-
asm for reform – smoothed the way for the restructuring of the apparatus.
In line with Gorbachev’s proposal, the Politburo decided to set up nine
CPSU Central Committee departments with the following hierarchical or-
der – party work and cadres policy; ideology; socioeconomic policy; agri-
culture; defense; state and legal policy; international relations; general af-
fairs; and administrative matters. Gorbachev stressed that the main object
of the changes was to stop the Secretariat and the CC departments from
interfering in government business.963 He also said that the decision to re-
tain the agrarian and defense departments was necessary at the current
stage of reform but that these departments might easily be dissolved in the
future. Gorbachev’s note indicated that the creation of the Commission for
Agriculture was intended as a temporary measure and that the days of Lig-
achev, the party secretary for agriculture, were numbered.
Close scrutiny of the work of the party apparatus after its reorganization
suggests that the changes were not aimed primarily at streamlining its
structure. It seems more likely that Gorbachev’s main goal was to deprive
the Secretariat of much of its tremendous power. As mentioned earlier, the
Secretariat had, in fact, been run by Ligachev rather than by the General
Secretary.964 By the summer of 1988, Ligachev, as the real master of the
party machine, was said to have become a threat to his nominal chief.
Consequently, Gorbachev took away the power of the Secretariat and re-
stricted the influence of Central Committee secretaries to specifically de-
fined areas by appointing them chairmen of new Central Committee Com-
missions. In the past, Central Committee secretaries virtually ruled the
963 In an otherwise uninspiring account of the reorganization, Gorbachev writes in
his memoirs that, for him, the ‘most important’ purpose of the reorganization was
not to ‘deprive Ligachev of his power’ but to ‘change the function[s] of the organ
[Secretariat], which had duplicated the function[s] of the Politburo and the gov-
ernment’; Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 410. Interestingly, the German version of
his memoirs is much more assertive and more to the point. Far more important
than the ‘neutralization of Ligachev, for me ...,’ he writes, ‘was the [purpose] of
finally putting an end to [the practice of] the Secretariat undercutting the compe-
tency of the Politburo and the government’, Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 399
(italics mine).
964 This was confirmed by the stenographic record of the October 1987 Central
Committee plenum, Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 2 (1989), p. 239. – On the role of
Ligachev see xxx p.
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country through the Central Committee departments, and the central party
apparatus was completely subordinated to them. After the September 1988
reorganization, however, Central Committee secretaries were placed under
the control of the Politburo and, in theory, became answerable to the mem-
bers of the Commissions they headed. However, the work of the commis-
sions failed to be organized in such a way as to make them an effective
substitute for the Secretariat in supervising the party machine.965
How, then, did the comprehensive reorganization of the apparat affect
the party’s international activities? The Politburo decision of 8 September
1988 had stated that ‘at present, there are three departments at the CC of
the CPSU concerned with international affairs [International Department,
Socialist Countries Department and the Department for Travel and Cadres
Abroad]. ... The preservation of such a structure is inappropriate and has
to be changed by the creation of a single International Department, within
which sub-departments should be created to deal with the major directions
of its activities.’966 This decision was put into effect, and Valentin Falin
was appointed head of the new ID.967
Several new sections were also created, including a section for contacts
with parties and international organizations of non-communist orientation,
such as the Socialist International and the Liberal International. This sec-
tion was headed by Rykin who had played an active role as head of the
Central European section, comprising the German speaking non-commu-
965 This was quite contrary to what Gorbachev had promised the Central Committee
members when he set up the new Commissions. The resolution of the November
1988 plenum that established the commissions had stated that one of their pur-
poses was ‘to facilitate the involvement of Central Committee members and can-
didate members in active work on major directions of domestic and foreign poli-
cy’ and that they should meet ‘when required but not less often than once every
three months’; Pravda, 29 November 1988.
966 ‘Postanovlenie Politburo TsK KPSS’, Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 1 (1989), p. 85
(italics mine). − Karen Brutents, Rafael Fyodorov and Viacheslav Morozov be-
came first deputy department heads, responsible respectively for the non-commu-
nist world, the socialist countries, and trips abroad.
967 Gorbachev’s memoirs utterly confuse the issues of reorganization of the foreign
policy activities of the party apparatus. He writes that ‘the question arose whom
to appoint [head of] the International Department (mezhdunarodnyi otdel) – Do-
brynin, Yakovlev, Medvedev? I then decided on Yakovlev’; Gorbachev, Zhizn’,
Vol. 1, p. 409. Falin is never mentioned in this context. Later, when he discusses
the establishment of the Commissions (p. 410), he states that Yakovlev became
responsible for the ‘international direction’.
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nist countries and entities in Europe – West Germany, West Berlin and
Austria. Rykin’s removal from the ‘German direction’ was largely viewed
in the ID as an expression of Falin’s professional jealousy. Rykin, as de-
scribed above, had known Gorbachev since the mid-1970s, had close con-
tacts with Chernyaev and was a personal friend of Willy Brandt and other
German social democratic leaders and thus a strong competitor to Falin.968
But Rykin’s job was given to his former subordinate and protégé, Igor
Shmatov, who, like Rykin, had started his career as an interpreter at the
International Department. Thus, unofficially, through his connections with
Shmatov, Rykin continued to play a role in German affairs.969
Another part of the restructuring of the party’s apparat in foreign poli-
cy-making was the creation of Central Committee Commissions. The res-
olution that established the six commissions had stated that one of their
purposes was ‘to facilitate the involvement of Central Committee mem-
bers and candidate members in active work on major directions of domes-
tic and foreign policy’.970 Their purposes appear to have been the dilution
of the party’s dominant role in decision making and revitalization of the
party’s activities by the inclusion of leading non-party experts and non-
party groups in the decision-making process.971 In the foreign policy area,
a Commission on International Policy (CIP) was formed. Its chairman was
Yakovlev. Its twenty-four members were leading experts in foreign and
foreign economic policy.
There was also an important change at the pinnacle of the party struc-
ture. Yakovlev was elevated to the position of Politburo member responsi-
ble for the party’s international activities (kurator) and thus, in addition to
being chairman of the Commission on International Policy, was empow-
ered to supervise Falin and the International Department.
What about the impact of the restructuring of the CPSU’s foreign poli-
cy? If the purpose of the changes had been enervation of the party’s domi-
nant role in foreign policy-making, as has been argued here, the objective
was certainly achieved. As almost any reorganization of a large bureaucra-
cy, the revamping of the ID, with the creation of new sub-departments and
sections, and the replacement or and transfer of personnel to operate new
cogs in the party machine, led to uncertainties and inefficiencies. The reor-
968 On Rykin’s connection with Gorbachev, see above, xxx p.
969 Interviews with Rykin and Grigoriev.
970 Pravda, 29 November 1988.
971 Grigoriev, ‘The International Department: A Case Study’, p. 301.
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ganization also carried with it substantial cuts in staff. The number of em-
ployees in the three sub-departments was to be reduced within a year and
not to exceed 300, which meant fewer functionaries than in the old ID
alone. Yakovlev, in his position as Politburo kurator, adopted a dual role.
On the one hand, presumably in the interest of enhancing his own power
and strengthening the analytical potential of the ID, he promoted or trans-
ferred several officials. But, on the other, he failed to involve himself ac-
tively in its affairs. Only twice, in March and June 1990, did he address
the new department’s employees.
In theory, the merger of the Central Committee’s three foreign affairs
departments permitted a more comprehensive view of and policy towards
the outside world. One could also argue that, to some extent, there was ad-
vance unification on German affairs since the relations with East Ger-
many’s SED were now put under the same roof as those with the political
parties and movements in West Germany.972 In practice, however, there
was little change. Now it was the sub-departments and their heads who
jealously guarded their turf.
What about the Commission on International Policy? The list of its
members had been approved at the CC’s November 1988 plenum but its
first meeting was to take place only in March 1989.973 Altogether, in
1989-90, only four meetings of the CIP were held. The scarcity of meet-
ings was matched by their lack of importance. In contrast to CC Secretari-
at decisions, CIP resolutions were non-binding. Analytical reports failed to
reach the leaders at the apex of power, with little harm done, since the
rapid pace of events in Central and Eastern Europe between 1988 and
1990 quickly rendered the reports obsolete.
To reflect on the restructuring of the foreign policy components of the
party machine, analysts have debated whether its purpose was to eviscer-
ate the apparat or to make it more effective.974 It is unclear, however, why
972 Interview with Zagladin.
973 Izvestiia TsK KPSS, No. 9 (1990), p. 24.
974 The two positions have aptly been argued by Sergei Grigoriev and Mark Kramer
in the former’s monograph, ‘The International Department of the CPSU Central
Committee: Its Functions and Role in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making and its Rise
and Fall Following the Major Reorganization of the Central Party Apparatus un-
der Gorbachev’, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard Univer-
sity, John F. Kennedy School of Government, December 1995. In Grigoriev’s
view, Gorbachev ‘did not have a secret plan to destroy the CC CPSU apparatus
from the inside’. The ID could have been ‘transformed into a viable structure’
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one objective should contradict the other, or why, for that matter, the two
aims should exclude still others. Restructuring was in all likelihood de-
signed to achieve four interrelated purposes: (1) to weaken the apparat by
organizational changes and staff reductions; (2) to make a smaller entity
more effective by the elimination of bureaucratic overlap, retirement of
aging officials, and appointment of new functionaries; (3) to subordinate it
more closely to the reformist core in the Politburo and its foreign policy
kurator; and (4) to make the party more responsive to an informed public
by the inclusion of non-party experts.
It might seem that Falin’s appointment to the position of head of the
new ID was both an auspicious and fortuitous move directly related to his
credentials as a German expert, occurring precisely at a time when the la-
tent German problem was beginning to become acute. This, however, was
not the case. In fact, his views and intention to play a determining role on
the German problem were one of the reasons why the ID, in the policy-
making process on that issue, failed to be more directly involved in
1989-90 than one might have expected at the time of the ID’s reorganiza-
tion. It is appropriate, therefore, to focus more closely on Falin’s role in
foreign policy-making, in particular on the German issue, and his relation-
ship with the reformist inner core of the Politburo.
Falin’s Role in Policy-Making
One of the main formative experiences in Falin’s life, as he writes in his
memoirs, was the German attack against the Soviet Union in June 1941,
which occurred when he was fifteen years old.975 The war struck his fami-
ly with full force and in all its brutality. His grandmother and his father’s
sister and her five children were its victims, as well as three of the four
children of his other sister, their husbands, and near and remote relatives
comparable to the U.S. National Security Council. He regards the fact that this
transformation did not come about as a ‘failure’, for which Gorbachev and his
top aides must bear ‘their share of responsibility’ (p. 87). Contrary to that,
Kramer argues (on p. 118) that, by autumn 1988, ‘Gorbachev had come to be-
lieve that a radical restructuring of Soviet society would be impossible unless he
weakened and even undermined the central party apparatus, which had been such
a formidable barrier to reform. ... The old system had to be weakened and, even-
tually, dismantled’.
975 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 21.
4. The CPSU: Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee Departments
411
on his mother’s side who lived in Leningrad and its suburbs. The war not
only shaped his emotions but also his educational and career preferences.
He found it almost incomprehensible that a nation that had been regarded
in Russia as a model of culture, organization, and order and had produced
eminent philosophers, scientists, writers and composers could create such
‘an ocean of evil and suffering’.976 The urge to comprehend the German
national character, whether it was shaped by ‘philosophy or the iron stud-
ded boot’, also determined his choice of university. In 1946 he enrolled in
the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) with a
concentration on German language, history, culture, politics and eco-
nomics. After his graduation in 1950, he was posted to the Soviet Control
Commission in Berlin, which, after the foundation of the GDR, was the
successor institution of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.
His responsibilities were to collect and analyze information pertaining to
developments in West Germany. In that capacity, he also forged contacts
with officials of the emerging political parties, trade union representatives,
and businessmen in both East and West Germany.977
Typically for career patterns of officials in the Soviet period, Falin alter-
nated between state and party jobs. After his return to Moscow in 1951, he
was posted to the Committee on Information at the foreign ministry and
the CC’s Information Department. For a number of years thereafter, he
held executive posts in the foreign ministry. In 1961, after the summit
meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna, he was transferred
to the prime minister’s office to act for Khrushchev as adviser and speech
writer on German affairs but he also continued to cooperate closely with
foreign minister Gromyko. Their working relationship deepened in 1965,
when he advanced to the position of head of the Group of Advisers at the
foreign ministry. One of his tasks was to analyze information reaching the
ministry and twice daily to report to Gromyko. He also was entrusted to
write speeches for him.978
In August 1968, at the time of the Warsaw Pact intervention in
Czechoslovakia, he was made head of the Third European Department. In
that capacity and as Soviet ambassador to West Germany in 1971-1978, he
became one of the main advocates of Soviet-West German rapprochement.
In 1978, he was transferred to the party apparat to become first deputy
976 Ibid.
977 Ibid., pp. 25-29.
978 Ibid., pp. 29-37.
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head of the Central Committee’s International Information Department
and served under , Chernenko and Andropov. But in 1983, his until then
smooth career was severely set back. His stepson, a Soviet diplomat who
had served in Vienna, had chosen not to return to the Soviet Union. A
cloak of secrecy was thrown over the defection because of the father’s
prominence. But moralist and disciplinarian Andropov apparently held the
father accountable for the sins of the son. What also did not help Falin’s
career was the fact that he married his own secretary, a woman from Sovi-
et Central Asia, several decades younger than he. It was his third marriage.
In October 1983, he was demoted to the humble position of Izvestiia polit-
ical analyst or ‘observer’ (obozryvatel').979
His fortunes improved after Gorbachev’s ascent to power. In December
1985, Shevardnadze offered him the post of planning chief at the foreign
ministry, which he declined. He did agree, however, to Yakovlev’s request
to become part of a team of writers, including Arbatov and Anatoli Ko-
valev (a writer turned deputy foreign minister), to participate in drafting
Gorbachev’s speech to the Twenty-seventh Party Congress. At that
congress, he was elected alternate member of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee and shortly thereafter, in March 1986, appointed chief of Novosti, the
official Soviet information agency. In October 1988, he was named chief
of the CC’s International Department and, finally, in July 1990, at the last
CPSU congress – the Twenty-eighth – appointed to the once powerful
Secretariat of the Central Committee.
What about Falin’s standing in the foreign policy establishment, his po-
litical philosophy and his attitudes towards the German problem? There is
no evidence that his life-long interest in German affairs and his experience
in Berlin and Bonn had elicited much empathy with or sympathy for Ger-
many, East or West.980 Perhaps as a reflection of this but more likely as a
979 In his memoirs, Falin makes no reference to these two possible reasons for his
demotion – the defection, which had occurred in 1981, and his unconventional
marriage. In his version, he fell victim to ‘intrigues’ by Leonid Zamyatin, his
chief at the CC’s International Information Department. Zamyatin’s maneuvers
supposedly ‘created my conflict with Yuri Andropov, who in the meantime had
become General Secretary’; Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 38.
980 This is not contradicted by the fact that he went to Hamburg after German unifi-
cation to live and teach there, a move facilitated by Egon Bahr. His de facto emi-
gration was in all likelihood not because of a special fondness for Germans and
Germany but the result of what he considered humiliating treatment by Gor-
bachev and lack of career opportunities in the new Russia.
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result of his active involvement in Soviet- German relations in the 1970s,
he remained wedded to the idea of the continued division of Germany. If
unification of Germany should ever occur (‘in a hundred years’?), it would
have to be under socialist auspices.981 As one of the chief architects of the
August 1970 Moscow Treaty and the September 1971 Quadripartite
Treaty on Berlin, he viewed the arrangements and the modus vivendi
reached between West Germany and the Soviet Union, and between the
two German states, as the main pillars of European security. He clearly
had a vested interest in the continuation of the conceptual and practical ap-
proach he had developed on the German problem. As his voluminous
memoirs underline, his views essentially did not deviate from those held
by Gromyko, except on a rather more theoretical than practical matter. He
severely criticizes Gromyko for having, in conversation with him, ‘put the
cards on the table’ and expressly ‘abandoned the perspective of a united
socialist Germany’.982 As his clinging to an unrealistic policy goal demon-
strates, Falin, although times have changed, has been unable or unwilling
to change with them.
In 1988-90, Falin’s approach towards emerging German unification was
distinctly more conservative than that of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevard-
nadze and Chernyaev. This, among other factors, was connected with his
close ties to the leadership of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD),
whose attitudes towards German unification were different from those
held by chancellor Kohl and the ruling coalition. His ties became ‘institu-
tionalized’ when he assumed the office as head of the International De-
partment. In this capacity he had to deal with the complaints and pressures
generated by the embattled SED and its successor party, the PDS. As the
German problem moved from the ‘hundred years’ horizon to the current
agenda, Shevardnadze and Chernyaev, in contrast, had to cope with the
practicalities of its solution in cooperation with the Kohl government.
From their institutional perspective, they felt that they could not afford the
luxury of theoretical discussion with opposition parties and forces.
Anti-American tendencies also played a certain role in Falin’s conser-
vative approach to the German issue. Talking to executives in the ID, he
often characterized Americans as ‘pushy, arrogant and over-confident’,
criticized the Soviet preoccupation with American affairs and demanded
981 Interviews with Kvitsinsky, Maksimychev and Bykov.
982 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 239.
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that equal attention be paid to relations with European and Asian coun-
tries.983 Since a viable NATO depended on the continued presence of
American forces in Europe, he also strongly opposed membership of Ger-
many in NATO, remarking scathingly in his book that ‘somehow, one
would not have suspected that “all-human values” are identical with At-
lanticism’.984
Conservatism on the German problem did not extend to all political is-
sues. As Chairman of APN, the Novosti news agency, he had been instru-
mental in the foundation of the progressive Moscow News, which contin-
ued to be financed by the agency until 1989. Yakovlev acknowledged that
he was impressed by Falin’s opposition to Ligachev’s demands to shut
down Moscow News. This was probably also one of the reasons why
Yakovlev strongly supported Dobrynin’s replacement by Falin as head of
the ID.985 In his position of Chairman of APN, which engaged in foreign
policy propaganda, Falin had closely cooperated with Yakovlev, who was
then in charge of the CC CPSU Agitation and Propaganda Department.
The two officials also shared disrespect, if not disdain, for certain leaders
of communist countries – for Ceaușescu, first and foremost, but also for
Honecker and Zhivkov. Finally, they derided the idea that it was necessary
or useful to maintain contact with and finance even the most minute and
uninfluential parties in the international communist movement.986
To summarize, given the emergence, nolens volens, of the German issue
on the Soviet foreign policy agenda, Falin’s appointment as head of a reor-
ganized International Department seemed both an auspicious and fortu-
itous move. Theoretically, the most eminent expert on Germany was ele-
vated to a position which would permit effective management of a com-
plex issue. Falin was certainly prepared to assume such a role. In practice,
however, his intention to play the first fiddle did not coincide with the
score and composition of the orchestra as determined by conductor
Yakovlev. His appointment to the position of department head, while he
was not even a full member of the Central Committee, let alone CC Secre-
tary, meant that he was expected to play a less prominent role.987 Falin
983 Personal notes by Grigoriev.
984 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 497.
985 Interview with Grigoriev.
986 Interview with Zagladin.
987 Unlike Ponomarev and Dobrynin, who had held the position of head of the ID
before him, Falin did not become CPSU CC Secretary upon appointment. He was
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was not prepared to reconcile himself with a more modest position. This in
itself was bound to lead to conflict between him and Yakovlev. But the
struggle over power and influence became intertwined with both differ-
ences over policy and a clash of personalities. Whereas Falin’s intellect
may be incisive, his bearing was detached and impersonal. These traits
stood in marked contrast to those of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev,
and Chernyaev. From 1988 to 1990, therefore, differences of personality
and conflict over power and policy combined not only to deny the fore-
most German expert centre stage in the resolution of the German problem
but progressively to relegate him to an isolated position.
As amply demonstrated here, Falin’s subordinate role in foreign policy-
making was intimately connected with the decline in the power of the par-
ty and its apparat. A similar development occurred in the role played by
one of the mainstays of the Soviet empire – the Soviet armed forces.
The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces
In the comparative history of imperial collapse the Soviet empire repre-
sents an anomaly. The Roman empire, the nineteenth and early twentieth
century Czarist, Ottoman and German as well as twentieth century British,
French and Portuguese colonial empires came to an end only after military
convulsions – a series of uprisings, local or regional wars, or a world con-
flagration, or a combination of internal and external conflict. Typically, the
ruling elite, with the assistance of the security apparatus and the armed
forces on which it depended, made determined efforts to prevent or post-
pone imperial decline and collapse. Furthermore, in several cases, military
governors on the periphery, on their own or in cooperation with factions in
the centre, took matters in hand and actively resisted imperial devolution.
None of these phenomena could be observed in the Soviet case. The Sovi-
et empire did not disintegrate as a result of catastrophic war. No resolute
action was taken by the institutions of imperial power – the party apparat,
the armed forces and the internal security services – to resist the demise.
The August 1991 coup attempt, with all the power institutions represented
in the Emergency Committee, occurred only after the external empire had
5.
elected to that position only after Yakovlev had announced in July 1990 that he
did not want any leading role in the CPSU hierarchy.
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already collapsed and was also a less than determined effort to keep the
internal empire intact.
To summarize the main arguments of this section, the Soviet military
grudgingly and resentfully but, in the final analysis, without open resis-
tance accepted imperial decline and disintegration. This was due to a com-
bination of factors. Foremost among them were (1) the lack of a Bona-
partist tradition in the armed forces; (2) strict subordination to and control
by the CPSU; and (3) a precipitous decrease in the party’s power and in-
fluence. An inner logic linked the last two factors. Since the party had
penetrated and was in control of the armed forces, the erosion of the CP-
SU’s power and authority was bound to erode the military’s equally
prominent and privileged position. In fact, the defense ministry, the armed
forces, and the ‘military-industrial complex’ essentially suffered the same
fate as the party apparatus, that is, significantly reduced access to, if not
exclusion from, policy-making on central issues. Within a very short time,
they had to adjust to the progressive devolution of empire, including the
withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe; a severe decline of their role in
economic affairs; deep cuts in forces and expenditure; shifts in resource
allocation from military to civilian uses; fundamental change in military
doctrine and security concepts; increased access of civilians to hitherto
closely guarded secrets; and a significant drop in prestige and social sta-
tus. Presentation of some detail is necessary in order to appreciate the
enormity of these developments, which in their impact went beyond the
Gorbachev era to affect deeply Russia’s conduct in world affairs under
Yeltsin.988
As in other dimensions of policy under Gorbachev, change in military
affairs was gradual at first, became more radical and eventually led to the
abandonment imperial thinking and policies. This process can be divided
into three major phases. The first phase extended from Gorbachev’s elec-
tion as party chief in March 1985 to the January 1987 Central Committee
plenum. In this period, there was little criticism of the military, some per-
sonnel and no institutional change, and an economic development strategy
that seemed to serve both civilian and military requirements. One might
have thought initially that the armed forces were to be exempted from re-
988 For a more extensive description and analysis see Hannes Adomeit, ‘Der
Machtverlust der Sowjetarmee’, in Martin Malek and Anna Tscho-Tschud-
nowskaja, eds., Der Zerfall der Sowjetunion: Ursachen, Begleiterscheinungen,
Hintergründe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013, pp. 187-202.
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structuring. A second period lasted from the January 1987 CC plenum to
the ‘Rust affair’ in May of the same year. This short time interval is char-
acterized by a more vigorous advocacy of restructuring, not solely in the
economy and society, but also in politics and military affairs. The third
phase began with the Rust incident and included the ouster of the defense
minister, extensive personnel transfers and demotions in the defense min-
istry and the armed forces, revisions of international security concepts and
military doctrine, and a greater role than hitherto for the foreign ministry
and academic institutes and specialists in security decision-making.989
Perestroika, Democratization, and Glasnost in the Armed Forces
The three-stage process of change was facilitated by developments prior to
Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary but after he had already ac-
quired an important role in policy-making. Beginning in the fall of 1984,
the military was subordinated more strongly to party control, as evident in
the removal of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, a strong advocate of modernisa-
tion and increased resource allocation to the military, from his posts as
Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister.990 Curtail-
ment of the military’s influence on policy-making continued after defense
minister Ustinov’s death in December 1984 and the appointment of Sergei
Sokolov as his replacement. The important role of the military had been
based to a considerable extent on the influence Ustinov had exerted on
Brezhnev and the top ruling circle.991 His successor, Sokolov, was bound
to be in a weaker position not only because of his 73 years of age but also
989 The ordering of phases draws on Marion Recktenwald, ‘Perestrojka in den sow-
jetischen Streitkräften’, Research Report, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche
und internationale Studien (Cologne), No. 10 (1987), p. 27; see also Dale R. Her-
spring, ‘On Perestroika: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military’, Problems of Com-
munism, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July-August 1987), pp. 99‑107.
990 Ogarkov’s dismissal was in all likelihood connected with disagreements between
him and the top party leadership about the level of resources to be allocated to
defense; see Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Com-
mand, The RAND Corporation, R-3521-AF, June 1987, and Dale R. Herspring,
‘Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Af-
fairs’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 29-59.
991 Testimony to Ustinov’s influence has been provided, for instance, by
Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, in his memoirs, published in a four‑part series, ‘Pen-
sioner soiuznogo znacheniia’, Ogonek, Nos. 40‑43 (October 1988).
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his rather uninspiring, colourless personality. Furthermore, in contrast to
his predecessor, he was not a full member of the Politburo.992
The turnover of top military officers and party officials concerned with
defense issues gained momentum after Gorbachev’s accession to power. In
the first two phases of change, this process included the removal in July
1985 of Grigori Romanov, one of Gorbachev’s main rivals, from his posts
as full member of the Politburo and CC secretary responsible for the arms
industry; the replacement of Sergei Gorshkov (Navy), Vladimir Tolubko
(Strategic Rocket Forces), Vasili Petrov (Ground Forces), Alexander Al-
tunin (Civil Defense), Pavel Kutakhov (Air Force), Ivan Shkadov
(Cadres), and Alexei Yepishev (Main Political Administration).
Several measures that Gorbachev adopted in the military sphere had a
symbolic and demonstrative character. In May 1985, conservative forces
had wanted to use the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory
and the renewal of the Warsaw Treaty as an occasion for patriotic mobili-
zation in grand style but both were celebrated on a more modest scale. On
such occasions in Red Square, the military under party leaders Brezhnev
and Andropov had prominently been placed atop the Lenin mausoleum at
the right hand side of the General Secretary, and they had taken up half the
rostrum. Starting with Chernenko’s funeral in February 1985, the senior
military figures were shunted to a less prominent position. By 1986 only
four senior officers were allowed on the rostrum, and only at some dis-
tance from the top political leader.993
Nevertheless, in the first two phases of perestroika in the armed forces,
there were several demands for change with which the military was able to
agree, or at least with which it was unable to disagree. Such demands in-
cluded the rejuvenation of cadres, the more careful utilization of economic
resources, eradication of corruption, the encouragement of initiative,
greater combat effectiveness and the more rapid and effective introduction
992 Sokolov was elected candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985.
993 See the corresponding photographs, Pravda, 14 November 1985, and ibid., 8
November 1986. The demonstrative diminution of the military’s standing has
been described in detail by Hans-Henning Schröder, ‘Gorbatschow und die Gen-
eräle: Militärdoktrin, Rüstungspolitik und öffentliche Meinung in der Perestroj-
ka’, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien
(Cologne), Research Report, No. 45 (1987), and Astrid von Borcke, ‘Militär und
Politik in der Sowjetunion: Zur Rolle des Militärs im politischen Entschei-
dungsprozess’, in Hannes Adomeit et al., Die Sowjetunion als Militärmacht
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1987), pp. 73-89.
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of science and technology in the armed forces.994 The military was to have
greater problems only with the pressures generated in the next phase of
change, which aimed at democratization and openness in the armed forces.
The third phase of restructuring in military affairs was ushered in by the
landing of Mathias Rust, a young West German pilot, with a single-engine
Cessna aircraft in Red Square, at the end of May 1987. Given that Gor-
bachev was embarking on more radical reform in domestic politics, the
Cessna’s landing was almost literally a gift from Heaven. The demonstra-
tion of gross ineptitude by the Soviet air defense forces in tracking and
failing to force the intruding aircraft to land was used by the party leader
to oust Marshal Sokolov, replace the chief of the Air Defense Forces and
demote and expel from the party’s ranks several other air defense officers.
In replacing the defense minister, Gorbachev bypassed the more senior
military contenders – Akhromeev, Lushev, Kulikov and Ogarkov – and
appointed Dmitri Yazov, a general almost unknown in the West. Changes
in the top military leadership in 1987, as Table 5 shows, were especially
numerous.995
Another major departure from traditional approaches was the attempt to
introduce democratic principles in the armed forces. This was an aspect of
military reform which, under the heading of innere Führung, had formed a
central part in the foundation of the West German Bundeswehr and which
was now, like the Prussian military reforms after the Napoleonic wars,
used by civilian experts in the Soviet Union as a model for change. Pre-
dictably, given centuries of harsh authoritarianism in both the Imperial
Russian and the Soviet army, the military establishment failed to under-
stand how ‘civilian’ principles, such as of voluntary participation, due pro-
cess and criticism could be brought in line with the ‘military’ requirements
of subordination, discipline, and command and control. ‘How can democ-
racy be reconciled with one-man command (edinonachalie)?’ was the
question which the editors of Krasnaia zvezda allowed readers to ask in
994 Agreement with several of these demands was expressed, for instance, at a meet-
ing of party activists in the armed forces, ‘Perestroika – delo kazhdogo. Sobranie
partiinogo aktiva Ministerstva oborony SSSR’, Krasnaia zvezda, 18 March 1987.
995 Adapted from Naomi Koizumi, ‘Perestroika in the Soviet Military’, Paper Pre-
pared for the European-Japanese Symposium on Soviet Perestroika: Security and
Foreign Policy Dimensions, London, RIIA, 14-16 December 1988.
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letters to the editor.996 The new defense minister did his duty to explain
that the two principles were not mutually exclusive but complementary.997
But such explanations never found practical support and application in the
services.







Mil. Distr. GF Navy ThF
 15a 5b 4c 8d 16e 4f 4g 4h
1985 2 2 2 0 3 1 2 0
1986 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1987 4 1 0 3 7 3 1 1
1988 1 0 1 2 3 0 0 1
Total 9 3 3 6 14 4 4 3
Percent 60 60 75 75 88 100 100 75
Notes
a   Ministry of Defense: defense minister, 3 first deputies, and 11 deputies.
b   Commanders in Chief of the five services of the armed forces.
c   Main Political Administration: chief, 1 first deputy, and 2 deputies.
d   General Staff: chief, 3 first deputies, and 4 deputies.
e   Heads of the Military Districts.
f   Chiefs of the Group of Forces.
g   Commanders of the four fleets.
h   Chiefs of the Theatre Forces.
Another reform attempt in security affairs was glasnost in defense expen-
ditures. In August 1987, deputy foreign minister Vladimir Petrovsky had
laid the groundwork for more realistic provision and international compar-
ison of data when he acknowledged that outlays for research, develop-
ment, testing and procurement were not included in the official Soviet de-
Table 5:
996 ‘Demokratizatsiia i Vooruzhennye Sily. Kandidat v chleny Politburo TsK KPSS,
ministr oborony SSSR general armii D. T. Yazov, otvechaet na voprosy chitatelei
“Krasnoi zvezdy”’, Krasnaia zvezda, 18 November 1988.
997 The examples which Yazov used to demonstrate the complementarity of the two
principles were rather limited. They included constructive criticism within the
appropriate party and other channels, greater participation in the evaluation of
training exercises, and more reporting of accidents, corruption, and other forms
of dereliction of duty.
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fense budget.998 One month later, Gorbachev suggested that the major
powers should provide each other with reliable figures on military expen-
ditures.999 The intention was laudable but the results disappointing. The
Soviet budgets for 1988 and 1989 still contained the unrealistic official
figures. Petrovsky and academic specialists regretted that the publication
of more detailed data on defense outlays had to await implementation of a
comprehensive price reform envisaged under the next (1991-95) five-year
plan.1000 U.S. defense secretary Frank Carlucci was informed in August
1988 that the Soviet government was unable for technical reasons to pro-
vide exact data because Soviet military expenditures were scattered across
several different government departments, making it difficult to produce a
budget breakdown resembling that of the Washington’s defense bud-
get.1001 However, the West German defense minister, in talks with his So-
viet counterpart in Moscow in October 1988, was told that figures on the
Soviet military effort did exist but that the ministry was against publica-
tion of such figures at present.1002
Legislative control of international security policy and the armed forces
was yet another intended reform measure. According to the draft provi-
sions for the reform of the constitution, as outlined by Gorbachev at the
June 1988 Nineteenth Party Conference and endorsed by the Supreme So-
viet in November 1988, the legislative organs (Soviets) at all levels of
government were to receive greater powers. At the national (all-Union)
level, a newly constituted Supreme Soviet, with the help of a standing
committee, was to exert control over all the main bodies involved in mili-
tary and military-industrial activity. As explained by Shevardnadze at the
foreign ministry’s All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference in July 1988,
998 ‘Razoruzhenie i razvitie. Na mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii v N’iu-Iorke’, Prav-
da, 27 August 1987; on the need for political and planning purposes to provide
more credible figures on military expenditures, see, for instance, G. Khanin and
V. Seliunin, ‘Statistika znaet vse’, Novyi mir, No. 12 (1987), p. 257.
999 In an important article on problems of world security that departed from many
other traditional Soviet approaches, Pravda, 17 September 1987.
1000 Petrovsky at a press conference in Moscow, as quoted by Süddeutsche Zeitung,
20 August 1988.
1001 On a visit to Moscow, Wall Street Journal, 31 August 1988, p. 6. Marshal
Akhromeev had made similar statements during his visit to Washington in July
1988; see Time, 8 August 1988, p. 6.
1002 Interview with the West German defense minister, Rupert Scholz, on the Zeit-
spiegel program of the Bayern 3 television channel, 2 November 1988.
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legislative control was to extend to ‘questions concerning the use of mili-
tary force across the national borders of the country, the plans for defense
construction, and transparency of the military budgets and their connec-
tion with the problem of national security’.1003
Finally, the changes that had the greatest impact on European security
and that most profoundly affected Moscow’s policy on the German prob-
lem concerned nuclear and conventional arms control as well as armed
forces reductions. Gorbachev’s initiative of January 1986 that had called
for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the October 1986 Reykjavik
summit meeting, at which the abolition of nuclear arms had been dis-
cussed, had raised concern among the military. But then, to their relief, no
agreement had been concluded. The negotiations on intermediate-range
nuclear missiles, however, were an entirely different matter. They did pro-
duce an agreement, and one that was resented by the military establish-
ment. MFA officials and academic specialists felt constrained to justify
themselves and explain to the military the rationale of asymmetrical cuts.
This Shevardnadze did at the July 1988 conference and on many later oc-
casions with the argument that the asymmetry of cuts created an asymme-
try of advantages.1004 The treaty, he explained,
removed from our borders American rockets which literally in a few minutes
could be fired and reach vitally important facilities on the territory of the
USSR. What difference does it make if it happens that we destroy more rock-
ets than the Americans? We put more of them in place, so let us remove more
of them. The main thing is that we are better off.1005
Even more damaging and devastating to military thinking was the whole
process of first unilateral and then asymmetrical cuts in conventional
weapons begun by Gorbachev’s announcement at the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in December 1988 of plans to cut the overall size of the So-
1003 Speech by Member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, E. A. Shevardnadze, at the Scientific-Practical Conference of the MFA
of the USSR, 25 July 1988, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 9 (September 1988),
p. 20.
1004 At the July 1988 conference he said that it was one of most basic interests of the
Soviet Union ‘to have the military activity of all countries confined to their na-
tional boundaries’ and that, as regards INF, it ‘took into account that these mis-
siles are of different value from the standpoint of Soviet and American securi-
ty. ... Thanks to it, the American nuclear presence has been moved away from
our borders’; International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10 (1988), p. 19.
1005 Shevardnadze, interview with Argumenty i fakty, No. 18 (1989).
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viet armed forces by 500,000 officers and men and to withdraw troops
from Eastern Europe. According to Western estimates, the Soviet armed
forces at that time consisted of 3.5 million officers and men, of which
800,000 were stationed abroad.1006 Military leaders had stringently warned
against downsizing per se but especially against unilateral and asymmetri-
cal reductions. For instance, Gen. Ivan Tretiak, commander of the Soviet
air defense forces, had called Khrushchev’s troop reductions a ‘hasty step’
and ‘a terrible blow to our defense capacity’ and now demanded that uni-
lateral cuts be examined ‘a thousand times over’.1007 Defense minister Ya-
zov, Soviet chief of staff Akhromeev, and Warsaw Pact forces chief of
staff Anatoli Gribkov had all, with minor variations, made the point that
‘the limits of sufficiency are defined not by us but by the actions of the
United States and NATO’.1008 Akhromeev also opposed unilateral down-
sizing; in fact, his resignation was made public on the very day on which
Gorbachev announced the military cuts and withdrawals.1009 There was
also considerable anxiety in the military industry, in particular among the
more highly paid production engineers and managers, to the effect that de-
fense expenditure and troop cuts would jeopardize their jobs and privi-
leges. As one of them exclaimed in exasperation after the signing of the
Washington INF agreement: ‘May God [sic] save us from further disarma-
1006 See Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Military Presence (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 114-15. At a press conference at the United
Nations in December 1989, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovsky dis-
closed that the Soviet Union still had a total of 627,000 troops stationed abroad
and that the Soviet aim was to bring ‘all our troops stationed abroad back by the
year 2000’; Reuters, 15 December 1989.
1007 TASS, 17 February 1988.
1008 D. T. Yazov, ‘O voennom balanse sil i raktno-iadernom paritete’, Pravda, 9
February 1988; S. F. Akhromeev, ‘Shto kroetsia za briussel’skim zaiavleniem
NATO?’, Krasnaia zvezda, 20 March 1988; A. I. Gribkov, ‘Doktrina sokhra-
neniia mira’, ibid., 25 September 1987.
1009 The timing of his announcement to coincide with Gorbachev’s speech may not
have been deliberate. Akhromeev reports in his memoirs that he asked Yazov in
September 1988 to report his resignation request to Gorbachev. At the end of
October 1988 he was told that his request would be accepted. At the beginning
of November Gorbachev called him to the Kremlin office, where he confirmed
the acceptance of his resignation but asked him to stay on as military adviser;
Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, pp. 215-216. For
further detail on the reasons for his resignation, see below, xxx pp. .
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ment measures.’1010 The appeals to divine intervention, however, were to
no avail.
Since Marshal Akhromeev can be considered representative of the
moderately conservative, professionally competent and politically loyal
type of military officer in the Soviet armed forces, his views are of partic-
ular importance. In his memoirs, he gave the following interpretation of
the 1988 reorganization of the party apparatus and its consequences, in-
cluding for the armed forces. ‘The Soviet people’, he said,
will yet have to analyze this historic period [the end of 1988]. Precisely at this
time, there started a carefully planned attack of the antisocialist forces and the
party’s own defectors on the communist party. Their aim was to discredit and
destroy the party. As a communist veteran, I had a hard time watching what
was happening to the country. It was especially hard for me until I finally re-
alized that we were dealing with real ideological opponents. We should have
fought them without making any concessions or compromises.1011
He then explains why he resigned. He turned 65 in 1988, and at such an
age he found it ‘appropriate for a prominent military leader to leave his
post. ... Certainly, one can still work productively and apply the richness
of one’s experience.’ However, he thought, ‘it becomes difficult to main-
tain one’s creativity at its peak, to develop new initiatives and to control a
large staff. No one can fight his age.’ He also had to think about his wors-
ening state of health: His war-time wounds had started to bother him
again. Most important in the present context, he was tired of the many dif-
ferences with the political leadership, notably ‘my frequent fights with
Shevardnadze ... about his independent moves during the negotiations on
conventional and nuclear arms reductions.’ He deplored that
my positions and views were almost certainly misrepresented or amended
with certain comments. This resulted in two or three quite poignant talks with
the General Secretary of the CPSU [Gorbachev]. He reprimanded me and I in
turn tried to justify my position, which was not appreciated by the leadership.
I was never shy to express my unflattering observations on the work of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the intra-departmental circles. I knew at that
1010 The head of a weapons laboratory, as quoted in a letter sent by a 25-year old
engineer, identified as Sergei Sukharev, to Literaturnaia gazeta; see ‘Ne dai
bog, poteriaem nomenklaturu’, ibid., 4 May 1988, p. 14.
1011 Akhromeev in Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p.
214.
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time that this would be reported to the leadership. I wouldn’t characterize the
situation around me as tense but found it uncomfortable.1012
A final reason for his resignation was acute concern about developments
in the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviet Union started to experience very difficult relations with many of
the [Warsaw Pact] countries. I saw all this happening but couldn’t help it.
This deeply frustrated me. Some readers perhaps don’t understand this but I
found it impossible to participate myself in destroying the alliance that had
been created by the efforts of Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky, and by the
efforts of officers, generals and admirals of several generations.1013
Akhromeev’s request to be relieved of his duties as chief of staff was ac-
cepted, but Gorbachev asked him to act as his military adviser, ‘to prepare
suggestions on major military issues, especially on negotiations on nuclear
and conventional arms’.1014
Akhromeev’s account is of some importance not only because it sheds
light on the circumstances of his resignation and – after the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact and the August 1991 coup attempt – his suicide. It is valu-
able also because it corroborates the existence of sharp disagreements be-
tween the MOD and the MFA over security and the military’s rejection of
the former’s point of view on practically all of the contentious issues of
Soviet security policy. The account also poses both an important and in-
triguing question: who was primarily responsible for the major departures
from traditional Soviet approaches to security affairs and foreign policy,
including on the German problem – Gorbachev, Yakovlev or Shevard-
nadze? Institutionally, was it the party chief and president with his person-
al assistants and staff, or the MFA? Akhromeev’s scathing description of
the MFA’s work and his acceptance of the offer to become military advisor
to Gorbachev clearly point in the direction that he, at least, thought She-
vardnadze to have been the main agent of change and the chief culprit in
the demise of the Soviet empire.
1012 Ibid., p. 215. He also mentions controversies ‘with the chiefs of other services in
relation to the Afghan problem’. Although Akhromeev speaks of these contro-
versies and those with Shevardnadze over arms control issues as ‘rumours’
(slukhi), it is clear from the context that these rumours were well-founded but,
in his view, misrepresented to Gorbachev.
1013 Ibid., pp. 215-16.
1014 Ibid., p. 216.
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After having highlighted the curtailment of influence of the military es-
tablishment in the centre of the Soviet empire and Akhromeev’s answer to
the perennial Russian question of Who is to Blame? (kto vinovat?), the
following sub-section seeks to illuminate the role played by the military
establishment at the periphery of empire, the Soviet armed forces in East
Germany.
The Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic
On 10 June 1945, the Red Army units stationed on the territory of the So-
viet Occupation zone in Germany were transformed into the Group of So-
viet Occupation Forces in Germany.1015 According to the Declaration Re-
garding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority
with Respect to Germany of 5 June 1945, supreme authority in the country
was assumed by the Four Powers. The Soviet armed forces that had con-
quered Berlin (largely consisting of the First Belorussian Front) became
an occupation force under the Soviet Military Administration and Marshal
Zhukov, its commander in chief. Its headquarters were originally in Pots-
dam but later moved to Wünsdorf, south of Berlin. When the occupation
regime was formally terminated in 1949, Moscow changed the name of its
forces to Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; it denied East Germany’s
request to substitute the ‘Germany’ by ‘German Democratic Republic’.1016
In fact, retention of the original term for the forces was one of the tangible
signs that Stalin insisted on maintaining Soviet rights and responsibilities
with respect to Germany as a whole and that, unlike Ulbricht, he refused
to regard the German question as settled. On 29 June 1989, only a few
months before the East German regime collapsed, a new designation was
1015 The following four paragraphs of this section on the Soviet forces in East Ger-
many are a revised and shortened but essentially verbatim summary of the com-
prehensive analysis by Ulrich Brandenburg, ‘The “Friends” Are Leaving: Soviet
and Post-Soviet Troops in Germany after Unification’, Bundesinstitut für ost-
wissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne), Research Report, No.
33 (1992). For a less comprehensive treatment, see Claus J. Duisberg, ‘Der
Abzug der russischen Truppen aus Deutschland: Eine politische Erfolgsbilanz’"
Europa-Archiv, No. 16 (1994), pp. 461-469.
1016 The other Groups of Forces in the European theatre were the Northern Group
(NGF) of forces based in Poland, the Central Group (CGF) in Czechoslovakia,
and the Southern Group (SGF) in Hungary.
5. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces
427
introduced: the Western Group of Forces (WGF). The statement issued on
this occasion clarified that this alteration again did not affect Soviet post-
war rights and responsibilities.1017
Before the unilateral reductions announced by Gorbachev in his speech
at the UN General Assembly in December 1988, the Soviet ground forces
in Germany consisted of the 2nd Guards Army (with headquarters in
Fürstenberg), the 3rd Assault Army (Magdeburg), the 8th Guards Army
(Weimar) and the 20th Guards Army (Eberswalde, surrounding Berlin)
with 4 divisions each, plus the 1st Guards Armored Army (Dresden), with
3 divisions. The Soviet Air Force embraced the 16th Front Air Army with
a network of air bases throughout the former GDR. Except for a small
support unit (not under GSFG/WGF command) there was no Soviet naval
presence in the territory. The 1,026 Soviet military installations covered
243,015 hectares (about 2.25 percent of the GDR territory) and included
110 airfields and helicopter bases, 100 training and firing ranges, 70 radar
and radio transmitter stations, 8 ammunition depots (the largest of which
covered nearly 3.5 square kilometres), and 400 barracks and housing com-
pounds. The full extent of the Soviet military presence and the area cov-
ered by the GSFG/WGF installations were not disclosed even to the East
German authorities until a few months before unification.1018
At the time when Gorbachev announced impending troop and equip-
ment cuts in December 1988, the Soviet military presence in East Ger-
many amounted to more than 400,000 servicemen with about 200,000 de-
pendents and civilian employees. After the cuts in 1989 there were still
about 550,000 persons associated with the renamed Western Group of
Forces (WGF), including 337,000 servicemen and 200,000 dependents
and civilian employees. In conjunction with East Germany’s National Peo-
ple’s Army (NVA), the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces, and Soviet
units based in the western military districts of the Soviet Union, the Group
of Soviet Forces in Germany formed the Warsaw Pact’s 1st Strategic
1017 Details on this and other issues of the presence and status of the GSFG/WGF
can also be found in Karl-Wilhelm Fricke, ‘Okkupanten oder Waffenbrüder?
Die Gruppe der Sowjetischen Streitkräfte in Deutschland’, Deutschland-Archiv,
Vol. 15, No. 3 (March 1982), pp. 269-76; Christian Raap, ‘Truppenstationierung
in Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung’, Monatsschrift für Deutsches
Recht, No. 12 (1991), and id., ‘Die Stationierung von Streitkräften in fremden
Staaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Deutschlands’, Archiv des Völker-
rechts, Nos. 1-2 (1991), pp. 53-84.
1018 Der Spiegel, 13 May 1991.
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Group. All of the GSFG/WGF units were classified as category A, with 90
percent of personnel at wartime strength. Service in East Germany was
considered prestigious because it appeared to be an indispensible rung on
the career ladder. Most of the commanders in chief of the GSFG became
commanders in chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, six were appointed
Marshal of the Soviet Union, and two – Zhukov and Grechko – Minister
of Defense.
Both the Declaration on Sovereignty of the German Democratic Repub-
lic, issued by the Soviet government on 25 March 1954, and the Treaty on
Relations between the GDR and the USSR of 20 September 1955, consid-
ered the presence of Soviet troops on East German territory to be tempo-
rary. But neither of the two treaties nor the Agreement on Questions Relat-
ed to the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Armed Forces of 11 April 1957
provided a legal basis for the presence of the Soviet forces other than that
they had a right to be there as an occupation force until the conclusion of a
German peace treaty. Article 18 of the 1957 agreement stipulated that, ‘in
case of a threat to the security of the Soviet forces’, the Supreme Com-
mand of the GSFG upon consultation with the GDR government had the
unrestricted right to take measures in order to ‘eliminate such a threat’.1019
In June 1953, the Soviet military had asserted such a right when it cracked
down on the popular revolt in East Germany and East Berlin.
Furthermore, in the 1957 agreement, the Soviet Union had reserved for
its forces a large measure of extraterritoriality. Military personnel, civilian
employees and family members travelled in and out of the country effec-
tively without East German control. Soviet troops enjoyed essentially un-
fettered freedom of movement, indifference of the GDR authorities to the
violation of environmental regulations, almost complete absence of re-
strictions on low-level flights by military aircraft and training unhampered
by GDR civilian interference. Military officers had access to special hunt-
ing preserves. Contacts between Soviet soldiers and their East German
counterparts, let alone the civilian population, were not allowed to develop
other than in a carefully staged setting.
Some contact, however, did exist at higher military levels. In his mem-
oirs, Marshal Akhromeev remembers large-scale military manoeuvres that
were held in East Germany in 1988, and he reflects in that context on So-
1019 The agreement as published in Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Re-
publik, Part 1, No. 28 (1957).
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viet-East German political and military relations.1020 In the course of the
exercises he met with the defense minister, Army General Hans Kessler.
We were old friends. For a long time, he had occupied the post of chief of the
general staff of the National People’s Army of the GDR, and during this time
we had frequently worked together. This was a person of true honesty. I be-
lieved him wholly. We were of the same age. He was born and raised in a
family of communists. In the years of his youth, fascism had ruled Germany.
In July 1941, in the most difficult time for us, as a soldier of the Wehrmacht,
he had crossed the line of the German-Soviet front and immediately joined us
in the battle against the fascists. After victory, as a member of the Communist
Party and later the SED, he diligently and wholeheartedly worked for the ben-
efit of the German people. Hans Kessler was a real friend and ally. He was
one of those people who fought for communist ideals to the end. I never be-
lieved and don’t believe even now that he was capable of committing any
kind of inappropriate deeds or the abuses of which he was accused during the
fall of Erich Honecker and the establishment of the new regime. [...] I just
want to say that we owe a debt to people like him.1021
The Chief of the General Staff of the National People’s Army, Col. Gen.
Fritz Strelitz, was also present at the training exercises. Akhromeev knew
him well, too, and had also ‘developed a friendly rapport’ with him. How-
ever, despite the friendships he had forged, he writes, he was ‘leaving the
GDR with a heavy heart, with a feeling of alarm and uneasiness’. Kessler
and Strelitz
had expressed concern and a lack of understanding of certain aspects of our
foreign policy as well as the relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR.
They openly told me that certain Soviet newspapers and magazines were writ-
ing articles that could undermine socialism in East Germany. I was forced, in
turn, to tell them that we did not understand Erich Honecker’s conservatism.
Couldn’t they see that the pressures within the GDR were mounting, the peo-
ple were demanding change and that it was impossible to ignore this? But it
was impossible to have a truly honest discussion with my German friends
since both they and I were constrained by the positions of our respective po-
litical structures and therefore had to maintain loyalty and correctness first
and foremost with regard to our leaders.1022
Such a mind-set of self-imposed constraints obviously did not lend itself
to independent action by the Soviet armed forces in Germany. Nor was
there any proclivity in Moscow to involve the WGF in the stabilization of
1020 Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p. 182.
1021 Ibid.
1022 Ibid. (italics mine).
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the Honecker regime. To the extent that controversy over the role of the
Soviet armed forces exists, it concerns the question as to whether they ‘in-
tervened’ in order to dissuade the East German regime and its security ap-
paratus from using force to prevent political change. This problem will be
examined next.
The Controversy Over the Use of Force
Several occasions for violent confrontation and intervention presented
themselves. On 6 and 7 October 1989 unauthorized demonstrations were
planned in Berlin to counter the official celebrations for the fortieth an-
niversary of the foundation of the GDR. Other demonstrations were sched-
uled for 9 October, when the customary manifestations against presumed
fraud committed on that day of the month in the May 1989 local elections,
were to be held in Berlin and other East German cities.1023 Since this date
fell on a Monday, the by then equally traditional demonstrations in
Leipzig – the Montagsdemonstrationen – were also going to take place on
that day.
Rumours about an impending violent crackdown abounded. Their ori-
gin, in part, lay in the SED’s Chinese connection. The East German lead-
ership had reacted with a mixture of equanimity and approval to the mer-
ciless repression of the student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in
June 1989. A parliamentary resolution, for instance, the draft of which
Honecker had personally signed, noted that the efforts
steadfastly pursued by the party and state leadership of the People’s Republic
of China at achieving a political solution of domestic problems have been
thwarted due to violent, bloody riots by anti-constitutional elements. As a re-
sult, the people’s power was forced to restore order and security by the use of
the armed forces. In that context, unfortunately, numerous people suffered in-
jury, and deaths also occurred.1024
1023 According to the GDR’s electoral commission chaired by Egon Krenz, 98.77
percent of the electorate had exercised their right to vote; 98.85 percent of the
votes had been cast for the candidates of the National Unity Front.
1024 Draft Declaration of the Volkskammer of the GDR Concerning the Current
Events in the People’s Republic of China, personally approved by Honecker in
his own handwriting on 8 June 1989; SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central
Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3221.
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The terse statement also considered ‘the events in Beijing exclusively a
[Chinese] domestic affair’ and opposed ‘any foreign interference’.1025
Furthermore, Krenz had returned on 2 October from an official visit to
China, and Yao Yilin, a high-ranking Chinese Politburo and Communist
Party member, was scheduled to attend the anniversary celebrations in
East Berlin. Krenz was later to deny any support or understanding for the
Chinese crackdown. However, the internal Politburo record on his meeting
with the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party on 26
September 1989 notes that Jiang Zemin was ‘grateful’ for the solidarity
which the SED had extended to the party ‘in the complicated situation of a
counterrevolutionary uprising’.1026 Krenz was apparently proud of this
solidarity, and certainly uncritical, when he replied that ‘for communists
such class solidarity [is] a matter of class honour and class obligations.
Whoever, like the People’s Republic of China and the GDR, is pursuing
the same social goals in the interest of the people is also facing the same
adversary on the barricades of socialist revolution.’1027 Krenz also did not
object to Jiang Zemin’s apodictic statement that with increasing distance
from the ‘June events’ there was ever more clarity about the ‘intentions
that the imperialist circles are pursuing with their concept of so-called
peaceful change’. Instead, they had an ‘aggressive programme for under-
mining socialism’.1028 In talks with Chinese Politburo member Qiao Shi-
he, Krenz went so as far as to say that the East German support was based
on the communist principle that ‘wherever the power of the people has
achieved victory, no one will be allowed to touch this power’.1029 Wide-
spread concern in East Germany and East Berlin that the SED leadership
was planning a chinesische Lösung – a Chinese-style solution – to its
problems, therefore, cannot said to have been unfounded.
The security services of the party certainly were meticulously watching
developments and keeping the top echelons informed. The Leipzig region-
al party office, for instance, sent a detailed report on the Montagsgebet
1025 Ibid.
1026 Notes on the talks between Krenz and Jiang Zemin on 26 September 1989 in
Beijing, attachment 1 for agenda item 5, Politburo session of 17 October 1989,
SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3247.
1027 Ibid.
1028 Ibid.
1029 Notes on the talks between Krenz and Qiao Shi on 25 September 1989 in Bei-
jing, attachment 2 for agenda item 5, Politburo session of 17 October 1989, SED
Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3247.
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(Monday prayer) in Nikolai church and the subsequent demonstrations to
Honecker. Krenz, too, read the report and summarized it for the party. Ho-
necker, who took careful note of the number of participants (6,000-8,000),
had both Krenz’s summary and the full report from Leipzig distributed to
the members of the Politburo.1030 The report had referred to the peaceful
demonstrations as a ‘provocation’ and attacked the church as the ‘starting
point of all of these hostile activities’ and a ‘hotbed of anti-socialist and
hooligan elements’. It concluded by expressing support for the ‘readiness
of the communists and [their] demand to act more decisively and to take
action against the hostile elements’.1031
Rumour was rampant also in West Berlin. Its mayor, Walter Momper,
had told Falin in conversation that he had heard that demonstrators from
Leipzig were planning a massive breach of the borders, presumably in
Berlin. Falin considered this information important enough to report it to
the head of the communist party of West Berlin (SEW), who relayed it to
SED Politburo member Hermann Axen, who in turn lost no time in in-
forming Honecker.1032 The message Falin wanted to convey to the SED
leadership was that, in view of the ‘wide international attention’ which the
anniversary celebrations would command, the East German leadership
should ‘think carefully about how to react’ to possible demonstrations.1033
If Falin had implied that the GDR authorities should exercise restraint,
his advice fell on deaf ears. On 27 September, Honecker issued a directive
which proceeded from the assumption that ‘certain circles in the FRG and
West Berlin as well as groups supported by them’ in East Germany were
intent on using the fortieth anniversary celebrations for a ‘slanderous cam-
1030 Report by the Leipzig Regional Party Office to Honecker and Internal Central
Committee Note by Egon Krenz to Erich Honecker, both dated 3 October 1989,
read and forwarded by Honecker (marked with his own handwriting) to the
Politburo, SED Politburo, Central Party Archives, IV 2/2039, 317. Krenz’s note
to Honecker also refers to a telephone conversation in the evening of 2 October
in which he had informed Honecker about developments in Leipzig.
1031 Leipzig report, ibid.
1032 Hermann Axen to Erich Honecker, Internal Central Committee Memorandum,
Secret, Eyes Only, 3 October 1989, Central Party Archives, Büro Axen, IV
2/2035.
1033 From a report on a conversation between Falin and the head of the SEW, Diet-
mar Ahrens, Hermann Axen to Erich Honecker, Internal Central Committee
Memorandum, Secret, Eyes Only, 3 October 1989, Central Party Archives, Büro
Axen, 2/2035.
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paign against the socialist order and social conditions’ and the ‘disruption
of normal life in the GDR’, and that measures had to be taken to maintain
law and order.1034 Kochemasov, the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin,
claims to have seen this or perhaps another directive signed by Honecker
to use force against the demonstrators.1035
It is doubtful that such a directive would have been specific as to imple-
mentation. It is an incontrovertible fact, however, that the state security
service, in Leipzig and Berlin did use excessive force against demonstra-
tors on 7 and 8 October. This included the merciless beating of unarmed
demonstrators with truncheons and the arrest of more than one thousand
people, many of whom subjected to police brutality while in detention. All
this was considered shocking enough later to lead to an official investiga-
tion by the East Berlin city parliament which concluded that ‘certain
forces [had] wanted an escalation’ so as to justify ‘the total use of all the
available combat means and force potential against the demonstrators’.1036
The police brutality substantially increased anxiety among members of the
opposition movement and heightened their fear as to what would happen
on Monday, 9 October, when even larger demonstrations were scheduled
to take place in Leipzig. To their relief there was no repetition of the vio-
lence of the preceding days. But plans and instructions for the demonstra-
tive use of force had undoubtedly existed. The problem is only to decide at
what level such plans were made, who was to be in charge of implementa-
tion and under what circumstances, and whether the Soviet armed forces
had any role in staying the arm of the GDR’s internal security services.
One of the accounts purporting to shed light on this problem is a report
by Rainer Wiegand, a former director of East German counterintelligence,
who has said that the ministry of state security had been told to use all the
force necessary short of shooting to stamp out dissidence, and he attribut-
ed to Krenz an order to ‘shatter counterrevolutionary structures in the
GDR’.1037 But Krenz and Schabowski strictly deny such allegations; the
1034 According to an official investigative report by the city parliament of East
Berlin, ‘“Chinesische Lösung”: Wollten Stasi-Leute ein Blutbad unter Demon-
stranten provozieren?’, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 18 December 1989.
1035 As quoted by Stanislav Kondrashov, ‘Nashe mesto v mire’, Izvestiia, 29 April
1990.
1036 Excerpts from the city parliament’s investigative commission report, as quoted
in ‘”Chinesische Lösung”’, Der Spiegel, 18 December 1989.
1037 In a ten-part series in Die Welt (Hamburg), 21 May to 13 June 1990; see also
‘“Chinesische Lösung”’; see also Elizabeth Pond, ‘A Wall Destroyed: The Dy-
Chapter 5: Domestic Implications of Gorbachev’s German Policy
434
former even contends that there was no contingency planning for 9 Octo-
ber. ‘It is an error to assume’, he stated,
that the demonstrations scheduled for Monday, 9 October 1989, had – in a
timely fashion and for a long time – been the centre of attention of the leaders
of party and state of the GDR. Neither the leadership of the GDR nor that of
the USSR was at that point fully conscious of the fundamental nature of the
processes taking place in the GDR. The loss of a sense of reality among the
SED Politburo members close to Erich Honecker was so profound that such
large-scale political demonstrations as would occur in Leipzig so shortly after
the fortieth anniversary of the GDR were deemed not to be possible. The
leadership of the GDR, for that reason, also had no prepared political concept
as to how to react to an internal crisis in the country.1038
Both former East German leaders even contend that they had not heard
anything about the police brutality on that evening – and not even on the
morning of 8 October, when they met at Stasi headquarters with the minis-
ter of the interior, the minister and several generals of state security, and
the chief of police. Mielke, the Stasi chief, is said to have reported on this
occasion that the provocateurs had not achieved their goals. They had
been dispersed. This had been done without major complications. How-
ever, one had to count on further demonstrations for which it was neces-
sary to keep the security forces in a state of readiness.1039
Since Krenz and Schabowski were determined to bring about reformist
change in the GDR, if need be without Honecker, any bloodshed in the
streets would have been counterproductive. Contrary to all the verbal sup-
port he gave to the Chinese, it is credible that Krenz told Schabowski after
his return from the visit to China: ‘Whatever may have happened at
Tiananmen Square, nowhere should we act with military force against
demonstrators. That would be the political and moral end for us.’1040 It is
also believable that the demonstrations in Leipzig came to be the central
focus of attention of the SED leadership only in the morning of 9 October;
that Krenz was informed only on that day by the director of the Leipzig
Youth Research Institute about ‘measures taken by the security organs,
anxieties among the population and the possibility of clashes during the
namics of German Unification in the GDR’, International Security, Vol. 15, No.
2 (Fall 1990), pp. 42-43.
1038 Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 366.
1039 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, pp. 78-79; id., Der Absturz, p. 237; Schabowski is
paraphrasing here, not quoting directly.
1040 Schabowski, Der Absturz, pp. 236-37.
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demonstrations’; and that he was concerned enough not to leave security
matters to the specialists but to intervene and to make sure that the ‘au-
thorities in Leipzig and the security ministries issue orders to avoid vio-
lence at any price’.1041 All of this does not exclude the possibility that lo-
cal officials and institutions in Leipzig and Dresden also acted to stave off
the blows prepared by security officials.1042
What about the role of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed forces?
Shevardnadze asserted in an interview that the danger of Soviet military
intervention existed, ‘for instance, during the demonstrations in East Ger-
many in 1989’.1043 If such danger existed, it was extremely remote and
lessened even further by political action. According to Soviet embassy
sources in East Berlin, the increasing instability of East Germany in the
summer of 1989 had prompted the Soviet leadership through various
channels to impress upon the party leaders in East Berlin that it regarded
any ‘interference in the affairs of other parties and states’ as ‘unaccept-
able’ and ruled out ‘the use of military force under any circumstance’.1044
On 8 October, in anticipation of a confrontation between the security
forces and the opposition on the streets of Leipzig on the following day,
Ambassador Kochemasov ordered General Boris Snetkov, the Comman-
der in Chief of the Western Group of the Soviet Forces, ‘under no circum-
stances to intervene in the events’. The troops under his command were to
‘remain in their barracks, not to engage in any military exercises’ and ‘not
1041 Ibid. (italics mine). In essence, Krenz’s account is confirmed by Schabowski,
Das Politbüro, p. 80. Markus Wolf, too, was ‘convinced’ that the ‘Beijing vari-
ant did not correspond to his [Krenz’s] preconceptions’; Wolf, In eigenem Auf-
trag, p. 195.
1042 Hans Modrow, for instance, in his then capacity as first party secretary of Dres-
den, in conjunction with mayor Wolfgang Berghofer has taken a large part of the
credit for successfully persuading both sides, the chiefs of police and the
demonstrators, to refrain from violence; Hans Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende
(Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1991), pp. 14-15.
1043 Shevardnadze interview in Der Spiegel, No. 22 (1991), p. 166.
1044 I. Maksimychev and P. Menshikov, ‘Edinoe germanskoe gosudarstvo?’, Mezh-
dunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 6 (1990), p. 45. Both authors were officials in the Sovi-
et embassy in East Berlin. Maksimychev confirmed the point about the warn-
ings to this author, personal interview in Moscow, 2 June 1993; similarly Soviet
ambassador Kochemasov in his interview in Tribüne (East Berlin), 8 May 1990,
as quoted by Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die sowjetische Rolle beim Umsturz in der DDR
und bei der Einleitung des deutschen Einigungsprozesses’, in Der Umbruch in
Osteuropa (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), p. 41.
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to leave their military compounds’.1045 According to Kochemasov, he had
acted upon his own initiative. On the following day, he claims, Moscow –
presumably the defense ministry – sent corresponding instructions to the
WGF command.1046
Krenz is emphatic that the Soviet side was not included by the SED
leadership in decision-making on that issue, and not even consulted. Any
possible or potential assistance to be extended by the Western Group of
the Soviet Armed Forces ‘was not considered at any point in the fall of
1989’.1047 As for any specific Soviet order not to intervene, he asserts that
he had had many meetings with Kochemasov and Snetkov. But an order
not to intervene
never became known to the political leadership of the GDR. Had it been giv-
en, Army General Snetkov would certainly have informed me about it. Our
long-standing personal acquaintance prohibits me from doubting the honesty
and candour of the former commander in chief. An order from Moscow to the
Soviet armed forces to stay out of the internal conflicts of the GDR would
have required that ‘somebody’ thought it possible that the Soviet army would
intervene. I do not know of anyone who would have made such a suggestion
to the [Soviet] army command in Wünsdorf.1048
The facts of the matter may very well be that neither the Soviet embassy
nor the WSG command discussed the intricacies of how to react to the
East German demonstrations, but that they did discuss how to react to an-
other event that touched their interests much more directly: the opening of
the Berlin wall on 9-10 November.1049
Rainer Eppelmann, a former Protestant clergyman appointed East Ger-
man minister for defense and disarmament after the collapse of the GDR,
asserted in an interview that on 11 November his predecessor, Kessler, had
ordered an army division into action to close the borders but that this order
1045 As quoted by Stanislav Kondrashov, ‘Nashe mesto v mire’, Izvestiia, 29 April
1990; this version of events was confirmed by Kochemasov (Meine letzte Mis-
sion, p. 169); see also Oldenburg, ‘Sowjetische Europa-Politik’, p. 758.
1046 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 169.
1047 Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 366.
1048 Ibid.
1049 Given the fact that Kochemasov is not always reliable on dates and often fails to
indicate any dates at all for the information he provides, it is probable that the
telephone conversation between him and Snetkov did not take place on 8 Octo-
ber but on 10 November. The latter date for the conversation is provided by Der
Spiegel, 2 October 1995.
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had been refused.1050 Assuming that there is some truth to this and that the
order was really an order and not part of some contingency planning, one
could further assume that Kessler had backing in Moscow for this move.
Shevardnadze’s frequently expressed dark allusions to the military’s oppo-
sition against German unification could be cited in support of such back-
ing.1051 However, Shevardnadze’s statements have always been of a gener-
al nature. He never described any specific contingency in response to
which troops were to be dispatched, nor has he provided evidence as to
which military leaders or units were allegedly involved at which time. It
would seem, therefore, that intentions or plans to undo the opening of the
wall by military force existed neither at the political nor at the military
level and neither in Moscow nor at Soviet military headquarters in Wüns-
dorf.1052 What in all likelihood did exist, however, was concern that mat-
ters could get out of hand and nolens volens involve the Soviet armed
forces. Unless one chooses to dismiss Kochemasov’s account as a fabrica-
tion, his telephone conversation with Snetkov as well as instructions by
the Soviet defense ministry to the WSG command are most appropriately
placed in the context of over-insurance, that is, to make absolutely sure
that neither active intervention nor inadvertent involvement would occur.
This conclusion is not necessarily contradicted by Krenz’s assertion that
he had not been informed. Had he asked, he might have been told.
The KGB
According to popular preconceptions, internal security and foreign intelli-
gence services – the guardians of the arcana imperii – are behind every-
thing important that is happening in the world. Such perceptions often
spring from fairly simple minds with a predilection for conspiracy theo-
ries. Given the closed nature of the Soviet system and the vast size of the
KGB, or Committee for State Security, Western (and Russian) public opin-
ion has particularly been prone to suspect that the agency exerted signifi-
cant influence on Soviet politics. Western analysts have proclaimed that,
6.
1050 Rainer Eppelmann interview, Die Welt, 10 July 1990.
1051 For instance, in an interview with Fyodor Burlatsky in Literaturnaia gazeta, 10
April 1991.
1052 This conclusion coincides with the analysis by Wettig, ‘Die sowjetische Rolle
beim Umsturz in der DDR’, pp. 55-56.
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because of the organization’s unrestricted access to open and secret infor-
mation, the KGB ‘enjoyed the best insight into the real situation at home
and in the Soviet empire’.1053 In its dealings with the outside world, the
agency has been regarded as having been ‘even more omnipresent than in
Soviet domestic life’ and the ‘primary executor in foreign policy’.1054 The
officers of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), responsible for Soviet clan-
destine activities abroad, have been portrayed as having been particularly
effective, as ‘highly skilled professionals and members of an elite
cadre’1055 and as ‘the Soviet regime’s most urbane, cosmopolitan and edu-
cated officials’.1056 Liberal inclinations, too, have often been imputed to
them, first and foremost to Andropov, and to officers at the organization’s
middle and lower echelons. Concerning the role of the KGB in the Soviet
empire and German unification, perceptions of the ubiquitous presence
and effective activities of the KGB have unequivocally been expressed in
a book with the catchy title of Conspiracy: How German Unity Was Really
Achieved.1057 ‘I am certain’, writes Yevgenia Albats, ‘that the KGB was
behind the overthrow of Honecker in East Germany.’1058
However, to summarize the main argument of this section, the author
confesses to be impressed less by the KGB’s analytical foresight, efficient
organization and effective operations than with its parochialism and pre-
posterous pretensions, and the many instances of bungling and blundering.
To be rejected is the notion that Andropov was some sort of closet liberal
1053 Astrid von Borcke, ‘The KGB and Perestroika’, in Federal Institute on Soviet
and International Studies, ed., The Soviet Union 1988-1989 (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1990), p. 64. To avoid misunderstanding, except for some overstate-
ments of the kind quoted, von Borcke’s work is scholarly and her conclusions
balanced. This applies in particular to her book KGB: Die Macht im Untergrund
(Stuttgart: Hänssler, 1987).
1054 John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, A Corgi Book
(London: Transworld, 1974), p. 23.
1055 Rose E. Goettemoeller and Paul F. Langer, Foreign Area Studies in the USSR:
Training and Employment of Specialists, The Rand Corporation, R-2967-RC,
January 1983, p. 99.
1056 Astrid von Borcke, ‘KGB International: The Role of the Secret Service in Sovi-
et Foreign and Security Policy’, in Federal Institute on Soviet and International
Studies, ed., The Soviet Union 1986-1987 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p.
313.
1057 Ralf Georg Reuth and Andreas Bönte, Das Komplott: Wie es wirklich zur
deutschen Einheit kam (Munich: Piper, 1993).
1058 Albats, The State within a State, p. 199.
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and that he and the KGB put Gorbachev in power and engineered pere-
stroika.1059 The agency from 1985 to 1989 did not, either at the senior or
middle-echelons of power, suddenly burst in full bloom with reformist
zeal. The Chekists, as KGB officers often refer to themselves, certainly
sought to convey the impression that they were fully in tune with the new
spirit of the time, but essentially they did not deviate from the agency’s
more nationalist than ideological, and authoritarian, repressive, xenopho-
bic, anti-Semitic and anti-Western institutional ethos.1060 Whereas every
other institution forming an integral part of the ancien régime, notably the
party and the armed forces, as we have seen, had to accept in the course of
the radicalization of reforms extensive personnel changes and had to suf-
fer through revelations of internal mismanagement, corruption and past
crimes, the KGB was largely exempted from such ignominies. The vast
majority of its officials remained unreconstructed, unrepentant, and un-
available for comment. The few exceptions – whistleblowers and defec-
tors – were shunned and reviled by the organization.
The agency, then, was not in the forefront of reformist change. But until
1990 it also did not actively conspire to turn back the transformation pro-
cesses in the internal empire. In the external empire, notwithstanding the
agency’s special powers and privileges, its pervasive network of informers
at home and missions (rezidentury) abroad, and the secret activities of the
myriad of officers thinly disguised as diplomats, foreign trade representa-
tives and journalists, the KGB was unprepared to act in a determined fash-
ion to try to prevent the collapse. It was included in decision-making on
the central issues of internal and external empire but more as a matter of
bureaucratic routine and political reassurance than as a competent actor
whose counsel was deliberately elicited. To return to the metaphor of the
decision-making orchestra used above, the clandestine fiddle played by
1059 This is not contradicted by the above-mentioned fact that Andropov in his pos-
ition as head of the Central Committee’s Socialist Countries Department, after
having left the KGB, cultivated relations with eminent academic specialists and
protected them from KGB and party harassment and persecution. This benevo-
lent intervention would seem to have been predicated less on any liberal inclina-
tions on Andropov’s part than on his proclivity to seek the best available exper-
tise in the interest of perfecting and modernizing the Soviet system.
1060 Cheka is short for Vserossiiskaia cherezvychainaia komissiia, or All-Russian
Extraordinary Commission, the name for the secret police founded by Felix Dz-
erzhinsky in 1917.
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the KGB was only of secondary importance. The following sub-sections
seek to substantiate these assertions.
The Impotence of Omnipotence
Considering its tremendous material and personnel resources, the inability
of the KGB to control the course of events is nevertheless astounding. Or-
ganized into four Chief Directorates (foreign operations, internal security
and counterintelligence, communications and cryptography, and command
of the border troops) and nine Directorates (military counterintelligence,
ideological counterintelligence and dissidents, economic counterintelli-
gence, security of government installations, government security, commu-
nications interceptions and signal intelligence, surveillance, transport, and
military construction), the KGB combined the functions of both the CIA
and the FBI.1061 But it exceeded both American agencies in the number of
employees and the scale and type of operations, and it differed from them
in the nature of its tasks. As for its size, when Gorbachev was elected par-
ty chief, the KGB was estimated to have 25,000 officers and some 40,000
administrative personnel on its central staff in Moscow, in the provinces
about 50,000 to 100,000 officials and a vast network of informers, some
300,000 to 350,000 border troops, and up to 30,000 agents abroad, who
cooperated to varying degree with 100,000 members of the ‘allied’ ser-
vices in Eastern Europe.1062 Former KGB Maj.-Gen. Oleg Kalugin has
claimed that more people worked in the KGB than in all the security agen-
cies of Europe put together.1063 Albats places the total number of KGB
1061 Albats, The State within a State, pp. 26-27. The Fifth Directorate, which had
monitored dissent, was dissolved in October 1989. Its responsibilities were reab-
sorbed by the Second Chief Directorate and a new Directorate for the Defense
of the Soviet Constitutional System.
1062 Von Borcke, ‘The Role of the Secret Police’, p. 56. The figure of 65,000 officers
in KGB headquarters is identical with that provided by former KGB Col. Oleg
Gordievsky; see his interview with Natalya Gevorkian, Moskovskie novosti, 3
March 1991. Yevgenia Albats says that she was ‘able to glean a more exact fig-
ure of 89,000 Chekists in the capital’; Albats, The State within a State, p. 24.
1063 In an interview with Yevgenia Albats and Natalya Gevorkian, Moskovskie
novosti, 3 March 1991; see also Kalugin, ‘Ne perekhodit’ na lichnosti’, Komso-
mol’skaia pravda, 3 July 1990. Kalugin was a specialist in foreign intelligence
and, as an exchange student at Columbia University, had become acquainted
with Yakovlev. In the agency, he rose to the position of chief of foreign counter-
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employees prior to the August 1991 coup attempt at 720,000 people, or
one Chekist for 428 Soviet citizens.1064 (In comparison, the CIA in the
1980s was said to have about 15,000 employees on its payroll and the FBI
about 21,000 agents.)1065
The KGB’s main function was also quite different from that of Western
intelligence agencies. As the ‘sword and shield’ of the revolution, it was
extensively used by the communist party to establish, consolidate and ex-
pand Soviet power. In performing these tasks, it left a wide trail of blood
and human misery. Robert Conquest estimates the number of victims of
the Great Purges alone at 15 million;1066 Alexei Myagkov speaks of a total
of 20 million KGB casualties;1067 Roy Medvedev cited 40 million vic-
tims;1068 and Alexander Solzhenitsyn holds the organization responsible
for the death of 60 million people.1069 Medvedev, whose estimates lie in
the middle range, included the following victims in his count:
– One million imprisoned or exiled from 1927 to 1929, falsely accused
of being saboteurs or members of opposition parties.
– Nine to eleven million of the more prosperous peasants driven from
their lands and another two to three million arrested or exiled in the
early 1930’s forced collectivization campaign, many of whom believed
to have been killed.
intelligence. He broke with the KGB in 1987, when he wrote a letter to Gor-
bachev warning him that the KGB was out of control.
1064 Albats, The State within a State, p. 23. ‘The total number of people it employs’,
she cautions, ‘is the KGB’s most closely guarded secret. And for good reason,
since if they were to answer the question truthfully, they would immediately be
faced with the far more challenging question: What exactly does this vast army
of people do?’
1065 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Dictionary of Espionage (London:
Harrap, 1984), p. 21; Albats, The State within a State, p. 24.
1066 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 533.
1067 Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB (New York: Ballantine, 1983), p. 29.
1068 In articles in Moskovskie novosti in November 1988 and Argumenty i fakty in
February 1989, as quoted by Bill Keller, ‘Major Soviet Paper Says 20 Million
Died as Victims of Stalin’, New York Times, 4 February 1989. The term ‘vic-
tims’ is broader, covering those people who did and those who did not survive
arrest, deportation, imprisonment, and forced labour (40 million in Medvedev’s
accounting).
1069 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf (New York: Harper and Row,
1980), p. 536. In his speech on the seventieth anniversary of the 1917 revolu-
tion, the reader may remember, Gorbachev had spoken only of ‘thousands and
thousands of party members and non-party people’; see above, xxx p. .
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– Six to seven million killed in the punitive famine inflicted on peasants
in 1932 and 1933.
– One million exiled from Moscow and Leningrad in 1935 for belonging
to families of former aristocrats, merchants, capitalists, and govern-
ment officials.
– About one million executed in the Great Terror of 1937-38, and anoth-
er four to six million sent to forced labour camps from which most did
not return.
– Two to three million sent to camps for violating absurdly strict labour
laws imposed in 1940.
– At least ten to twelve million ‘repressed’ in World War II, including
millions of Soviet Germans and other ethnic minorities forcibly relo-
cated.
– More than one million arrested on political grounds from 1946 to Stal-
in’s death in 1953.
It would, of course, be unfair to taint every KGB officer with the brush of
collective guilt for the immense human misery caused by that institution.
In particular, it would be inappropriate not to draw a distinction between
officers engaged in analytical work and those responsible for mokrye dela,
the wet or bloody affairs. One may want to differentiate between officers
involved in the task of maintaining a repressive system in the Soviet
Union itself and those active in foreign intelligence, the latter as a rule be-
ing relatively more sophisticated and engaged in more analytical work
than the former. And one may also find differences in the personality pro-
file and world view of KGB career officers and those komitetchiki who
had begun their career in other Soviet institutions, e.g., the party or the
diplomatic service, and were then transferred to the agency. Nevertheless,
in order to make it in the KGB it was useful to be or at least appear dedi-
cated to the organization, indifferent to its sordid past and impervious to
moral issues.
To turn to the role of the KGB in the Gorbachev era, some analysts
have considered the secret service not only as the ‘sword and shield’ of
perestroika but also as the ‘power behind the throne’. They argue that An-
dropov as party chief had remained loyal to the agency. He had promoted
Gorbachev to the number two position in the party hierarchy during his
tenure in office, and after his (Andropov’s) death the organization had
continued its support for the heir apparent. Under the assumption that Gor-
bachev would provide the discipline and dynamism necessary to modern-
ize the Soviet economy and improve the country’s defense capabilities, the
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KGB threw its support behind him in the Kremlin succession struggle. For
instance, the First Chief Directorate for foreign intelligence, headed at that
time by Vladimir Kryuchkov, in close cooperation with the rezidentura in
Britain took great pains to make sure that Gorbachev’s visit to London in
December 1984 would be a success and enhance his foreign policy cre-
dentials.1070 In some versions of the argument, an ‘unholy trinity – the
KGB, the CPSU, and the MIC [military-industrial complex] – cooked up
the plan for perestroika’1071 and in another the KGB had stopped believing
in Marxism-Leninism and conspired to replace it by nationalism.1072
Whereas Gorbachev’s election as party chief was not due entirely or even
mainly to support from the KGB, the agency nonetheless saw the election
as a major victory.1073 Gorbachev, the argument continues, repaid the
KGB for its support. He agreed to an expansion of the retaliatory powers
of the security forces to expel foreign representatives in response to expul-
sions of Soviet spies, consented to a substantial increase in KGB represen-
tation in the party organs at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress and ex-
empted the agency from the rigors of perestroika. He made Victor Che-
1070 Interview with Grigoriev; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The
Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hod-
der and Stoughton, 1990), p. 606. Gordievsky was a KGB foreign intelligence
officer recruited in 1974 as a double agent by the British secret service. In
1982-85 he was the KGB’s deputy resident in London.
1071 Albats, The State within a State, p. 197. It is unclear in her chapter entitled
‘Who Was Behind Perestroika?’ whether she identifies with this argument or is
simply telling a ‘fascinating story’ (p. 202) for effect. At the end of the chapter
she cautions against ‘over-simplification’ by saying: ‘The story is more complex
than that: it’s about subtle timing and overlapping interests.’
1072 This version is expounded by Victor Yasmann, ‘Red Religion: An Ideology of
Neo-Messianic Russian Fundamentalism’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 1, No. 2
(1993), pp. 20-39.
1073 Ibid., p. 608. The more outlandish statements about the KGB being behind Gor-
bachev’s appointment and perestroika typically come from Russians living and
writing in the West, including Albats, Gordievsky, and Yasmann; similarly, Ab-
durakhman Avtorkhanov, Ot Andropova k Gorbachevu: dela i dni Kremlia
(Paris: YMCA Press, 1986). In the jointly authored book by Andrew and
Gordievsky it would seem that the Western scholar was valiantly attempting to
tone down some of the more radical assertions of his Russian co-author. For in-
stance, it is incorrect to quote the book to the effect that ‘the KGB had stage-
managed perestroika’ (Albats, The State within a State, p. 168). Andrew and
Gordievsky write (p. 608) that Gorbachev’s election ‘was not, of course, due
wholly or even mainly to support from the KGB’.
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brikov a full member of the Politburo in April 1985 and also conferred this
status on his successor Kryuchkov as head of the KGB in October
1988.1074
This interpretation does have some validity. However, it ignores Gor-
bachev’s ambiguous attitude towards the KGB and fails sufficiently to
take into account the fact that perestroika was a dynamic process with dis-
tinct phases of development as described in previous sections. Ample evi-
dence has been presented here to confirm that Gorbachev shared some of
Andropov’s beliefs and continued some of his policies in the ‘modernisa-
tion’ and ‘acceleration’ phase of his tenure in office. Furthermore, he had
to rely extensively on the agency’s internal affairs directorates for imple-
mentation of his anti-corruption and anti-alcoholism campaigns. Similarly,
his attempts at introducing science and technology to the production pro-
cess, staying in the military-technological competition with the West, un-
dercutting Star Wars and acquiring foreign technology for these purposes
also made extensive KGB involvement necessary. Not surprisingly, then,
as late as June 1988 – at the Nineteenth Party Conference – he praised the
‘purposeful work’ of the leadership of the KGB and GRU (military intelli-
gence), ‘aimed at improving their activities in the conditions created by
the present stage of the development of our society and the unfolding of
democratic processes’.1075
However, in the radicalization-of-reform, openness, and democratiza-
tion phase with its new directions in Soviet ideology and foreign policy,
the KGB was bound to be more of a liability than an asset. Furthermore,
the argument can be made, although not conclusively be proven, that in
this phase (lasting until autumn 1990, when he began actively courting the
conservative forces), Gorbachev considered the KGB a threat to his re-
form program. There would have been a compelling logic to such a per-
ception. This logic would have consisted of the following elements. (1) As
the party’s authority was weakening and its power after the 1988 reorgani-
zation deliberately being curtailed, its control mechanisms in the KGB
were also being eroded. This process was enhanced by the progressive dis-
mantling of the ideology upon which the party’s power and authority had
rested. The KGB, in contrast, did not suffer commensurately from the de-
1074 Ibid., pp. 608-609. The argument about the KGB as a motor driving perestroika
can also be found in J. Michael Waller, The KGB in Russia Today (Boulder, Co-
lo.: Westview Press, 1995).
1075 Pravda, 29 June 1988.
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ideologization of Soviet politics and society. Its institutional ethos, as
mentioned, was much more technocratic and nationalist than ideological.
In a disoriented and disintegrating system this would have enhanced the
agency’s relative autonomy and elevated its status as a repository of law
and order. (2) In the CPSU, notably in the International Department, but
also in other Soviet institutions, there was some differentiation and a fair
number of officials who could be persuaded actively to join in the reform
effort. A similar state of affairs did not exist in the KGB. (3) The defense
ministry and the armed forces bore the full brunt of perestroika. Although
not in a mutinous and insurrectionist mood, they certainly had to be a
source of concern for the political leadership. Since the new presidential
and parliamentary institutions formed after May 1989 never became root-
ed and politically effective, it could have been a disastrous mistake for
Gorbachev to confront the KGB head-on and precipitate a powerful anti-
reform coalition of Chekists, orthodox party officials, and disgruntled mil-
itary officers. In this interpretation, then, the caution Gorbachev displayed
in his attitudes and policies towards the KGB was neither predicated on
ideological affinity with the agency nor on gratitude for past favours. For
him, it would seem, the KGB was simply one powerful Soviet institution
too many to take on.
This is not to say that no attempt at all was made to bring the KGB in
line with perestroika and openness and to change its personnel and opera-
tions. In 1985-89, eight of fourteen union republic KGB chiefs were re-
lieved of their duties. The officers included, with the likely reasons for
their replacement in parenthesis hereafter, the top Chekists of the Central
Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan (corruption or
inability to stamp out corruption); Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and Armenia
(failure to control ethnic and inter-republican unrest); Georgia (age); and
Ukraine (maltreatment of an investigative journalist who died in deten-
tion).1076 At the end of September 1988, the personnel changes reached
the very top. Chebrikov, who had been first party secretary of Dne-
propetrovsk oblast’, KGB cadre chief from 1967 to 1982, and chief Chek-
ist since 1968, and whose career profile reflected the conservative and
provincial outlook of the agency, was ostensibly promoted. He was made a
CC Secretary and head of one of the newly established Commissions, the
1076 Von Borcke, ‘The KGB and Perestroika’, p. 62.
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Commission for Legal Policy.1077 That body was tasked to oversee the
work of the CC’s State and Legal Policy Department which had tradition-
ally exercised a degree of control over the administrative organs – the
armed forces, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor’s
Office, the trade unions and the Komsomol. On paper, the functions of the
Commission for Legal Policy were broader than those of the other com-
missions, and thus Gorbachev seemed to have made a deal with Chebrikov
in order to whittle away at Ligachev’s power. He appeared to have gained
Chebrikov’s support and not, as many observers thought, lost it. The for-
mer head of the KGB also still ranked high on the CPSU’s ‘popularity
scale’. In the election of the party candidates for the Congress of People’s
Deputies from March to May 1989, he – together with Gorbachev and
Ryzhkov – was among the Politburo members receiving the highest num-
ber of votes.1078 In practice, however, since the party was losing power,
any previously important party position was being devalued, and thus
Chebrikov’s promotion was in essence a demotion. At the same time, the
trend lines pointed in the direction of more pressure on the KGB. In con-
junction with the attempt to exert parliamentary control over the armed
forces, the KGB, too, was to be supervised – by a Supreme Soviet Com-
mittee on Defense and State Security.
One KGB officer’s loss was another officer’s gain. Kryuchkov was ap-
pointed chairman of the KGB, promoted over the heads of two first
deputies, and he was the first chief of foreign intelligence ever to reach the
top position in the agency. His career had been closely tied to that of An-
dropov, beginning in Hungary when the former was posted to the reziden-
tura and the latter ambassador in that country. Kryuchkov followed An-
dropov to Moscow and worked for him in the CC socialist countries de-
partment and later, when his mentor became KGB chief, as head of the
agency’s secretariat. Kryuchkov was thus privy to the agency’s most sensi-
tive secrets. In 1971 he was promoted to deputy head and, three years lat-
er, head of the FCD. In December 1987, Kryuchkov – travelling incognito
– was included in the Soviet delegation going to Washington to sign the
treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Never be-
1077 This description and analysis of Chebrikov and the Commission on Legal Policy




fore had a Soviet leader been accompanied on a visit to the West by the
head of the FCD.1079
When he became chairman of the KGB, Kryuchkov was hailed by
Western analysts as an ‘expert with modern ideas, at least in foreign poli-
cy’ and an ‘ally’ of Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.1080 Gordievsky, however,
who knew him well, has painted a different picture. He has described him
as single-minded, self-confident, intolerant of differing viewpoints and ut-
terly humourless, as someone who never strayed from a prepared text and
never tried to coin a striking phrase. A workaholic, he shunned alcohol,
and even before Andropov and Gorbachev launched their anti-alcoholism
campaigns, he banned drinking parties wherever he had the power to do
so. When he became FCD chief he had absolutely no experience of for-
eign intelligence operations or of life in the West. His world view was
‘shaped by ideological stereotypes and conspiracy theories’ and by ‘para-
noia about the threat from the West’.1081 This was not, one would have
thought, the kind of personality and political profile conducive to the plu-
ralization and liberalization of Soviet society, abandonment of empire and
cooperation with Western countries. It was a profile that fit much more
closely his later role as one of the main organizers of the abortive August
1991 coup. In fact, he never repented his role in it. The only regret he had
was that he and his co-conspirators had let themselves be deceived and
that they had not acted more decisively. When asked later about the reason
why he, as head of such a powerful organization as the KGB, could have
let the collapse of the Soviet Union happen, he replied: ‘We were hostages
of our own illusions. ... We obeyed the law and the president, and Gor-
bachev had one quality: his hypocrisy was so great that it was not easy to
tell the difference between truth and lies.’1082 What precisely it was that
recommended Kryuchkov to Gorbachev or someone close to him is un-
clear and will probably remain so.
Perhaps it was apparent flexibility and adaptability. Kryuchkov did in-
troduce some cosmetic and operation changes and thereby conveyed the
impression – to some – that the KGB was now in step with openness. As
aptly described by American journalist David Remnick, Kryuchkov tried
1079 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 625.
1080 Von Borcke, ‘The KGB and Perestroika’, p. 64.
1081 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, pp. 534-35, 602.
1082 David Remnick, ‘Letter from Russia: The War for the Kremlin’, The New York-
er, 22 July 1996.
Chapter 5: Domestic Implications of Gorbachev’s German Policy
448
to ‘personalize’ himself and the institution he represented. He confessed to
the press his admiration for Van Cliburn and Bellini’s Norma.1083 He field-
ed (carefully screened) questions on a television show. He allowed (care-
fully chaperoned) tours of Lubyanka. Comrade Katya Mayorova was
crowned Miss KGB – probably then the only security services beauty
queen in the world. ‘Violence, inhumanity, and the violation of human
rights have always been alien to the work of our secret services’, he told
the Italian communist party newspaper L'Unità.1084 To the parliament’s
Committee on Defense and State Security he revealed: ‘The KGB has no
secret informers, only assistants.’1085 In November 1989, Sergei
Kuznetsov, an active member of the Democratic Union Party, had been
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for civil rights activism. One
month later, Kryuchkov presided over a meeting with the International
Women Journalists' Press Club where he clarified for the record that ‘the
security organs did not combat “dissent”, only specific unlawful activi-
ties’.1086 As for the future work of the komitetchiki, he said, ‘our actions
must protect human rights’.1087
There were a few changes at the operational level. So called ‘active
measures’, disinformation, and cooperation with and financing of ‘peace
movements and various front organizations – work that had traditionally
been coordinated with the CC’s International Department – were being
deemphasized. Officers that had been trained for work abroad were being
reassigned to the Baltic republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and oth-
er areas in which independence movements and ethnic unrest were erupt-
ing. Finally, prompted by the embarrassment which terrorists armed with
Soviet weapons and explosives were causing in Moscow’s diplomatic rela-
tions with the West, the hijacking of an Ilyushin transport plane from the
northern Caucasus to Israel in December 1988 and, as Kryuchkov said, the
disappearance not of ‘several tons of enriched uranium in the world but ...
1083 The enumeration of measures designed to enhance the KGB’s image draws on
Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 342-44.
1084 Ibid., p. 342.
1085 Supreme Soviet Hearings, 14 July 1989, BBC, SWB, SU/0513 C/1-6, 20 July
1989; as quoted in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 627.
1086 Transcript of the December 1988 meeting (Stenogramma vstrechi Predsedatelia
KGB Vladimira Kriuchkova s chlenami Mezhdunarodnogo press-kluba zhen-
shchin-zhurnalistok), Yevgenia Albats’s personal archive; Albats, The State




of several hundred tons’, the KGB was by 1989 ready for (limited) coop-
eration with Western intelligence agencies to combat international terror-
ism.1088 However, to the extent that it is known, there were no concomi-
tant personnel cuts in the KGB and no significant organizational
changes.1089
After this survey of the functions of the KGB in the Soviet political sys-
tem and the ambiguous relationship between Gorbachev and the KGB, the
question about the likely role of the agency on the German problem can
now be addressed.
KGB Operations in Germany
What follows closely from the cosmetic character of the changes in the
KGB is the fact that access to the agency’s archives on its operations in
Germany remains closed. Some interesting and intriguing information,
however, is available, suggesting some plausible lines of interpretation.
There is, first and foremost, little doubt about the KGB’s concern about
developments in East Germany. Like the armed forces, the security agen-
cy’s largest base abroad was in the GDR, and to lose it would have meant
major disruptions of its intelligence operations in West Germany and NA-
TO. Organizationally, one of the FCD’s deputy heads, Gen. Victor
Grushko, had nominal responsibility for West European affairs but de
facto for the German problem as a whole since – as in the MFA before
1986 – one of his departments, the Fourth Department, dealt with both
West and East German affairs as well as with Austria. General Anatoli
Novikov was the chief of this ‘German’ department.1090
Even before the rapid erosion of the GDR’s stability in 1989, the FCD
and the German department in Moscow as well as the rezidentura in East
Berlin (Karlshorst) were facing the same problem that Gorbachev had to
contend with at the political level: East German arrogance and condescen-
sion; disdain for the changes occurring in the Soviet Union; expression of
1088 For the changes in KGB operations see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The In-
side Story, pp. 635-36 and Albats, The State within a State, p. 235.
1089 The dissolution of the Fifth Directorate was noted above, xxx fn. 1061 .
1090 The data on the organizational structure concerning the KGB and Germany and
on Gen. Grushko are from Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story,
pp. 3-4, 565, 641, 653; on Novikov, see Reuth and Bönte, Das Komplott, p. 211.
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concern about their possible repercussions in the GDR; and failure to in-
form Soviet counterparts about sensitive developments in the GDR. The
harbingers of change became briefly visible in the mid-1970s, when a
KGB officer from the Karlshorst rezidentura was arrested for drunken
driving and its chief, Gen. Anatoli Lazarev, complained about ‘the use of
Nazi methods against a fraternal power’.1091 Honecker vigorously rejected
the complaint, and at his insistence – along the Yefremov-Abrasimov pat-
tern – Lazarev was recalled to Moscow.1092
When Kryuchkov moved up to become top Chekist in October 1988, he
was succeeded in his post as FCD head by Leonid Shebarshin.1093 Unlike
his predecessor, Shebarshin had extensive international experience. He
was a professional diplomat who had been posted twice to Islamabad,
transferred to the KGB, and worked for the agency in New Delhi and
Teheran. There is little direct evidence of his relations with the East Ger-
man state security ministry or his attitudes towards developments in the
GDR. A rare exception are the transcripts of his talks with Stasi chief
Mielke in East Berlin in April 1989. Also present at the meeting were Lt.
Gen. Grushko, Col. Novikov, and the head of the rezidentura in East Ger-
many, Gennadi Titov.
Mielke lived up to the Russian proverb, ‘Wherever the khan, there goes
the horde.’ He followed closely in Honecker’s footsteps. In an extraordi-
narily tedious and pretentious briefing, Mielke showered his colleague
with the usual statistics about the GDR’s achievements and concluded:
‘As a matter of principle, it can be stated that the situation in our republic
is characterized by great political stability. State security is at all times re-
liably safeguarded.’1094 He then verbally flogged and flailed Shebarshin,
vehemently complaining about an article in Moskovskaia pravda (‘with a
circulation about 1 million’) that had revealed to Soviet readers that Stalin
had at one time worked as an agent for the Czarist secret police, the
Okhrana.1095 He pierced him with questions: Had the KGB not placed the
1091 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 640.
1092 Ibid.
1093 Shebarshin has published a book about his work as head of foreign intelligence;
Leonid V. Shebarshin, Iz zhizni nachal'nika razvedki (Moscow: Mezhdunarod-
nye otnosheniia, 1994). It does not, however, contain anything of value on the
issue of KGB operations in Germany.
1094 ‘Top secret’ notes (Notiz) about the talks between Mielke and Shebarshin on 7
April 1989, SE, Central Party Archives, ZAIG 5198, Bl. 100-39.
1095 The article had appeared in Moskovskaia pravda on 30 March 1989.
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archives under its control? Are there still any archives that are not under
KGB control? If Stalin had liquidated the people who knew about his past,
why hadn’t he destroyed the archival evidence? Could it now be said that
it had been Stalin, the Okhrana agent, who had defeated fascism? Had he
built socialism and the international communist movement in that capaci-
ty? If that were true, he, Mielke would also be an agent of the Okhrana. In
fact, ‘all of us would be Okhrana agents because we worked under Stalin’.
The blistering attack culminated in a thinly veiled threat: ‘I have to be
afraid that you will expose our agents if there is a possibility to look at the
archives. ... You hurt yourself, and we are put in the uncomfortable pos-
ition [to have to decide] whether we can still tell you where we are getting
[our] information from.’ Shebarshin interrupted Mielke at that point, the
only time he did so in the course of the harangue, to state the obvious: ‘I
sit here like a defendant. I am not responsible for this article.’1096
Several other gems serve to refract both the secret service mind-set and
the state of Soviet-East German relations. After his lecture, Mielke asked
his guest’s forgiveness for its length. However, they had not been meeting
all that often. Furthermore, ‘I thought that Comrade Shebarshin would re-
port it [the content of Mielke’s statement] to Comrade Kryuchkov, and
that Comrade Kryuchkov will transmit it in an appropriate form to Com-
rade Chebrikov, who would inform Comrade Gorbachev.’ One almost has
to admire the pathetic if not pathological sense of self-importance of the
Stasi chief, his apparently unshakable belief in the effective flow of infor-
mation and the unbroken importance of the Soviet Politburo as a decision-
making body. Mielke evidently assumed that Kryuchkov, not being as yet
a full member of the Politburo, would have no direct access to Gorbachev,
but that Chebrikov, by virtue of his full membership, did and would have
the time and interest to listen to a rehash of Mielke’s innuendos. Neverthe-
less, what Mielke specifically had in mind was stated at another place with
similarly disarming simplicity as his explanation of the purposes of his
elaborations. Since Gorbachev’s visit to West Germany was at that time
only a few weeks away, he warned against ‘détente euphoria’, falling vic-
tim to ‘human rights demagoguery’ and other ‘imperialist intrigues’, and
allowing ‘interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries’. In that
1096 ‘Top secret’ notes (Notiz) about the talks between Mielke and Shebarshin (italics
mine).
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context he exclaimed: ‘The FRG is playing a dual game! To know that is
important for Comrade Gorbachev’s trip to Bonn.’1097
A final gem is an exchange about the role of the security agencies in
political and social change. In the process, Shebarshin – in stark contrast
to his own superior and to his East German counterpart – emerges as an
essentially sensible observer and politically loyal official. After a poignant
and fair presentation of both the risks and benefits of perestroika and glas-
nost, he dismisses his East German host’s evident proclivity for the eradi-
cation of problems such as the emergence of nationalism and excesses of
glasnost by traditional administrative measures: ‘It would not be realistic
to hope that [these problems] can only be solved by state security means,
albeit the state security organs have to make a corresponding contribu-
tion.’ He also tells his host that whether anybody liked it or not: ‘We are
carrying out the orders and instructions of the party. We don’t make poli-
cy, but we are implementing it.’ Mielke disagreed. In another example of
his exaggerated sense of self-importance and of the manipulative role of
the security agency Mielke countered: ‘It isn’t entirely true that we are on-
ly implementing party policy. Our information must find expression in par-
ty policy.’ He begged his interlocutor ‘not to be too modest’ about this.1098
As in the Gorbachev-Honecker private conversations, several sensitive
subjects in the Shebarshin-Mielke exchange were either missing or only
cryptically alluded to. The most important of the these was the systematic
attempt made by Honecker to increase, with the assistance of Mielke, his
own control in the domestic system and the Stasi’s autonomy vis-à-vis the
KGB. As Gordievsky has confirmed, both attempts had begun well before
Gorbachev’s ascent to the highest office in the Kremlin. He also provides
an interesting twist to this confirmation when he reports that Mielke and
Markus Wolf, the Stasi’s chief of foreign intelligence, were complaining at
the KGB’s Lubyanka headquarters that ‘Honecker was restricting the inti-
macy of Soviet-GDR intelligence operations’.1099 It is difficult to say
whether these complaints were either genuine or disingenuous or a ruse or
trap laid to ascertain how the KGB would react. Whatever the case may
be, the ‘endless discussions in the [KGB] centre’, some of them witnessed
by Gordievsky in Grushko’s office, on how to strengthen Mielke’s and
1097 Ibid. (italics mine).
1098 Ibid.
1099 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, p. 640.
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Wolf’s hands against Honecker, were utterly pointless.1100 In Gordievsky’s
view, the ‘situation was further complicated by the fact that Mielke and
Wolf themselves were scarcely on speaking terms’.1101
Missing in the ‘top secret’ conversation of the secret service officers
was also a KGB operation in East Germany that was so secret that it was
kept not only from the Stasi but out of normal KGB channels – the Luch
(‘beam’ or ‘ray’) operation. According to a report by the German Federal
Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, and replicated by Soviet
sources,1102 ‘Luch was removed from the ordinary hierarchical structure of
the official rezidentura and was known only to members of the Fourth
[‘German’] Department directly concerned and the top level of the
FCD.1103 It is plausible to assume that Titov was also informed about the
operation and provided staffing for it. That is, Shebarshin, Grushko,
Novikov and Titov were almost certainly aware of the operation in their
meeting with Mielke in April 1989 but chose to keep quiet.
What about Luch’s functions? The Federal Agency’s report states:
The establishment of this group had been considered necessary in the course
of the growing tendencies of emancipation of the MfS [Ministry for State Se-
curity] in relation to [its] KGB ‘mentor’ and doubts about the unconditional
loyalty of the leading SED cadres in that connection. ... Starting from the
mid-1980s, the Luch group had been instructed to persuade citizens of the ...
GDR in leading positions of science, technology and politics to cooperate
with the KGB and thereby influence socially relevant processes.1104
This poses the interesting question whether Gorbachev was playing a dual
game, asserting publicly and in conversation with Honecker the principle
of ‘non-interference’ but authorizing clandestine operations for the desta-
1100 Ibid.
1101 Ibid. In his book, Markus Wolf, In eigenem Auftrag: Bekenntnisse und Einsicht-
en (Munich: Schneekluth, 1991), refers neither to the differences with Mielke
nor to Soviet-East German controversies over the breakdown of cooperation.
1102 Evgeni Bovkun, ‘“Luch” KGB v svetlom tsarstve kapitalizma’, Izvestiia, 22
September 1993. The title of Bovkun’s article is derived from Russian literature,
that is, from luch sveta v temnom tsartstve (ray of light in the dark Czardom), a
literary critique by Nikolai Dobrolubov in reference to a nineteenth century play
by Alexander Ostrovsky, Groza. Dobrolubov called the heroine of this play, a
progressively- thinking woman, a ray of light in the darkness.
1103 A summary of and excerpts from the report by the Bundesamt für Verfassungs-
schutz (Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) can be found in
Reuth and Bönte, Wie es wirklich zur deutschen Einheit kam, pp. 210‑12.
1104 Ibid., p. 210.
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bilization of the Honecker regime – an effort, furthermore, that turned out
to be successful when Honecker was forced to resign on 17 October 1989.
The story sounds interesting but has no basis in fact. In reality, the Luch
operation was more limited in scope and politically ineffective. It also
changed over time, as the West German report states. Whereas, from the
mid-1980s until 1988, ‘priority was given to persuade high-level GDR
leading cadres’ to cooperate with the KGB, Luch subsequently concentrat-
ed on the establishment of contacts with ‘experts at the mid-level of man-
agement’ and ‘members of the [old] bloc parties, parties newly founded in
the process of systemic change, and youth organizations.’1105
There may have been two interrelated reasons for the change in ap-
proach. The first is high-level political intervention. Several instances are
known in which high-ranking members of the SED Politburo had contact-
ed Soviet representatives about the possibility of assistance in the replace-
ment of Honecker. SED Politburo member and First Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Krolikowski had approached Ambassador Kochemasov and told him
that for a long time he had looked for a pretext under which to talk to him.
A very difficult state of affairs had arisen in a party rife with dogmatism,
centralisation and curtailment of discussion. Everything was being painted
in rosy colours. Something needed to be done. When Kochemasov asked
what it was he had in mind, he received the following reply: ‘The leader-
ship has to be replaced.’1106 The ambassador was also told that there were
other members in the Politburo who shared this point of view. In accor-
dance with Gorbachev’s stance of non-interference and referring to the cir-
cumstances of Ulbricht’s replacement, Kochemasov explained that the
times of Soviet involvement in East German leadership changes were
over. Kochemasov nevertheless sent a telegram to Moscow reporting the
conversation.1107
Kochemasov was similarly approached, as he writes in his memoirs, by
Prime Minister and Politburo member Willi Stoph.1108 Even prior to that,
Stoph had taken the ‘extreme risk’ of establishing contact with the KGB
rezidentura. According to Ivan Kuzmin, the head of its Information De-
partment, the East German premier had transmitted material to the KGB
residency, some of which in his own handwriting. The material described
1105 Ibid., p. 211.
1106 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 59 (italics mine).
1107 Ibid.
1108 Ibid., p. 60.
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the precarious state of the East German economy, the state of affairs and
distribution of power in the party and Honecker’s dishonesty in his rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. Stoph’s approach, in Kuzmin’s interpretation,
allowed only one simple conclusion: unless Honecker was replaced the
GDR would collapse.1109 To that extent, it was a ‘direct appeal to Mikhail
Sergeevich [Gorbachev] for [his] support’ in an attempt to force the East
German leader from office.1110 How did Gorbachev react? He responded,
according to the KGB officer, in line with a ‘personal trait of his character.
As usual, he said nothing. He didn’t take any decision.’1111
It is reasonable to infer from all this that the political leadership in
Moscow could have cooperated with a faction in the East German leader-
ship trying to unseat Honecker but deliberately desisted from making such
an attempt. The change in the level of contacts Luch was seeking to estab-
lish may have been directly connected with this approach. The political
leadership in Moscow appears to have reasoned that sooner rather than lat-
er, somehow, Honecker would be forced out of or die in office. In that
event, it was expedient to have in place contacts with mid-level cadres for
the post-Honecker era. Gorbachev thus declined to authorize the KGB to
give history a push. He decided to let things drift or, if one prefers to use
his terminology, to let history decide. And decide it did. But in ways nei-
ther predicted nor desired by him. The account of the role of the KGB, or
lack thereof, in the unfolding events in East Germany would be incom-
plete without a brief comment on one of the many agents in that part of
Germany: KGB captain Vladimir V. Putin.
1109 Interview with Ivan Kuzmin, conducted by Mikhail Karpov, ‘Padenie Berlin-
skoi steny’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 November 1994.
1110 Ibid.
1111 Ibid. Kuzmin obviously thinks that the political leadership should have taken ac-
tion – and earlier than 1989. Starting in the second half of 1988, he wrote in an
article, the residentura reported more frequently and more strongly about the
GDR’s growing indebtedness, deterioration of economic conditions, dissatisfac-
tion among the population, and the emergence of ‘irreversible structures’ which
pointed to an ‘objective process towards the restoration of German unity’; Ivan
Kuzmin, ‘sekretnye sluzhby mnogo znali – no resheniia prinimali politiki’,
Novoe vremia, No. 20 (1993), pp. 28-29 (italics mine).
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Putin at the Dresden rezidentura
Putin was posted to Dresden in August 1985 at the age of 32, shortly after
having completed training at the KGB’s Red Banner Institute in Moscow
where he concentrated on the analysis of and possible future appointment
in German-speaking countries, that is, in the (4th) department of the
KGB’s First Chief Directorate (FCD), including, as mentioned, Austria,
Switzerland and both Germanys.
What is it that he did at that posting? Did he involve himself in promot-
ing perestroika, glasnost, demokratizatsiya and the New Political Thinking
in the GDR? How well known and how influential was he in influencing
the course of events, perhaps as an active participant in the Luch opera-
tion?
Once Putin had risen to prominence, academic specialists and journal-
ists from all over the world travelled to Dresden and Leipzig, Bonn and
Berlin, to uncover traces of his activities and the possible imprint he may
have left there. The results were poor.1112 The previous chief of Soviet for-
eign intelligence and head of the KGB from 1988 until 1990, Vladimir
Kryuchkov, could not remember Putin. That name also did not ring a bell
with the legendary chief of GDR state security, Markus Wolf. The previ-
ous head of the SED’s Dresden regional party organization, Hans Mod-
row, as far as he knew, had never met him.1113 And the previous KGB
general of the First KGB Department, Oleg Kalugin, shrugged his shoul-
ders when the name Putin was mentioned.
Putin, in what is described as an autobiography, provides some informa-
tion about his activities.1114 He says tersely that he carried out ‘work along
1112 The enumeration of persons who could have remembered Putin but didn’t draws
on Alexander Rahr, Wladimir Putin: Der ‘Deutsche’ im Kreml, 2nd, revised ed.
(Munich: Universitas, September 2000), p. 55.
1113 Putin, however, stated in his ‘autobiography’ that he ‘met Modrov a couple of
times at official receptions’. Vladimir V. Putin, Ot pervogo litsa. Razgovory s
Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), p. 66.
1114 Putin, Ot pervogo litsa. The autobiography comes in the format of questions-
and-answers in six interviews by three journalists. One may want to disagree
with their claim (p. 4) that, with the publication of the book, ‘the question of
“Who is Mr. Putin” has now been closed’. − Doubt about whether the main
questions about who is Mr. Putin are answered should extend to Rahr who
claims that ‘Putin himself has very extensively [sic] told about his time as an




the lines of political intelligence − acquisition of information about politi-
cal actors and plans of the potential adversary. … We were interested in
any information … about the main adversary, and the main adversary that
was NATO’.1115 In more detail, ‘ordinary’ and ‘routine’ work in such post-
ings, including the GDR, would, he continues, consist of
recruitment of sources for information, acquisition of information, and its
analysis and dispatch to the centre. That pertained to information about politi-
cal parties, trends in these parties, and about their current and possible future
leaders, about the rise of people to decisive positions in the [political] parties
and the government apparatus. It was important to know who worked how
and on what in the foreign ministry of the countries that interested us, how it
conducted its policy on different questions and in different parts of the world,
and …. what would [probably] be the position of our partners [sic], for in-
stance, in disarmament negotiations. Of course, in order to receive such infor-
mation, one needed sources and, therefore, in parallel with the [performance
of analytical tasks] recruitment work … was carried out.1116
It is possible and even probable that Putin carried out such work. But why
of all places in Dresden? The city, with a population of about 500,000, af-
ter East Berlin and Leipzig, was only the third-largest in the GDR. Its lo-
cation close to the border with Czechoslovakia was far away from West
Berlin and NATO territory. Putin was even deprived of the pleasure − one
would think, as an analyst to cover trends in NATO countries, the require-
ment – of watching West German television: In Dresden and the surround-
ing area it was technically impossible to receive West German TV broad-
casts. The local population sarcastically referred to that area as East Ger-
many’s schwarzes Loch, or ‘black hole’, and the Tal der Ahnungslosen, the
1115 Putin, Ot pervogo litsa, p. 62.
1116 Ibid., pp. 62-63. Rahr (Putin, p. 59) claims that Putin’s work also included the
gathering of intelligence on political parties (and leaders) in East Germany.
There is no evidence of this, certainly not in Putin’s ‘autobiography’.
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‘valley of the clueless’.1117 Dresden, as he himself acknowledged, was an
appointment to a ‘provincial’ post.1118
The journalists conducting the interviews for his ‘autobiography’ asked
him whether he had, during his time as an agent, ever been in West Ger-
many. He had not, he says.1119 He emphatically denies (‘complete rub-
bish’) that he was in any way engaged in the acquisition of information
relating to Western high technology.1120 It was also ‘nonsense’ to conjec-
ture that ‘I was involved in any operations outside the purview of the local
organs of power of the GDR’.1121 The interviewers also wanted to know
whether he in any way participated in the Luch operation and what, in-
deed, that operation was all about. Putin claims he ‘doesn’t know’; he did
‘not involve himself in it’; and he does ‘not even know whether it was car-
ried out’. To the extent that he was aware, its target was the ‘political lead-
ership of the GDR’ and that level was above his position.1122
The autobiographical notes are nevertheless an extraordinary document
because they are typical of the narrow mind-set not only of the Soviet mil-
itary and security establishment in the GDR but also in the Soviet Union.
They are of interest not so much because of what they explicitly state but
what they reveal about implicit assumptions and convictions. Thus, one
searches in vain about anything relating to what ostensibly was the main
object of his work, West Germany and NATO. Instead, the reader is treat-
ed to observations about East Germany and the reasons for its demise.
‘The GDR’, he states, ‘was for me in a sense familiar.’ In conversation
with his Stasi colleagues, he
1117 Concerning the ‘black hole’ problem, incredible as it may sound, the central
SEP cadres’ HQ had difficulties persuading officials to take up posts in the
Dresden area. − Even the East German political leadership, up to its most
prominent exponent, Erich Honecker, watched West German TV. This was re-
vealed on the occasion of the reopening of the reconstructed Semper Opera in
Dresden when Honecker admitted to visiting prime minister and SPD leader Jo-
hannes Rau that he had come to realize how beautifully the Opera had been re-
stored by having watched a report on it on West German TV: Dieter Buhl, ‘So
manches Glas auf den Frieden’, Die Zeit, 18 January 1985.
1118 Putin, Ot pervogo litsa, p. 62.
1119 Ibid.
1120 Ibid., p. 66.
1121 Ibid., p. 67.
1122 Ibid., p. 65.
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suddenly realized that they, and the very GDR, were [stuck] in conditions that
the Soviet Union had outlived many years ago. ... [The GDR] was a stone-
hard totalitarian country along the lines of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The
tragedy was that many people [sic] genuinely believed in communist ideals. I
thought then: If changes were to begin [in the Soviet Union] what impact
would that make on the fate of these people? … It was difficult to imagine
how the GDR could set in motion such sharp changes [as in the USSR]. Yes,
this didn’t enter into anyone’s head! Furthermore, when these changes did oc-
cur, we did not make any assessments as to how they would end. Sometimes
[sic], of course, the thought arose that this regime could not maintain itself for
long.1123
No wonder, then, that ‘the Germans’, after the fall of the Berlin wall, ‘de-
stroyed its MSS [Ministry for State Security, or Stasi]’ and that the
‘crowd’ that had appeared at the Dresden rezidentura was ‘in an aggres-
sive mood’.1124
It was, of course, nonsense to compare Honecker’s crumbling GDR of
the 1980s, at a loss to cope with mass demonstrations, with Stalin’s USSR
of the 1930s, with mass terror as a constituent element of the system. Even
more revealing of Putin’s mindset and that of his fellow Chekists in Dres-
den and Moscow, however, is the complete absence of any thought given
to the national issue, the core of the German problem. He fails to reflect
on the operational problems of the Common House of Europe for East
Germany, and how it could be possible to accommodate two German
states with a common history and language under one common − German
and European − roof. He fails to mention the Mitteleuropa debate.1125
Such terms as German ‘unity’, ‘unification’ or ‘reunification’ do not occur
in the report on his time he spent in the GDR. He fails to note the differ-
ence between the demand for regime change in East Germany and the de-
mands in other countries of the Soviet bloc and, indeed, the Soviet Union.
Specifically, he does not show any awareness of the fact that by the time
the threatening German ‘crowd’ appeared at the Dresden rezidentura in
December 1989, the slogans of the demonstrators throughout East Ger-
many had already changed from Wir sind das Volk (‘We are the people’) to
Wir sind ein Volk (‘We are one nation’). There is, finally, no reflection on
1123 Ibid., p. 70.
1124 Ibid., p. 71.
1125 Putin’s mental map reveals some strange features. In reference to the GDR he
says: ‘It seemed to me that I travelled to an east European country in the center
of Europe.’ Ibid., p. 70.
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the fact that the Soviet military and the KGB were instruments of the cen-
tre’s colonial control, the ultimate guarantee of the GDR’s existence.
Questions, therefore, pertaining to the legitimacy of Soviet rule in East
Germany and Eastern Europe, let alone the Baltic republics, remain un-
touched.
Putin, however, does deal with the relationship between the center and
the periphery. And what he says is again vivid testimony to the mindset of
the Soviet military and security establishment, both in Moscow and in
Dresden. When the threatening crowd appeared at the rezidentura, Putin
says, ‘I called our Group of Forces and explained the situation.’ They
replied that there is nothing that they could do without any instructions
from Moscow, but Moscow was silent. Some military did arrive and the
crowd dispersed but Putin had ‘the feeling that the county [the Soviet
Union] no longer existed’.1126 Even more importantly for understanding
his policies as president after 2000, he considered it a mistake, in fact, in-
comprehensible how ‘one could just drop everything and leave’. 1127 He,
so his message, would have acted differently than Gorbachev.
1126 Ibid., p. 71.





The Transformed Internal and International Setting
Gorbachev's attitudes and policies on the German problem evolved on
three interacting levels: (1) radicalization of political change and mounting
economic and nationality problems in the Soviet Union; (2) redefinition of
the Soviet-East German relationship in a new context of Soviet-East Euro-
pean relations; and (3) transformation of the perceived importance of West
Germany for the reordering of European security and the mitigation of So-
viet economic problems. Change that had been initiated ‘from above’ was
now driven ‘from below’, and this applied to both the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
Mounting Domestic Problems
To turn to the first level, in his account of the Gorbachev era, Chernyaev
dwells on the acute frustration he felt with the evolution of domestic polit-
ical and economic affairs in 1989. He sensed a ‘crisis of leadership’ and
harboured an ‘inner discomfort’ and ‘dissatisfaction with Gorbachev that
resulted from the great gap between domestic and foreign policy develop-
ments’. He calls that year a ‘year lost’.1128 Leonid Abalkin, deputy prime
minister and chairman of a newly founded Commission on Economic Re-
form, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 29 June 1989, considered the
Soviet economy to be in a ‘state of emergency’. He deplored that for one
and a half years, economic conditions in the Soviet Union had ‘deteriorat-
ed further every month’.1129 Gorbachev, at the Congress of People's
Deputies, on 30 May 1989, regretted that the general public had not felt
any major beneficial effects of perestroika. Whereas, previously, he had
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characterized the economy as being ‘on the verge of crisis’, he now
thought that the Soviet economy was ‘in a state of crisis’.1130
The economic crisis had acute social repercussions. The growing gap
between popular expectations raised by promises for the improvement of
the economy and the acute supply problems in the agricultural and con-
sumer goods sector created ‘strong tensions,’ made people ‘insecure’, and
even led to ‘embitterment’, as Gorbachev confided to Honecker in
June.1131 In the following month, a wave of workers’ strikes broke out in
the Soviet Union. They began in the coal mines of the Kuznetsk Basin of
Siberia and then spread to Vorkuta in the far north, to the Don Basin in
Ukraine, Karaganda in northern Kazakhstan, and Sakhalin in the Far East.
After that month, the Kremlin could never again have confidence that it
was the master of events. Links were being forged between the radical re-
formers among the intelligentsia in the cities, nationalists in and between
the republics, and the political uprising of workers across the country.1132
There was perhaps only one way to avoid shipwreck: not to attempt to
steer against powerful currents but to navigate with them. A passionate
plea not to battle the tide was made by Andrei Sakharov in private conver-
sation with Gorbachev in May 1989 after a heated and unpleasant ex-
change at the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies. ‘It is not
for me,’ Sakharov said,
to tell you how serious things are in the country, how dissatisfied people are
and how everyone expects things to get worse. There is a crisis of trust in the
country towards the leadership and the party. Your personal authority and
popularity are down to zero. People cannot wait any longer with nothing but
promises. A middle course in situations like these is almost impossible. The
country and you are at a crossroads – either increase the process of change
maximally, or try to retain the administrative command system with all its
qualities. In the first case, you must use the support of the ‘left’ [the reform-
ers]; you can be sure there will be many brave and energetic people you can
1130 Central Soviet Television, 30 May 1989. – I caught of the population’s frustra-
tion and failure to see any major beneficial effect of perestroika at that time.
When, on the way from Sheremetevo airport to the centre of Moscow, I asked
the taxi driver what movement forward he had seen in the last months he replied
sarcastically: ‘The only thing that’s moving are Gorbachev’s lips.’
1131 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Gorbachev and Honecker in
Moscow, 28 June 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2.035/60.
1132 Remnick, Lenin's Tomb, p. 233.
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count on. In the second case, you know for yourself whose support you will
have but you will never be forgiven the attempt at perestroika.1133
But three years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, speaking in
reference to the constitutional changes Sakharov had suggested, Gor-
bachev was to lament: ‘If we had only listened more carefully to Andrei
Dmitrievich [Sakharov] ...’1134
The catharsis of vigorous political debate, demonstrations, elections and
the workers’ strikes interacted with another factor that would be of crucial
importance in the demise of both the internal and the external empire: the
proliferation of ethnic conflicts and the upsurge in independence move-
ments throughout the Soviet Union. The most determined national revival
threatening the survival of the Soviet Union developed in the Baltic re-
publics.
What, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1987 and 1988, had been a
drive for more autonomy within the constitutional framework of the Sovi-
et Union, in 1989 turned into a powerful independence movement with
torrents of demonstrations and protests against the Hitler-Stalin pact, the
forcible incorporation of the three Baltic countries into the USSR and the
subsequent executions and deportations. Management of the nationality
problems was not helped by Gorbachev's inability to understand that na-
tional emancipation movements have hardly ever been deflected from
their drive towards independence by arguments of economic rationality.
Even after their achievement of independence, Gorbachev took the Baltic
peoples to task for ingratitude. They forgot, he writes in his memoirs, that
their well-being and the higher labour productivity in the Baltic republics
as compared to other Soviet republics had been ‘created by immense in-
vestments financed from the Union budget and of course also by qualified
specialists and workers who had come to the Baltic area from Russia and
other Union republics’ and by the ‘supply of fuel and energy free of
1133 Ibid., p. 281. Earlier, at the congress session, Sakharov had taken the floor, im-
ploring Gorbachev to endorse a ‘decree on power’ that would end the commu-
nist party's monopoly. Gorbachev had reacted angrily. He unceremoniously cut
Sakharov off and proceeded to lecture him, adopting, as Remnick observes, an
attitude of ‘haughty disdain’ and a ‘peremptory, bullying tone’.
1134 Ibid., p. 282 (italics mine). The full sentence reads: ‘If we had only listened
more carefully to Andrei Dmitrievich [Sakharov], we might have learned some-
thing.’
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charge (darovomu)’.1135 He failed to understand that the Baltic peoples did
not compare their level of socio-economic development with that of other
Soviet republics but with their Scandinavian neighbours, notably with Fin-
land and Sweden.
In another European part of the Soviet Union, unrest occurred in
Moldova, with demonstrators demanding independence and reunification
with Romania. Most sensitive for the whole character and cohesion of the
Soviet Union and Russia's identity, however, was the emergence of Rukh,
a powerful independence movement in Ukraine. Ordinary Russians could
conceive of a Soviet Union without the Baltic republics and Central Asia.
However, the Kievan Rus had been the precursor of the Russian state, and
‘Little Russia’ (as Russians historically called Ukraine), was being regard-
ed in Moscow as an integral part of a Slavic Union. The idea of two, let
alone three, separate Slavic states was simply anathema even to ordinary
Russians and certainly the power elite in Moscow. The political survival
of Gorbachev and the reform course, therefore, crucially depended on the
prevention of Russian-Ukrainian separation and divorce.
The Pandora Box of nationalism, ethnic conflict and secessionism was
opened also in Central Asia and the southern republics of the USSR. In
April 1989, large demonstrations for autonomy and independence took
place in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. They were brutally suppressed by
Soviet troops, with the use of spades and poison gas. In July, with the situ-
ation in the Georgian capital ostensibly defused, the sparks of ethnic strife
ignited another fire in the area, in Georgia's Abkhaz Autonomous Region.
In neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan, the upsurge of nationalist senti-
ment locked the two republics into conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In
Uzbekistan in June 1989, more than 50 people were killed and at least 500
injured in the Soviet Union’s worst ethnic bloodshed in decades, as
Uzbeks turned against the Meshketians, a Turkic minority. The uncertain-
ties created by ethnic conflicts and the reassertion of Muslim identity in-
duced many Russians to leave the area. Those remaining behind were or-
ganizing and demanding that the centre intervene on their behalf. In
September, a special Central Committee plenary meeting on nationality
problems finally took place. But its decisions and resolutions had practi-
cally no impact on the course of events.
1135 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 511 (italics mine)
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The Soviet leaders’ preoccupation with internal affairs and their felt ne-
cessity to try to extinguish the flickering ethnic fires limited their ability
effectively to manage foreign policy. For instance, in preparation for Gor-
bachev’s planned visit to Bonn, 12-15 June, Shevardnadze was scheduled
to visit the West German capital on 16 April. However, because of his in-
volvement in Moscow’s efforts to defuse the nationality conflict in Geor-
gia, the foreign minister felt constrained to postpone the visit. Similarly,
on 7 June, government spokesmen in Bonn let it be known unofficially
that Gorbachev’s program in West Germany would have to be curtailed
due to domestic political problems in the USSR, including the outbreak of
violent nationality conflicts in Uzbekistan and the on-going session of the
Congress of People's Deputies. Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gerasi-
mov surmised that the session might be interrupted for the duration of
Gorbachev’s visit. Meetings with the chairmen of the four parties repre-
sented in the West German parliament were first removed from the pro-
gram and then reinstated but a planned interview for the two main West
German television channels was cancelled. Gorbachev also asked that sev-
eral hours daily be kept free of any engagements so that he would be able,
from the Soviet embassy in Bonn, to deal with reports from the USSR.1136
Eastern Europe: Breaking Through the Socialist Framework
To turn to the second level of analysis, the drive for national emancipation
in Eastern Europe: a pivotal role here was played by the increasing real-
ization among both party leaderships and popular movements that Gor-
bachev was disinclined to use force in order to prevent change. Nationality
conflicts and independence movements in the Soviet Union and the way
the centre attempted to cope with them forcefully interacted with the
movements for national emancipation in Eastern Europe: as with regard to
the German problem, the leadership's intense preoccupation with national-
ity issues in the Soviet Union was a drain on Gorbachev's time and energy;
it reinforced his aversion to intervention in the internal affairs of the de-
pendencies; and it eroded even further Gorbachev’s will to empire. Clearly
1136 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 and 9 June 1989. The talks with the chairmen of the four
parties represented in parliament took place after a formal dinner on 12 June.
The session of the Congress of People's Deputies ended on 9 June, a few days
prior to Gorbachev's arrival in Bonn.
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recognizable for everyone, his attempt to safeguard the integrity and via-
bility of the USSR took precedence over maintaining control and cohesion
in the bloc.
This was reflected in the evolution of the principle of Freedom of
Choice. When Gorbachev visited Kiev in February 1989, he explained the
principle, stating authoritatively that Soviet relations with the socialist
states should be based on ‘unconditional independence (bezuslovnaia
samostoiatel'nost’), full equality [and] strict non‑intervention in internal
affairs’.1137 This, in turn, presupposed ‘responsibility of the party and gov-
ernment of each socialist country to its own people’.1138 In other words,
the local party leaderships could no longer rely on the Brezhnev Doctrine
and Soviet military intervention to keep them in power. They themselves
had to provide for their own political legitimacy and viability.
Up to that point, however, Gorbachev had said nothing about any free-
dom of choice for the population in the East Central European countries.
This was to change a few months later, in June 1989,1139 and confirmed
and given wide prominence on 25 October 1989 by foreign ministry
spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov. In an appearance on a U.S. television
program, he discussed a speech made two days earlier by his chief, foreign
minister Shevardnadze. The latter had said that the Soviet Union recog-
nized the freedom of choice of all countries, including the member coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact. Gerasimov told the interviewer that ‘We now
have the Frank Sinatra doctrine. He has a song, I Did It My Way. So every
country decides on its own which road to take.’ When asked whether this
would include Moscow accepting the rejection of communist parties in the
Soviet bloc, he replied: ‘That’s for sure … political structures must be de-
cided by the people who live there.’1140
In the countries to which the principle of Freedom of Choice applied,
the most important changes occurred in Hungary and in Poland. In
November 1988, in Hungary the Social Democratic Party, outlawed since
1948, reconstituted itself, and at the beginning of March 1989 held its first
national party congress. In the communist party – the Hungarian Socialist
1137 ‘Perestroika − delo vsekh narodov strany. Rech’ M.S. Gorbacheva na vstreche s
trudiashchimisia v.g. Kieve’, Pravda, 24 February 1989.
1138 Ibid.
1139 Ibid.
1140 ‘Sinatra Doctrine’, Wikipedia.org, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sina-
tra_Doctrine (italics mine).
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Workers' Party (HSWP) – quite in contrast to the CPSU, radical reformist
strands became ascendant This state of affairs, also unlike in the Soviet
Union, later in the year led to the split of the party into a conservative and
radical reformist wing. Parliament adopted a new constitution which abol-
ished the monopoly of a single political party; codified human and civil
rights, the separation of powers and equality of several forms of owner-
ship; and opened the way to a market economy. In domestic political af-
fairs, the new government under Prime Minister Miklós Németh and For-
eign Minister Gyula Horn, was thoroughly committed to a reform socialist
program and, in foreign policy, to a reorientation away from the Warsaw
Pact and Comecon towards cooperation with Western European countries,
notably West Germany (see below).1141 The new government, therefore,
reinstated the two main objectives promulgated by Prime Minister Imre
Nagy that had prompted Soviet intervention in 1956: the establishment of
a multi-party system and the declaration of neutrality.
On domestic political issues, however, it was Poland which, seen from
the traditional Soviet perspective, broke even more fundamentally through
the limits of acceptable change in the bloc. The forces of radical change
lay in an accelerating political and economic crisis. In April 1989 the
‘round-table’ talks on constitutional reform were successfully concluded
with an agreement on comprehensive parliamentary and electoral reform,
later approved by the lower house of parliament, the Sejm. In June, the
Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) suffered a crushing defeat. Solidari-
ty received 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, the newly created upper
house of parliament. In the Sejm, the communist party also found itself in
a minority after the elections. The party had compiled a national list of 35
candidates, including such ostensible party reformers as Prime Minister
Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiesczak as well as
other members of the Politburo and top leaders of the communist coalition
parties. All of these candidates failed to receive the necessary 50 percent
of the vote and thus were unable to run in the second round of the elec-
tions. This stood in stark contrast to the votes cast for Solidarity. All of its
candidates received more than 50 percent of the vote, and all of them were
represented in parliament without having had to stand in the second round
1141 The new constitution was adopted in March 1989, and the election of a new
government occurred in March 1989. The first national conference of the re-
formist wing of the HSWP was held in May 1989 in Szeged.
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of elections. As a result, the PUWP lost its monopoly on power. Solidarity
and the parties allied with it became the dominating force in parliament.
The stunning defeat of the communist party raised the question as to the
legitimacy of its rule. President Wojciech Jaruzelski nevertheless appoint-
ed Kieszcak prime minister – a choice unacceptable to Solidarity since he
had been one of the architects of the December 1981 state of emergency
and the subsequent suppression of the labour organization. Unable to form
a government, he resigned on 19 August. This raised a prospect unprece-
dented in the history of the Soviet bloc: the formation of a non-commu-
nist, in fact, anti-communist government. No surprise, then, that the
PUWP made a last-ditch effort to prevent that prospect from becoming re-
ality.1142 Party chief Rakowski tried the traditional ploy of the ‘Soviet
card’, asserting that a grand coalition was needed in order ‘to dispel fears
of allies and partners abroad’. He declared that the party had ‘entered a pe-
riod of open struggle for power and [was] threatened by a breach of agree-
ments signed at the Round Table’. He went on: ‘The situation is danger-
ous, but this is not the time to give up. The party should not commit sui-
cide.’1143
In these conditions, Moscow's attitudes were crucial. The mainstream
Soviet media mirrored the PUWP's concern, calling the situation in Poland
‘dangerously aggravated’. At the governmental level, however, more re-
strained counsel prevailed. A foreign ministry statement said: ‘The Soviet
Union is vitally interested in what happens in a neighbouring friendly
country that is a member of the Warsaw Pact ... but [the Soviet Union] has
no intention of interfering.’1144 On 20 August, Gorbachev did intervene
but de facto in support of Solidarity. He called Rakowski, and in the
course of a 40-minute telephone conversation, the Soviet party leader –
according to PUWP spokesman Jan Bisztyga – encouraged the communist
party to take part in the new government.1145 The spokesman did not offer
a precise summary of the phone call. Neither did Gorbachev, despite the
1142 The following summary of events draws on Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza
Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 69-71.
1143 Pravda, 21 August 1989, as quoted by Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p.
70.
1144 As reported by Warsaw Television Service, 17 August 1989, quoted by Zelikow
and Rice, Germany United, p. 70.
1145 Francis X. Clines, ‘Gorbachev Calls, Then Polish Party Drops Its Demands’,
New York Times, 23 August 1989.
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fact that his telephone call was probably the only example of direct inter-
vention in Eastern Europe between 1985 and 1990 in favour of radical
change.1146 However, the subsequent alteration in the tone and content of
statements by the Polish Communist Party in favour of cooperation with
non‑communist parties and the designation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a
long-time leading member of Solidarity, for the post of prime minister
would seem to have been the result of Gorbachev's involvement.
Addressing Solidarity's parliamentary caucus, the prime minister desig-
nate stated obliquely that his government would take immediate steps to
‘make it possible for different economic organizations to be formed in the
direction of the reform of the system of property.’1147 In an interview with
an Italian newspaper, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa put the point more
bluntly. He said that the government intended to embark upon the road
from a communist system of ownership to capitalism. Echoing, probably
unwittingly, a then current popular East European joke about socialism as
constituting ‘the longest and most painful transition phase from capitalism
to capitalism’, he added: ‘Nobody has previously taken the road that leads
from socialism to capitalism. We are setting out to do just that, to return to
the pre-war situation when Poland was a capitalist country, after having
gone through a long period of socialism.’1148
What about East Germany? Was the Honecker regime to be exempted
from the need to establish its own legitimacy and viability? Did Gor-
bachev disingenuously imply that the Freedom of Choice should be grant-
ed to the East German state and government but not to the people? The
Soviet leader's reaction to the rapidly unfolding events in that country will
be examined below in detail. As for the conceptual and declaratory level,
ambiguity was dispelled in June 1989, during Gorbachev's visit to West
1146 In his memoirs, Gorbachev fails to reflect on the first transgression of the pa-
rameters of the socialist framework of change in the bloc, nor does he report the
telephone conversation with Rakowski. After having mentioned the election of
Jaruzelski to the post of president and Rakowski to that of head of the PUWP, he
merely muses that the ‘constellation of political forces [in Poland] continued to
remain unfavourable for the party that had ruled the country [Poland] for almost
forty-five years. However, the labour organization Solidarity, which now as-
sumed political responsibility, at the same time did not achieve greater popular-
ity.’ Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 347 (italics mine).
1147 John Tagliabue, ‘Wider Capitalism Encouraged by Polish Leaders’, New York
Times, 24 August 1989.
1148 Il Messagero (Rome), 22 August 1989.
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Germany. The Joint Soviet-West German Declaration, signed on that occa-
sion, acknowledged the ‘right of all peoples and states freely to determine
their destiny.’1149 It went even further by endorsing the ‘precedence of in-
ternational law in domestic and international politics’ and ‘unqualified re-
spect for the norms and principles of international law, especially respect
for the right of peoples to self-determination.’1150 According to West Ger-
man understanding, this term was the international legal counterpart to
Gorbachev's Freedom of Choice. As interpreted in four decades of politi-
cal and legal discussion in the Federal Republic, the right of self-determi-
nation was denied to East Germans. It could be exercised only in free elec-
tions, which would also be the precondition for the re-establishment of
German unity. The Joint Declaration was carefully prepared and exten-
sively discussed point by point over a period of six months.1151 Thus there
was agreement between Moscow and Bonn on the principle of popular le-
gitimacy. Yet there was no Soviet position, and there would never be offi-
cial clarification, as to whether that principle was compatible with the one-
party state in the GDR and whether it was being violated in that country
through undemocratic elections.
The dramatic internal changes in Eastern Europe had fateful conse-
quences in the international realm. On 2 May 1989, an event of world his-
toric significance took place when border units of the Hungarian armed
forces began to dismantle obstacles along the Austro‑Hungarian bor-
der.1152 This was not the first time that the Iron Curtain was dismantled in
Hungary. In 1955, in the era of Soviet acceptance of Palmiro Togliatti's
idea of ‘diversity in unity’ in international communism and the first major
post‑World War II thaw in East‑West relations, Hungary had torn down
1149 ‘M.S. Gorbachev v FRG. Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie’, Izvestiia, 15 June 1989 (ital-
ics mine).
1150 Ibid. (italics mine).
1151 Interviews with Teltschik and Chernyaev; Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutsch-
lands Einheit, as portrayed by Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth (Berlin:
Propyläen, 1996), pp. 40, 47-49; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 625.
1152 The significance of the dismantling of the Iron Curtain in Hungary for triggering
a process that was to lead in the final analysis to German unification, beginning
on 2 May with the first physical measures at the borders and culminating in Bu-
dapest's authorization of the exit of thousands of East Germans to Austria on 11
September (see below) has been emphasized by Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands
Einheit, pp. 65-85, and Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 637-42. In contrast, Gor-
bachev in his memoirs fails even to mention Hungary's decision.
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the border obstacles. This was one of the main reasons why hundreds of
thousands of Hungarians were able, in the aftermath of the November
1956 popular revolt, to cross the borders into Austria. In 1957, as a result
of Soviet intervention, a new protective fence had been erected. In the sec-
ond half of the 1960s and early 1970s, mines were cleared from the securi-
ty zones, but an elaborate electric warning system was installed and new
lanes for border patrols were added. The measures adopted in May 1989
re-established the permissive regime of the fall of 1956, and they were
more than a simple demolition job. They were political symbolism, mark-
ing the disappearance of the Iron Curtain. Reporters from both East and
West were invited to witness the event, and to underline its significance,
special equipment from Austria was used to extract the concrete posts
from the soil. Pieces of barbed wire were distributed as souvenirs.1153
The dismantling of the border obstacles had primarily an internal ratio-
nale. Since most Hungarians were permitted to travel freely to Austria and
only very few of the travellers had used the opportunity that presented it-
self to stay abroad, the border regime was – as Prime Minister Németh
thought – a ‘cruel anachronism’. He also considered the border obstacles
to be like a ‘second Berlin wall’.1154 Yet when the Hungarian government
adopted the decision on the opening of the borders, it was still willing to
adhere to a 1968 agreement and the previous practice according to which
only East Germans with valid GDR exit stamps in their passports would
be allowed to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border. East Germans trying to
cross illegally would continue to be arrested and sent back to the GDR.1155
But the dismantling of the border obstacles was bound to create severe
complications for East Germany and evoke concern in Prague and
Bucharest. East German travellers, principally in Hungary but in other
East European countries as well, would attempt to leave and then, frustrat-
ed in their effort, would seek refuge in West German embassies. In the
1153 Michael Frank, ‘Ungarische Grenzaktion: Ein erstes Loch im Eisernen
Vorhang’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3-4 May 1989. The measures were taken in im-
plementation of a Hungarian government decision adopted in February 1989.
1154 Németh in an interview with Friedrich Kurz, ‘Ungarn 89’, in Dieter Grosser,
Stephan Bierling and Friedrich Kurz, Die sieben Mythen der Wiedervereini-
gung: Fakten und Analysen zu einem Prozeß ohne Alternative (Munich: Ehren-
wirt, 1991), p. 130.
1155 Ibid., pp. 37-39, 123-130. This summary of the Hungarian decision to open the
borders and its international repercussions also draws on Zelikow and Rice,
Germany Unified, pp. 63-64.
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summer, more than 200,000 East Germans were on vacation in Hungary,
many of whom on camping sites close to the borders and waiting for an
opportunity to travel west. The number of would-be emigrants in the West
German diplomatic representations in Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, and East
Berlin was rising. On 9 August, Hungary stopped enforcing the return of
GDR citizens. Its border authorities kept turning back thousands of East
Germans but hundreds were slipping through the net each week. By late
August thousands of East Germans were awaiting their fate in Hungarian
detention camps and several hundred in the West German embassy com-
pound in Budapest. On 25 August, Németh and Horn held secret talks
with Kohl and Genscher at Schloss Gymnich near Bonn. The Hungarians
informed the West German chancellor and the foreign minister that they
were prepared, as Horn later wrote, to embark on the risky and ‘illegal’
step to open the Hungarian-Austrian border on a specified date at night
until early morning so that several thousand GDR-citizens could es-
cape.1156 Implementation of a corresponding decision occurred in the night
of 10-11 September.1157
Several conclusions are appropriate. First, the events in Hungary were
an early indication of uncontrolled and uncontrollable dynamics becoming
dominant in the bloc. Leaders in both East and West were forced to react
to unforeseen events, in the process altering and often abandoning alto-
gether well established policies and preferences. As for the West German
government, its attitudes and policies had been governed by the then still
valid principle of Ostpolitik, that is, to avoid undercutting the Honecker
regime while attempting to alleviate the hardships of the division. In fact,
in the Schloss Gymnich talks, the German chancellor had characterized
the position of the government in Bonn as a balancing act: to avoid desta-
bilizing the GDR but at the same time not to strengthen it.1158 But the in-
creasing popular pressures ‘from below’ in East Germany and the Hungar-
ian decisions on emigration led to a shift in Bonn's attitudes. Starting from
1156 Gyula Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine: Erinnerungen des ungarischen Außenmin-
isters, der den Eisernen Vorhang öffnete, trans. Angelika and Péter Máté (Ham-
burg: Hoffman and Campe, 1991), pp. 319-20.
1157 Kohl says that more than 6,000 people crossed the borders from Hungary into
Austria on 10-11 September and that – presumably prior to the opening of the
Berlin wall – more than 100,000 East Germans were to follow; Kohl, Ich wollte
Deutschland's Einheit, p. 84.
1158 Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine, p. 319.
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August and September 1989, the West German government was less in-
clined to take the vulnerabilities and sensitivities of the Honecker regime
into consideration and more prone to pursue a new agenda of pressure for
change in the GDR.1159
Second, governments and communist party leaderships in the bloc were
increasingly acting in accordance with their own definition of interests and
taking fateful and far-reaching decisions without consultation of the impe-
rial centre. As amply demonstrated, for instance, by East Berlin's credit
deals with Bonn and its refusal to ‘change the wallpaper’, independent ac-
tion in the bloc was certainly not unprecedented. But in 1989 the tendency
grew in direct proportion to Gorbachev's manifest disinclination to involve
himself actively in bloc policy. In Horn's view, Gorbachev and Shevard-
nadze would most likely have ‘consented to our decision’ to let the East
Germans leave if they had been asked. But they were not. The Hungarian
leaders proceeded from the, in all likelihood correct, assumption that their
Soviet counterparts knew about the Hungarian plans through their contacts
with East Berlin and that they were being pressured to intervene on its be-
half. There was another, more unlikely, source of information for the im-
pending Hungarian move: the West German chancellor. In a telephone
conversation shortly after the Schloss Gymnich talks, Kohl told Gor-
bachev what the Hungarian government was planning and asked him
whether it had his support. The Kremlin leader had only one comment:
‘The Hungarians are good people.’1160 It appears that Budapest, of all the
major players in the event, was the last source of information for Moscow.
According to Horn, ‘we informed the Soviets only on the last day’ before
adopting the measures of 10-11 September.1161
Third, the Hungarian events brought into sharp focus an accelerating
East German malaise. Conditions were beginning to resemble those ob-
taining in the months of crisis before the building of the Berlin wall. In
fact, the main function of the wall as compelling the East German popula-
tion to cooperate with the regime was superseded by the Hungarian deci-
sions. As in the spring and summer of 1961, the East German regime was
now again being faced with the syndrome of Torschlußpanik, the concern
1159 This change has been described in more detail by Zelikow and Rice, Germany
Unified, pp. 65‑67).
1160 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 75. The exact date of the telephone
conversation is unclear.
1161 Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine, p. 326.
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among the GDR citizens that to leave the country was a matter of now or
never because, either as a result of a conservative backlash in Moscow or
an SED decision to outlaw travel to Czechoslovakia, the gates would soon
be closed. Again as in 1961, this concern enormously swelled the number
of would-be emigrants and produced an exodus of mostly young and en-
terprising citizens. This, in turn, exposed the tenuous legitimacy of the
communist regime, the glaring gap between the quality of life in the two
Germanys and the wide gulf between an entrenched party leader and a
restive society. It also threatened to have negative repercussions on East
German economic development.
Fourth, the Hungarian decisions on emigration and Soviet reactions il-
luminated East Germany's increasing isolation in the bloc. This was the
major difference in conditions between 1961 and 1989. Given the funda-
mental congruence of Soviet and East German interests in the early 1960s,
the unbroken will to empire in Moscow and tight bloc discipline Ulbricht
had been able to muster collective Warsaw Pact support for the building of
the wall. In the late 1980s, however, except on the issue of the continued
existence of the GDR, Soviet and East German interests and policies di-
verged; the will to empire no longer existed in Moscow; bloc discipline
had evaporated; and East Berlin was able to draw support only from like-
minded orthodox party leaderships in Prague and Bucharest. Its pressures
on Budapest to comply with the 1968 agreement, therefore, were to no
avail. Informed by Horn of the Hungarian decision on 31 August in the
GDR capital, foreign minister Fischer exclaimed in exasperation: ‘This is
blackmail! In fact, this is treason! Don’t you realize that you are thereby
abandoning the GDR and joining the other side? This will have grave con-
sequences for you.’1162 SED Politburo member and CC Secretary Günter
Mittag, in a meeting later in the day, according to the East German tran-
script, ‘strictly opposed [the Hungarian government's] intention to ignore
agreements concluded with the GDR’ and ‘demanded of Comrade Horn to
reconsider the position which he had taken’.1163 On 9 September, Honeck-
1162 Ibid, p. 324.
1163 Notes (Vermerk) on the meeting between Mittag and Horn, SED Politburo, Ar-
beitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3238. Fischer was present at
the meeting. Judging from Horn's report on the talks, despite the clarity of Mit-
tag's demand (Aufforderung), the latter tried a more conciliatory and diplomatic
tack than the one Fischer had adopted earlier; Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine, p.
324.
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er personally intervened and, in a telegram to Hungarian party leader
Rezsö Nyers, attempted to reverse the Hungarian government's decision.
But this effort, too, was wasted.1164
Fifth, the Hungarian government's actions underlined the crucial impor-
tance of West German economic leverage in the disintegrating bloc. As
Fischer’s rage indicated, the Hungarian government had made a deliberate
decision to give preference to the relations with West Germany over those
with East Germany and to reorient itself away from the bloc towards, as
Horn put it, ‘Europe’.1165 The reason for this had much to do with eco-
nomics. In their memoirs, Kohl and Genscher emphatically rejected West-
ern news reports and East European rumours that there was a direct link-
age between West German money and the Hungarian decisions. In the se-
cret talks at Schloss Gymnich, Kohl asked Németh several times whether
the Hungarians expected West German concessions (Gegenleistungen) in
exchange for their refusal to return would-be East Germans refugees to the
GDR, and each time the Hungarian prime minister had replied: ‘Hungary
will not sell people.’1166 But although the assertions of the absence of a di-
rect linkage in the Gymnich talks are credible, neither the West German
nor the Hungarian leaders involved have denied that linkage was implicit
on a more general level. Kohl, in his own words, considered it simply a
matter of fact, or self-evident (selbstverständlich), that ‘we would help
those who help us. The Hungarians could have acted quite differently. It
was not an easy decision for the government in Budapest in this situation,
despite valid agreements with the GDR government simply to say: We let
the Germans go.’1167 It is for this reason that the negotiations in progress
for the extension of a West German credit to Hungary in the amount of
DM 500 million were successfully concluded shortly after the Gymnich
talks and that Bonn vigorously supported Budapest in its endeavour to be-
come a member of the European Community. ‘I am convinced,’ Horn has
acknowledged, ‘that the Hungarian reform forces, above all at the time of
change in 1988-89, would not have managed to stay on top without practi-
cal [West German-Hungarian] cooperation and [West German] cred-
1164 Ibid., pp. 325-26.
1165 Ibid., p. 322.
1166 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschland's Einheit, p. 74. The West German foreign minis-
ter has similarly contended that ‘Our Hungarian guests did not make financial
demands’; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 640.
1167 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 74.
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its.’1168 As will be argued below, similar implicit linkages, rather than spe-
cific and direct conditionalities, applied to the nexus between West Ger-
man economic incentives and Gorbachev's later consent to German unifi-
cation and united Germany's membership in NATO.
West Germany: The New Soviet Priority
To turn to the third dimension of the transformed domestic and interna-
tional setting, Soviet policy towards West Germany: in May 1989, as we
have seen, the Hungarian leadership had begun to reorient its foreign poli-
cy toward that country and Western Europe. A convincing case can be
made for arguing that the Soviet leadership followed suit only one month
later. The occasion for Moscow's reorientation was Gorbachev's long de-
layed visit to West Germany. Chernyaev has unequivocally made that very
point. Speaking about the visit and its results, he concludes: ‘Even in the
GDR, at top and bottom levels, it was [now] understood that the Federal
Republic was to be given priority in Soviet policy towards Germany.
[West Germany] would also be the main partner for the construction of a
new Europe.’1169 What are the reasons that would justify such a far-reach-
ing conclusion?
One of the reasons is of a general nature and lies in the international po-
litical realm. Genscher has pertinently observed: ‘In retrospect, one can
say ... that German foreign policy immediately prior to entering into the
most dramatic phase of post-war policy had reached the pinnacle of its in-
ternational influence.’1170 This fact of international life was reflected not
only in Gorbachev's reorientation of priorities but also in President Bush's
invitation to West Germany to join the United States in a ‘partnership in
leadership’.1171
A second, more specific factor can be found in the removal of one of
the major obstacles to a rearrangement of Soviet-West German relations:
NATO’s decision at the Brussels summit meeting on 30 May not to insist
on the immediate modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. It is diffi-
cult in retrospect to comprehend the highly emotional character of the con-
1168 Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine, p. 318.
1169 Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym, p. 291.
1170 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 626.
1171 In a speech in Koblenz on 30-31 May 1989.
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troversies which preceded the decision, both within the Western alliance
and between the Soviet Union and NATO. Indeed, the acrimonious debate
from January to May 1989 about theatre nuclear weapons appears quite in-
congruous in view of the fact that three years earlier Reagan had acceded
to Gorbachev's vision of a nuclear‑free world, scholars had been talking
about a ‘post‑nuclear era,’ agreement had been reached on the abolition of
both long-range and medium-range nuclear missiles, and proposals for
comprehensive disarmament in conventional weapons were seriously be-
ing discussed. Finally, the conflict seems even more incomprehensible
considering the rapidly changing political context in 1989. Given the New
Thinking, with its by then clearly demonstrated implications for a reduc-
tion of the East-West military competition in Europe, it was no longer ap-
propriate, if it ever had been, to look upon nuclear weapons as a primarily
military issue. Genscher recognized this with great clarity and was deter-
mined to prevent an SNF modernization decision – as was the Soviet
Union.
Briefly to remind ourselves of the heated controversy, in April 1989
Marshal Akhromeev had claimed that the Oka (SS-23) missile had a range
of less than 500 kilometres and should thus be considered a short-range
system. He had also asserted that ‘its range was no secret to US represen-
tatives at the [INF] talks’ and objected to United States plans to deploy a
new missile, the Lance, with a range of close to 500 kilometres.1172 Two
weeks prior to the NATO summit, on 12-13 May, Shevardnadze had reiter-
ated the viewpoint of the Soviet chief of staff when he visited Bonn in
preparation of Gorbachev's visit. At a press conference, he deplored that
NATO wanted to deploy a new missile with a range comparable to that of
the Soviet SS-23 Oka missile, which was being abolished in accordance
with the December 1987 Soviet-American INF treaty. He pointedly asked:
Why, then, should we destroy the SS-23 missiles if the other side is creating
and will deploy an analogous missile? By engaging in scholastic exercises
one cannot resolve the problem. The fact is that there would be two identical
types of missile. But whereas the Soviet one would be destroyed, the Ameri-
can one would be produced.1173
1172 ‘Takticheskie iadernye oruzhiia ‑ preimuzhestvo ili balans?‘, Pravda, 19 April
1989.
1173 ‘Press-konferentsiia v Bonne,’ Pravda, 14 May 1989.
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When he was asked whether that statement should be interpreted in such a
way that, if NATO were to take a decision on modernization, the Soviet
Union would halt the withdrawal of the SS-23 and their destruction, he
replied: ‘One would have to think about this. Would it [after a decision by
NATO to develop a follow‑on system to Lance] make sense to destroy
these [our] missiles? Or would it be possible that in that circumstance we
would be forced to create new systems and respond in kind to the NATO
decision?’ Pressed further, he continued: ‘We either will have to arrest the
destruction of the SS-23 missiles or create new systems.’1174
Although Shevardnadze's reply was interpreted by members of the
Western defense community as a ‘throwback to cold war tactics’ and ‘bla-
tant extortion’,1175 and despite the fact that such tactics in the past had of-
ten had a tendency to backfire, Genscher's determination to prevent an ear-
ly SNF modernization decision prevailed at the Brussels summit.1176 NA-
TO was committing itself to ‘partial reductions,’ thereby implying that
there was a minimum number of SNF that was non-negotiable. But since
the existing Lance system was soon to become obsolete and further arms
control and disarmament measures (including Bush's proposal for the limi-
tation of Soviet and American troops in Europe to 275,000 officers and
men) were being discussed, it was, as Genscher realized, highly likely that
the Lance would never be modernized and that there would be a ‘triple ze-
ro’ solution for nuclear missiles.1177 Undoubtedly, to conclude the consid-
eration of this issue, the successful West German opposition to SNF mod-
ernization contributed significantly to the acceleration of the arms control
and disarmament process in Europe and removed a major impediment to a
productive Soviet-West German summit.
A third reason for the shift of priorities in Soviet policy on the German
problem and, more generally, in Europe lay in the strengthening of the ‘re-
lationship of trust’ between Kohl and Gorbachev that had been established
in October 1988.1178 To the detriment of an accurate understanding of in-
1174 Ibid.
1175 Richard Perle, ‘Moscow's Threat: A Bluff the West Should Call,’ International
Herald Tribune, 18 May 1989.
1176 In his memoirs, Genscher has described at length the circumstances and the dra-
matic proceedings at the Brussels summit; Erinnerungen, pp. 614-21.
1177 Ibid., pp. 618-19. The first two ‘zeroes’ were on intermediate-range and medi-
um-range nuclear missiles.
1178 For the establishment of a ‘relationship of trust’ during Kohl’s October 1988
visit to Moscow, see above, xxx p. 328.
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ternational affairs, political scientists often tend to downplay the impor-
tance of personality factors. One may suspect that this has something to do
with the difficulty of measuring, or ‘operationalizing’, such intangible
‘variables’ as sympathy and empathy. Political leaders and diplomats, on
the contrary, have generally been less averse to admitting their impor-
tance. In this writer's view, too, such factors matter a great deal. Judging
from the personal accounts of the two leaders and their entourage, Gor-
bachev's opinion of Kohl substantially improved during and after his visit
to West Germany in June 1989. This, in turn, affected his thinking and be-
haviour – as Gorbachev privately and publicly acknowledged. Concerning
the latter, for instance, at the July 1990 press conference, where he and
Kohl announced details of their agreement on the external aspects of Ger-
man unification, he said that he (Gorbachev) considered the ‘personal fac-
tor highly important’ and that the agreement they were announcing would
not have been possible if it had not been for the close relations that had
developed between him and the German chancellor and also among other
Soviet and German officials. After his visit to Bonn in June 1989, but be-
fore the rapid changes on German soil, he continued, a ‘reserve’ of trust
and good will had been built, which had helped ‘us deal responsibly and
constructively’ with the changes.1179
Concerning the former, the two leaders met privately on three occasions
during Gorbachev’s visit, twice at the chancellery and once at the chancel-
lor's home.1180 At their meeting in Kohl's villa on the banks of the Rhine,
they talked extensively about their personal background and life, with mu-
tual understanding facilitated by the fact that they are part of the genera-
1179 Joint press conference in Zheleznovodsk, in the northern Caucasus; ‘Press kon-
ferentsiia M.S. Gorbacheva i G. Kolia’, Pravda, 18 July 1990. Analytically,
however, it is still an interesting problem to consider what came first, Gor-
bachev’s realization of the expediency, if not political necessity, to establish a
better personal rapport with Kohl or the ‘establishment of trust’ that led to a re-
orientation of the Kremlin leader’s policies toward West Germany. In this writ-
er's view, it was the former that came first. Furthermore, it would seem that dis-
trust and suspicion in Gorbachev’s view of Kohl was never far below the sur-
face. An indication of this is his rapid return to decidedly negative perceptions
after the chancellor’s announcement of his Ten Points on 28 November 1989,
when a furious Gorbachev (and Shevardnadze) turned the tables on the chancel-
lor’s Goebbels remarks and compared Kohl’s behaviour with that of the Nazis;
see xxx infra, p. 551.
1180 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 40; Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 159.
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tion that had experienced World War II. Gorbachev told Kohl about his
childhood, his grandfather as a victim of Stalinism, his father's work on
the collective farm, and his own experiences during the war, including the
German occupation. Kohl reciprocated and told his guest about his own
parents, his father having been drafted to the war, the allied air raids on his
native Ludwigshafen and about his brother, who was killed at the front.
After the conversation about both personal and political matters, when
Gorbachev and his wife were leaving the chancellor’s villa, they embraced
each other. ‘For me’, Kohl wrote, ‘this evening was a pivotal experience,
and I believe for Gorbachev too.’1181 Gorbachev, in his memoirs, remains
non-committal about what he felt. This is presumably for the reason that
he has been keen to dispel the notion that his policies on German unifica-
tion were in any way governed by emotion rather than reason. However,
there is nothing in his account that would contradict the favourable im-
pression which the chancellor had received.
In contrast to the reticence about Kohl in his memoirs, Gorbachev is ex-
plicit on what he felt about von Weizsäcker. He writes that he understood
why the German people had such great admiration for their president, con-
sidering his ‘comprehensive knowledge, intelligence, natural poise and
good will’, attributes which contributed to the fact that, ‘since that time,
we have kept in contact and that our conversations each time became more
sincere and characterized by more trust’.1182
It was, however, not only between the chancellor and the Kremlin lead-
er and at the very top level that an atmosphere of friendship prevailed. The
advisers on foreign policy to the two leaders and the two foreign ministers
also built on their good previous contacts and strengthened their personal
relationship.1183
The impact of personal experiences on Gorbachev's perceptions and be-
haviour can also be found in another dimension: the enthusiastic welcome
he received from the German population and from labour union, business
and public opinion leaders. In his memoirs, he reports:
The program for the visit was extraordinarily varied. I had the opportunity to
visit many Bundesländer and numerous cities and villages as well as to meet
with politicians, entrepreneurs, artists, workers, and representatives of politi-
cal parties and social groups. ... We also came in contact with the inhabitants
1181 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 47.
1182 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 156.
1183 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 627-32; interviews with Teltschik and Chernyaev.
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of the German capital. ... The scenes at the square of Bonn’s city hall were
truly unforgettable. In the street below there was an overflowing wave of
well-wishers and people expressing their friendship. Calls and wishes of luck
like, ‘Gorby! Make love, not walls!’ and ‘Keep it up, Gorbachev!’ accompa-
nied us. As we stepped out onto the balcony of the City Hall, thunderous ap-
plause surged forth from the crowd.
In the course of the visit, we also met with metal workers in a factory of the
Hoesch corporation in Dortmund. When we stepped out of the car, we ended
up in a row of thousands of people who welcomed us. An enormous factory
room was filled to the last seat. People stood on an improvised parquet floor
and on workbenches, climbed onto scaffolding and moving equipment and al-
ternately lifted each other onto their shoulders.1184
Gorbachev summarizes these experiences by comparing them with those
gained during his visit to West Germany fourteen years earlier, acknowl-
edging that in June 1989 he was ‘moved by the wave of warmth from
these people who had received us so cordially and welcomed us so sin-
cerely’.1185
It would seem that the encounters had impressed Gorbachev not only
because they did not fit the stereotypes implanted in his mind. Speaking
about a similarly warm welcome Gorbachev had received in Washington
in December 1987, former American ambassador to Moscow Jack Mat-
lock has observed that Gorbachev enjoyed the pomp and circumstance of
power and thirsted for public acclaim. At home, to continue the ambas-
sador's account, he was beginning to bridle at indications that his popular-
ity was less than universal and to contain politicians like Yeltsin, who ex-
hibited more charisma with people in the street than he. In Washington, as
later in the capitals of Western Europe, he found what he was denied at
home: worship of an adoring crowd. His evolving personal relationships
with Reagan, Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand and other Western leaders
reinforced the important insight that he no longer dealt with hostile forces
that had to be managed, fended off or appeased. The focus shifted to how
common interests could be served.1186
A fourth reason for the priority accorded to West Germany in Soviet
policy in Europe after June 1989 was connected with the content of the
talks, the agreements reached and the prospects for future cooperation. It
1184 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, pp. 156-57.
1185 Ibid., p. 159.
1186 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Ac-
count of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), p.
152.
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is not possible to prove but proper to conjecture that in his conversations
with Gorbachev about the German problem, Kohl had struck a responsive
chord. On a walk along the Rhine in the early morning hours on the third
day of the visit, the German chancellor outlined his vision of a compre-
hensive reordering of Soviet-German relations and their codification in a
Grand Treaty. Such a treaty, Kohl said, would be inadequate as long as
Germany remained divided. The division of Germany was the most impor-
tant impediment to an improvement in the relations among the two peo-
ples. Gorbachev responded by reiterating the Soviet position about the
division as being the logical result of a historic development. Kohl re-
sumed the argument. Pointing to the Rhine, he said that the river symbol-
ized history. A dam could be built across its path but the river would over-
flow and still find its ordained way to the sea. It was similar with German
unity, which was sure to come. The only question was whether it should
be addressed by the present generation or whether one should continue to
wait, with all the problems that this would pose. The Germans would nev-
er reconcile themselves with the division. Gorbachev no longer contradict-
ed.1187 Although he failed to draw any practical conclusions, but consider-
ing what he had told Rykin fourteen years earlier, it would seem that he
fundamentally agreed with the German chancellor.1188
As for the Grand Treaty, the outlines of its probable provisions were
visible in the Joint Declaration issued at the end of the talks. In a similar
document, the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, Washington had unwisely deferred to tradi-
tional Soviet language. The first principle of the agreement had stated that
the United States and the Soviet Union would ‘proceed from the common
determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting
their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence’.1189 Thus, on
the face of it, the Nixon administration had agreed to class struggle as the
governing principle in Soviet-American relations. West German negotia-
tors in 1988-89, in contrast, succeeded in committing Moscow to several
concepts and norms favoured by Bonn. As described above, this applied to
the principle of self-determination. It was extended to the precedence of
international law in domestic and international politics and included the
1187 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 43-44.
1188 See above, xxx pp. 264-65. Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 43-44.
1189 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66 (26 June 1972), pp. 898-99. National Se-
curity Advisor Henry Kissinger had negotiated the text of the Basic Principles.
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West German concepts of Gemeinsame Sicherheit (common security) and
Europäische Friedensordnung (framework, structure, or architecture of
peace in Europe) which supplemented Gorbachev's idea of the Common
European House.1190 On the German problem, the Joint Declaration also
contained language supporting Bonn's viewpoint. The document deplored
that the European ‘continent has been divided for decades’ and that both
countries considered it ‘their paramount objective ... to contribute to over-
coming the division of Europe’. In the Russian version, it also featured a
terminological innovation conforming to West German preferences. In the
first sentence, the declaration refers to the Federal Republic of Germany
as Federativnaia Respublika Germaniia, rather than Germanii, the alter-
ation implying that there is one single Germany – Germaniia – rather than
two or more German entities.1191
As for a Grand Treaty and the comprehensive reordering of Soviet-Ger-
man relations, perhaps their most important component was the idea of a
significant expansion of Soviet-German economic cooperation and West
German economic and financial assistance for the modernization of the
Soviet economy.1192 However, since this was a long-term proposition and
depended on both West German private investors and traders to take risks
as well as on the kind of radical structural reforms that Gorbachev was not
as yet prepared to undertake, there was little the West German government
could do beyond committing itself to short-term assistance (Sofort-
maßnahmen) to help alleviate the acute supply problems in the Soviet
Union.1193 For the time being, cooperation in the economic and other
spheres had to remain limited. What could be achieved was set forth in
eleven agreements signed during Gorbachev's visit. They concerned the
protection of German investments in the Soviet Union; the opening of cul-
tural institutes; exchange programs involving scientists, youth, high school
students and teachers; the training of qualified workers and management
personnel in commerce and industry; joint measures against drug traffic;
1190 Text in Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bul-
letin, No. 61 (15 June 1989). Several of the principles under this heading con-
formed to the New Thinking but these, in turn, were significantly influenced by
West German, above all Social Democratic, concepts.
1191 ‘M.S. Gorbachev v FRG. Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie’, Izvestiia, 15 June 1989.
1192 Interviews with Teltschik and Chernyaev.
1193 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 42.
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information exchange on nuclear energy; and the opening of a ‘hot line’ –
an encoded telefax connection – between Bonn and Moscow.
West Germany thus became the Soviet Union’s most important partner
in Europe. But this was not, it would seem, because of Gorbachev's per-
sonal preferences but because of objective conditions. His liaison with
Kohl, to use a convenient metaphor, was primarily not one of the heart but
of the mind.1194 His true preference, one suspects, really lay with other
European countries – with France, for instance. This is indicated by state-
ments he made at the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Bucharest, on
7-8 July, shortly after his return from a visit to Paris ‘We have to devote
primary attention to France’, he told the assembled party chiefs. ‘That is a
country of developed political thinking and with a developed culture.
France is listened to not only in Europe but also in many other extremely
important regions of the world.’1195 The fact that West Germany neverthe-
less had become the Soviet Union's most important partner in Europe in
practice meant that Gorbachev was prepared to cooperate more closely
with that country than with any other in Europe, including East Germany.
Cooperation with West Germany, however, meant within the framework of
two separate German states. It did not mean that he accepted Kohl’s idea
of actively working toward ending the division of Germany. This was
shown, among other things, by continuing Soviet-West German differ-
ences over the Berlin problem. Two agreements had been ready for signa-
ture at the summit, one on maritime shipping and the other on shipping in
internal waters, but both failed to be signed because Moscow, to underline
its legal position that West Berlin was a separate political entity, insisted
on the city flying a separate flag. This demand was rejected by the Federal
government.
The thinly veiled euphoria in Bonn about the Joint Statement and about
having committed Moscow in that document to the idea that overcoming
the division of Europe was in the paramount interest of both West Ger-
many and the Soviet Union would have dissipated somewhat if the West
German negotiators had known what Gorbachev told Honecker only two
1194 This is to reinforce the point made above xxx about Gorbachev’s vacillating per-
ception of Kohl, see p. 551. [Editor please see above: Please note: the ‘W’ in the
sentence ‘We have to devote primary attention ...’ should be in italics].
1195 Speech by Gorbachev at the Warsaw Pact summit conference in Bucharest, 7-8
July 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/2/2336 (italics mine).
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weeks after its publication. In private conversation, the Kremlin leader as-
sured his East German counterpart that there had been no horse trading
and that the Soviet Union had made no concessions. He had sensed that
attempts had been made to set him and Honecker as well as the GDR and
the Soviet Union against each other. In response, he had emphasized that
the Soviet Union maintained close relations with the GDR but that it also
wanted to improve relations with West Germany. He had portrayed this as
being quite normal. Prospects for an improvement of Soviet-West German
relations were significant if the transformation process in the Soviet Union
were to be successful. As for the problems raised by Kohl (that is, German
unification), he had replied that history had decided. Nothing could be
changed about that. The course of history might change; one would have
to wait and see. However, one always had to proceed from existing reali-
ties.1196
If what Chernyaev has stated is correct, namely, that – in the wake of
Gorbachev's visit – West Germany was to be given priority in Soviet poli-
cy towards Germany and that Bonn rather than East Berlin was to be the
main partner for the construction of a new Europe, nothing was said about
this to Honecker. In the private talks, Gorbachev also did not attach any
special significance to the Joint Declaration. In fact, he failed to mention
that document. No wonder, then, that Honecker acted as if everything was
back to normal in Soviet-East German relations. ‘Comrade Honecker em-
phasized,’ the transcript says, ‘that we consider the complimentary words
[sic] which Comrade Gorbachev uttered in Bonn about the GDR and its
policies to be an endorsement of the line pursued thus far [by the GDR]
and an encouragement unwaveringly to adhere to it.’1197
In view of the serious differences in political philosophy and policy be-
tween the GDR and the USSR, it may almost seem absurd to raise the
question whether Honecker was simply speaking tongue in cheek, being
perfectly conscious of the lack of Soviet endorsement for his policy line,
1196 Transcript (Niederschrift) of talks between Honecker and Gorbachev in Moscow
on 28 June 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV
2/2A/3228. Kohl had indeed raised the issue of Honecker's recalcitrance and
commented that it was now easier to talk with Moscow than with East Berlin;
Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 41-43.
1197 Transcript (Niederschrift) of talks between Honecker and Gorbachev of 28 June
1989. There is no evidence, however, that in his talks with the chancellor Gor-
bachev had said anything complimentary about East Germany.
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or whether he genuinely believed that he had Soviet support. Controversial
as the proposition may be, it would seem that on balance he was more sin-
cere in his belief than ironic, let alone sarcastic. Until that time, in all the
private conversations recorded in the East German archives, Gorbachev
had never directly criticized Honecker or his policies, and he would con-
tinue to refrain from open criticism until the very end of the Honecker
regime. He had, contrary to that, been complimentary about both the East
German leader and East German policies (although not in conversation
with Kohl), even deferential. The objective divergence of Soviet and East
German policies could be, and in all likelihood was, interpreted by Ho-
necker along the lines of what is good for the Soviet goose had already
been digested by the East German gander − Gorbachev had consistently
encouraged this very notion − and that the changes that he considered to
be bad for the Soviet Union should not be imitated by East Germany. In
the circumstances, it is hard to blame him for believing that Soviet en-
dorsement of his policies should unambiguously be reiterated at the forth-
coming celebrations on the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the
GDR. Gorbachev did indeed repeat some praise but the celebrations nev-
ertheless turned into a marche funèbre for the Honecker regime. They
were also another step forward along the path towards the collapse of East
Germany and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.
The Demise of the Honecker Regime
The anniversary celebrations from 6 to 8 October and Gorbachev’s visit to
East Berlin on that occasion could not have failed but take place in an at-
mosphere of heightened tension and apprehension. From the Honecker
regime’s perspective, several problems had to be solved. There was, first,
the problem of those wanting to leave the country, the Republikflüchtige.
In response to the Hungarian government’s decision to let East Germans
leave without valid travel documents, the East German authorities had at
first severely restricted travel to Hungary. But this had failed to produce
the – from the GDR's perspective – desired effect of closing all loopholes:
the flow of people intent on leaving the country was simply diverted to
Western, primarily West German, embassies. That concerned, above all,
the Federal Republic’s embassy in Budapest and Prague but also in War-
saw and Bonn’s diplomatic representation in East Berlin. In the Hungarian
capital, thousands of East Germans had scaled the walls of the West Ger-
2.
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man embassy and found themselves stranded on its muddy grounds. In
principle, Honecker was averse to abandoning the official East German
position that the ‘illegal presence of some [sic] GDR citizens in the repre-
sentations of the FRG can only be interpreted as blackmail;’ that there was
‘no special road (Sonderweg) around GDR emigration laws;’ and that the
only thing the East German government would be prepared to do was to
‘give assurances that those who return will not be punished’.1198 But con-
sidering that the festivities in East Berlin could be marred by an unre-
solved and embarrassing problem, he relented. At the end of September,
that is, only little more than a week prior to the beginning of the celebra-
tions, he yielded to West German pressures and let the East Germans leave
Czechoslovakia – by special trains and on a circuitous route from Prague
via Dresden to Hof in Bavaria in order to convey the notion that the East
Germans were leaving their country legally. By that time, since the begin-
ning of the summer, about 45,000 East Germans had left the GDR, legally,
semi-legally or illegally. On 3 October, the GDR authorities attempted to
prevent a repetition of East Germans scrambling into the Prague embassy
by closing the border with Czechoslovakia. However, unless there was a
fundamental resolution of the problem, either by more far-reaching East
German restrictions and repression or by a rapid and comprehensive liber-
alization of emigration laws, it was obvious that the exodus would contin-
ue.1199
Second, the official celebrations were to coincide with unofficial
demonstrations scheduled to take place in East Berlin on 7 October. The
unauthorized demonstrations, held on the seventh of every month, were
also commemorative. But they were not designed to celebrate GDR
achievements but to remind the ruling party of the electoral fraud which
the demonstrators were convinced the party had committed in the May
1198 Protocol of the meeting between GDR state secretary and first deputy minister
of foreign affairs, Herbert Krolikowski, and the chief of the Federal Republic's
chancellery's office, Rudolf Seiters, on 18 August 1989 in East Berlin, Central
Party Archives, Büro Axen, IV 2/2035.
1199 For details about the East German refugee problem, the West German pressures
on East Germany to consent to their exodus from the embassies and Soviet reac-
tions: for primary sources, see Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 643-45, 650-51;
Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine, p. 327; for secondary sources, see Elizabeth Pond,
Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification, A Twentieth Century Fund
Book (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 97-98; and Ze-
likow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 73-76.
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1989 local elections. Krenz at that time had been chairman of the electoral
commission. On 9 October, the by then equally traditional demonstrations
held every Monday of the week in Leipzig (Montagsdemonstrationen)
were also planned to take place. Restiveness and rumours abounded.
Krenz, the SED Central Committee secretary in charge of security, was to
be back in time for the celebrations from a visit to China. Members of the
democratic opposition, as noted supra, feared that he would return as an
advocate of a ‘Chinese solution’ to the East German regime’s troubles and
that a crackdown on demonstrations and dissent would begin as soon as
the anniversary celebrations were over.1200
For Honecker, the celebrations were of symbolic importance to show
once again how far the GDR had travelled since 1949. They presented an
opportunity to remind his detractors that the state had weathered several
crises before and that, if need be, it would overcome many more. Yet this
time Honecker faced three problems that were linked with external diffi-
culties: deterioration of his health; increasing intra-party rivalries and dis-
satisfaction; and a widening gap between the party and the people. The
East German leader, then 77 years of age, had undergone surgery in the
preceding year and in the period from 12 August to 25 September 1989
had been absent from public life for health reasons. His political health
had also deteriorated, both inside the party and the bloc. In these circum-
stances, he and the dogmatic party stalwarts needed Soviet support more
than ever. But they were unsure whether they would receive it. Such sup-
port was perhaps not unlikely. Gorbachev may have been warned and
chastened by the developments in Poland and Hungary.
For Gorbachev, too, much was at stake in the context of the visit. The
first question that had to be decided was whether to accept Honecker's of-
ficial invitation to attend the anniversary celebrations. The SED chief had
put pressure on him to attend. In private conversation, on 28 June 1989 in
Moscow, Honecker had explained:
In the GDR, we now focus on the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the
republic on 7 October. We want to celebrate this jubilee together with our al-
lies and friends all over the world, whose support, empathy, and solidarity we
have felt in all these years of socialist construction. More than seventy dele-
gations from socialist countries, fraternal and avant-garde parties, and nation-
al-democratic movements are expected in Berlin. We would be pleased if we
1200 For the discussion of East German fears, the Stasi's plans to use force, and the
role of the Soviet armed forces, see above, xxx pp. 438-40.
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could, on that occasion, welcome Comrade Gorbachev at the head of the del-
egation of the Soviet Union. One could arrange things so that Comrade Gor-
bachev could, with his delegation, before and after the celebrations, visit a
few important places in the GDR.1201
Gorbachev was non-committal. He thanked Honecker for the invitation
and stated that, ‘in principle, participation at the fortieth anniversary
would be very desirable. [We will] think about it.’1202 Honecker seemed to
be taken aback by this tepid response and reiterated his invitation. Indeed,
he said,
one should think carefully about it; [the event] will have great resonance in
the GDR and in the whole world. ... The participation of Comrade Gorbachev
would, in effect, be [putting] a seal [of approval] on socialism on German soil
[and on the GDR] as being a cornerstone of peace and socialism in Central
Europe. It would at the same time be an expression of solidarity with restruc-
turing in the Soviet Union.1203
The Soviet leader still refused to commit himself and continued to do so
throughout the summer. In mid-September it seems that Honecker,
through CPSU stalwart Ligachev, tried to force Gorbachev's hand. Lig-
achev, as noted, had been shunted away from central issues to a political
siding (the Central Committee’s agricultural commission) but was unwill-
ing to reconcile himself to a secondary role in the affairs of state. On 12
September, he travelled to East Berlin, purportedly to discuss agricultural
issues but more likely to shore up the SED’s sagging morale. He spoke
warmly of the Soviet Union's ‘forty years of indestructible friendship’
with East Germany, went on to say that Gorbachev and the USSR con-
demned the provocative West German campaign against East Germany
and, apparently without the Soviet leader’s knowledge and permission, an-
nounced that Gorbachev would visit East Berlin to participate in the an-
niversary celebrations. On the following day, a Soviet foreign ministry
spokesman limited himself to acknowledging that the visit was ‘perfectly
1201 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Honecker and Gorbachev on 28
June 1989 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2A/3228 (direct and indirect speech is used in the original; ital-
ics mine).
1202 Ibid. (indirect speech.)
1203 Ibid. (indirect speech).
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possible’ and said that ‘a delegation at the highest level’ had not been
ruled out.1204
The reason for Gorbachev’s reluctance to commit himself was rooted in
a dilemma. Not to attend could have been interpreted as an affront and a
signal that Honecker no longer had his confidence. Even worse from the
Soviet leader’s vantage point, it could have been regarded as a sign that he
had written off the GDR altogether – a message which he was not pre-
pared to convey. But attendance could have been misinterpreted as en-
dorsement for Honecker, which he was equally determined to avoid. Re-
formist forces in East Germany, both inside and outside the party, expect-
ed the Soviet visitor to exert pressure on Honecker, preferably publicly, to
change his policies and persuade him to step from office.
Gorbachev's ultimate decision was influenced by advice provided by
the CC’s International Department that he should attend but make it a
point to talk not only to Honecker but also to meet with the whole East
German leadership.1205 The officials of the department thought, correctly,
that Gorbachev had ‘conducted his educational work with the East Ger-
man primus only’ who, in turn, had ‘not been telling his colleagues the
whole truth’.1206 They advised him, therefore, that in closed session with
the entire top SED leadership he should, more forcefully than previously,
make a case for comprehensive reform in East Germany.1207 The difficulty
of charting a course between the Scylla of attendance and putative en-
dorsement of Honecker and the Charybdis of blunt criticism and destabi-
lization of East Germany was apparent in last minute changes in the
preparation for the visit: ‘The size of the delegation was significantly re-
duced, the schedule of the meetings altered, and language somewhat more
1204 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 72; author interviews as well as the in-
terview conducted by Condoleezza Rice (September 1994) with Chernyaev. −
The agro-business part of Ligachev’s trip was tersely reported by Pravda and
Izvestiia, 13 September 1989. Western diplomats said that Ligachev had partici-
pated in the weekly SED Politburo meeting and that he had admonished his East
German colleagues that, even if they were not to institute Gorbachev‑style re-
forms, they should at least try to respond better than before to the needs and
grievances of the people; Die Welt, 14 September 1989. − On the conservative
to reactionary outlook of Ligachev and his demotion see xxx pp. 397-98,
408-09.
1205 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 484 (italics mine).
1206 Ibid.
1207 Interviews with Zagladin and Rykin.
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critical of East German policies included for his meetings with Honecker
and the SED leadership.’1208
Considering the extraordinary importance of the anniversary celebra-
tions, it is appropriate to provide some detail, beginning with a reconstruc-
tion of the schedule of events. On Friday morning, 6 October, Gorbachev
would arrive and be welcomed by the East German leadership at East
Berlin's Schönefeld airport. He would then travel by car to Nieder-
schönhausen palace where the Soviet delegation was to stay. In the after-
noon, the celebrations would officially begin with a gala meeting in the
Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic), with public speeches to be
delivered, among others, by Gorbachev and Honecker. In the evening,
there would be an officially sponsored Fackelzug, or torch-light proces-
sion. The Soviet delegation would then return to Niederschönhausen, with
opportunities provided for its members to relax and prepare for meetings
on the following day. On Saturday, 7 October, the celebrations were to
continue with the laying of wreaths at Treptow cemetery; a military parade
in downtown East Berlin; private talks between Honecker and Gorbachev
and a meeting with the participation of the two party leaders, the Soviet
delegation, and the full and candidate members of the SED Politburo, both
to take place in Niederschönhausen palace; a reception and dinner later in
the afternoon; and Gorbachev's departure to Schönefeld airport for a plane
scheduled to depart for Moscow at 8:00 p.m. The impression which vari-
ous aspects of the events made on the main protagonists can now be re-
constructed with some confidence from archival materials, memoirs, and
interviews.
Gorbachev's perceptions of political conditions in East Germany began
to be shaped on the car trip from the airport to the palace. The streets
along the way were lined with people, many of whom young, who were
enthusiastically and demonstratively welcoming the Soviet president with
shouts of ‘Gorby! Gorby!’ The outburst of popular enthusiasm visibly an-
noyed Honecker who sat stone-faced in the car next to the Soviet guest
who noticed that his host felt quite uncomfortable. Along the way to
Niederschönhausen, Falin saw only one placard supportive of Honecker,
carried by a middle-aged man, which read: ‘Mach weiter so, Erich!’ (Car-
ry on, Erich!). The outbursts of popular enthusiasm were repeated during
the evening torch light procession, despite the fact that the 40,000 to
1208 Interviews with Grigoriev (the verbatim quote) and Tsipko..
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50,000 participants had been carefully selected from party activists and af-
filiated organizations, notably the communist youth organization
(FDJ).1209
In his speech at the gala meeting in the Palace of the Republic on 6 Oc-
tober, Honecker defiantly repeated formulas that confirmed to everyone
present that far‑reaching reforms were not on his agenda. ‘Forty years of
the GDR have meant forty years of heroic labour, forty years of successful
struggle for the construction of our socialist republic and the welfare of
our people,’ was the main theme pursued by him.1210 In the social sphere,
everyone in the GDR had his place, independent of Weltanschauung and
religion. Socialism, with its humanistic aspirations, was creating space for
the development of the personality of each and everyone. The GDR had
risen to be one of the top ten industrial nations in the world and was
strengthening its economic potential by the introduction of modern tech-
nologies. The country had enhanced its international prestige and influ-
ence and become a member of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies. One hundred and thirty-five states had established diplomatic re-
lations with it. The GDR was also a reliable guarantee against neo-Nazism
and chauvinism and would remain firmly anchored in the Warsaw Pact.
No one could doubt that East Germany, as the other socialist states, would
step over the threshold of the year 2000 in the certain knowledge that the
future belongs to socialism. Honecker's few references to the Soviet Union
almost exclusively concerned economic and technological cooperation. ‘In
the meetings I have held in the past few years with our friend and com-
rade, Mikhail Gorbachev,’ the possibilities for a more productive division
of labour and cooperation had been ‘ever more deeply explored’ and ‘cor-
responding steps’ had been initiated.1211
Gorbachev, in his public speech, struck fairly traditional and conserva-
tive notes. He rejected accusations that the Soviet Union had been respon-
sible for the division of Germany and Europe. He reprimanded West Ger-
many for allegedly seizing on the reforms to ‘reanimate’ dreams of a Ger-
1209 The description of events and of Gorbachev's observations and reactions accord-
ing to Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, pp. 934-35, and Falin, Politische Erinnerun-
gen, p. 484.
1210 ‘Ansprache des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staat-
srates der DDR, Erich Honecker, auf der Festveranstaltung zum 40. Jahrestag
der Gründung der DDR’, Neues Deutschland, 9 October 1989.
1211 Ibid.
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man Reich. With the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries arrayed behind
him, Gorbachev assailed demands to dismantle the Berlin wall.
We are constantly called upon to liquidate this or that division. We often have
to hear, ‘Let the USSR get rid of the Berlin wall, and then we'll believe in its
peaceful intentions.’ We don't idealize the order that has settled on Europe.
But the fact is that until now the recognition of the post-war reality has in-
sured peace on the continent. Every time the West has tried to reshape the
post-war map of Europe it has meant the worsening of the international situa-
tion.1212
In another indication of support for the GDR and of his opposition to
putting the German problem on the international agenda, he thought that
he ‘should tell our Western partners that matters relating to the German
Democratic Republic are decided not in Moscow, but in [East] Berlin’.1213
He alluded only slightly to East German problems, and this was cou-
pled with reassertion of the Soviet position of non-interference in the in-
ternal affairs of socialist countries and parties. ‘The GDR,’ he said, ‘of
course has its problems that demand solution. They arise from the internal
demands of a society moving towards new horizons and the gradual pro-
cess of modernization and renewal in which the socialist world now finds
itself.’ But, he added, the East German communists ‘will know how to
find answers to the questions on the agenda of the day in cooperation with
all the forces of society.’1214 Another mild allusion to the necessity of
change in the GDR was his remark that ‘history has its own laws of devel-
opment (zakonomernosti) and its own tempo and rhythm determined by
1212 Gorbachev’s speech at the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR in
East Berlin on 6 October 1989, ‘Prazdnik sotsializma na nemetskoi zemle.
Rech’ M.S. Gorbacheva’, Pravda, 7 October 1989.
1213 Ibid. (italics mine).
1214 Ibid. The allusion to East German problems that demanded solution had trav-
elled a strange and tortuous path through Soviet bureaucratic channels. Perhaps
unbeknownst to Gorbachev, it was suggested by a West German political leader.
Shortly prior to Gorbachev’s departure to East Berlin, Prime Minister Björn En-
gholm (SPD) of the Land Schleswig-Holstein, on a visit to Moscow had pro-
posed to CC advisor and German expert Portugalov that Gorbachev include in
his GDR anniversary speech a statement supportive of the GDR’s putative re-
formists. For reasons that are unclear, Portugalov asked Tsipko to ask
Shakhnazarov to suggest it to Gorbachev. Portugalov may already have begun
to suspect that Falin’s standing with Gorbachev had declined and that
Shakhnazarov had a better chance to win Gorbachev's ear; interview with Tsip-
ko.
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the ripening of objective and subjective factors of development. To ignore
this is to invite further problems.’1215 The potential impact of the latter al-
lusion was limited, however. Gorbachev had not referred specifically to
East Germany – his remark had prefaced the part dealing with perestroika
in the Soviet Union – and ‘ripening’ was by then a well-known Gorbache-
vian metaphor for internal inaction and external non-intervention.
The evening in Niederschönhausen presented the opportunity for walks
in the park and for Gorbachev and his delegation to review the events of
the day. The Soviet leader had been conscious of difficulties in East Ger-
many. But he had apparently underestimated the width of the gap that sep-
arated the SED from the population. ‘What shall we do?’, he asked. ‘We
can't force the people to be silent. Honecker is beside himself. If he can’t
manage to get along with his own party activists, one can well imagine the
mood among the masses. There is something we didn’t under-stand.’1216
The remarks were made to fellow party members Falin and Shakhnazarov,
who consoled themselves by thinking that Gorbachev's presence in Berlin
was a guarantee of sorts to the effect that the dissatisfaction with the
regime would not take aggressive forms and rupture the political frame-
work.1217 They also expected that the following day would bring some
‘clarification’ as to what could or should be done. If at all, such clarifica-
tion would be obtained in two meetings, the first restricted to Honecker
and Mittag on the East German side, and Gorbachev and members of his
delegation on the Soviet side,1218 the second with the entire SED Polit-
buro.
The meetings of 7 October indeed brought clarification but not of the
kind desired by the Soviet delegation. According to the East German tran-
script of the meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev, the Soviet leader
continued to take a conciliatory and deferential attitude, saying that
1215 Ibid.
1216 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 485.
1217 Ibid.
1218 Günter Mittag, Um jeden Preis (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1991), p. 18. There is,
for the present purposes, a rather inconsequential controversy as to whether Mit-
tag was present. Mittag has written: ‘I participated in both talks which Gor-
bachev conducted on 7 October in Berlin – initially with Erich Honecker and
then with the whole Politburo.’ Falin (Erinnerungen, p. 485) confirms that Mit-
tag was present at both meetings but Schabowski (Der Absturz, p. 241; Das
Politbüro, pp. 73-74), based on what he was told by a TASS correspondent, de-
nies that he was.
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what unites us today [is] not accidental but based on firm principles. Every-
thing else are specific questions. Occasionally, some problems arise about do-
mestic conditions and foreign policy. We need constant exchanges about that.
I find that to be normal. We understand each other better now than before, and
that gives us the possibility better to discharge our role and responsibility.
[We] harbour no suspicion towards other countries [and our] relations are
characterized by mutual trust. We are able to speak of mature relations be-
tween our peoples and states.1219
After this blatant misrepresentation of the actual state of affairs in Soviet-
East German relations and some platitudes about the difficulties of social-
ist transformation, Gorbachev cautiously alluded to the desirability or ex-
pediency of unspecified change in the GDR. These allusions were preced-
ed and followed by complimentary remarks about Honecker's public
speech of the preceding day. He (Gorbachev) was ‘very pleased’ with that
speech because it had ‘clearly shown the path travelled by the GDR and
very convincingly demonstrated [the GDR's] success’ and also because it
had ‘honestly and correctly stated what needed to be done’. He also want-
ed to say in a spirit of
friendship that [I] am pleased that the sights have been directed towards the
future. There is no need on a day like this to develop these ideas further but
[I] have understood this to mean that the SED will deal with [them] shortly
after the celebrations, on the road towards the Twelfth Party Congress [to be
held on 15-19 May 1990]. The fact that concerns, that had recently arisen, had
been dealt with proved the necessity and accuracy of the ideas of E. Honeck-
er. E. Honecker and the party should take the initiative lest demagogues sug-
gested other ideas. From [my] own experience [I] know that one must not be
too late.1220
The remainder of his remarks again addressed problems of transformation
in the Soviet Union.
In his reply, Honecker reiterated the themes he had struck in his official
speech about friendship between the GDR and the USSR, new life that
had sprouted from the ruins of World War II and content citizens who now
had running water, showers, and baths. He boasted yet again about East
1219 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev of 7
October 1989 in East Berlin, SED Politburo, Central Party Archives, J IV,
2/2.035/60 (direct speech, italics mine).
1220 Ibid. (indirect speech, italics mine). The Eleventh Party Congress was held in
1986. The Twelfth was originally scheduled to be take place in 1991 but, in
1989, was rescheduled to 15-19 May 1990 but because of the collapse of the
SED was never held.
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German progress in microelectronics and plants which had achieved an as-
tonishing increase in labour productivity of between 300 and 700 percent
as a result of the introduction of new technology. ‘The GDR,’ he conclud-
ed the portions of the speech dealing with internal issues, ‘is a modern in-
dustrial state with a high research potential.’
What about problems? To the extent that they existed, perhaps with the
exception of the activity of the churches, they all had an external origin.
They were due, in Honecker's view, to a sharpening of the class strug-
gle.1221 First, there were economic pressures. Chancellor Kohl had de-
clared that Bonn would extend economic assistance to the GDR only if it
embarked on reform. He (Honecker) had rejected corresponding offers be-
cause the GDR refused to accept any conditionality. Bonn and Washing-
ton, however, had a broad agenda and in their economic strategy were
concentrating their efforts on Hungary. Kohl had offered to extend a credit
of DM 500 million to that country if it opened its borders and Bush had
tied his credit offer to the election of a new party leadership in Budapest.
Second, there was the issue of open borders, a topic that Honecker had
introduced when he had explained Kohl’s credit offer. He complained that
the West German chancellor had the same aim as Reagan, who (in June
1987, at the Brandenburg Gate) had demanded not only the abolition of
borders between the GDR and the FRG but in all of Europe. The Hungari-
an border issue, he thought, was particularly complicated. Seven million
GDR citizens annually visited Czechoslovakia and many vacationers
heading for (the Black Sea coasts in) Bulgaria and Romania travelled
through Hungary. This ‘forced us temporarily to stop visa-free travel to
Czechoslovakia’.
Third, there were the military-political pressures. NATO had scheduled
manoeuvres with a planned participation of 250,000 troops. On the basis
of previous such exercises and of documents in the possession of the GDR
he was able to state that alleged ‘“erosive tendencies”’ in socialist coun-
tries were meant to serve as a pretext ‘to deal a blow to the GDR and the
USSR’.
Fourth, in line with his past complaints to Gorbachev about the unpleas-
ant necessity for GDR to defend itself on two fronts, he incongruously
agreed ‘with the CPSU that no more ground should be yielded to dema-
gogues, since such demagogues have their say in Soviet newspapers, too’.
1221 The ordering and numbering of the issues is the author's, not Honecker's.
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He also emphasized the crucial importance of strengthening the Soviet
communist party so that it could cope with the transformation process in
that country.
Finally, Honecker's exposé included some gratuitous and injurious re-
marks about supply problems in the Soviet Union. The background to the
remarks was his 28-30 June 1989 visit to Magnitogorsk, on the occasion
of the sixtieth anniversary of the city's foundation. The city administration
had invited him to take part in an excursion in order to show him some-
thing about the living conditions of the people. He himself had not accept-
ed the invitation, he said, but the comrades accompanying him had done
so. When they had returned they had reported to him what they had seen.
He then commented to Gorbachev and the members of the Soviet delega-
tion present in the meeting: ‘It [is] incomprehensible that, despite volumi-
nous production, salt, soap, flour and other things have disappeared from
the shops.’1222
There can be little doubt that the exchange was considered artificial and
unproductive by both sides. This was immediately obvious even to out-
siders. An East German television correspondent reported that she had
been asked to cover the press conference that Gorbachev and Honecker
were scheduled to hold after their meeting. However,
a press spokesman appeared and announced that there would be no briefing.
Shortly thereafter Honecker came out alone. With his hands in his pockets, he
went across the park to the Politburo meeting [with Gorbachev] that was to
become so famous later. Then Gorbachev came out, also alone. I clearly un-
derstood: This is it. There will be no perestroika in the GDR.1223
The subsequent meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev in the pres-
ence of the full and candidate members of the SED Politburo and the Sovi-
1222 Ibid., (indirect speech, italics mine). According to Falin's recollections (Politis-
che Erinnerungen, p. 486), Honecker said that ‘the shops were lacking even salt
and matches’. Falin, however, while generally rendering the content and atmo-
sphere of the meetings accurately, confuses the sequence of events. He ascribes
much of what was said in the first − more restricted − meeting, including Ho-
necker's remarks on the supply problems in Magnitogorsk, to the second ses-
sion. The transcripts of both meetings clarify that Honecker made this comment
in the restricted meeting. Falin has acknowledged that his account is based on
memory, not on notes he took.
1223 As quoted by Maksimichev, Rekviem po GDR, p. 47.
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et delegation was essentially a replay of the more restricted session.1224
But there were also some important differences. Gorbachev’s allusions to
the necessity of change in the GDR were somewhat more forceful. Ho-
necker refrained from reiterating the notion of the ‘sharpening class strug-
gle’ and chose not to repeat the review of internal problems caused by ex-
ternal interference. Gorbachev again spoke first, for a full for fifty minutes
‘in the extraordinarily appealing way so typical of him’,1225 as participants
were to state later, ‘coherently, convincingly, and emotionally’.1226 He
paid homage to the achievements of the GDR and its positive role in the
socialist community, in Europe and in the world. He complimented the
East German communists, who had given everything so that the dream of
the working class, which had inspired several generations of Germany's
working people, could assume concrete form. The SED could now justifi-
ably have a feeling of satisfaction. Turning to Soviet-East German rela-
tions, he still asserted: ‘For us, the German Democratic Republic is the
most important partner and ally. This provides the guideline in our poli-
cy.’1227 The time horizon for the continuation of a Soviet-East German
special relationship at the state and party levels had to be measured not in
years but in centuries. ‘We have talked about this [and other matters] with
Comrade Erich Honecker and realized that we are in complete agreement
[sic] as regards the assessment of processes occurring in our countries
and in the socialist world as a whole.’1228
To the participants in the meeting it looked as if there was going to be
no end to the praise of East German achievements and not even a hint to
the serious differences between the two leaders and parties. This was not
to be. By, in essence, reinterpreting Honecker's public speech, he attempt-
1224 Stenographic record (Niederschrift) of the meeting between Honecker and Gor-
bachev on 7 October 1989 in East Berlin, SED Politburo, Central Party
Archives, J IV, 2/2.035/60. The meeting lasted from 1 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.
1225 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 74; id., Der Absturz, p. 241. Schabowski used
the term ‘sympathisch’ which is often erroneously rendered as ‘sympathetical-
ly’. It has, however, nothing to do with the expression of sympathy or condo-
lence and should, as here, be translated as ‘appealing’.
1226 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 486.
1227 Stenographic record (Niederschrift) of the meeting between Honecker and Gor-
bachev on 7 October 1989 in East Berlin, SED Politburo, Central Party
Archives, J IV, 2/2.035/60 (italics mine).
1228 Ibid. (italics mine).
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ed to commit him and the SED leader to embark on comprehensive
change:
The question arises, of course: What next? What Comrade Erich Honecker
said in his speech [yesterday] in reply to this question naturally could not be
complete. This was, in fact, only an anniversary address, in which he ex-
pressed very important thoughts also for the long term. What was dealt with
only briefly was the necessity of further thorough and fundamental changes in
society, its basis, superstructure, and democracy, with the emphasis on a more
comprehensive inclusion of people in the processes that are occurring. I have
concluded this from the fact that work for the next Party Congress [the
Twelfth in May 1990] is in full progress – a party congress that will have to
be a turning point in the development of the country and that will have to de-
termine the perspectives of the further development of society. It was very
important for me to hear this.
There had, of course, been nothing in Honecker's public address about
fundamental change or any turning point in the development of the GDR,
and to that extent Gorbachev’s remarks, although they did not contain di-
rect criticism of the Honecker regime for its failure to outline a reform
program, can be regarded as a fairly strong appeal for change. The appeal
was strengthened by saying (as he had, indeed, several times before), that
he had ‘just told Erich Honecker that it will be easier for you to carry out
transformations because you don’t have such [high] tensions in the socio-
economic area [as we do in the Soviet Union]’. Furthermore, after a de-
tailed discussion of transformation problems in the USSR, he repeated his
philosophical statement about the necessity of change but again without
linking it to the GDR: ‘If we were to remain behind, history would punish
us immediately.’1229And later, in reference to the demise of the communist
parties in Poland and Hungary, he said: ‘If the party does not react to his-
tory, it [the party] will be condemned.’1230 He concluded his speech with
1229 ‘Wenn wir zurückbleiben, bestraft uns das Leben sofort.’ The Russian zhizn’ and
German Leben – literally ‘life’ – have been rendered here throughout as ‘histo-
ry’.
1230 Ibid. (italics mine). The aphorism of ‘Those who are late will be punished by
history’ has come to assume an almost mythical quality. This memorable phrase
came to be widely disseminated. In one form or another, Gorbachev did, indeed,
use it, both in private conversation with Honecker on more than one occasion
[Editor delete xxx] but also publicly. For instance, on 6 October 1989, at the
Memorial for the Victims of Fascism and Militarism, at the Neue Wache, in
Berlin he said: ‘I believe that dangers are lurking only for those, who do not re-
act to history. (Ich glaube, Gefahren lauern nur auf jene, die nicht auf das Leben
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an appeal and a promise: ‘We are ready to act jointly with you, to cooper-
ate. We are open to everything, without reservation.’1231
Honecker had listened to Gorbachev's speech with a ‘slightly reddish
face and, perhaps to be polite, cut a contorted smile.’1232 In a voice that
was faint but more high-pitched than usual, he expressed gratitude for
what Gorbachev had said. Without hinting at the political problems in East
Germany and the disintegrating bloc, he again lectured on the country's
achievements in microelectronics and space technology. There was now a
deafening silence in the room. Gorbachev turned around to members in his
delegation. With a forced smile and puzzled look he uttered a ‘sss’, per-
haps a short substitute for: ‘Well, comrades, that's it then. There is nothing
more to say.’1233
There was a brief exchange immediately after this meeting between
Gorbachev and Polish communist leaders Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Gen-
eral Jaruzelski. The Soviet leader told them: ‘Well, the German comrades
reagieren). In the Russian original available on Youtube, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYbDkZXoo5A. – The actual wording, however,
was not used by Gorbachev but created by the correspondents of the German
press agency (DPA) and Associated Press (AP), Jürgen Metkemeyer and Heinz
Joachim Schöttes. Gorbachev’s press spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, had ap-
peared shortly after the Gorbachev-Honecker meeting and, according to the cor-
respondents, used the dictum in some ‘complex construction’. They then made
what they considered to be the most appropriate translation which was then, at
6:30 p.m. on 7 October, carried by DPA and AP (‘Gorbatschow hat den
berühmten Satz nie gesagt’, Welt.de, 6 October 2014, http://www.welt.de/
geschichte/article132968291/Gorbatschow-hat-den-beruehmten-Satz-nie-
gesagt.html). – Gerasimov apparently liked that rendering of his statement and
used the exact wording in an interview on Radio GDR II, 19 October 1989. −
Gorbachev later denied that his remark was meant to apply to Honecker and the
GDR. When Krenz, in his capacity as new party leader, visited Moscow on 1
November 1989 to coordinate policies with the Soviet Union, he conveyed ‘cor-
dial greetings from all of the comrades of the Politburo of the CC of the SED’
and expressed gratitude for the talks he (Gorbachev) had held with the full Polit-
buro, in which ‘many things had been mentioned,’ and that this applied ‘above
all to the remark that those being late would be punished by history.’ Gorbachev
interrupted him and said that in making this remark he ‘had really talked about
himself’; transcript of the talks between Krenz and Gorbachev, SED Politburo,
Central Party Archives, IV, 2/1/704, p. 3 of the typed transcript.
1231 Stenographic record (Niederschrift) of the meeting between Honecker and Gor-
bachev on 7 October 1989.
1232 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 74.
1233 Ibid., pp. 74-75; id., Der Absturz, pp. 241-42.
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are optimists, and they have interesting concepts.’ But he failed to explain
what he meant, pointing instead to the ceiling of the room to indicate that
the Stasi had probably planted listening devices and that it would be inop-
portune to discuss matters in detail.1234 There were also brief exchanges
between Gerasimov and Schabowski, and between Falin and Krenz, in the
course of which the East Germans expressed their disappointment with
Honecker's speech and gave cryptic assurances that matters in East Ger-
many would take their inevitable course, that is, presumably, that the re-
placement of the top leader was imminent.1235 The subsequent dinner con-
firmed that Honecker was unrepentant and perhaps even determined to
embarrass and humiliate Gorbachev. The seating order at table number
one placed Gorbachev next to Ceaușescu, whom Gorbachev despised.1236
PLO leader Yasir Arafat, too, was seated at that table, as was Krenz.1237
Truth and Consequences
The visit to East Berlin made a deep and lasting impression on the Soviet
participants. Disappointment, disbelief, frustration and resignation were
their main reactions. In his memoirs, Gorbachev writes that
my careful attempts to convince [Honecker] of the necessity of not delaying
the start of reform in the country as well as in the party led to no concrete
results whatsoever. Each time, I ran into a wall of incomprehension. After our
last meeting in October 1989, when I was taking part in the celebrations of
the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, I went home in a particu-
larly uneasy frame of mind. It was painfully obvious that the country resem-
bled nothing so much as a simmering kettle with a tightly shut lid.1238
On separate occasions, he told Krenz and Kochemasov that talking to Ho-
necker and the Politburo had been like ‘throwing peas against a brick
wall’.1239 To Willy Brandt he confessed: ‘I returned from the GDR wor-
1234 Polityka (Warsaw), No. 16, 18 April 1992.
1235 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 77; Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 487.
1236 See xxx p. 337.
1237 Interview with Krenz.
1238 Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, p. 711.
1239 Transcript of the meeting between Krenz and Gorbachev in Moscow, 1 Novem-
ber 1989, SED Politburo, Central Party Archives, IV 2/1/704, p. 39 of the typed
transcript (italics mine); Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 111. In keep-
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ried and alarmed.’1240 ‘If it still needed confirmation’, Gerasimov ob-
served, ‘Gorbachev now knew that there was never going to be any far-
reaching reform in the GDR under Honecker.’1241 Similarly, Falin and
Shakhnazarov concluded that ‘the days of the Honecker regime are num-
bered’.1242 They were indeed. Honecker was forced to step down from of-
fice just ten days after Gorbachev had departed from East Berlin. But how
is one to evaluate Gorbachev's behaviour? What was his contribution to
Honecker's downfall?
Upon his return to Moscow, at the airport, Gorbachev remarked to
members of the Politburo that, in front of the rostrum at the Platz der Re-
publik, groups of young people had marched by, protesting against Ho-
necker and the SED leadership, and claimed that he had turned to Honeck-
er and said: ‘You won't be able to stay [in power] unless you start reforms
immediately.’1243 Two questions arose from these remarks for the Soviet
ambassador in East Berlin:
First, why didn't Gorbachev speak about this during his meeting with the
members of the leadership of the CC of the SED on 7 October in order to but-
tress his argument with newly won impressions? Second, at our get-together
in the palace [Niederschönhausen] in the evening of 6 October, after the torch
light procession of youth, Gorbachev didn't mention anything about such ob-
servations. On the contrary, he spoke of an impressive manifestation. Where,
then, lies the truth?1244
The truth is most likely to be found in Gorbachev’s continuing approach
of persuasion and restraint. The peas he threw at Honecker were of the
mushy and overcooked variety. Despite the fact that his remarks in the 7
October meetings about the necessity of change and about history being a
stern judge were stronger than what he had ever stated before, they were
made only after he had let Honecker throw sticks and stones at him for
several years. Furthermore, nothing has come to light and no one in Gor-
bachev's entourage has ever suggested that he ever directly raised the sub-
ing with the appropriate English idiom, I have added the ‘brick’ to the ‘wall’ of
the transcript and Kochemasov’s report.
1240 Transcript of meeting between Brandt and Gorbachev, Moscow, 17 October
1989, M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Iz Arkhiva Gorbacheva: M. S. Gorbachev – W.
Brandt’, Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 17 (November 1992), p. 27 (italics mine).
1241 Interview with Gerasimov.
1242 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 487.
1243 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 113.
1244 Ibid.
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ject of reform and the kinds of reform supposedly necessary with Honeck-
er; that he at any time advised him to step down if he were unwilling to
comply with his suggestions; and that he was actively encouraging or au-
thorizing anyone in the East German leadership or in the Soviet imperial
establishment in the GDR to seek ways to replace Honecker.
A good case can be made for the argument that, if Gorbachev had want-
ed to maintain some semblance of cohesion and commonality in the ‘so-
cialist community’, he now needed to interfere more vigorously on behalf
of processes of change in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and
that it was simply not enough to try through pleading and persuasion to
change Honecker’s siege and bunker mentality and the policies conducted
on that basis. One of the possible ways to bring pressure to bear on Ho-
necker would have been a public campaign. But there was none. Soviet re-
ports on the anniversary did not even hint at any dissonance. They failed
to mention the demonstrations against the SED regime. They trumpeted
utterly false notes such as ‘the historic anniversary of the German socialist
state’ had proceeded ‘in an atmosphere of optimism’.1245 Those who had
seen the torch light procession on 6 October had realized that East German
youth had ‘taken over the banner of socialism and peace on German soil
from the older generation and were carrying it forward into future
decades’. The military parade on the following day had emphasized that
‘the GDR remains a reliable member of the Warsaw alliance’.1246
As noted above in reference to the KGB and its Luch operation, there
was also no coordinated and consistent attempt at rearing a party faction in
the SED that Moscow could have relied upon to remove the recalcitrant
party leader from office. Schabowski has acknowledged: ‘The Soviet am-
bassador was not, as he would have been in former times, allowed to inter-
fere.’ When Walter Ulbricht was forced to resign, ‘everything was dis-
cussed in Moscow. But now there was no Brezhnev Doctrine.’1247 Gor-
bachev confirmed publicly on 6 October and reiterated privately to Krenz
on 1 November that ‘matters relating to the German Democratic Republic
1245 S. Baigarov, B. Ovchinnikov, and M. Podkliuchnikov, ‘Nash orientir ‑ druzhba’,
Pravda, 8 October 1989; similarly their earlier report, ‘Znamia truda i mira.
Spetsial’nye korrespondenty “Pravdy” peredaiut iz Berlina’, Pravda, 6 October
1989.
1246 Ibid., the special correspondents’ report of 7 October, Pravda, 8 October 1989.
1247 Schabowski interview with Serge Schmemann, New York Times, 17 October
1989.
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are decided not in Moscow, but in Berlin.’1248 It may be credible, as Krenz
has said, that Gorbachev’s parting remark at the Schönefeld airport to a
small group of ‘trusted East German comrades’ had been ‘deistvuite’ (take
action), but it would be quite erroneous to draw from this the conclusion
that Gorbachev had thereby given an opposition faction in the party a sig-
nal to act.1249 Schabowski calls such ideas ‘simply a pathetic myth’.1250
The Soviet party leader could not in the least have considered ‘Politburo
members Mittag and Axen, who were also at the airport’, to ‘have been
possible conspirators’ against Honecker.1251 Yet if Gorbachev had wanted
to promote the removal of Honecker, his ability to do so may have been
limited but corresponding possibilities certainly existed.1252
In accordance with the inner logic of the new paradigm, he emphasized
instead the need for events to run their course. Autonomy of national deci-
sion makers, non-interference and freedom of choice were the new opera-
tional principles that he applied. As he told Krenz in Moscow, he had ‘al-
ways exercised the greatest degree of restraint towards the comrades in the
GDR’. He had, of course, known ‘very well the situation in the GDR’. But
his goal had been ‘not to let disharmony arise in the relations’ between the
CPSU and the SED. He had been patient because he ‘understood that the
[East German] party and the whole society had to mature for these
changes’.1253 Thus, in Gorbachev's design, rather than taking the initiative
himself to impose change, he left it up to the East German reformist lead-
ers to take charge. Falin put it succinctly when he told Krenz after the 7
October banquet that Gorbachev, as a guest in East Berlin, ‘has done and
said more than could be expected from a guest. Everything else now de-
pends on you’.1254 The anti-Honecker conspirators were left to their own
devices and limited to keeping Gorbachev informed of their progress.
This process began at the end of the anniversary celebrations, when
Krenz and Schabowski made some cautious attempts to convey to various
1248 The 6 October remark, as quoted xxx above , p. 497; for Gorbachev’s reiteration
of the point, see Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 366.
1249 Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, p. 96.
1250 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 77.
1251 Ibid.
1252 For details see pp. 378-79.
1253 Transcript of meeting between Gorbachev and Krenz, in Moscow, 1 November
1989, SED Politburo, Central Party Archives, J IV, 2/1/704, p. 37 of the typed
transcript (italics mine).
1254 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 487 (italics mine).
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members of the Soviet delegation, including Falin and Gerasimov, the no-
tion that some leaders in the SED top echelons were dissatisfied with Ho-
necker's disastrous course.1255 Krenz told Falin: ‘Your [party leader] has
said everything there was to say. Ours didn't understand anything.’1256 As
the details of the plan for Honecker's involuntary resignation were taking
shape, Harry Tisch, a full member of the SED Politburo and chairman of
the trade unions, who had travelled to the USSR on 16 October on a rou-
tine visit, informed Gorbachev about the planned move. The Soviet party
leader reportedly ‘took note’ of this information ‘with satisfaction and
without losing many words over it’.1257
The information was apparently not lost on Gorbachev. On the follow-
ing day, when the SED Politburo met in East Berlin to depose Honecker,
he reassured Willy Brandt (and probably also himself) that
serious changes are beginning to take place [in the GDR]. A meeting of the
[SED] Politburo will take place today to be followed by a plenary meeting of
the CC. At issue will be the [establishment of] a broad dialogue of the party
with society and the population.1258
But what were Gorbachev's options if these serious changes were not to
materialize in the East German communist party and the broad dialogue
between the SED and the population failed to occur? They would then be
quite limited. In essence, he would find himself not simply on the prover-
bial horns of a dilemma but tossed in the air by ‘history’ as if on the horns
of a bull in the streets of Pamplona. For his approach of non-interference
to work in favour of the Soviet Union and the creation of a reform social-
ist East Germany, he needed the cooperation of both the West and the pop-
ulation in the GDR. A separate reform socialist GDR, however, was nei-
ther in the interest of the West German government nor of the East Ger-
man population. This would be revealed unequivocally after the collapse
of the Berlin wall and through the official West German and popular East
German reactions to that momentous event.
1255 Schabowski, Das Politbüro, p. 77.
1256 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 487.
1257 Schabowski, Der Absturz, p. 262.
1258 Transcript of meeting between Brandt and Gorbachev in Moscow, 17 October
1989, M. S. Gorbachev, ‘Iz Arkhiva Gorbacheva: M. S. Gorbachev – W.
Brandt,’ Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 17 (November 1992), p. 28.
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Gorbachev and Krenz
With the replacement of Honecker, Gorbachev finally appeared to have
achieved a major unspoken objective: the establishment of a reform so-
cialist system under a new leader. Yet Krenz’s regime was only transition-
al and it was to last only until 3 December. In a repetition of patterns ob-
servable in many previous revolutions, he and the demoralized representa-
tives of the ancien régime were retreating step by step in front of ever
more insistent and more far-reaching demands for change. The pressures
were transported to the top like on a conveyor belt: popular opinion influ-
enced the attitudes and actions of the rank and file of the party, who in
turn exerted pressure on the top party leaders. They, like the troubled im-
perial centre, were unwilling to use force and lost control over the course
of events.
In his attempt to construct reform socialism in East Germany, Krenz
faced major problems. One was that of political legitimacy. When Ho-
necker resigned, he had suggested Krenz as his successor, thereby convey-
ing a perhaps not too erroneous notion of continuity. Krenz, after all, had
for a long time been considered Honecker's heir apparent, the Kronprinz,
or crown prince, of the regime.1259 In the perceptions of the members of
the democratic opposition, he was considered a careerist capable of mak-
ing tactical adjustments but not of carrying out strategic change. As chief
of internal security in the party, he was held responsible for many years of
repression and for having ordered the violent dissolution of the 7 October
demonstrations in East Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and other East German
cities. As head of the electoral commission, he was seen as having been
responsible for rigging the May local elections. And as head of the delega-
tion that had travelled to China after the June crackdown in Tiananmen
Square to congratulate the Chinese, he was regarded as not being averse to
a ‘Chinese solution’ in East Germany. Many observers, including mem-
bers of the SED, were appalled by his hour‑long television speech, a repe-
tition of his address to the earlier CC session, with which Krenz had begun
his rule on 18 October.1260 Matters were not helped either by the fact that
3.
1259 This problem was referred to by Schabowski as the ‘curse of the Pharao’; Sch-
abowski, Der Absturz, p. 271.
1260 Schabowski is scathing in his criticism of the speech, saying that Krenz, appear-
ing in front of millions of people in East and West Germany, ‘simply repeated
what he had told the highest party organization a few hours earlier ... as if he
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Krenz assumed all of Honecker's political functions and adorned himself
with his regalia. He allowed himself to be crowned party chief, head of
state, and chairman of the national defense council. Furthermore, several
of the discredited members of the old Politburo and the Central Committee
apparatus, including Horst Dohlus and Hans-Joachim Böhme, some the
most pliant of the Honecker leadership, were reappointed to their pos-
itions.1261
It was obvious that the CC, as it was then constituted, was unwilling
and incapable of confessing to the fundamental errors of the past and
meeting the new challenges. Furthermore, an internal Politburo report
(compiled by Dohlus) still observed with opprobrium that the Neue Forum
was continuing ‘to develop broad activity in all social areas’ and that the
church institutions were continuing ‘to serve the opposition forces in their
activity’.1262 At the same time, the report was optimistic that the ground
could be cut from under the opposition movement and that a greater de-
gree of trust could be established between the SED and the population if
the party entered upon the road to democratization and openness jointly
with Gorbachev. In implementation of the report, the Politburo decided to
permit again the sale of Sputnik magazine. On 1 November it also re-
opened the borders with Czechoslovakia and three days later announced
that its citizens would be allowed to leave through Czechoslovakia upon
simple presentation of personal identity cards. This had the immediate
and, from the SED’s viewpoint, disastrous effect that over the weekend
was speaking in front of a gigantically enlarged Central Committee’; Schabows-
ki, Der Absturz, p. 272. In fairness, however, many parts of the speech were not
couched in the party jargon; see Wolfgang Oschlies, ‘Egon Krenz: “Mut zur
Wahrheit”: Sprachliche Anmerkungen zur Antrittsrede des neuen SED-Chefs’,
Gelesen, kommentiert (Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und interna-
tionale Studien), No. 19, 19 October 1989.
1261 The mixture of the old and the new and differences over how to deal with the
mounting problems in East Germany were evident also in the fact that the East
German security agencies were still plotting and scheming to carry out all sorts
of, as they called it, Measures for the Prevention of the Further Formation and
for the Roll Back of Anti-Socialist Movements; heading of an agenda item pre-
pared by Mielke and others for the SED Politburo session of 24 October 1989,
SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3250.
1262 Information Concerning the Current Political Situation after the Ninth Meeting
of the Central Committee of the SED, internal paper for the SED Politburo ses-
sion of 23 October 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2A/3250.
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when the announcement was made a record 23,500 East Germans left for
West Germany. This was a higher rate of emigration than during the peak
periods in August 1961, when East Germany had closed the borders and
built the wall.1263
Another record was broken on 4 November. The largest demonstrations
in the GDR since 1953, with about half a million people participating in
the event, took place on Berlin's Alexanderplatz. For many participants the
demonstrations were a moving experience. Organized by the opposition
movement, the speakers included dissidents of dubious political convic-
tion, such as Markus Wolf, the former intelligence chief, and trial lawyer
Gregor Gysi, later to become head of the PDS, the renamed SED.1264
None of the speakers’ placards and banners called for reunification as yet.
The demands were for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom
of travel, and accountability of government officials. The volonté général
(‘We are the people!’) was set against the no longer credible claim of the
party to be the people's vanguard. Clearly, the framework for the changes
envisaged was a socialist East Germany with a human face. In fact, the
representatives of the Neue Forum and other alternative and opposition
forces in East Germany now began to call more persistently and vigorous-
ly on their compatriots to remain in their own country rather than look for
a brighter future in West Germany.
Among many other inalienable conditions, Soviet support for the re-
form socialist experiment was seen as crucial by the new regime. This was
evident in the internal report for the Politburo meeting of 23 October
which had asserted that ‘the telephone conversation between Comrades
Egon Krenz and Mikhail Gorbachev [see below] elicited great satisfaction
among the population’ and that the citizenry was ‘looking forward to the
imminent visit by Comrade Krenz in Moscow’, a forthcoming event that
they ‘understood to be significant for the closing of ranks between the
SED and the CPSU’.1265 It was indicated also by Krenz’s later statement
1263 The figures on emigration according to ADN, the East German news agency, 6
November 1989.
1264 Gysi, at the time of the demonstrations, was one of the few independent lawyers
in the GDR. In that position, he defended dissidents such as Robert Havemann,
Rudolf Bahro, Jürgen Fuchs, Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe.
1265 SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3250. The
content of the telephone conversation was reported in Neues Deutschland, 23
October 1989. Schabowski has reported that Krenz, in a Politburo meeting on
29 October, had explained that, in his first meeting as party chief with Gor-
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that he would never have accepted the job of party leader if he had not
been convinced that he would receive Gorbachev's backing.1266 On 21 Oc-
tober he called the Soviet leader and informed him about the leadership
change. In the conversation, according to Krenz, he did receive the Soviet
leader’s ‘full support’. Nothing was said that would have led him to be-
lieve that Gorbachev was ‘anything but sincere in his backing for a reform
socialist East Germany’.1267
Reports in the Soviet press also conveyed the notion that there was sup-
port in Moscow for a reform socialist East Germany. As noted in the con-
text of the October celebrations in East Berlin, the central Soviet papers
and national television had essentially failed to paint an even vaguely ac-
curate picture of Honecker and the deteriorating state of affairs in the
GDR. Now, after the leadership change, Soviet newspapers launched vitri-
olic attacks on Honecker, saying that with the help of the news media he
had erected a ‘wall of silence cut off from reality and trumpeted the
GDR’s success and the over-fulfillment of the annual plans not very differ-
ent from the way our dispatches used to be’.1268 As a complete surprise to
most Soviet readers, their newspapers now reported that, since August
alone, more than 60,000 East Germans had fled to the West. Krenz, ac-
cording to the press reports, had much to recommend him. He belonged to
a new generation of East German leaders, had visited the Soviet Union
several times in the past, spoke Russian fluently and was ready to engage
in dialogue with the democratic forces of his country.1269
In private conversation with Krenz on 1 November in Moscow, Gor-
bachev reiterated his support for Krenz. According to the transcript of the
talks, the Soviet leader took note of the fact that the East German people
and party were about to embark on fundamental reform and wished Krenz
success in this endeavour. East Germany was, after all, the Soviet Union's
bachev to take place in Moscow, he wanted to have the party's ‘blessing’ for his
policies; Schabowski, Der Absturz, p. 299.
1266 Interview with Krenz.
1267 Ibid.
1268 Trud, 22 October 1989, in an article by its correspondent in East Berlin, V.
Nikitin.
1269 Ibid.
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‘closest friend and ally’.1270 He also reflected on the importance of their
meeting:
Your visit, Comrade Krenz, so shortly after your election to the highest of-
fices of the GDR, is of extraordinary significance for mutual coordination [of
our policies] at the beginning of a new stage in our relations. The point [now]
is jointly to demonstrate that we stand together and that the development in
the Soviet Union is very close to that in the GDR and vice versa. This is also
important for the other socialist countries and for the whole world. The FRG,
too, will be interested in what it is that Gorbachev and Krenz have agreed to.
In principle, I share all the thoughts that you, Comrade Krenz, have ex-
pressed.1271
As Krenz later said, since he was concerned about East German instabili-
ties on the one hand, and the widening discussion in the West about Ger-
man unification on the other, the central purpose of his visit was to estab-
lish whether Gorbachev was still committed to the idea of the continued
existence of two German states and what role, if any, he saw for East Ger-
many in a new Europe.1272 The transcript reflects this concern. Krenz
asked his host ‘to outline more clearly the place which he [intended] to al-
locate to the FRG and the GDR in the all-European house’.1273 Gorbachev
prefaced his reply by saying that he welcomed the fact that Krenz had
raised this question and continued:
On this problem [German unity] the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the other so-
cialist countries have until now pursued a correct line. [This line] has led to
the recognition of the existence of two separate German states, to the interna-
1270 Transcript (Niederschrift) of the talks between Krenz and Gorbachev on 1
November 1989 in Moscow, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, IV 2/1/704, pp. 2-3 (indirect speech); see also the supplementary
Politburo materials on the visit, J IV 2/2/2358 and J IV 2/2A/3255. Krenz also
took notes, to which he referred in his ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Berliner
Mauer im Herbst 1989,’ Osteuropa, No. 4 (1992), pp. 365-369. All subsequent
citations from the transcript are in indirect speech (indirect speech) in the origi-
nal, rendered here for better readability in direct speech. For the same reason,
the first person singular has been used for the ‘Comrade Honecker’ and ‘Com-
rade Gorbachev’ in the original. The subsequent page numbers are those of the
typed manuscript. − Zelikow and Rice quote from an essentially identical tran-
script kept in the Bundesarchiv in Potsdam, E1-5630; see Zelikow and Rice,
Germany Unified, pp. 87-91. The reason for the existence of two versions is un-
clear.
1271 Transcript, pp. 33-34; Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 367.
1272 Interview with Krenz.
1273 Transcript, p. 19; Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 367.
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tional recognition of the GDR, to its active role in the world, to the conclusion
of the [1970] Moscow treaty as well as other treaties, and to the Helsinki con-
ference.
He then proceeded to dismiss the talk about German unification. There
was nothing to worry about. ‘There is no reason’, he told Krenz, ‘to sur-
mise how the German question will be solved some time [in the future].
The current realities have to be taken into account. This is the important
thing.’ Typically, as several times before, he left open the possibility of re-
unification at some distant time in the future:
Should the tendency of rapprochement in Europe endure for several decades
and the process of integration continue – irrespective of the social systems
and with a separate evolution of politics, culture, paths of development, and
traditions – then, perhaps, the question could be different. But this is not a
problem of current politics.1274
What is it that gave Gorbachev the confidence so close to the collapse of
the GDR and the Soviet empire to believe that the question of German
unity might ‘perhaps’ arise in ‘several decades’? Internationally, he ar-
gued, there was no support for it. It had become clear to him
in recent talks with Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, but also with
Jaruzelski and [Italian prime minister Giulio] Andreotti, that all of these polit-
ical leaders proceed from the [necessity of] safeguarding the post-war reali-
ties, including the existence of two German states. Posing the question of the
unity of Germany is regarded by all of them as extremely explosive for the
current situation. They also do not want the Warsaw Pact and NATO to be
dissolved, and it is for this reason that they are for continued membership of
Poland and Hungary in the Warsaw Pact. The balance [of power] in Europe
[they argue] should not be disturbed because no one knew what the conse-
quences might be.1275
As for the United States, he thought that they had ‘until now taken a simi-
lar position’. He reported that, in a meeting between Yakovlev and former
national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the question had been dis-
1274 Transcript, p. 24 (italics mine).
1275 Transcript, p. 20; Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 367. Gor-
bachev had expressed these views about what Western leaders really thought
about the prospect of German reunification in private conversation with Willy
Brandt, chairman of the SPD and the Socialist International; ‘Iz Arkhiva Gor-
bacheva: M.S. Gorbachev – W. Brandt’ (transcript of a meeting between Gor-
bachev and Brandt, held in Moscow on 17 October 1989), Svobodnaia mysl’,
No. 17 (November 1992), pp. 22-29.
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cussed ‘whether one could imagine a situation in which the reunification
of Germany became a reality’. Brzezinski had replied that ‘for him, this
would be a calamity’.1276 Nevertheless, Gorbachev thought that there were
‘some nuances’ in the American attitude, which still had to be examined.
This idea, however, was dismissed by Shakhnazarov, present at the meet-
ing in his capacity as Gorbachev's adviser on Eastern Europe: to the extent
that nuances existed, they were most likely designed for ‘the broad pub-
lic’.1277
The exercise in mutual reassurance continued with evidence derived
from Gorbachev’s talks with West German social democratic leaders. Gor-
bachev told Krenz that Willy Brandt, chairman of the SPD and the Social-
ist International, had said that he considered East Germany an enormous
achievement of socialism. Its disappearance would be a shocking defeat
for social democracy. Although Brandt was putting himself at a distance
from communists, he nevertheless considered social democracy a branch
of the workers’ movement and continued to adhere to the socialist idea.
Egon Bahr, chief architect of the SPD’s Ostpolitik, the Soviet leader went
on, had unequivocally made this very point.1278 Further evidence for the
vision Brandt shared with Gorbachev that most likely confirmed his (Gor-
bachev’s) perceptions on the long-term existence of two German states
was provided on 17 October, in private conversation. The SPD party chair-
man outlined the common views and interests on the German problem that
allegedly existed between Western European social democrats and social-
ists, on the one hand, and between Soviet and Eastern European reform
communists, on other. He regretted that young people were leaving the
GDR despite the ‘new self-awareness’ that was being born there. The rem-
edy he suggested was for the SED leadership ‘to begin a dialogue not only
with the bloc parties but also with society at large’.1279 Importantly, Brandt
1276 Transcript, p. 19. The East German transcript uses the term Zusammenbruch,
which could be rendered as ‘collapse’. But this could give the idea that Brzezin-
ski, as reported by Yakovlev and Gorbachev, had simply referred to the collapse
of the post-war order. But the thought to be rendered here is probably that of a
strongly undesirable development, that is, a ‘calamity,’ ‘catastrophe,’ or ‘disas-
ter’.
1277 Transcript, p. 20.
1278 Ibid.
1279 ‘Iz Arkhiva Gorbacheva: M.S. Gorbachev - W. Brandt’ (transcript of a meeting
between Gorbachev and Brandt, held in Moscow on 17 October 1989), Svobod-
naia mysl’, No. 17 (November 1992), p. 28.
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outlined an alternative to German unification in the form of increased co-
operation between West Germany and a reformed East Germany. He told
Gorbachev:
One cannot separate German from European affairs. If this is the case, and if
the rest of Europe will keep moving towards closer relations and integration,
then both German states may discover more similarities in different spheres
between themselves than with other countries. Maybe it makes sense, then, to
draw before them the perspective of getting some ‘common roof’ for cooper-
ation in those spheres.1280
It is precisely such a ‘common roof’ in the form of a community governed
by treaties across various dimensions of policy (Vertragsgemeinschaft)
that reformist GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow would propose only
several weeks later.
To return to the Krenz-Gorbachev exchanges, there is a second reason
why the Soviet leader thought that German unification was not on the in-
ternational agenda and why East Germany would and should continue to
occupy an important room in the Common House of Europe: the by now
familiar idea that democratic socialism in the GDR not only had a chance
but more of a chance in that country than elsewhere in the socialist bloc.
According to Gorbachev, this was true, in particular, because of the ‘social
orientation’ of GDR's economy – a strong asset ‘that should not be aban-
doned’. Although he considered it ‘too early’ for the SED, just a few days
after the replacement of Honecker, to present a ‘detailed plan’ of change,
he was nevertheless heartened by the fact that the ‘main directions of a
program of action have clearly been outlined – more socialism, renewal
and democratization’.1281
But what kind of socialism? If the GDR were to introduce democratic
socialism and a market economy and present a human face, what would be
the difference between such a system and the West German Sozialstaat?
Krenz, probably in contrast to Gorbachev, who never addressed this issue
publicly and (to the extent that this is known) privately, was conscious of a
basic problem. Echoing Reinhold's conviction, expressed a few months
earlier, that East Germany was thinkable only as xxx a socialist alternative
to West Germany,1282 Krenz considered de-ideologization (Entideolo-
1280 Ibid.
1281 Transcript of the Krenz-Gorbachev meeting, p. 35.
1282 xxx Otto Reinhold, Dean of the SED Central Committee’s Academy of Social
Sciences.
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gisierung) of the relations between the two German states to be a ‘very
complicated question’ and a problem ‘quite different than what is [normal]
in the relations among other states’. De-ideologization in the German-Ger-
man relationship would mean ‘abandoning the defense of socialism’ in
East Germany and would raise questions as to the rationale of the Berlin
wall and the border regime between East and West Germany.1283
Furthermore, did reform socialism in the GDR mean that the SED
should abandon its claim to the monopoly on power? Apparently not, in
Gorbachev's view. Only a few weeks earlier, he had rejected this idea. To
revert to the private conversation between him and Brandt, the latter had
asked him for advice on what he considered to be a difficult problem with
which he had been confronted:
A group of Social Democrats has been formed in the GDR. They consider
themselves not a party but an association. I don't know them personally. But I
have heard that they don’t want to be an appendage of the SED. Recently, I
received a letter from them in my capacity as chairman of the Socialist Inter-
national and was put in an awkward position. On the one hand, we can't admit
this association to the Socialist International. On the other hand, I can’t just
refuse to react to this approach.
The CPSU General Secretary replied by saying,
I would advise you, in order not to do any harm to the processes taking place
there, to wait some time and particularly now to show caution and restraint.
Later, after reassessing the situation and the on-going processes, it may be
possible to work out a reaction.1284
To return to Krenz and Gorbachev, a large part of their conversation con-
sisted of a diagnosis of East Germany's economic malaise and its political
implications. Quite in contrast to the pattern of the Honecker-Gorbachev
talks, the two leaders now soberly and at times sombrely addressed what
they acknowledged to be a precarious state of affairs – and one utterly at
variance with Gorbachev’s optimistic assessment at the meeting that, if
Honecker had adopted a reform program just ‘two or three years ago’, the
ensuing development ‘could have been the culmination of his life’.1285
Given the importance of the topic, it is appropriate to link it up with the
1283 Transcript, p. 25.
1284 Transcript of meeting between Brandt and Gorbachev, p. 28.
1285 Transcript, p. 40.
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‘debt and dependency’ problem that had plagued Soviet-East German rela-
tions in the Honecker era.1286
By 1989, the economic plight of the GDR was not only serious but des-
perate. Due to the secrecy and compartmentalization of functions endemic
to communist systems, few members even at the top echelons of the SED
were aware of this fact. The extent of the economic malaise was revealed
to them only in a watershed analysis of the economic situation of the
GDR, presented by Gerhard Schürer, the chairman of the State Planning
Commission, and one of the chief economic advisors to Honecker. The re-
port was presented to Krenz and most of the members of the SED Polit-
buro on 31 October and to the Tenth Conference of the SED Central Com-
mittee from 8 to 10 November 1989. When Krenz discussed East Ger-
many’s predicaments with Gorbachev, he was not only aware of the con-
tent of the report but several times used data it contained.1287
The Schürer report concentrated on three major deficiencies of the East
German economy: (1) the decline in the ‘rate of accumulation’ in the pro-
ductive sector from 16.1 percent in 1970 to 9.9 percent in 1988, which had
led to obsolescence of much of the industrial equipment and declining
rates of growth in national income; (2) the financing of economic growth
through external and internal credit; and (3) the inability to meet the plan-
ning targets for exports in the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan. The overall pic-
ture painted by the report was that of a society living far beyond its means.
Honecker had blatantly disregarded what he had said in 1971, that ‘our so-
ciety should never borrow more than it produces’.1288 The violation of this
1286 On the ‘debts and dependency’ issue, see xxx above, pp. 205-212, 224 and
288-89.
1287 Gerhard Schürer et al., ‘Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit
Schlussfolgerungen’, dated 27 October 1989, submitted to the Politburo for its
meeting of 31 October 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2/2356. The co-authors were Gerhard Beil, Alexander Schalck-
Golodkowski, Ernst Höfner and Arno Donda. The Politburo endorsed the report
without changes. − For a detailed discussion of the report and its repercussions,
see Hans-Hermann Hertle, ‘Staatsbankrott: Der ökonomische Untergang des
SED-Staates’, Deutschland-Archiv, Vol. 25, No. 10 (October 1992), pp.
1019-30, and his interview with Schürer, ‘“Das reale Bild war eben katas-
trophal!”: Gespräch mit Gerhard Schürer’, ibid., pp. 1031-39.
1288 Information Concerning the Current Political Situation after the Ninth Meeting
of the Central Committee of the SED, internal paper for the SED Politburo ses-
sion of 23 October 1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party
Archives, J IV 2/2a/3250.
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common economic sense was amply reflected in the data that Schürer sub-
mitted. These included a reported increase in the GDR’s indebtedness to
the ‘non-socialist world’ from 2 billion Valutamarks, or hard currency
marks, in 1970 to about 49 billion marks in 1989; the growth in the
regime's internal debt from 12 billion East German marks in 1970 to 123
billion marks in 1989; a debt-to-export ratio of 150 percent, rather than the
25 percent that Schürer considered economically sensible; subsidization of
the microelectronic industry to the tune of 3 billion East German marks
annually; and labour productivity that was 40 percent lower than in West
Germany.1289 Perhaps the most shocking revelation to the party was the re-
port’s assessment that, if merely an increase in the level of hard-currency
indebtedness was to be avoided, the rate of consumption would have to be
curtailed by 25 to 30 percent.1290
One of the many reasons for the mounting debt and economic decline
lay in the difficulties experienced by the Soviet Union, upon which the
GDR had long relied for much of its economic activity, including the im-
port of raw materials at cut rates and, early in the Honecker era, the fi-
nancing of credit. But in 1989 the Soviet Union itself was experiencing
acute financial distress and was no longer able and no longer willing to
sustain the GDR in the way to which the latter had become accustomed.
The centre was looking after its own interests rather than those of the pe-
riphery.
The political implications of the dismal economic state of affairs were
considerable. East Germany in the late Honecker era had led a kind of du-
al existence. On the one hand, it had stridently affirmed its sovereignty
and rejected any attempt, implied or explicit, by West Germany, to erode
its political or social autonomy. On the other hand, it had begun to under-
mine this very autonomy by allowing its indebtedness to Western banks
and governments to increase. The GDR, as a result, became economically
most dependent on that state from which it most wanted to remain apart.
But West Germany’s willingness to continue to finance much of the debt
in exchange for making the division of Germany less painful for the East
Germans (menschliche Erleichterungen) and a lessening of tensions be-
tween the two Germanys changed during the Krenz interregnum: it was
progressively raising the price tag for economic and financial assistance.
1289 Schürer report, pp. 4 and 10-11.
1290 Ibid., p. 11.
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Within a few days after the opening of the wall, it would no longer be con-
tent with piecemeal concessions but demand fundamental systemic
change. Given the severity of the GDR's economic problems, something
had to give, and that something would turn out to be the regime itself. In
the apt words of the analyst: ‘No other state in the world [other than West
Germany] would have been ready to relieve the GDR of its debts, and its
allies were in no position to do so. Thus, the political and economic de-
struction of the GDR was preordained.’1291
To resume the description and analysis of the private exchanges be-
tween Krenz and Gorbachev, it was Krenz who introduced the topic by
saying that the day before the SED Politburo had received and discussed
an unadulterated report of a kind that had never been submitted to that
body. He was concerned, he said, that when the report would be brought to
the attention of the Central Committee, it ‘could produce a shock with
detrimental consequences’.1292 In reply, Gorbachev claimed (not very
credibly) that
the Soviet Union has been aware of the real state of affairs in the national
economy of the GDR ... and has always endeavoured to meet its obligations
towards the GDR. Except for the fact that, due to domestic problems, 2 mil-
lion tons of projected oil deliveries had to be cancelled, [we] always under-
stood that the GDR cannot function without the Soviet Union. Such support
was the internationalist duty of the Soviet Union. At the same time, [we]
asked ourselves, why, given this state of affairs, were we constantly being
showered in such an aggressive way with GDR success stories? This was hard
to bear since [we] knew the real condition of the GDR. [I] tried once to raise
this issue with Comrade Honecker and to discuss the GDR's indebtedness.
But he strongly objected to this since such problems [supposedly] did not ex-
ist.1293
Krenz repeated (without direct attribution) some of the salient data of
Schürer's report, saying that the GDR had to pay interest in the amount of
$4.5 billion, which amounted to 62 percent of annual export revenue; that
it had to raise new credit in order to meet its credit obligations; that the
electronics industry was being subsidized with 3 billion marks per annum;
that the economy was facing new challenges; and the population had new
expectations, but if one were to match productive capacity and consump-
1291 Hertle, ‘Staatsbankrott: Der ökonomische Untergang’, p. 1019.
1292 Transcript of the Krenz-Gorbachev exchanges, pp. 9-10.
1293 Ibid., p. 10. Gorbachev may have alluded to his talks with Honecker on 20 April
1986 in East Berlin; see xxx above , pp. 244-45.
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tion, the standard of living would have ‘to be lowered immediately by 30
percent’.1294 At one point during Krenz's presentation of economic data,
Gorbachev interjected and admitted that he had ‘not imagined the situation
to be that precarious’.1295
What, then, was to be done? What policies should be adopted, individu-
ally and jointly, to meet the precarious situation? Even a benevolently in-
clined reader of the record can only conclude that the Krenz-Gorbachev
policy prescriptions fail to add up to a coherent plan of action. They con-
stitute instead a hodgepodge of inadequate measures, obsolete remedies,
contradictory preferences and vague commitments.1296 A first set of mea-
sures discussed concerned economic assistance. If East Germany was to
survive as a state, let alone be transformed into a showcase of reform so-
cialism, a massive rescue operation was immediately required. But the So-
viet Union was neither prepared nor able even to begin thinking about
such an operation. At one point, after having admitted earlier that, for do-
mestic reasons, the USSR had to cut oil deliveries to the GDR by 2 mil-
lion tons (see above), Gorbachev assured Krenz that ‘things would remain
unchanged [sic], that the GDR would [continue to] receive raw materials
from the Soviet Union’.1297 At another point, he promised that the Soviet
Union ‘will do everything in order to meet the obligations it has assumed’
but acknowledged that this would only ‘alleviate the situation in the GDR
somewhat’.1298 It is only in relation to the socialist bloc as a whole and
Polish indebtedness to the West in particular that Gorbachev realistically
1294 Transcript, pp. 9-10, 13-16.
1295 Transcript, p. 15. The transcript of the Krenz-Gorbachev talks in the Bunde-
sarchiv in Potsdam (document E1-56320) states that the East German leader put
the projected GDR debt at the end of 1989 at $26.5 billion and the estimated
current account deficit at $21.1 billion. The note taker recorded: ‘Astonished,
Comrade Gorbachev asked whether these numbers are correct.’ For a summary
of the talks, including the above citation, see Zelikow and Rice Germany Uni-
fied, p. 87.
1296 This author, therefore, disagrees with Zelikow and Rice, who write that ‘Krenz
and Gorbachev had agreed on a detailed plan of action’; ibid., p. 91.
1297 Transcript, pp. 10 and 22. The reality was, however, that – as Schürer had re-
vealed in an earlier report (May 1989) – it had not been ‘possible to conclude an
agreement in the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan ... for the delivery of certain raw
materials [from the USSR], such as lead, zinc, apatite concentrate, ammonium
phosphate and ...’; cited in Hertle, ‘“Das reale Bild war eben katastrophal”’, p.
1034.
1298 Transcript, p. 17.
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and unequivocally stated: ‘The question is often posed what the Soviet
Union can do in this situation. Economically, it can do very little.’1299
A second circle of problems touched upon several times in the conver-
sation were the relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany.
The record clearly reveals, as the Germans would say, Ratlosigkeit, or not
knowing what to do. At one point in the talks, Gorbachev suggested that
Moscow should seek to ‘bind the partner FRG more closely’ to the Soviet
Union because this would give East Germany a better position in the ‘tri-
angular relationship USSR-GDR-FRG’.1300 At another, he thought that
‘now is the time to exert more pressure on Chancellor Kohl’, presumably
for the reason that ‘there are people in the governing parties who would
like to get rid of Kohl’, despite the fact (presumably advantageous for him
in the CDU) that he had ‘put his money on the nationalism horse’.1301 And
at yet another point, he declared that it was important to continue ‘the
principled and flexible policy’ and to make sure that West Germany would
‘not be able to exert pressure on the GDR through the known [economic
and financial] mechanisms’.1302
A third set of policies discussed concerned the relationship between the
two Germanys. Both leaders were acutely aware of and anxious about
West German attempts to use economic leverage for political purposes but
also conscious of the fact that East Germany now needed West German fi-
nancial assistance more than ever. Furthermore, curtailment of the links
between the two German states would have contradicted Gorbachev’s
New Thinking and his concept of the Common House of Europe. He
therefore acknowledged that ‘manifold human contacts exist between the
two German states’; that ‘it would be detrimental to reduce the relations
between the GDR and the FRG or even to rupture them’; and that it was
‘important for the GDR to maintain and further develop its relations with
the GDR’.1303 Yet at the same time, the contacts had to ‘be kept under con-
trol and managed’ and it was necessary ‘to exercise caution so that the
ideological opponent would not gain positions that he could exploit’.1304
1299 Transcript, p. 23 (italics mine). ‘It is absurd to imagine,’ Gorbachev continued,
‘that the Soviet Union could subsidize 40 million Poles.’
1300 Transcript, p. 22.
1301 Transcript, pp. 22, 25.
1302 Transcript, p. 17.
1303 Transcript, pp. 21, 22.
1304 Transcript, p. 21.
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A fourth set of measures dealt with the political dimensions of Soviet-
East German cooperation. As previously in his private talks with Honeck-
er, Gorbachev pleaded for more coordination and less secrecy. He also
made it clear that he considered the party to be the main agent of change –
a surprising and incongruous idea considering his own disappointments
with the CPSU, his move away from that institution to an executive presi-
dency and the fact that East Germany was not Hungary or Poland, that is,
that the SED had neither a strong tradition nor a significant reservoir of
reform socialism. Nevertheless, he advised Krenz to do what essentially
amounted to copying major elements of the October 1988 CPSU reform:
to replace party cadres at the forth-coming SED Central Committee
plenum and to ‘elect some smart and original people from the CC to the
Politburo as well as prominent representatives from the cultural and scien-
tific community to the Central Committee. That would improve the pres-
tige of these bodies.’ At the plenum ‘one could certainly continue to de-
fend Honecker’ although it was ‘doubtful whether this would still be pos-
sible in relation to society’. He agreed with Krenz that Soviet-East Ger-
man cooperation should now ‘be brought more strongly under the control
of the parties’; that the ‘exchange of experience should be intensified be-
tween the departments of the Central Committees’; and that the same ap-
plied to contacts between ‘the CC secretaries’.1305
Fifth, the new East German leader provided his Soviet counterpart with
information about some measures that had been taken and were being pre-
pared in East Germany itself. The use of weapons at the borders to prevent
would-be refugees from escaping would be stopped, Krenz told Gor-
bachev. The border troops had been instructed accordingly. The travel and
emigration regime would be liberalized. Since this issue was the most im-
portant change coveted by the East German population and the most vex-
ing for the SED and was to become a bone of contention between Moscow
and East Berlin only a few days later, it is appropriate to quote Krenz in
full:
The draft of the new Law on Travel (Reisegesetz) has been adopted in the
Politburo and has been passed on to the Council of Ministers, which will put
it up for public discussion. It is scheduled to be adopted by the Volkskammer
[parliament] before Christmas. Each GDR citizen, according to the law, will
have the possibility to acquire a passport and an exit visa for travel to all
1305 Transcript, pp. 35-36.
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countries. The circle of those exempted from this [new rule] will be kept very
small.
Krenz also mentioned that the GDR was not in a position to supply those
who wanted to travel abroad with hard-currency funds. All of this would
be made public.1306
In conclusion, a careful reading of the record of the conversation re-
veals not only an astonishing amount of wishful thinking and uncertainty
about what to do next but also serious concern about future developments.
Speaking about the mass demonstrations in the GDR, Krenz said that the
party leadership would use political means to solve political problems.
The demonstrations would be legalized and the police would not inter-
vene. But he also acknowledged that ‘the situation is developing according
to its own dynamics’.1307 Gorbachev had similar concerns:
The processes now develop very dynamically and could further accelerate.
The leadership of the party must react accordingly. If the processes were to
gain in spontaneity or lose their political orientation, this would be a disaster.
An unmanageable situation could thereby arise.
Gorbachev added that he had seen this happening in the Soviet Union.1308
Concern about the likely course of events was evident also among his ad-
visers.1309 Chernyaev, for instance, remembers that, as Krenz’s plane was
leaving Moscow, several officials joked ominously: ‘There goes the com-
mittee for the dissolution of the GDR.’1310
Such comments raise the question as to whether Krenz really had Gor-
bachev’s backing or whether he and the germanisty advising him would
have preferred someone like Modrow, with better reform socialist creden-
tials, to be at the helm in East Germany. As for these credentials, Modrow
had become chief of the regional party organization in Dresden in 1973
and almost immediately had gained respect and trust among party reform-
ers and the population by his self-confidence, relaxed style and openness
to discussion and new ideas. For instance, in interviews prior to his nomi-
nation to full Politburo membership on 3 November and to prime minister
on 8 November, he had described the country as ‘ruined’ and said that,
1306 Transcript, pp. 25-26.
1307 Transcript, p. 29.
1308 Transcript, p. 34.
1309 Interviews with Shakhnazarov and Grigoriev.
1310 Rice interview with Chernyaev, Moscow, June 1994, as quoted by Zelikow and
Rice, Germany Unified, p. 91.
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without new leaders, East Germany would be ‘lost’. Not surprisingly, in
East Germany and abroad he was often described as a possible ‘East Ger-
man Gorbachev’.1311 Krenz, in contrast, upon his appointment to the top
leadership positions in the GDR – and in conformity with a pattern typical
of many revolutions, where conservative reformers had first been replaced
by more radical figures and then by revolutionaries – was widely consid-
ered a transitional figure.1312
In Gorbachev's talks with Krenz, there is a slight hint to the former's
preferences. The Soviet party leader regretted that Honecker had ‘blindly
supported Comrade Mittag’ and that he had humiliated and failed to con-
sult with other SED leaders. Gorbachev had been struck ‘especially nega-
tively’ by how Modrow had been dealt with.1313 Furthermore, almost im-
mediately after Krenz had taken office, Ambassador Kvitsinksy confiden-
tially conveyed Moscow's preference for Modrow to a high-ranking offi-
cial in the West German government.1314 On 21 November, Portugalov
mentioned to Teltschik that he doubted whether Krenz would outlast the
next SED Party Congress and that Modrow would be his successor in the
position of party leader.1315 But while it is appropriate to infer from these
remarks that the Soviet leadership and the Kremlin's germanisty would
have preferred Modrow to Krenz as party chief, it would again be wrong
to conclude that they conspired in his replacement or, for that matter, that
they would have acted differently if Modrow had been elected party chief
by the CC in mid-October. As with Honecker, the centre dealt with who-
ever happened to be the chief paladin at the periphery of the crumbling
empire.
1311 Ferdinand Protzman, ‘From Dresden, Torchbearer for Change’, New York Times,
11 November 1989.
1312 This is, for instance, what Hungarian prime minister Németh told Kohl on 19
November in Bonn; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 155; Teltschik,
329 Tage, p. 40.
1313 Transcript, p. 11. Krenz, in response, told Gorbachev that two years earlier Ho-
necker had instructed him to intervene in controversies that had broken out in
the Dresden party district and to engineer Modrow’s replacement. Honecker’s
disapproval of Modrow is reflected also in the conclusions of an internal SED
Central Committee inquiry. The party leadership of the Dresden region, the con-
cluding report said, had allowed severe deficiencies in industry and construction
to develop and showed a lack of offensive orientation ‘in the struggle against
bourgeois and hostile (feindliche) views’; Neues Deutschland, 23 June 1989.
1314 Interviews with Kvitsinsky and Teltschik.
1315 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 44.
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
524
The Collapse of the Berlin Wall
In Moscow, Krenz had defended the wall as historically necessary, as a
‘border between two social systems, a border between two military
blocs, ... a kind of protective shield.’ He had rejected the idea to tear it
down, saying: ‘We should not live in a world of dreams.’1316 Little more
than a week later, a ‘minor error’ turned the world of dreams into reali-
ty.1317 Liberalization of travel and emigration was one of the main points
on the agenda of the new regime in East Berlin. The matter had become
more urgent, however, as a result of external pressures. On 1 November,
as mentioned, the East German government had reopened the borders with
Czechoslovakia, and three days later it announced that its citizens would
be allowed to leave through Czechoslovakia using only personal identity
cards. As in September, thousands of East Germans crowded Czechoslo-
vak roads and the West German embassy compound in Prague. On 7
November, foreign minister Fischer summoned Kochemasov and in-
formed him that the Czech leadership had requested to free it from the nui-
sance of having to deal with the East German refugees per se but also to
4.
1316 Wire reports from Moscow, 1 November 1989; David Remnick, ‘Krenz Hints at
East German Perestroika’, Washington Post, 2 November 1989.
1317 ‘Kleiner Irrtum, große Wirkung’ (Small Error, Big Repercussions) is the title of
the chapter in Krenz's book that deals with the collapse of the Berlin wall; Wenn
Mauern fallen, p. 176. Several accounts of the main actors involved in the dra-
ma have been published, making it possible to reconstruct with some confidence
the circumstances leading to the opening of the wall. The accounts include
Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, pp. 176-82; id., ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der
Mauer’, pp. 365-69; Schabowski, Der Absturz, pp. 302-11; id., Das Politbüro,
pp. 134-39; and Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, pp. pp. 184-87. − The
extent to which Soviet leaders and officials were informed about the Law on
Travel and how they reacted to the opening of the wall has best been described
by Igor Maksimychev, Kochemasov's deputy, who was privy to the exchanges
between Moscow, the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, and the East German gov-
ernment. The present account draws extensively on Maksimychev’s testimony,
notably his article, with Hans-Hermann Hertle, ‘Die Maueröffnung: Eine rus-
sisch-deutsche Trilogie’, Deutschland-Archiv, Vol. 27 (November 1994), pp.
1137-58; his ‘Possible “Impossibilities”’, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6
(June 1993), pp. 108-17; ‘Krushenie. Rekviem po GDR’, in id. and Hans Mod-
row, Poslednii god GDR (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1993), pp.
9-156; and his two-part series, ‘Berlinskaia stena. Ee padenie glazami ochevidt-
sa’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 and 12 November 1993. He clarified some ambigu-
ities in an interview with me on 2 June 1993 in Moscow.
4. The Collapse of the Berlin Wall
525
prevent repercussions on the Czechoslovak population. If appropriate
measures were not taken, the Czechoslovak government would be forced
to close the borders with East Germany. Since such a turn of events, Fisch-
er continued, could have unpredictable consequences, the SED Politburo
was inclined to adopt the following decision: to formulate language in the
new version of the Law on Travel under preparation to permit East Ger-
man citizens to exit directly to West Germany. Permissible points of exit
would be certain border crossing points in East Germany and in
Czechoslovakia. Only GDR citizens who had applied for exit in East Ger-
many would be allowed to leave through Czechoslovakia in transit to West
Germany but not if they applied in Czechoslovakia. The East German for-
eign minister wanted the ambassador to ascertain the reaction of the Soviet
leadership concerning the proposed measures.
Kochemasov immediately called Shevardnadze for instructions. The re-
ply he received was that, ‘If [our] friends consider such a decision to be
feasible, there will in all likelihood be no objection.’ But he would never-
theless tell the MFA bureaucracy to formulate an answer, which would be
supplied to the East German leaders no later than 9 November. The Soviet
foreign minister also asked the embassy to formulate a position.1318 On 8
November, Kochemasov accordingly called a meeting of the leading em-
bassy staff, including KGB and GRU representatives, in which he outlined
the problem. The reaction of the participants in the meeting was unani-
mous: The GDR is a sovereign country, and the Soviet Union should not
instruct it how to act. The East German leaders possessed the most accu-
rate information on the internal political situation. They should know how
to find a way out of the crisis. But they also should bear responsibility for
the measures they adopted, not, as previously, the Soviet Union. As one of
the embassy counsellors pointed out, since the planned step de facto meant
the opening of the borders, an obviously risky step, East Berlin evidently
wanted to share responsibility with Moscow for the possible conse-
1318 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, pp. 185-86. According to Falin, another
telephone call was made by Shevardnadze's first deputy, Anatoli Kovalev. He
had called Kochemasov and, like his superior, told him that the Law on Travel
should be treated as an East German decision. The Soviet ambassador had not
considered the oral instructions to be sufficient and asked for written confirma-
tion; Falin, Erinnerungen, pp. 488-89.
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quences. The Soviet foreign ministry was informed of the embassy's
views.1319
Simultaneously with Fischer's request to the Soviet ambassador, Krenz
had instructed prime minister Willi Stoph to work on an executive decree
as the basis for a law on travel and emigration to be adopted later. (On 7
November, the government had resigned because parliament had rejected
a rather restrictive cabinet draft law on exit but it continued to handle af-
fairs until the formation of a new government.) Stoph transmitted these in-
structions to minister for state security Mielke. In the morning of 9
November, two colonels of his ministry, together with two interior min-
istry department heads, began drafting a text in accordance with the new
instructions. The limited character of the instructions was, in the Soviet
embassy’s view, confirmed by the fact that the working group did not in-
clude representatives of the East German foreign ministry’s department on
West Berlin, which, because of its special significance, had at some point
come under direct control of the head of party and state.
However, either for the reason that the drafting committee did not un-
derstand the instructions or because it deliberately chose to ignore them,
the draft prepared by the four officials was strikingly different from what
Fischer apparently had intended. The draft referred to all types of travel,
including short-term visits, and to all of East Germany’s borders, includ-
ing the borders with West Berlin. Although it is more than doubtful that
the drafting committee did not know the quadripartite status of Berlin and
the duty of East Germany to consult the Soviet embassy on all questions
affecting this status, it seems that their members failed to direct the atten-
tion of their superiors to the latitude they had allowed themselves.
Starting in the morning of 9 November, the phone connecting the Sovi-
et embassy with the East German government hardly ceased ringing. East
German foreign ministry officials requested information about Moscow’s
response. But Kochemasov could not reach anyone in the Soviet capital to
give an authoritative answer. Finally, Ivan Aboimov, deputy foreign mini-
ster and head of the MFA's department for European socialist countries –
at his own risk – instructed the ambassador to tell Krenz that Moscow had
no objections. Any other response was hardly possible. But both
1319 This account draws in particular on Maksimychev, ‘Berlinskaia stena’ and
‘Krushenie’ [Editor delete the xxx].
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Kochemasov and Aboimov naturally assumed that the East German au-
thorities would act in accordance with the intentions conveyed by Fischer.
In the meantime, a political storm had broken loose in the GDR. A
three-day plenary meeting of the SED Central Committee had begun on 8
November with the resignation of the full Politburo (practically unchanged
since Honecker had been forced to step down) and continued in an atmo-
sphere of popular distrust in the party and the new leadership. On the fol-
lowing day, shortly prior to the resumption of the CC plenum at 3:30 p.m.,
outgoing prime minister Stoph handed the draft of the new Law on Travel
to Krenz. Since the latter realized that the law was of crucial importance
for the future of the country and should not be a matter determined only
by the Politburo and the government, he decided to deviate from the agen-
da and familiarize the 213 members of the Central Committee with the
text of the draft.1320 The draft decree provided that, ‘effective immedi-
ately’, the following new ‘temporary regulations’ would apply to travel
and permanent exit abroad. (1) There would no longer by any requirement
in the process of application to present supporting documents (e.g., gov-
ernment orders for business trips, private invitations or proof of family
connections); (2) no more reliability checks would have to be performed
by the regional offices of the Volkspolizei; (3) the offices issuing the visas
had to provide the travel documents without delay (unverzüglich); and (4)
any exit point between East and West Germany, as well as East and West
Berlin, could be chosen. The new regulations, according to the draft,
would terminate the previous practice of GDR embassies to issue the ap-
propriate travel documents for permanent exit through other countries to
East German citizens possessing an identity card. In the discussion at the
Central Committee plenum, it was pointed out that the ‘temporary’ validi-
ty of the draft would lead to a flood of travel and exit applications, and
that it would be better to delete this provision. A corresponding proposal
was adopted and the draft approved without any further changes by the
Central Committee.1321
1320 Interview with Krenz. For the text of the draft as presented to the Central Com-
mittee, see Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, pp. 180-81.
1321 There is some controversy here about the extent to which the draft was dis-
cussed. Krenz conveys the notion that there was ample discussion; Krenz, Wenn
Mauern fallen, p. 181. Schabowski, based on what CC members told him,
thinks that Krenz refrained from pointing out the enormity and the likely conse-
quences of the changes that were envisaged and that he may have done so delib-
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Schabowski, the SED secretary for Berlin, had not been present at the
discussion of the draft decree. Shortly before 6 p.m. he returned to the CC
meeting, was given a copy of the draft and told by Krenz to announce the
new regulations at the 7 p.m. press conference. He was conscious of the
fact that the draft had been approved by party bodies, that is, by the Polit-
buro and the Central Committee, but not by the government (Council of
Ministers), and that his primary task was to explain the proceedings of the
CC plenary meeting. It was only at the end of the press conference that a
question was put to him concerning travel and permanent exit. Schabows-
ki explained the new provisions as best as he could, wondering, when he
came to the part of the text that dealt with the applicability of the decree to
the borders in Berlin, whether all of this had been coordinated with the So-
viet authorities. However, despite the fact that he was explaining only
draft provisions, and that cabinet approval was only pending, he an-
nounced the regulations as being ‘effective immediately’.
The combined effect of the announcement that the GDR authorities had
been instructed to issue travel and permanent exit visas without delay and
without the usual prerequisites, that the regulations also applied to the bor-
ders in Berlin and that the provisions were effective immediately pro-
pelled thousands of Berliners into action. They wanted to verify for them-
selves whether all of this could be true. Confused security guards at the
checkpoints, as a consequence, were faced with growing crowds of peo-
ple. Overwhelmed, the local commanders decided on their own simply to
open the borders. At 11 p.m. a bewildered minister of the interior ratified
the fait accompli and confirmed the commanders’ desperate decisions with
an official order.1322
erately in order not to provoke unwelcome questions or criticism by what was
still a conservative body; Schabowski, Der Absturz, p. 306. Maksimychev goes
even further (too far, in this writer's view), asserting that the draft was presented
‘during a break’ in the CC proceedings; that it was hardly discussed because
‘everyone was busy doing other things’; and that, consequently, the decision
which put an end to the Berlin wall ‘was taken hastily and as a result of several
misunderstandings’; Maksimychev in Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 November 1993.
1322 Krenz has correctly pointed out that, in the evening hours of 9 November, the
question was whether to open the borders or use military force. There was no
time left for Soviet-East German coordination and to decide which border cross-
ings were to be opened, and when. Action had to be taken swiftly in order to
avoid bloodshed and civil war. ‘I was aware of the fact that Allied interests were
touched. It was also clear to me that our unilateral action in the GDR annulled
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To return to the Soviet dimension, embassy officials in East Berlin were
unpleasantly surprised by the statements that Schabowski had made at the
press conference, above all, by the fact that the checkpoints in West Berlin
had been included as possible exit points.1323 They could not imagine that
this could have occurred without Gorbachev’s specific approval and as-
sumed that Krenz had contacted the Kremlin directly without their knowl-
edge. But doubts as to whether such approval had, in fact, been given
arose early in the morning, on 10 November, before the official beginning
of the working day at the embassy. The embassy received a call from the
MFA’s European socialist countries’ department: ‘What is happening at
the wall? The world's telegraph agencies have gone crazy.’ After having
been provided with an explanation of the events, the department followed
up with a second question: ‘Was all this discussed with us?’ Erroneously,
the Fourth Department thought that it would be easier to get an answer to
this question in East Berlin rather than in Moscow. Nevertheless, it persist-
ed in its attempts at clarification and a few minutes later the ambassador
received a request to demand explanations from Fischer, whom he imme-
diately called. The East German foreign minister, referring to apparently
more pressing business (the continuation of the SED plenary meeting) on-
ly remarked: ‘What’s the point of talking about it now?’ Unable to receive
a satisfactory reply from Fischer, the embassy called the head of the West
Berlin department at the East German foreign ministry, Walter Müller,
who provided the following explanation:
We ask you to understand that the decision taken last night on exit without
visas to West Berlin and West Germany was a forced one. Any hesitation
would have had very dangerous consequences. There was no time for consul-
tation. Today, we will directly inform Gorbachev about everything. Starting
from 8:00 this morning, the regular border crossing regime will be re-estab-
lished [sic!]. The GDR government requests the embassy to influence the oc-
the 1961 joint resolution of the member states of the Warsaw treaty on the joint
securing of borders. But in the evening of 9 November, I saw no other possibili-
ty’; Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 369. – For an excellent
reconstruction of the fall of the wall, especially the dilemma confronting the
East German borders guards, see the 2014 re-enactment produced by the First
Channel of German TV, ‘Bornholmer Straße’, Daserste.de, http://www.daser-
ste.de/unterhaltung/film/themenabend-mauerfall/film/index.html.
1323 The account on Soviet reactions to the opening of the Berlin wall is based on
Maksimychev, ‘Krushenie,’ pp. 56-59, and ‘Berlinskaia stena’, for the most part
in verbatim translation.
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cupation authorities of the three Western powers in West Berlin with the pur-
pose of maintaining public order at the wall on the West Berlin side.1324
Kochemasov also talked to Shevardnadze, who approved the position of
the embassy and said that, according to his information, ‘there appear to
be movements of the [Soviet] military [in East Germany]. It is necessary
to make sure that there is full compliance with Moscow’s instructions as to
‘No action!’” The ambassador at once contacted the chief commander of
the Soviet armed forces in East Germany and told him not to move and to
avoid contact with the German population. This occurred despite the fact
that neither the embassy nor the secret services, then or later, had any in-
formation about any action supposedly intended by the Soviet forces. She-
vardnadze's concerns were apparently more of a precautionary character.
As Müller’s communication to the Soviet embassy implied, East German
foreign ministry officials – and perhaps others in the party and security
services – thought that ‘order’ would somehow be re-established at the
crossing points. If so, these ideas turned out to be erroneous. East German
officials also requested that the Soviet embassy address the Western pow-
ers with regard to preventing attempts by West Berliners to besiege and
cross the wall without any authorization, also to no avail.1325
Krenz has asserted that he had informed Gorbachev about the GDR
government's plans for the liberalization of travel; that there had been con-
sultation and coordination on the issue; and that the Soviet leadership,
therefore, ‘could not have been surprised by the opening of the bor-
der’.1326 He also thought that Moscow was divided on the question as to
how to react to the opening of the wall. This he inferred from two tele-
phone conversations with the Soviet ambassador. The first telephone call
came shortly after 9.00 a.m. on 10 November.
Kochemasov:Comrade Krenz, Moscow is concerned about the situation at the
Berlin wall as it has developed last night.
Krenz:That surprises me. In principle, we only moved up by a couple of hours
what was scheduled for today anyway. Our foreign minister had coordinated
[in advance] the travel decrees with the Soviet side.
Kochemasov:Yes, but this is only partly true. It only applied to the opening of
border crossings to the FRG. The opening of the border in Berlin affects the
interests of the allies.
1324 Maksimychev, xxx ‘Berlinskaia stena’.
1325 Ibid. On the controversy about Soviet military intervention in the fall of 1989,
see above, xxx pp. 438-40.
1326 Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung der Mauer’, p. 368.
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Krenz:That was not my understanding of the matter. But this is now merely a
theoretical question. Life gave a different answer last night. The opening of
the border could only have been stopped by military means. That would have
caused a terrible bloodbath.
Kochemasov, according to Krenz, briefly remained silent and then re-
marked: ‘You are right. I see it the same way.’ Krenz later said that he was
‘angry about the content of the phone call. I asked myself who was play-
ing with marked cards here. On the very 9 November, it had been ex-
plained to me that the draft decrees on travel had been coordinated with
the Soviet side.’1327
Shortly before 10.00 a.m., Kochemasov called a second time. This time,
he conveyed a personal message from Gorbachev.
Kochemasov:Comrade Krenz, on behalf of Mikhail Gorbachev and on behalf
of the Soviet leadership I congratulate you and all [our] German friends on
your courageous step of opening the Berlin wall.
Krenz:I sincerely thank you and ask you to thank Mikhail Sergeevich for this
solidarity. Convey to him that we are very happy that our views coincide.1328
German Unification on the National Agenda
The process of German unification began in earnest after the collapse of
the wall, and it began immediately and spontaneously in Berlin. As a sign
of the accelerating dynamics, without consultation of the sector comman-
dants in Berlin and the inter-allied Kommandatura, the mayors of East and
West Berlin met and began discussing the practical consequences of a
now, in essence, undivided city. Students from East Berlin and East Ger-
many began enrolling in classes at universities in West Berlin; the presti-
gious West Berlin Tagesspiegel newspaper more than doubled circulation
in response to a dramatic increase in demand from East Germany and East
Berlin; West Germany’s Lufthansa and East Germany’s Interflug began
making arrangements for new routes; the Volkswagen company, without
waiting for new laws on joint ventures, prepared to build a new car with
the makers of the East German Trabant; the West German political parties
1327 Quoted by Krenz according to his personal notes of the telephone conversation
with Kochemasov on 10 November 1989; Krenz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Öffnung
der Mauer’, pp. 368-369.
1328 Ibid.
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began looking for counterparts in the East to build up party organizations;
and the harbingers of monetary integration appeared in the form of the
West German Deutschmark becoming the de facto tender among people in
East Berlin.
For the East German regime, the collapse of the wall opened a vicious
circle. Contrary to expectations, the new regulations on travel and emigra-
tion failed to stem the westward exodus of East Germans. Since May of
the year, when Budapest had begun dismantling the Iron Curtain, about
60,000 East Germans had left through Hungary. From 3 to 9 November,
about 65,000 had emigrated through Czechoslovakia. Before 9 November,
a total of 220,000 East Germans had registered in West Germany and West
Berlin. After 9 November, in less than two weeks, the number of East Ger-
mans registering to remain in West Berlin was 12,500 and, in West Ger-
many, 42,200 people.1329 As in 1953 and 1961, the majority of the emi-
grants were young and enterprising members of society, and as in the two
previous years of crisis, the downward spiral of the East German economy
was thereby accelerated. This, in turn, persuaded even more East Germans
to seek a better future in West Germany. It also changed the mood and po-
litical direction at the mass demonstrations in East Germany. On 20
November, at the demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, and oth-
er East German cities, the defiant slogan of ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (We are
the people) was being replaced by ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ (We are one people,
or one nation).1330
The fact that Kohl had abandoned the strictures of German Ostpolitik
had become obvious even before the opening of the wall. In the traditional
state of the nation address, on 8 November, he said: ‘We have less reason
than ever to be resigned to the long-term division of Germany into two
states.’ Without, at this stage, explicitly outlining how the division could
be overcome, enough was said for anyone to know the general direction:
through systemic change in East Germany. This was indicated by his calls
for an East-West German dialogue ‘with all political forces in the GDR’
and his promise of a ‘completely new dimension of our economic assis-
tance’ if the new regime in East Berlin embarked not merely on ‘cosmetic
corrections’ but instituted ‘fundamental reforms’ (grundlegende Refor-
1329 New York Times, 25 November 1989.
1330 Pond, Beyond the Wall, p. 135. The change in mood was duly noted by
Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 42. – On the failure of KGB’s Putin in Dresden to note
this change, see xxx pp. 461-62.
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men). ‘The SED,’ he said, ‘must give up its power monopoly, allow inde-
pendent parties and assure binding free elections.’1331 To the chagrin and
fury of both East German and Soviet communist party leaders, the de-
mands were repeated by Kohl in the Bundestag on 16 November and be-
came more insistent as the SED regime became more shaky and vulnera-
ble.1332 On 17 November, Prime Minister Modrow countered the German
chancellor’s demands by the announcing a program of internal reforms
and outlining a concept on the national question. He rejected as ‘unrealis-
tic, as well as dangerous, speculation about reunification’ and proposed in-
stead wide-ranging cooperation between the two German states governed
by a series of bilateral treaties – a Vertragsgemeinschaft, or treaty commu-
nity.1333
Kohl and his advisers considered it important to prevent Modrow's idea
from gaining international acceptance. Furthermore, they thought that the
time was ripe to present their ideas about the path to German unification
more clearly and comprehensively than before. Parliamentary elections
were scheduled for the following year; taking the initiative now on a vital
national issue could serve to differentiate the CDU from both the opposi-
tion Social Democrats and the junior partner in the ruling coalition, the
Liberals.1334 It was primarily the last purpose that accounted for the fact
that the initiative was being prepared in secrecy. This, in turn, had the ef-
fect of not only excluding Genscher (FDP) and the foreign ministry from
the drafting process but also of surprising West Germany's Western part-
ners and the Kremlin when the initiative was launched by the chancellor
on 28 November in a speech to the Bundestag.1335 Since his program for
1331 Text in Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestages, 8 November
1989, pp. 13010-18. For the origin of Kohl's demand for fundamental political
change in the GDR, see Pond, Beyond the Wall, p. 131.
1332 ‘Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur Lage in der DDR’, Vol. 7 (Bonn: Bun-
desverlag, 1990), pp. 412-21.
1333 Text in Neues Deutschland, 18 November 1989.
1334 The first and second of the three purposes have been described by Kohl, Ich
wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 159 and Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 46-53. The
third purpose was only hinted at by Teltschik, who has reported opinions ex-
pressed in the CDU presidium to the effect that one had to watch out that the
SPD would ‘not steal this subject’ (German unification) from the CDU; ibid., p.
53.
1335 As a tribute to the special role of and strong support extended by the United
States on the unification issue, an exception of sorts was made. Bush was in-
formed by Kohl in general terms on 17 November that an initiative would be
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
534
the achievement of German unification (Ten Point Plan) was to lead to a
major crisis of confidence in Soviet-West German relations and prompt
Gorbachev savagely to attack Genscher when he visited Moscow, it is ap-
propriate briefly to summarize it.1336
Point 1. Practical measures should be adopted to deal immediately with
some of the issues that had arisen from the opening of the wall. These in-
cluded the proposal to East Berlin to share the burden for financing the
flood of East German visitors to West Berlin and West Germany.
Point 2. There should be a significant expansion of cooperation be-
tween the two German states on economic, technological, environmental,
and cultural matters; emphasis was put on the improvement of telecommu-
nications and railway connections between the two parts of Germany.
Point 3. West German economic assistance to East Germany would be
significantly expanded if the new regime would commit itself ‘irrevoca-
bly’ to a ‘fundamental change of the political and economic system’.
Specifically, the GDR had to change its constitution, admit multiple par-
ties, introduce free elections and abandon central planning. Such demands
were described as not being preconditions (Vorbedingungen) but objec-
tively necessary so that economic aid could produce the desired effects.
Point 4 explicitly endorsed Modrow's concept of a Vertragsgemein-
schaft. This was understood by Kohl as the establishment of a close net of
contractual relations through inter-governmental cooperation, including
the forging of common institutions across all dimensions of policy. The
‘treaty community’, however, was not considered to be a goal in itself but
a transitory form of intra-German relations.
Point 5 introduced the next stage. It provided – after free elections in
East Germany – for the creation of ‘confederative structures’ between the
two German states with the ultimate goal of the creation of a federation.
Points 6-9 dealt with the international conditions necessary for the pro-
cess of German unification to succeed. These included placing the process
into the context of European integration; the opening of the European
forthcoming. The American president was also to receive the text of Kohl's
speech together with an explanation of the West German position and interests
to be considered in preparation for the Malta summit; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutsch-
lands Einheit, pp. 158 and 167-68. But this was only on 28 November, as the
Ten Point plan was announced to the Bundestag.
1336 Text in Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestages, 28 November
1989, pp. 13508-14.
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Community to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; the broaden-
ing of cooperation within the CSCE, with the possible creation of new in-
stitutions for East-West economic cooperation; and further progress in
conventional and nuclear arms control.
Point 10 merely restates the goal of the government as being reunifica-
tion, that is, the reestablishment of German unity at the state level.
The Ten Points contained little that had not been stated in Kohl’s previ-
ous two speeches to the Bundestag on 8 and 16 November. Their novelty,
as well as their impact lay in the fact that they were presented as a plan for
the achievement of German unity in several stages of development. Kohl
had refrained from indicating a time frame, saying in his introduction to
the program that ‘The road to German unification, we all know that, can-
not be planned at the drawing board or with a calendar in hand.’1337 (Pri-
vately, he thought that German unity might be achieved within five to ten
years.)1338 But the failure to consult or inform domestic and international
partners conveyed the notion that West Germany was now determined to
speed up the process towards reunification. It reinforced the concern
abroad that a unified Germany would be prone to act unilaterally; that it
would be the dominant country in Europe; and that it would return to
Great Power policies. The German problem, therefore, yet again became
the central issue on the international agenda.
German Unification on the International Agenda
The prospect of German reunification had been a topic of international
discussion in the fall of 1989. But the opening of the Berlin wall advanced
the discussion of reunification from a mere theoretical possibility to the
single most important topic on the agenda of international politics. This
was evident in the preparations for and discussions at the summit confer-
ence of the European Community leaders in Paris on 18 November; the
Soviet-American summit in Malta on 2-3 December; the summit meetings
of the two military alliances, of NATO in Brussels and of the Warsaw Pact
in Moscow, both on 4 December; the meeting between Gorbachev and
Mitterrand in Kiev on 6 December; and the summit conference of the EC's
5.
1337 In German, ‘ist nicht vom grünen Tisch oder mit einem Terminkalender in der
Hand zu planen.’
1338 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 52.
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European Council in Strasbourg on 8 December. The most important fea-
tures of these meetings and of the private exchanges between its major
participants were the reservations and hesitations by Prime Minister
Thatcher and President Mitterrand on the one hand, and the determined
drive towards the achievement of German unity by both Chancellor Kohl
and President Bush on the other.
As for the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and his supporters have argued that
– in the period from the opening of the wall on 9-10 November until the
end of January 1990 – their primary concern was not the prevention of
unification but the management of a process that could have gotten out of
control and led to unpredictable consequences. Support for this argument
could be found in the fact that Gorbachev refrained from adopting the kind
of forceful measures at the military level but also at the political and diplo-
matic level that would have been necessary to arrest the inexorable move-
ment towards German unity. The means to do so were still available to
him in the form of the presence of substantial Soviet military forces in
East Germany. But the Gorbachevian interpretation is credible only up to a
point. After all, his preferences were clear: East Germany's transformation
from a moribund, orthodox system to a viable, reform socialist country. To
that extent he was against unification. It is, therefore, not convincing to
argue that his negative attitude towards German unification was essential-
ly tactical and temporary, embarked upon under the assumption that the
GDR and with it the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe were irretrievably
lost. Until the end of 1989 it was still unclear, certainly to Gorbachev,
whether the reform experiment in the GDR would fail. If it had succeeded,
the purportedly provisional support for a reformist GDR could have lasted
a long time. It could have turned the wide-spread idea in both Eastern and
Western Europe of the 1970s and 1980s that the division of Germany was
here to stay from a possibility into reality.
In detail, as for the Soviet leadership's reactions to the opening of the
wall, it was − as on most issues demanding a radical departure − Yakovlev
who adopted the most advanced position. On 15 November, he called the
accelerating democratization movement in Eastern Europe, including the
dismantling of the Berlin wall, moves in the right direction. The Soviet
Union, he told the Japanese prime minister, would not interfere in the pro-
cesses of change. In conversation with Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)
Chairwoman Takako Doi, he went even further and said that the Soviet
Union would not interfere with moves by East and West Germany to re-
unite. ‘The decision is for the Germans themselves to make.’ He also indi-
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cated that Britain, France, and the United States were wary of reunifica-
tion and were trying to persuade the Soviet Union to slow down the pro-
cess, thereby de facto cautioning his colleagues in Moscow not to lend a
helping hand to such Western efforts.1339
Shevardnadze and the foreign ministry, in contrast, were attempting to
slow down the momentum towards German unification. In talks with
Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister, on 14 November in Moscow,
he said:
Great anxiety is caused by attempts being undertaken by certain circles in
West Germany to place the issue of reunification of Germany on today’s po-
litical agenda. What we have here is a matter that affects the vital interests of
many European countries. We are seeing a desire to question the existence of
a sovereign state, the German Democratic Republic, and also the territorial
and political structure of the continent as a whole.1340
The principal means to assure stability on the continent, in his view, was
‘the gradual rapprochement of the eastern and western parts of Euro-
pe’.1341 Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gerasimov also propagated
this line. Furthermore, he provided one of the first negative, perhaps antic-
ipatory or pre-emptive, reactions to possible changes in the alliance sys-
tems and the balance of power in Europe. ‘Politically’, he warned, ‘now is
not the time to talk about reunification. The two Germanys belong to two
different military blocs.’ It was impossible to talk realistically about reuni-
fication as long as there were ‘American, British, French, even Canadian
troops in West Germany’. Conversely, Gerasimov continued, the GDR is a
‘strategic ally’ of the Soviet Union and certainly ‘more important geo-
graphically than Hungary’. To convert the GDR into a neutral Austria was
just hypothetical. ‘Why should East Germany be considered an Austria
when this is our firm ally? The NATO forces are dangerous and to com-
pensate we should count on the Warsaw Pact.’1342
1339 ‘Soviets Won't Oppose German Reunification’, Jiji Press Ltd., Tokyo, 15
November 1989 (italics mine).
1340 Bill Keller, ‘Gorbachev Urges West to Show Restraint on Turmoil in Eastern
Europe’, New York Times, 15 November 1989.
1341 Ibid.
1342 At a press briefing in Moscow after the GDR's lifting of travel and emigration
restrictions, as quoted by Esther B. Fein, ‘The Kremlin Reacts Calmly, But Says
Border Must Stay’, New York Times, 11 November 1989, and David Remnick,
‘Soviets Warn Against Reunification’, Washington Post, 11 November 1989.
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Gorbachev shared these viewpoints. This is reflected in a plethora of
public and private statements. These included letters sent to Bush, Thatch-
er and Mitterrand on 10 November. In the letter to the American president,
he expressed the fear that ‘a chaotic situation may emerge with unforesee-
able consequences’ and warned against the danger of ‘political extremism’
in West Germany. In particular, he thought that
when statements are made in the FRG designed to stir up emotions, in the
spirit of implacable rejection of the post-war realities, that is, the existence of
two German states, then such manifestations of political extremism can only
be seen as aimed at undermining the current dynamic processes of democrati-
zation and renewal of all aspects of the society's life. And, looking ahead, this
can bring about a destabilization of the situation not only in Central Europe,
but on a larger scale.1343
The practical political consequence he derived from such dangers was to
call for the immediate convocation of a Four Power meeting.
The appeal to Four Power action and his concerns about political ex-
tremism in West Germany, however, were lacking in a telephone conver-
sation with Chancellor Kohl, on 11 November. The German chancellor, in
his rendering of its content, assured Gorbachev that the government had
no interest in chaos in the GDR; that it did not want to deplete the GDR of
its population because this would lead to severe economic problems; the
people should stay in their homeland and this they would do if conditions
in the GDR were to change fundamentally.1344 Gorbachev acknowledged
that the changes that had occurred in Eastern Europe since they had last
met (in June 1989) had been much more rapid than expected. Differences
were evolving in the speed, depth and form of the changes. As for the
GDR, it needed more time for its transformation in the direction of free-
dom, democracy and economic viability. He then continued:
Instability is inherent in any change. This is why, when I talk about maintain-
ing stability, I mean that in every respect we should take well-thought out
steps in relation to each other. Today, an historical turn is taking place towards
new relations and towards a different world. We should take care not to put
this turn at risk by awkward (neukliuzhimie) actions. I hope, Helmut, that you
will use your authority and your political weight and influence, that other po-
1343 State Department document 363047, 11 November 1989, cited by Zelikow and
Rice, Germany Unified, p. 107.
1344 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 141. Later in the conversation, Kohl
also expressed understanding for the difficulties of the new leadership in East
Berlin and acknowledged that reforms could not be achieved overnight.
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litical leaders will remain within the framework appropriate for the present
time and its demands.1345
Kohl, in Gorbachev’s version of the conversation, had replied that a cabi-
net meeting had just been concluded in Bonn and that if he (Gorbachev)
had been present, he would have realized that he would ‘probably have
been surprised by how much our assessments coincide’.1346 The congru-
ence of views, however, is not confirmed by Kohl and Teltschik. They re-
port the chancellor as having told Gorbachev that if he had been present at
the meeting, ‘you could have convinced yourself that policy on Germany
in the Federal Republic is being conducted with a sense of measure’.1347
Gorbachev, indeed, would most likely not have found a congruence of
views. Differences of perception and policy, as it turned out, remained hid-
den – despite or perhaps because of the cordiality of the conversation.
First, whereas Gorbachev had in mind stability and change towards reform
socialism in the GDR, Kohl’s vision transcended the division of Germany.
Second, whereas Gorbachev may have thought that he had received com-
mitments by the German chancellor to the effect that he would cooperate
in slowing down the momentum of change, Kohl concluded from the con-
versation that Gorbachev had agreed to let the people of the GDR decide
their own fate, irrespective of the speed of change. Third, whereas the two
leaders had indeed agreed to consult each other if required by the circum-
stances, it was unclear what such circumstances might be.
Gorbachev's reactions, furthermore, were shaped by wishful thinking
and an astounding misreading of developments. This became apparent in a
meeting on 16 November with the parliamentary leaders of West Germany
and France that lasted several hours and dealt almost exclusively with
events in Germany. There was no reason to dramatize things, Gorbachev
1345 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 164. This part of the conversation was recorded
essentially identically by Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 141-43;
Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 28, and Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym, p. 305.
1346 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 164.
1347 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 141-43; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 28.
The term used is Augenmaß. Similarly, the record of the conversation transmit-
ted to East Berlin stated only that ‘Kohl agreed with Gorbachev's point of view
[literally: Ausführungen]. According to him [Kohl] this problem was discussed
along these lines at the cabinet meeting’; Information über den Inhalt des Tele-
phongesprächs zwischen Michail Gorbatschow und Helmut Kohl, 13 November
1989, SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/
3258.
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mused. He was, of course, aware of the never-ending procession of cars
(the East German Trabants, or Trabbies) streaming across the various bor-
der checkpoints in Berlin. But this was only natural given the fact that
travel and emigration had been denied to the East Germans for such a long
time and that the decision by the new leadership in East Berlin to open the
borders had long been overdue. No state should deny rights of free move-
ment to its citizens. However, he continued, the East Germans simply
wanted to get an impression of what things were like in the West. They
were not going to turn their backs on the GDR. The novelty of their being
able to exercise new rights and the attractions of the West would wear
off.1348
The next opportunity for Gorbachev to shape the debate and decisions
on the German problem presented itself in Italy, at the end of November,
en route to the Malta summit. Soviet-American relations would obviously
be the central focus of the discussions. But Gorbachev and his entourage,
both prior to and during the summit, were very much under the impression
of the rapidly unfolding ‘velvet revolution’ in Czechoslovakia. In mid-
November, demonstrators in Prague had brutally been beaten. Undeterred,
the anti-communist opposition had formed the Civic Forum and over the
next two weeks had organized a series of mass demonstrations and strikes
that quickly swept away the orthodox communist party leadership under
Miloš Jakeš in both Eastern and Western Europe and forced the govern-
ment to agree to round-table discussions with the Civic Forum, to expunge
1348 Participants in the meeting included, in addition to Gorbachev, the presidents of
the Bundestag, Rita Süssmuth; of the Assemblée Nationale, Laurent Fabius; of
the Supreme Soviet, Anatoli Lukyanov; and of the Union Soviet, the upper
house of parliament, Yevgeni Primakov. Information on the meeting was pro-
vided to this author by Wolfgang Ischinger, present at the meeting in his capaci-
ty as German foreign service official responsible for parliamentary liaison. It is
possible that Gorbachev developed this unrealistic notion in part as a result of
his telephone conversation with Kohl on 11 November. The record of the con-
versation transmitted to East Berlin stated: ‘Chancellor [Kohl] admitted that the
majority of the GDR citizens, which had crossed the borders to the FRG did not
want to stay there permanently [and] avowed that the leadership of the FRG was
not striving for that to happen. In his words, a mass resettlement in the FRG
would be an absurd development. “We want the Germans to build their future in
their own home.”’ Information über den Inhalt des Telephongesprächs zwischen
Michail Gorbatschow und Helmut Kohl, 13 November 1989, SED Politburo,
Arbeitsprotokolle, Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2A/3258.
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the communist party's monopoly from the constitution and to embark on
comprehensive political and economic reform.
To put the events in context, Poland and Hungary were well on the road
to rejecting rather than reforming socialism. The mood in East Germany,
as noted, was changing demands for unification rapidly increasing.
Czechoslovakia was following the very same pattern observable in the
neighbouring countries, with evolution turning into revolution. It appears,
however, that Gorbachev failed to understand the inexorable drift in East-
ern Europe towards the collapse of communism. In Czechoslovakia, he
thought, the conditions for the successful introduction of reform socialism
were promising since that country was not encumbered by external debts
and, in contrast to the Soviet Union, did not suffer from food supply prob-
lems.1349 Hence, it was not only for tactical political reasons but also be-
cause of genuine conviction that, on 30 November in Rome, he publicly
dismissed the Western raptures about the alleged victory of capitalism in
the cold war as mere anti-communist propaganda and rudiments of old
thinking. Socialism was not coming to an end but taking various forms in
its further evolution. The dramatic processes of change were only now
‘unleashing the tremendous human and democratic potential inherent in
that system’. It was fitting to remember, he said, that the history of capital-
ism had encompassed many centuries and had known bloody revolutions,
terrible wars, sharp political crises and economic depressions, even fas-
cism. Socialism, contrary to that, had existed only for a few decades.1350
The implication of this defiant reaction to Western glee was obviously that
socialism in Europe had several more centuries ahead of it.
Gorbachev also outlined how the processes of change should be man-
aged. He restated his vision of the Common European Home and, in order
to strengthen pan-European cooperation, proposed to convene a summit
meeting of the leaders of the thirty-five CSCE member states (Helsinki 2),
to be held in 1990. Should the CSCE, then, be empowered to deal also
with the vexing German problem? Perhaps this was the implication of the
proposal. But Gorbachev refrained from establishing such a link.1351 In his
prepared speeches – in Rome and, on the following day, in Milan – he stu-
1349 Interview with Shakhnazarov; see also id., Tsena svobody, p. 109.
1350 Speech in Rome on 30 November, ‘Za meniaiushchiisia is stabil'nyi mir. Rech’
M.S. Gorbacheva’, Pravda, 1 December 1989.
1351 Zelikow and Rice speak of a ‘major proposal’, and they convey the notion that
Gorbachev directly linked the CSCE and the German problem; Zelikow and
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diously avoided mentioning Germany. It was only at the press conference
in Milan, and only in response to a question by an Italian journalist about
German reunification, that he repeated the familiar contradictory refrain:
history had already decided but history might decide otherwise. Political
leaders, however, should not touch the issue: ‘Today, to put the problem of
reunification on the agenda of international politics would be inappropri-
ate. Moreover, it would complicate the situation.’1352
Prior to the Soviet-American summit meeting on Malta, then, Gor-
bachev had conveyed three different notions about how he might deal with
the German problem: (1) manage the process in a Four Power framework;
(2) discuss the problem at a CSCE summit conference; and (3) do nothing.
At the summit, to the extent that there was clarification, it was that there
was no Soviet concept on how to manage the German problem and that
the third course of action, that of inaction, was the option preferred by
Gorbachev. This impression, formed by both Soviet and American partici-
pants at the summit, was reinforced by the fact that the German topic, its
central importance notwithstanding, was only one of many others dis-
cussed. These included Western versus all-human, democratic values; po-
litical developments in the Soviet Union; the situation in the Baltic
repjublics; East-West economic relations; conventional and strategic arms
control; chemical weapons; the US ‘open skies’ proposal; and regional
conflicts (Afghanistan, Central America and the Middle East).1353 In fact,
Gorbachev made a deliberate attempt to downplay the German issue. This
is also evident in his memoirs. He writes that he had told Bush that there
was too much haste in connection with the events in Germany. Reunifica-
tion was a very serious matter and hence it was necessary to act with care.
The process could perhaps not be stopped. But it should also not be artifi-
cially accelerated.1354 Bush had replied that even the most conservative
Western political leaders agreed with such an approach and that he would
Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 126-27. The former opinion is debatable but the lat-
ter is erroneous.
1352 ‘Press konferentsiia v Milane’, Pravda, 3 December 1989 (italics mine). He also
said: ‘One should not push and force processes that have not ripened.’
1353 According to the extensive account of the Malta summit in Gorbachev, Zhizn’,
Vol. 2, pp. 142-49, and id., Gody trudnykh reshenii, pp. 173-76. Other primary
sources used for this part are the accounts by Chernyaev, Shest let s Gor-
bachevym, pp. 301-10; Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplo-
mata, pp. 253-54, 259; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 630.
1354 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 146.
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‘not jump on the wall because too much is at stake in the situation’. He
(Gorbachev) had reiterated his ‘Helsinki 2’ proposal in order to deal with
a new phase in East-West relations and to turn NATO and the Warsaw Pact
into political rather than military organizations.1355 His account, as well as
that of other participants in the conference, shows that he refrained again
from establishing a direct link between this proposal and the German is-
sue. To that extent, it is fair to conclude that the most important feature of
the Malta summit lay in the absence of any decision on the German or any
other major international problem and in the congenial atmosphere of the
discussions – in mutual assurances to exercise restraint and, as secretary of
state (foreign minister) James Baker summarized, in enabling Bush and
Gorbachev ‘to establish a personal bond,’ which became critical as
‘through the spring of 1990 we worked to bring a unified Germany into
NATO.’1356
Two members of the Soviet delegation would severely criticize Gor-
bachev for this off-hand and hands-off attitude: ambassador Dobrynin and
Marshal Akhromeev. According to the former Soviet ambassador's obser-
vations, President Bush had ‘cautiously sounded out Gorbachev on reuni-
fication in casual conversation’. He (Gorbachev) had ‘responded in a gen-
eral way’ that Soviet policy was founded on adherence to an all-European
process and the construction of a Common European Home, in which the
security interests of all countries should be respected. But he had not spec-
ified how this could or should be done, although he had with him a confi-
dential MFA memorandum outlining a concrete policy: German reunifica-
tion should be the final product of a gradual transformation of the political
climate in Europe, in the course of which both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact would shift their orientation from military to political purposes and
be dissolved by mutual agreement.1357
Akhromeev was even more critical.1358 He noted that the ‘discussion of
what may very well have been the most important question at that time,
1355 Ibid.; similarly, Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 310.
1356 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 169-70.
1357 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 630. The confidential foreign ministry memoran-
dum, to which Dobrynin referred, has not been published. Nevertheless except
for the suggestion that German reunification should be the end result of the evo-
lution of the CSCE process (it is doubtful that the MFA had, in fact, put it that
way), all the other ideas were mentioned by Gorbachev.
1358 Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p. 253.
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the situation in Europe and Germany, was scheduled for the final stage of
the negotiations’. He reflected on the reason why this may have been the
case: ‘On our part, I think, this was due to the fact that our position on the
question of German unification had not yet been formulated.’1359 Little
more than a month had passed since the departure of Honecker and his
closest advisors from the leadership of the GDR, he continued. Events in
the GDR had developed rapidly, and no less rapidly was the Soviet Union
losing its influence in that country. Despite that, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev ar-
rived at the Malta meeting without a defined long-term plan for dealing
with the German problem.’1360
He thought that the absence of a Soviet position and a long-term plan
on the German problem was causing some problems for the United States
because
understanding the posture of the Soviet Union towards the emerging idea of
union between East and West Germany was one of the foremost [American]
goals of the Malta summit. Because of this, George Bush, while expressing
satisfaction as well as awe at the rapid changes taking place in the countries
of Central Europe, and in East Germany in particular, spoke of the United
States’ satisfaction with the moderation of the position of the Soviet Union
with regard to these changes. He relentlessly grilled Gorbachev as to which
position the Soviet Union would take with regard to the possible unification
of Germany. It was clear that the answer to this question would, in large part,
determine the future US policy toward the problem of German unification as
well as the relations with the Soviet Union in 1990.
Akhromeev concluded by saying that Gorbachev avoided giving a defini-
tive answer to this question and explains why.
His [Gorbachev's] reasoning stemmed from the belief that it was necessary to
resolve European problems as a whole within the framework of the Helsinki
accords of 1975, which guaranteed the sanctity of borders in Europe, includ-
ing the borders between the GDR and the FRG. He proposed, due to the fact
that the situation in Europe was unclear, to have Eduard Shevardnadze and
James Baker work on the European question more substantively and thus also
to tackle the German problem.1361
1359 Ibid. (italics mine). It is unclear what Akhromeev meant by ‘scheduled’. To the
extent that Germany was discussed at all, it was also discussed on the first day.
1360 Ibid.
1361 Ibid. To comment again on Akhromeev's portrayal, the author accurately speaks
of a general belief by Gorbachev to solve European issues in the Helsinki
framework but not of a specific corresponding proposal tied to the German
problem.
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The criticism is taken one step further in the joint analysis by Akhromeev
and Kornienko. They enumerate various opportunities missed by the for-
eign ministry and other agencies, and that these included the failure by
Gorbachev to discuss the question of Germany with Bush at the Malta
summit and shortly thereafter at the meeting with Mitterrand in Kiev. But
they consider it even more inexcusable that there was no defined Soviet
position on this topic even at the meeting with Chancellor Kohl in
Moscow in February 1990.1362
Gorbachev, Genscher, and Kohl's ‘Diktat’
It is a matter of political preference whether one should interpret Gor-
bachev’s attitude on the German problem as a deliberate policy of non-in-
terference or a deplorable lack of defined position. Whatever the prefer-
ence, on 5 December the Soviet president abruptly abandoned the philo-
sophical musing on the German issue. This occurred in talks with Gensch-
er in Moscow, described by the German foreign minister as the ‘most un-
pleasant meeting’ he had ever had with the General Secretary. ‘Never be-
fore or thereafter had I seen Gorbachev so agitated and bitter.’1363
Chernyaev has concurred, saying that the meeting ‘went far beyond the
bounds generally accepted in the relations among government leaders of
that rank’.1364 The bone of contention were Kohl’s Ten Points.
The Malta summit had presented Gorbachev with the opportunity to
discuss and, if necessary, to criticize Kohl’s initiative. Gorbachev had not
used that opportunity. This had been the case despite the fact that, as he
has written, he had considered the Ten Point plan an inappropriate re-
sponse to the requirements of the times because the impression was being
created that the German chancellor was subordinating interests of historic
significance to the exigencies of the upcoming parliamentary elections in
West Germany, an impression which Gorbachev regarded as having been
confirmed by Kohl’s failure to inform not only his European allies but also
1362 Ibid.
1363 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 684.
1364 Chernyaev, Shest‘ let s Gorbachevym, p. 308. For reasons difficult to fathom,
his account of the Gorbachev-Genscher exchanges were not included in the Ger-
man version of his memoirs.
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his own foreign minister.1365 Prior to the Gorbachev-Genscher exchanges,
the Soviet foreign minister had prepared his German counterpart for things
to come, warning him that Gorbachev was very upset and predicting that
the upcoming meeting was hardly likely to be pleasant.1366 As the meeting
was to confirm, the Soviet president was well briefed by the then still in-
fluential germanisty of the foreign ministry and the Central Commit-
tee.1367
Gorbachev welcomed Genscher, saying that events had given the visit a
particular coloration.1368 He called his guest a privileged discussion part-
ner and said that he knew him well and regarded him highly, and that it
was precisely for that reason that he felt he could speak openly and direct-
ly, and raise difficult subjects. Genscher conveyed regards from the Ger-
man president and from the chancellor, and proceeded to dwell on the
transformation that had occurred in East-West relations, the irreversibility
of the changes, and the necessity for policy-makers to proceed carefully
and responsibly. West German policy was based on the treaties concluded
with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the Basic Treaty with
East Germany, and the (June 1989) Soviet-German Joint Declaration. The
1365 Gorbachev, Zhizn‘, Vol. 2, pp. 163-64.
1366 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 683.
1367 Interview with Zagladin. Kvitsinsky remembers that, at the end of November or
the beginning of December, he had briefly been recalled from Bonn to help pre-
pare an interdepartmental paper on upcoming negotiations with the East German
government; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 17. Falin was responsible for the
Central Committee input.
1368 Present at the meeting were, on the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and
Zagladin, and, on the German side, in addition to Genscher, the foreign min-
istry's political director, Dieter Kastrup, and the head of the presidential office,
Klaus Blech. This account of the meeting is based on what is apparently a tran-
script of the meeting in possession of the Gorbachev Foundation, ‘Zapis' besedy
M.S. Gorbacheva s ministrom inostrannykh del FRG F.-D. Genscherom, 5
dekabria 1989 goda’, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 3, Zelikow-Rice Project
on German Unification; the memoirs by Gorbachev, Genscher, and Chernyaev;
and personal interviews with Zagladin and Blech. Zelikow and Rice, Germany
Unified, pp. 135-37, have aptly summarized Gorbachev's attack on Kohl's ten-
point program based on these sources, with the exception of Gorbachev's and
Genscher's memoirs, which were unavailable to the authors at the time of their
writing.
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Federal Republic was not entering upon a separate German road, he said,
but was fully integrated in the European Community.1369
Gorbachev replied that a difference needed to be made between politi-
cal philosophy and practical steps. Concerning the latter, he failed to un-
derstand Chancellor Kohl and his intentions towards East Germany as ex-
pressed in the Ten Points. ‘One has to conclude, frankly speaking, that
they are demands having the character of an ultimatum put to an indepen-
dent and sovereign German state.’ 1370 Kohl had assured him in the tele-
phone conversation (on 11 November) that he did not want to destabilize
the situation in the GDR and that he would act with circumspection and
only after consultation. Now it seemed that the German chancellor no
longer needed this understanding. ‘Perhaps he thinks that his melody, the
melody of his march, is already playing and he is already marching to it.’
There was no point to engage in diplomatic niceties. ‘If you want to coop-
erate with us, we are ready for it. If not, we will draw the appropriate con-
clusions.’1371
Gorbachev, with Shevardnadze’s vigorous support, in particular object-
ed to two points of the Ten Point program. The first was the idea of estab-
lishing a confederation. Only yesterday, he said, Kohl had asserted that
Bush supported the idea.
1369 There are two major discrepancies here between the Soviet transcript and Gen-
scher's memoirs. The first concerns the terms ‘stability’ and ‘stabilization.’
Whereas Genscher fails to mention these terms even once, the Soviet transcript
shows five usages. Genscher allegedly had spoken of West German policy as
being aimed at the (1) ‘creation of a stable framework for reform in Central and
Eastern Europe’; (2) the ‘stabilization of the situation by means of the develop-
ment of relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR; (3)
turning the Helsinki process into a ‘guarantee of stability on the continent’; (4)
‘enhancing stability in Europe and the rapprochement of its states and peoples’;
and (5) allocating a ‘stabilizing function’ to the two military alliances; ‘Zapis
besedy s Genscherom’, p. 33. The second is about German unification. Gensch-
er asserts that he had spoken of the necessity of the two states to grow together
(Zusammenwachsen) within European structures and developments; that the
Letter on German Unity (August 1970) had unambiguously posited the West
German goal as being German unification; and that Moscow could at no time
have been in doubt about this goal. Neither the transcripts nor Gorbachev's and
Chernyaev's memoirs make any reference to this.
1370 ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, p. 34. Contrary to what he was to claim later
(see infra), at least according to the transcript, Gorbachev did not explicitly use
the term diktat.
1371 ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, pp. 34-35.
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What next? What is meant by confederation? Does confederation envisage a
common defense, a common foreign policy? Where would the FRG be – in
NATO or in the Warsaw Pact? Or will it perhaps become neutral? But what
would NATO be without the FRG? And, in general, what will happen further?
Have you thought all of this through?
Shevardnadze interjected, saying that ‘Today, this style [in West German
policy] is being adopted towards the GDR, tomorrow perhaps towards
Poland and Czechoslovakia, and then – towards Austria.’1372
The second point that Gorbachev fiercely attacked, quoting verbatim
from Kohl’s speech to the Bundestag, was the idea that West Germany
would be prepared to embark on an entirely new dimension of aid if East
Germany irrevocably changed its political and economic system. This he
considered to be quite unacceptable. ‘What else is that but the most blatant
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state?’ he asked. She-
vardnadze again interjected: ‘Even Hitler didn’t permit himself this.’ Gor-
bachev resumed the attack and, among other things, called Kohl's demand
for the liquidation of the bureaucratic command economy and the opening
of its doors to Western investment ‘simply double-dyed revanchism.’1373
Gorbachev's perceptions of Kohl, it would seem, had reverted to the peri-
od from the chancellor’s Goebbels remark to the meetings of October
1988 and June 1989. In fact, the deliberate display of irritation with Kohl
and the irksome German problem found its expression in similar reactions
to the German chancellor’s attempts, for instance, in a lengthy letter of 14
December, to clarify the Ten Points and his suggestion ‘to meet soon in
the new year in an informal setting and at a place of your choosing’.1374 In
a letter of his own to Kohl, Gorbachev reiterated his position, without re-
ferring to the clarification and the invitation.1375
1372 ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, p. 34 (italics mine)..
1373 Ibid., pp. 34-35 (italics mine).
1374 Cited by Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 193-94.
1375 This was interpreted in Bonn as the letters having crossed each other; ibid., p.
209, and Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 85. Neither Kohl nor Teltschik mention the date
of Gorbachev's letter, only that they saw it on 18 December, after their return
from Hungary. However, the interpretation of the letters having crossed each
other is not very convincing: Kohl's letter was dispatched on 14 December and
he then left for a three-day visit to Hungary on 16 December. No letter had ar-
rived in Bonn before his departure. Thus, the time interval of two days should
have been sufficient time for Gorbachev in his letter at least to acknowledge re-
ceipt of the letter from Kohl.
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How is one to interpret the vehement attack on the Ten Points and the
demonstrative displeasure with Kohl? One possible explanation is that of a
spontaneous emotional outburst. It could be argued that Gorbachev was
lashing out at Genscher in frustration and anger caused by the conver-
gence of mounting political problems, deterioration of economic condi-
tions and rising nationality conflicts in the Soviet Union, and uncontrol-
lable events in Eastern Europe. As his former chief of staff has observed,
‘Gorbachev was increasingly tired and irritable during the last two years
of his tenure, losing his temper often’.1376 Such outbursts by top leaders,
furthermore, were not uncommon in the internal intercourse in the Soviet
era, and Gorbachev had permitted himself on several occasions to follow
that pattern.1377 But they were quite uncommon in talks with Western
leaders. Nevertheless, in the international domain, too, examples of exces-
sive and unreasonable behaviour by Gorbachev can be found. For in-
stance, when he and Shevardnadze had met with Canadian prime minister
Brian Mulroney in Moscow shortly prior to Kohl’s speech to the Bun-
destag the Soviet leader had accused the American ambassador in Bonn
(Vernon Walters), an outspoken supporter of German unification, of ‘act-
ing like a German Gauleiter’.1378 But whereas frustration about loss of
control domestically and internationally may have played a role in Gor-
bachev's behaviour, the outburst in conversation with Genscher was by no
means spontaneous. The Soviet leader, as noted, was not only well
briefed, quoting verbatim from the Ten Point plan, but also – judging from
Shevardnadze's advance warning to Genscher – determined to dispense
with the customary diplomatic conventions and convey a strong message.
Even if the eruption was deliberate, the question still needs to be answered
what prompted it.
One possible explanation is to be found in the Gorbachev-Kohl tele-
phone conversation of 11 November and the genuine or pretended differ-
ences in interpretation of its content. The emphasis Gorbachev chose to
put on the telephone conversation was that there was a congruence of
views and a mutual commitment to consult each other, to act responsibly,
to exercise restraint and to contribute to the stabilization of conditions in
1376 Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World, p. 262.
1377 One of the examples, Gorbachev's rude treatment of Sakharov, was mentioned
above, xxx fn. 1133.
1378 Zelikow and Rice, Germany United, p. 124, based on the memcon of a dinner
between Bush and Mulroney, 29 November 1989.
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the GDR. Kohl had concurred with the necessity to prevent chaos in East
Germany, but he had also contended that this was possible only if funda-
mental reforms were to be adopted by its new leadership.1379 To highlight
the difference of view, whereas Gorbachev wanted to stabilize the new
regime, Kohl aimed at stable conditions in East Germany under a new sys-
tem.
Another reason for the acrimonious exchanges lay in Gorbachev’s per-
ceived link between West German domestic politics and change in East
Germany. On this issue, too, he was well briefed. His attack on Genscher
is littered with references to Kohl’s initiative as having been motivated by
the upcoming parliamentary elections and as demonstrating the subordina-
tion of responsible international conduct to the electoral campaign. In allu-
sion to presumed or genuine policy differences between the CDU and the
FDP, he professed to be astonished that Genscher, not having been in-
formed of the initiative by Kohl, would act as a policy advocate for the
chancellor. The Ten Points, of course, had an important domestic political
dimension. But Gorbachev chose to disbelieve Genscher's explanation that
Kohl’s initiative had found wide-spread support not only in the Bundestag
and among the West German public but also in East Germany, and that at
issue was not the subordination of national interests to party politics but
their alignment.
Yet another reason for the fierce attack may lie in Soviet internal polit-
ics and, more broadly, future perceptions of Gorbachev’s role in history.
By December 1989, his position as master of the Kremlin notwithstand-
ing, Gorbachev had to cope with the Sorcerer's Apprentice syndrome, with
the increasing perception domestically that he had set in motion processes
that he was unable to control – an extremely dangerous image to present in
the Soviet context. The consistent pattern of non-interference was making
him vulnerable to charges of inactivity and incompetence, to the liquida-
tion of the GDR either by criminal design along the lines of Beria or,
equally damaging, by criminal neglect. Concern about such perceptions
had briefly surfaced in his remark to Mitterrand that the day Germany was
unified, ‘a Soviet marshal will be sitting in my chair’ and to Kochemasov
that ‘Our people will never forgive us if we lose the GDR.’1380
1379 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 164; ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, p. 34; Kohl,
Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 141-43.
1380 The remark to Mitterrand, as quoted by Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p.
137. The remark to Kochemasov as reported by Maximychev, ‘Possible “Impos-
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If domestic purposes were one of the factors underlying the harsh line
Gorbachev had taken with Genscher, one would expect to find indications
of such purposes in the Soviet leader’s public statements. There, a delicate
balance had to be struck. To convey the new image of being tough on
Kohl and seemingly in control of events was certainly advantageous polit-
ically but revelation of the full extent of the acrimonious exchanges with
Genscher and the intended pressures on Kohl could have reinforced rather
than mitigated domestic perceptions that his policies had been ineffective
and that he had indeed lost control – and his composure. To complicate
matters, a decision on how to proceed had to be made on the spot since
Genscher had asked him directly at the end of the meeting how both sides
should characterize the talks. The Soviet transcript and Genscher’s mem-
oirs provide different accounts of the reply. The German foreign minister’s
memoirs have Gorbachev answering that the time for making his assess-
ment public had not yet arrived.1381 According to the Soviet transcript, he
(Gorbachev) suggested specific language that recurs almost verbatim in
the subsequent TASS report. This includes the wording that the talks had
been ‘frank and comprehensive’, as well as ‘open and direct’, and that
Gorbachev had emphasized that ‘the Soviet Union considers the German
Democratic Republic a reliable ally and an important guarantor of peace
and stability in Europe and will extend to it solidarity and support’.1382
Corroborating the interpretation of domestic purposes, the ringing declara-
tion of support for East Germany was repeated by Gorbachev in a speech
to the Central Committee on 9 December. ‘We would like to emphasize
with all determination,’ he said, ‘that we will let no harm come to the
GDR. It is our strategic ally and member of the Warsaw Pact.’ To ignore
sibilities”’, pp. 112-13; similarly Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 110.
There are some discrepancies as to the date when the latter remark was made,
whether in October or November. The date, however, is immaterial. The con-
cern about the likely domestic consequences of the loss of the GDR was a con-
stant preoccupation.
1381 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 686.
1382 ‘Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva s G.-D. Genscherom’ (TASS report), Pravda, 6 De-
cember 1989, and ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, p. 36. There are only slight
variations in the wording. The TASS report uses the wording ‘direct, frank and
comprehensive’, and Gorbachev's suggested ‘true’ (vernyi) ally was turned into
a ‘reliable’ (nadezhnyi) ally.
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the realities that had developed after the Second World War carried the
risk of a ‘destabilization of Europe’.1383
A probable contributory factor for such a seemingly unequivocal com-
mitment to the GDR was the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact that had
taken place in Moscow on the preceding day and the separate talks be-
tween Gorbachev and Modrow on that occasion.1384 The composition of
the East German delegation reflected the accelerating pace of change in
East Berlin – and put the Soviet leadership in a quandary. Krenz and the
SED Politburo had been forced to resign on 3 December. Krenz was still
included in the delegation but no longer in his capacity as party chief but
as head of state and chairman of the defense council, positions from which
he would step down immediately after his return from Moscow. Thus,
pending the election of a new party leadership and program at an extraor-
dinary congress, to begin on 8 December, the SED was in a state of disar-
ray. In the circumstance, the Soviet leaders decided to treat Modrow, the
prime minister and simultaneously their preferred candidate for the top
party position, as the head of the delegation. In consequence, he rather
than Krenz was given the floor at the Warsaw Pact summit and identified
in the press as the main discussion partner in private conversation (ar-
ranged by Falin) with Gorbachev.1385
1383 Gorbachev delivered two speeches to the Central Committee, one dealing pri-
marily with domestic affairs, the other with the results of the Malta summit. The
quotation can be found in the former, ‘Vystuplenie M.S. Gorbacheva na
Plenume TsK KPSS po voprosam II S’’ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR’, Prav-
da, 10 December 1989 (italics mine). The Russian term used for ‘strategic ally’
was, as usual, strategicheskii soiuznik.
1384 In fact, as Genscher was being driven from the airport to Moscow, he saw the
caravan of vehicles with the East German delegation stopped close to the air-
port, on the opposite side of the road. Shevardnadze, apparently still involved in
the wrap-up of the Warsaw Pact summit but perhaps also as a sign of displea-
sure with the West German government, had failed to appear at the airport. In-
stead, it was Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Adamishin who had met the West
German foreign minister and who had pointed out the caravan with the East
German leadership. Genscher surmised that the vehicles had deliberately been
halted in order to preclude that he would meet, or meet with, the East German
leadership; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 682.
1385 Hans Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1991),
pp. 48, 92; id., ‘Abschied von der zweiten Heimat’, Die Zeit, 27 April 1990.
Modrow only cursorily refers to the Warsaw Pact summit and his conversations
with Gorbachev. The TASS report issued at the time was equally brief. It stated
that talks had been held on 4 December between Gorbachev and Prime Minister
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The purpose of the meeting, according to Modrow's later account, was
to discuss the character of the democratic changes in East Germany and to
coordinate Soviet-East German policies. Characterizing the meeting, Mod-
row stated that
It became apparent that Gorbachev still harboured illusions. I did not dissuade
him in this regard because I, at least in part, still believed in this idea as well:
democratization as a process that would strengthen socialism in the GDR. In-
deed I had the fear – but he had no idea – that [the process would lead] to a
gradual disintegration of socialism in the GDR. Gorbachev [however] thought
that now the path was free for perestroika in the GDR.1386
The fact that Gorbachev still harboured illusions was apparent also a few
days later, in a meeting with Mitterrand in Kiev. The Soviet leader rumi-
nated: ‘The situation in the GDR is difficult. But it is not catastrophic. The
people are working, and there are fewer demonstrations.’ Mitterrand
asked him whether he thought that the East Germans were responding
favourably to the idea of reunification. Gorbachev replied that there was
such a response. ‘However, you know, more than half of the population of
the GDR want to keep the present make-up of their country.’1387 In confor-
mity with such convictions, Gorbachev had not drawn the conclusion from
the resignation of the SED Politburo that the centre of gravity in the GDR
had irrevocably shifted away from the SED to the coalition government,
the opposition parties and the East German population. He still considered
the SED (to be renamed PDS, or Party of Democratic Socialism at the par-
ty’s upcoming extraordinary congress) to be the agent of change in East
Germany.1388 He also retained an ambiguous attitude to the ideas of Ver-
tragsgemeinschaft, confederative structures and confederation, no matter
whether in the Modrow or the Kohl versions. An interdepartmental paper,
in the drafting of which Kvitsinsky was involved, included the suggestion
Modrow, and that ‘Chairman of the State Council of the GDR E. Krenz and For-
eign Minister of the GDR O. Fischer’ had attended the meeting; Pravda, 5 De-
cember 1989.
1386 Ibid.
1387 ‘Zapis’ besedy M.S. Gorbacheva s prezidentom Frantsii F. Mitteranom, Kiev, 6
dekabria 1989 goda’, p. 39 (italics mine).
1388 The TASS report provides an indication of this belief. The report states that Gor-
bachev gave assurances that the ‘SED and our German friends can always count
on our solidarity and support by the CPSU and the whole Soviet people’ and
that he wished ‘the communists of the GDR success in the preparation of the
[extraordinary] party congress.’
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to the SED to refurbish its proposal, first made by Ulbricht in the 1950s,
of a German confederation.1389 A limited nature of intergovernmental co-
operation was envisaged by its authors. Portugalov had hinted at such pur-
poses earlier, when he had spoken of ‘federative structures in areas such as
the economy, ecology, culture, and many other things.’1390 Similarly, in his
meeting with Genscher, Gorbachev had attacked the idea of a common de-
fense and security policy of a German confederation.1391 Limited intergov-
ernmental cooperation, however, was not what the West German govern-
ment or the East German population wanted. Kvitsinsky, therefore, con-
sidered the interdepartmental paper to be dead on arrival even if it were to
receive endorsement by the Soviet Politburo, formally still empowered to
approve the draft.1392
The apparent or real abandonment of the nonchalant and noncommittal
attitude towards the erosion of imperial control and influence in East Ger-
many and Eastern Europe in December 1989 raises the question as to
whether Gorbachev was now prepared to take tough practical measures
and, if so, what options he still had available. One possible course of ac-
tion was to play on the keyboard of Western European, and particularly
British and French, concerns about the emergence of a strong Germany – a
Fourth Reich – in the centre of Europe and, for that purpose, to revive
Four Power control mechanisms.
European Concerns and the Four Power Card: Four Minus Two?
The opportunity to play the card of European apprehensions certainly ex-
isted. It presented itself not only because Kohl’s Ten Point plan had been
as much of a surprise to West Germany’s European allies as to Gorbachev
but also because it had been received by them with as much dismay. This
was evident at the summit meeting of the European Community on 8 De-
cember in Strasbourg. ‘In all the years that I had been chancellor’, Kohl
1389 Concerning the origins of the interdepartmental paper, see above, xxx pp.
556-57.
1390 Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 17 November, FBIS-
SOV-89-222, 20 November 1989, p. 34, quoted by Gedmin, The Hidden Hand,
p. 114.
1391 This was mentioned above, xxx p. 550-51; ‘Zapis’ besedy s Genscherom’, p. 34.
1392 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 17.
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was to write in retrospect, ‘I had never experienced an EC summit held in
such an icy atmosphere.’ He was taken aback about his partners’ reactions
– the ‘interrogative questioning almost resembling that of a tribunal’.1393
The primary reason underlying the dismay lay in an apparent paradox.
Western European leaders had reiterated their commitment to German re-
unification in the belief that this topic would forever remain theoretical,
while privately adhering to the view that the division of Germany served
European security interests. The latter sentiment, like the little boy's reve-
lation about the emperor’s new clothes in Andersen's fairy tale, had pub-
licly been expressed in September 1984 by Giulio Andreotti, then Italy's
foreign minister. In the context of blossoming intra-German contacts but
frigid East-West relations and prompted by the cancellation of Honecker’s
visit to West Germany, he had stated: ‘We all agree that there should be
good relations between the two Germanys ... but one should not exagger-
ate things in this direction. ... Pan-Germanism has to be overcome. There
are two German states, and two they shall remain.’ He also joked ‘I love
Germany so much that I prefer to see two of them.’1394 Unrepentant, he
later added that he didn’t understand the commotion caused by his re-
marks. He had not been the only Western leader who in the past twenty
years had objected to German reunification. ‘Who’, he asked, ‘has ever as-
serted that Ostpolitik means reunification?’1395 Unlike in the fairy tale,
however, the little boy of the twentieth-century real-life story incurred the
wrath of the emperor and was severely taken to task; his parents profusely
apologized and in the end the public reasserted that the emperor wore
clothes after all.1396 Yet despite the reassertion of reunification as an
1393 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 195.
1394 ‘Genscher: Andreotti hat die Bundesrepublik gekränkt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 17 September 1984.
1395 Ibid. Confirming Andreotti's allegation, former Austrian chancellor Bruno
Kreisky commented: ‘Mr Andreotti had the mishap to express somewhat more
clearly what everyone is thinking.’ For this quote and other European reactions
see ‘'Dem Herrn Andreotti ist es halt passiert': Wer denkt was über den Wunsch
der Deutschen nach Einheit?,’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 September
1984, and Eberhard Schulz and Peter Danylow, Bewegung in der deutschen
Frage? Die ausländischen Besorgnisse über die Entwicklung in den beiden
deutschen Staaten, 2nd ed., Research Paper No. 33, Research Institute of the
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, April 1985, pp. 164-54.
1396 The Italian ambassador in Bonn was called to the West German foreign office
for an explanation of Andreotti’s statement. In a letter to chancellor Kohl, Italian
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agreed-upon goal, European – in particular, French, Italian, and Dutch –
apprehensions had not been assuaged. This was evident at the Strasbourg
summit.
Thatcher was to take the lead in the ‘interrogation’. The German chan-
cellor thought that her negative attitude in Strasbourg, like that of many
other leaders and among the public in Britain, was predicated, at the psy-
chological and emotional level, upon ‘deep distrust’ vis-à-vis Germany
and the Germans and, at the political level, based on categories prevalent
before Churchill and on ‘nineteenth-century ‘balance of power’ thinking’.
Kohl also imputed to her the idea that Britain still played first fiddle in Eu-
rope.1397 Genscher, not usually given to dramatization, in retrospect char-
acterized Thatcher's demeanour at the meeting as ‘blustering,’ motivated,
in his view, by the fact that the prime minister only ‘hesitatingly adjusted
to the inevitability of Germany unity’.1398 But there was more to her atti-
tude than mere adjustment problems. She was not only concerned about
the speed with which German reunification was being put on the interna-
tional agenda but about the very principle. In September, returning via
Moscow from a visit to Japan, she had confided to Gorbachev that ‘al-
though NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany's as-
piration to be reunited, in practice, we were rather apprehensive.’1399 (This
echoed a statement made by French political scientist Alfred Grosser to
the effect that West Germany's Western allies were all in favor of reunifi-
cation as long as they knew that it was not a realistic prospect.1400) The
West, she had told Bush in November, should ‘respect Gorbachev’s wish
to keep the Warsaw Pact frontiers’.1401 She also questioned whether self-
determination should be the central principle to govern the German prob-
prime minister Benedetto Craxi disavowed his foreign minister; see Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 September 1984.
1397 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 196. Genscher similarly has stated
that ‘The British prime minister, it seemed, had political and emotional reserva-
tions’; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 691.
1398 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 690.
1399 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993),
p. 792.
1400 Cited in Le Monde, ‘La question allemande: ouverte ou fermée?’, 30 September
1984.
1401 Memcon of a telephone conversation between Bush and Thatcher, 17 November
1989 (note taker was Philip Zelikow), quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany
Unified, p. 406.
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lem. There were other important issues to consider, she said, including the
role of the Four Powers in Berlin, the CSCE commitment to the inviolabil-
ity of the European borders, continuation of change in Eastern Europe and
the very fate of Gorbachev and perestroika.1402 At the Strasbourg summit,
however, the principle of self-determination was formally reasserted, and
the summit, in consequence, was interpreted by Genscher as a ‘great suc-
cess’.1403
On the surface, Thatcher's attitude seemed to coincide with that of Mit-
terrand. The French president thought that ‘If there was any hope now of
stopping [sic] or slowing down reunification, it would only come from an
Anglo-French initiative.’1404 The latter's reservations, however, were
much less fundamental than that of the former: the French president was
thoroughly committed to his country's reconciliation with Germany and to
European integration. The strong personal bonds that existed between
Kohl and Mitterrand were also very much an expression of several
decades of close French-German cooperation in the European Community
on Coal and Steel and the European (Economic) Community and the two
countries’ mutual commitment to European integration. To that extent, as
Kohl realized, Mitterrand shared the West German government’s view that
European integration and German unification should not be contradictory
but complementary processes.1405 Similarly, Genscher thought that ‘Mit-
terrand, through the Europeanization of the German problem, wanted to
prevent a repetition of the previous mistakes on both banks of the Rhine’.
The German foreign minister also understood the importance which the
French leader attached to an unequivocal codification of Poland’s bor-
ders.1406
A first major test as to whether Gorbachev intended to play the anti-
Hitler coalition card and, if so, whether he would be able to do so came in
the meeting between him and Mitterrand on 6 December in Kiev. Certain-
ly, as the transcript of the meeting underlines, there were similarities in
1402 In talks with Bush at Camp David, on 24 November 1989; Thatcher, The Down-
ing Street Years, p. 794, and the memcon of the meeting (note taker Brent
Scowcroft), quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 115-16.
1403 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 690.
1404 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 796.
1405 Kohl, Ich wollte die deutschen Einheit, pp. 197-99.
1406 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 691-92.
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perception between the two leaders. These pertained in particular to
Kohl’s initiative.1407
F. MITTERRAND. ... Kohl's speech, his Ten Points, turned everything upside
down. He confused all the factors. He is hurrying. I told Genscher that, and he
didn't very much contradict my conclusions.
M.S. GORBACHEV. This is very interesting! I also told him that. ... [He] is
formulating his theses in such a form that they practically amount to a diktat.
F. MITTERRAND. You said that explicitly? Diktat – that is a German word.
M.S. GORBACHEV. I spoke even more sharply. And E.A. Shevardnadze [in
reference to Kohl’s demands for fundamental change in East Germany] said
that even Hitler did not always speak in such a tone.
French and Soviet views also coincided on the relationship between Ger-
man reunification and the processes of both Western and pan-European in-
tegration.
F. MITTERRAND. ... It is necessary to make sure that the all-European pro-
cess develops more rapidly than the German question and that it overtakes the
German movement. We have to create all-European structures. The German
component must only be one, and by no means the dominant or leading ele-
ment of politics in Europe.
The similarities in interpretation extended to the importance of codifying
the Polish borders as final and alleged ambiguities in the American atti-
tude on this issue.
F. MITTERRAND. ... I have to acknowledge that I remarked to my German
friends and expressed my astonishment that when they put forward their con-
siderations they failed to mention the frontiers of Poland. This is a serious
problem. All the countries of the European community approach this the same
way even though the sharpness with which they express this may vary.
M.S. GORBACHEV. I have the feeling that the United States are not quite
open about their position, they don't explain it fully.
F. MITTERRAND. This is true. ...
What about the practical consequences of this congruence? Did Gor-
bachev intend to turn the similarity of views and French concerns into a
diplomatic instrument against reunification? Mitterrand put that very
question to Gorbachev. ‘What, concretely, are you planning to do?,’ he
asked. ‘Above all, to continue the line of peaceful changes,’ Gorbachev
replied. ‘May each country decide its directions for itself.’ Perhaps taken
1407 All subsequent citations from the meeting according to ‘Zapis’ besedy M.S.
Gorbacheva s prezidentom Frantsii F. Mitteranom. Kiev, 6 dekabria 1989 goda’.
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aback himself by the lack of concreteness, the Soviet leader added: ‘You
are right, one should not simply observe, one has to act.’ However, ac-
cording to the Soviet transcript, the suggested action extended to nothing
more than generalities such as ‘building trust’ and ‘broadening coopera-
tion’.
The inkling of some joint initiative, strange as it was, came in the con-
text of Mitterrand’s plans to visit the GDR, still agreed upon with Honeck-
er and scheduled for 20 December. He wondered about the political signif-
icance of such a visit and whether could be considered a declaration of no-
confidence in the Modrow government. Gorbachev interjected that per-
haps he, too, should visit the GDR! The French president then suggested:
‘Well, then, let's go together.’ Nothing, however, came of this suggestion.
To generalize from the meeting with Mitterrand, the two leaders shared
interpretations, sentiments, and concerns, and agreed that something
should be done. But they had no plan of action and, at least as far as bilat-
eral relations were concerned, no intention to develop a plan. It was in all
likelihood in consequence of the mutually perceived need to do something
and be seen as doing something that, on 8 December, Gorbachev reverted
to the Four Power proposal.
The idea to convene a Four Power meeting at the ambassadorial level to
discuss the German problem had apparently been developed in the Soviet
embassy in East Berlin. In a telegram to Moscow, Kochemasov had em-
phasized that the very convocation of such a meeting would serve to em-
phasize the continued responsibility of the Four Powers for the German
problem and that it would be advisable to hold meetings on a regular ba-
sis, that is, to institutionalize the process. Presumably conscious of the
likely Western, certainly American, objections to a reactivation of the Four
Power mechanism on Germany, the embassy suggested using an initiative
advanced by the Western allies of December 1987 on Berlin as a frame of
reference.1408 The initiative had envisaged an expansion of contacts and
exchanges between East and West Berlin and authorization for Lufthansa
to institute a regular service to Berlin but Moscow had rejected the idea
with the argument that Four Power discussions could only pertain to West
Berlin and that matters of civil aviation could not be discussed in that
framework because they touched upon the sovereignty of the GDR.1409
1408 Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, p. 196.
1409 Soviet and East German decision-making processes and the rationales for the
objections in Moscow and East Berlin to the Western initiative, including talks
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Now, however, not only Berlin as a whole but the German problem, ac-
cording to Soviet intentions, was to be the subject matter of discussion.
The Four Power meeting took place on 11 December in the building of
the Allied Control Council in the American sector of Berlin.1410 If symbol-
ism was the intended effect of the meeting, no better venue could have
been chosen. The ACC, defunct since Marshal Sokolovsky had left it in
protest in March 1948 at the onset of the Berlin crisis, had been the collec-
tive repository of inter-allied sovereignty in and instrument of control over
defeated Germany. Now, after the passage of more than four decades, the
widely disseminated picture of the four ambassadors – Vernon Walters,
Vyacheslav Kochemasov, Christopher Mallaby and Serge Boidevaix – in
front of the Control Council headquarters building was bound to create the
impression that the wartime coalition was determined to reassert its inter-
ests in Germany and give corresponding notice to Bonn. To that extent, it
superbly served the purpose of a warning shot and proof of inter-allied ac-
tivity. If, however, the meeting was designed by the Soviet leadership as a
serious effort to prevent or delay German unification, or to re-establish the
anti-Hitler coalition framework for managing the German problem, it
turned out to be a resounding failure. Although the British and French had
readily agreed to the meeting, and the Americans reluctantly, all three
powers had insisted on an agenda limited to Berlin. Kochemasov did not
respect that limitation, repeating the then current Gorbachevian litany
about the GDR as a strategic ally of the Soviet Union and member of the
Warsaw Pact and criticizing certain persons or circles who would like to
interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR. The three Western ambas-
sadors, however, opposed the broadening of the agenda and objected to
the Soviet proposal for an institutionalization of the inter-allied process.
The meeting also evoked strong reactions in Bonn. At the NATO foreign
between Bondarenko and SED Politburo member Krolikowski and Honecker’s
consent to the Soviet reply, can be found in SED Politburo, Arbeitsprotokolle,
Central Party Archives, J IV 2/2/2A/3146.
1410 Mitterrand, at the Strasbourg summit, had reported as a matter of fact that the
Soviet Union had asked to convene a meeting of the four guarantors of the 1971
Berlin Agreement, adding that France, as a matter of course, would accede to
the request; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 72; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit,
p. 201. It is unclear from Kochemasov's account where the suggestion came
from to choose the ACC building as the venue for the meeting. The Soviet am-
bassador had suggested holding the meeting ‘in the FRG’; Kotschemassow,
Meine letzte Mission, p. 196.
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ministers' conference on 13 December in Brussels, Genscher wanted to
achieve ‘absolute clarity’ on that matter and bluntly warned: ‘You have to
decide between cooperation with us in NATO and the European Commu-
nity or with the Soviet Union in the Control Council.’1411 If, to reiterate,
the Soviet leadership had regarded the Four minus Two venue as an appro-
priate forum for asserting its interests, it failed in that purpose.
To summarize, utilization of Western European concerns and Four
Power machinery to arrest or delay German unification was never a viable
Soviet option. Gorbachev realized that little could be gained by attempts
to turn the anti-Hitler coalition into an anti-Kohl coalition. Moscow con-
tinued to make such attempts even after the 11 December meeting in
Berlin but they lacked conviction and determination. There were several
mutually reinforcing reasons for Gorbachev to refrain from playing the in-
ter-allied card. (1) The Western powers were not prepared to join the Sovi-
et Union in such an attempt. For several decades, as mentioned, they had
formally committed themselves to the principle of German unification to
be achieved through self-determination, which in turn was to be exercised
through free elections. For these powers now to admit openly that their
support of these principles had been a charade would seriously have erod-
ed the credibility of Western diplomacy. (2) Even the Soviet Union was
committed − on paper at least − to self-determination through the assertion
of the principle of the Freedom of Choice and, more specifically, the June
1989 Joint Declaration. Furthermore, on a practical level, the anti-Hitler
coalition option carried serious risks. West Germany's power and influ-
ence in Europe had steadily increased; the United States regarded that
country as its most important ally in Europe and solidly supported Bonn's
position; France was inextricably linked to West Germany in the European
Community and unwilling to jeopardize progress on European integration;
and Britain on its own was too weak to be an effective Soviet ally. (3)
None of the Western leaders, ideologically least of all Thatcher, but also
Mitterrand, as his performance in Kiev showed, had any serious interest in
stabilizing a reform socialist East Germany of dubious legitimacy, nor did
they have the means to do so. In addition, the Four minus Two framework
meant exclusion not only of West Germany but also of East Germany
from the negotiation process – a step that would have counteracted any
policy aimed at upgrading the international stature and internal legitimacy
1411 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 696.
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of the GDR. (4) The stabilization of the reform process in the Soviet
Union had top priority for the Soviet leadership and for that purpose a co-
operative rather than an ostracized West Germany was an important pre-
condition. For the Soviet Union to join Bonn’s partners in an attempt to
stop German unification, as Chernyaev has written, would have meant that
‘the cold war would have broken out again’ and that this was something
the Western European ‘alliance partners [themselves] did not want’.1412
Soviet policies on Germany, therefore, continued to be constrained by se-
vere internal and international circumstances, by lack of vision and by bu-
reaucratic confusion. This applies also to Gorbachev's acceptance of Ger-
man unification.
Gorbachev's Acceptance of German Unification
One of the central analytical tasks in the reconstruction of the collapse of
Soviet empire could be the attempt to pinpoint the precise date when the
Soviet leadership consented to German unification and decided on the ba-
sic outlines of united Germany's international status. Ideally, one would be
able to identify one or more Politburo meetings where the internal and ex-
ternal aspects of German unification were put on the agenda, discussed
and then implemented. In practice, however, both the internal and external
aspects were never formally linked, discussed and decided. A formal
meeting of the Politburo to consent to German unification or to decide the
Soviet position on Germany’s international status was never held. A meet-
ing that took place at the end of January 1990 and that involved a selected
circle of decision-makers, including several Politburo members, by then
simply took German unification for granted. Its participants decided a few
procedural questions for negotiations with West German and East German
leaders but failed to address, let alone resolve, the principles of the Soviet
negotiation position on the external aspects of German unification. A for-
mal Politburo meeting on the German problem was convened at the begin-
6.
1412 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 310. He expressed this opinion in ref-
erence to the Malta summit and Bush's comment to Gorbachev that ‘Kohl
knows that some Western alliance partners verbally support reunification, which
the German people want, but are concerned about this perspective’, and that it
was ‘strange that the Soviet Union was sitting in the same boat with our Euro-
pean NATO allies.’
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ning of May 1990 but it continued to treat the internal and international
problems of the German problem as separate, and the majority of its par-
ticipants, including Gorbachev, were adamantly opposed to united Ger-
many’s membership in NATO. This apparently firm position was reversed
less than four weeks later by Gorbachev, single-handedly, at the Soviet-
American summit in Washington – to the surprise of the American and the
consternation of the Soviet participants, without prior consultation of other
Politburo members and top decision-makers, and contrary to the advice of
all the senior experts on Germany.
How is it possible to explain this extraordinary state of affairs? Part of
the answer has been provided in the previous chapter, which dealt with the
relegation of the traditional mainstays of the imperial system to a sec-
ondary role; the shift in decision-making authority to a small circle of top
leaders and their advisers and personal assistants; the exacerbation of con-
flict between the broad base of conservative bureaucracies and the thin
layer of advocates of the New Thinking at the top; and increased pressure
for more radical reform exerted by the newly created legislative bodies
and the politically aware segments of public opinion. Another explanation
lies in the interaction of the disintegration of the traditional decision-mak-
ing institutions and machinery and the disintegration of empire.
In detail, the Soviet consent to German unification began with bureau-
cratic confusion. One of its noteworthy examples was the speech Shevard-
nadze delivered on 19 December to the Political Commission of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Not unlike the main report by the general secretary to
party congresses, including Gorbachev's address to the Twenty-seventh
Congress in February-March 1986, the foreign minister’s speech constitut-
ed a compromise between different positions of various institutions. In the
present case, in addition to embodying the vested interests of the foreign
ministry and the Central Committee’s International Department, it repre-
sented a split between the top and the middle echelons within the foreign
ministry. Shevardnadze, conscious of the inexorable drift towards German
unity on the one hand, and the stale and ineffective Soviet approach to the
German problem on the other, had wanted to set new directions in his
speech in Brussels. That objective, in essence, failed to be achieved be-
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cause of blatant inconsistencies and contractions, and the unhealthy mix-
ture of the old and the new that characterized the speech.1413
The problem had begun with a draft submitted by Bondarenko and the
Third European Department that reflected both the traditional Soviet pos-
ition on Germany as well as the hard line Gorbachev had adopted vis-à-vis
Genscher on 6 December and at the 9 December Central Committee meet-
ing. The draft contradicted Shevardnadze’s purposes of flexibility. In con-
sequence, he asked Tarasenko (as noted, one of his chief personal aides
but not an expert on Germany) to rewrite it and to focus on the conditions
that the Soviet Union should attach to German unity if and when it oc-
curred. The revised draft was returned to the Third Department and pro-
duced a severe conflict between Tarasenko and Bondarenko, the latter de-
manding that the line authoritatively laid down by Gorbachev be adhered
to and that the draft be kept intact. Upon Shevardnadze's insistence, the re-
visions remained in the draft document. However, it would seem that the
foreign minister himself was by no means as unequivocally committed to
an entirely new approach as his aide has made it appear in retrospect: the
foreign minister had the draft submitted to ambassador Kvitsinsky in
Bonn, who bent it away from the implicit acceptance of unification and
hardened the conditions to be attached to it. Shevardnadze received
Kvitsinsky's revised revisions after he had arrived in Brussels and,
Tarasenko’s protest notwithstanding, accepted them for the final version.
Shevardnadze sought ex post facto to impute clarity of purpose to the
speech. ‘In Brussels’, he wrote in his memoirs, ‘I carefully outlined our
position.’1414 However, given the conflicting inputs, the speech contained
major contradictions. One of the most glaring concerned the fact that She-
vardnadze dealt with the possible implications of German unification but,
at the same time, stated that the Soviet position had been expressed by
‘Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee plenary meeting’ to the effect
that the GDR was the Soviet Union's ‘strategic ally and a member of the
Warsaw Pact’; that one had to take these ‘realities’ into account; and that
any departure from the existence of two separate German states would
1413 The following account of the background of the speech is based on this author’s
interviews with Tarasenko and Kvitsinsky; see also, based on the same sources,
Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 149-50.
1414 Shevardnadze, Moi vybor, p. 230.
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threaten ‘destabilization in Europe’.1415 The Helsinki process of pan-Euro-
pean cooperation should not ‘be ruined on German soil’, he warned. That
was ‘impermissible.’ He also reminded his listeners that the Four Powers
had legal rights in Germany and ‘have at their disposal a considerable con-
tingent of armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons on the territory of
the GDR and the FRG’.
The central part of Shevardnadze’s speech was a barrage of questions,
formally separated as a bloc of seven, with several sub-questions. ‘Where
are the legal and material guarantees’, he asked, that German unity would
‘not create a threat to the national security of other states and to peace in
Europe?’ Would Germany recognize the existing borders in Europe? What
place would it take in the military-political structures existing on the conti-
nent? What would be its military doctrine and the structure of its armed
forces? Would it be prepared to take steps toward demilitarization and
adopt a neutral status? What would be its attitude toward the presence of
allied troops and the continued operation of military liaison missions of
the Four Powers? What would be the status of the Quadripartite Agree-
ment of 1971 on Berlin? How would German unification tie in with the
Helsinki process? Would a united Germany radically restructure its econo-
mic and other links with Eastern Europe? Would the two German states, if
they expressed themselves in favour of starting to move toward the unity
of the Germans, consider the interests of other European states and be
ready to conclude a European peace settlement? ‘The peoples of the Sovi-
et Union’, Shevardnadze concluded, ‘have a right to know what changes
in Central Europe [sic] might mean for their future and their security. We
paid for today's European stability with the lives of 20 million people.’1416
The hybrid nature of Shevardnadze’s speech was evident not only in its
contradictory substance but also in the fact that some of the questions ap-
peared in the future tense (‘will Germany ...?’), others were expressed in
the future conditional (‘would Germany ...?’), thus leaving the audience to
wonder whether its author(s) proceeded from German unity as inevitable
or hypothetical. Nowhere, however, was German reunification mentioned
as a potentially positive contribution to European security. Several of the
questions were almost indistinguishable from conditions. They failed to
add up to a consistent Soviet position or international framework within
1415 ‘Evropa – vremia peremen. Vystuplenie E.A. Shevardnadze v politicheskoi
komissii Evropeiskogo parlamenta’, Pravda, 20 December 1989.
1416 Ibid.
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
566
which German reunification could be achieved. Shevardnadze's prefer-
ences as to how individual questions should be answered also remained
vague. Since a united Germany was apparently considered undesirable, the
continued existence of two German states could be interpreted as being his
main preference. If German unity were to come nevertheless, his prefer-
ence then appeared to be a demilitarized, neutral country. NATO member-
ship seemed to be definitely out of the question: one could ‘not seriously
think that the status of the GDR will change radically while the status of
the FRG will remain as it was’, Shevardnadze said. This, however, was
precisely what was to happen. In fact, as the Soviet foreign minister was
speaking, the internal conditions in the GDR were changing radically and
eroding even further Moscow’s remaining influence in that country.1417
Acceleration of the Demise of the GDR
The primary instrument of Soviet control in East Germany had been the
East German communist party. That control, as reconstructed here in de-
tail, had substantially weakened as a result of policy differences between
the CPSU and the SED and, at the personal level, between Honecker and
Gorbachev. After the involuntary resignation of both Honecker and Krenz,
one of the issues that would determine the fate of the residual Soviet influ-
ence in East Germany was the degree to which the SED would be success-
ful in transforming itself into a viable reform socialist party. An attempt to
achieve such metamorphosis was made at the party’s extraordinary
congress that began on 8 December and lasted, with one week of intermis-
sion, until 17 December. The party changed its name to Socialist Unity
Party–Party of Democratic Socialism (SED–PDS, later only PDS); elected
as party chief Gregor Gysi, a flamboyant defense lawyer, who had made a
name for himself in political trials; gave prominence to reform communist
leaders such as Wolfgang Berghofer, the mayor of Dresden, and prime mi-
nister Modrow; and promised to pursue a new path between Western-style
capitalism and command-bureaucratic socialism, that is, the road of demo-
1417 Shevardnadze talked to Genscher after he had delivered the speech. The conver-
sation appears to have been uneventful and uninspiring. The West German for-
eign minister formed the impression that Moscow would accept the course of
events, provided they proceeded in an orderly fashion; Genscher, Erinnerungen,
p. 703.
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cratic socialism. The effort, however, was in vain. Several factors con-
tributed to this failure.
First, revolutions, as perceptive observes have noted, often follow a cy-
cle. The ancien régime’s repression provides cause for grievances and
gives rise to demands for reform; a new leadership takes heed of the de-
mands and embarks upon a reformist course, which in turn is interpreted
as weakness, fuelling a revolution; radicalization sets in, and the cycle
ends in a return to reform or in reaction.1418 In late 1989 and the first half
of 1990, East Germany, neighbouring Czechoslovakia and Poland, as in-
deed the Soviet Union itself, were in the middle of a phase of radicaliza-
tion. In such a phase, the discredited mainstays of the old regime, includ-
ing its reformist vanguard, usually have little chance to recapture the trust
and goodwill of the population.
Second, the SED lacked a reform socialist tradition. Its possible emer-
gence had been suppressed first by Ulbricht after the forced merger of the
KPD and SPD in April 1946 and then by Honecker, most recently in his
‘two-front’ struggle against Gorbachev-style demokratizatsiia and West
German social democracy with soziale Marktwirtschaft. Conceivably,
there was a reform socialist base among the rank and file members. That
possible base, however, was rapidly melting away. In the three months
preceding the congress, the party lost over half a million of its 2.3 million
members – a process that showed no sign of being arrested, let alone re-
versed, as 1989 drew to a close. The majority of those who were leaving
the party, one would suspect, were turning their back not only on past neo-
Stalinism but also on possible future reform socialism in the GDR.1419
Third, the SED-PDS’s association with the Soviet Union and the CPSU
was a serious liability. The disadvantages of the link had by no means
been removed by Gorbachev’s reform attempts, which in both Soviet and
East German perceptions had yet to produce tangible economic benefits.
To the extent that the enthusiastic welcome that the Soviet party leader
had received in East Berlin two months earlier could have been interpreted
as a popular endorsement for the introduction of reform socialism in the
1418 See, for instance, Alexis de Tocqueville, L'ancien régime et la révolution (Paris:
Gallimard, 1979), and Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. ed. (New
York: Vintage Books, 1965).
1419 For the statistical data and their interpretation see David Binder, ‘At Confes-
sional East Berlin Congress, an “Absolute Break” with Stalinism’, New York
Times, 18 December 1989.
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GDR, rather than a tribute to Gorbachev’s courage and personality and a
demonstration of no confidence in Honecker, the popular mood had sub-
stantially changed after the opening of the wall. Due in part to the realiza-
tion, both in East Berlin and in Moscow, of the possible problems that
could be caused by an emphasis on close party links, the CPSU delegation
attending the congress was small and kept a low profile. Previously, the
CPSU’s General Secretary would have attended such a congress. At the
SED-PDS’s extraordinary congress, however, the Soviet delegation was
led by Yakovlev and included Ambassador Kochemasov and CC Interna-
tional Department officials Falin, Portugalov and Valentin Kopteltsev. It
did not include Gorbachev: his personal assistants and ID officials thought
that his participation could have been interpreted as old-style interference
in internal party affairs and would have committed the prestige of the So-
viet Union to a political process and a leadership struggle whose outcome
was indeterminate.1420 The role of the delegation, too, was minimal. In the
view of Markus Wolf, one of the officers of the congress, that role consist-
ed for the most part of the ‘delegation conveying to the party chairman
and his deputies the official greetings of the Central Committee of the CP-
SU’.1421
Fourth, the establishment of trust between the new party and the popu-
lation was hampered by the stream of revelations about party corruption
and the activities of the state security ministry.1422 Most East Germans had
apparently adhered to the notion that the GDR party elite had been inured
against the temptations of the perks and privileges enjoyed by the ‘new
class’ in other communist countries. Such comforting notions about aus-
tere lifestyles of the elite, however, were shattered starting in early De-
cember after the submission to the Volkskammer of a parliamentary com-
mittee report that had investigated the party's abuse of power. Other inves-
tigations also revealed the shadowy business activities of Schalck-Golod-
kowski’s committee for Commercial Coordination (Kommerzielle Koor-
dinierung, or KoKo) under the auspices of the GDR’s foreign trade min-
istry. Its primary purpose was the procurement of hard currency but in the
process it engaged in shady business deals, including weapons exports and
the sell-off of treasures from East German art and natural history muse-
1420 Interview with Zagladin.
1421 Wolf, In eigenem Auftrag, p. 313.
1422 The description of party corruption and Stasi activities follows Pond, Beyond
the Wall, pp. 140-44.
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ums. The damaging revelations extended to the involvement of the Stasi in
sheltering West German terrorists, as well as training and financing terror-
ist activities abroad. The vast network of Stasi informers also began to be
uncovered. At the same time, evidence came to light about systematic at-
tempts made by state security personnel to destroy files, tapes and videos
that presumably contained incriminating evidence about Stasi activities,
full-time agents and collaborators. In response, also at the beginning of
December, irate citizens began to occupy Stasi offices in order to prevent
the burning and shredding of records.
Fifth, the repository of radicalization was irrevocably shifting from an
amorphous Roundtable of social and political forces to an even more
amorphous but ultimately more powerful population at large. Typically for
the vagaries of revolution, a wide rift was opening between two major
agents of radicalization. The Roundtable, which in addition to the purport-
edly ‘new’ communist party and its vacillating allies of the ‘democratic
bloc’ included a colourful spectrum of social and political opposition
groups – the Protestant and Catholic churches, human rights activists,
peace advocates, feminists and ecologists – stood firmly on the ground of
building a separate socialist East Germany; some of its members even ex-
pressed regret that the wall had come down because it hindered such a de-
velopment.1423 The majority of the population, in contrast, was increasing-
ly embracing the goal of unification which, in essence, meant the transfer
of the West German political, economic and social system to East Ger-
many.
1423 For instance, Friedrich Schorlemmer, one of the opposition leaders, had ex-
pressed the following view: ‘The coexistence of two political and social systems
will create great problems. Therefore I would prefer that the wall, where there
are no holes, remains a while longer’ (italics mine); quoted in Daniel Hamilton,
After the Revolution: The New Political Landscape in East Germany, German
Issues, No. 7 (Washington: American Institute for Contemporary German Stud-
ies, 1990), p. 12. – Schorlemmer remained true to such anti-‘establishment’ and
anti-mainstream convictions. In 2014, German president Joachim Gauck, as
well as other German government officials, on several occasions made the point
that military power in international affairs retained utility and that international
conditions existed where there was no choice other than the use of force. In re-
sponse, Schorlemmer called the president a ‘disgusting warmonger’ (widerlich-
er Kriegshetzer): ‘Friedrich Schorlemmer: Friedrich Schorlemmer: Gauck sollte
schweigen’, Neues-deutschland.de, 27 June 2014, http://www.neues-deutsch-
land.de/artikel/937316.schorlemmer-gauck-sollte-schweigen.html.
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In their attempt to construct a socialist utopia, it was not only the SED-
PDS but also the more radical opposition democrats temporarily allied
with it in the Roundtable that faced severe handicaps in their attempt to
shape the destiny of a separate East Germany. The latter’s main problems
consisted in internal dissension, political ineffectiveness and lack of ad-
ministrative experience. Their common denominator had been opposition
to the Honecker regime but their social and professional backgrounds as
well as their political and philosophical persuasion were extremely di-
verse.1424 The artists, writers, bards, pastors and scientists that made up
the opposition groups were, for the most part, only loosely organized.
They subscribed to a wide range of ideas, including those expressed by
Mahatma Gandhi about civil disobedience; Catholic Latin American liber-
ation theologists; Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer of the Protes-
tant anti-Nazi Confessing Church; American civil rights activists; the West
German Greens; and the remnants of the once powerful ‘peace move-
ment’. Some of the groups shared a strong sense of ‘anti-politics’, with an
emphasis on Kultur and society rather than on the acquisition and manage-
ment of power. Furthermore, in contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia,
with their Lech Wałęsas and Václav Havels, East Germany lacked a
prominent anti-establishment figure who could have united the various
currents of the opposition movement and given them purpose and direc-
tion. The Roundtable, then, acting in many ways as a second parliament,
was bound to be yet one of those transitional institutions that tend to
spring up in times of revolutionary upheaval but disappear as it progress-
es. Its most important achievement, perhaps, was the agreement to hold
free elections in May 1990, later advanced to 18 March.
Given the inability of the SED-PDS to win the trust of the population
and the ineffectiveness of the democratic opposition, the West German
government and West German political parties became the most important
driving force in East German internal affairs. A Hegelian approach or, in
its material version, a Marxist view may help in understanding the ensuing
process. Its objective nature – deteriorating East German political and eco-
nomic conditions – was supplemented by a dialectic relationship between
two subjective factors: the West German government's determination to
maintain the momentum towards unification and its interest in a stabiliza-
tion of conditions in East Germany. This necessitated reconciliation of
1424 See Hamilton, The New Political Landscape, pp. 8-9.
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seemingly contradictory purposes. (1) While unification implied abolition
of the GDR, stabilization necessitated some degree of assistance; but that
assistance should not serve to preserve what was, after all, still a commu-
nist regime without popular legitimacy. (2) The commitment to reunifica-
tion had to be credible, but it should not precipitate a collapse of law, or-
der, and administrative structures in the GDR.1425
One of the main reasons for the West German government’s interest in
a modicum of stabilization lay in the unabated outflow of East Germans.
In mid-December 1989, the Federal German government reported that, in
the period from 1 January to 13 December 1989, a total of 324,776 East
Germans had registered to resettle in West Germany.1426 In November,
133,429 Übersiedler had registered. In the period between 1 and 13 De-
cember, 24,143 East Germans had done so, that is, East Germans were still
leaving the GDR at the rate of 2,000 a day – a rate that was maintained in
January 1990.1427 This state of affairs caused problems for both the Kohl
and the Modrow government. As for East Germany, given essentially the
same composition of the emigrants in 1989 as in 1953 and 1961, the dis-
ruptive effects on the economy were considerable. But West Germany was
negatively affected, too, since it was saddled not only with the administra-
tive cost and effort of attempting to integrate the large influx of Germans
from the GDR but also of the German Aussiedler from Eastern and South-
eastern Europe (foremost from Romania) and the Soviet Union (the Volga
Germans), expected to reach about 350,000 by the end of the year. As the
chief West German manager of the difficult technicalities of unification
has stated, Bonn was concerned that ‘the national problem could turn into
1425 The West German government’s perceptions of conflicting policy preferences
became evident in the government's preparations for Chancellor Kohl’s visit to
Dresden; see Wolfgang Schäuble, Der Vertrag: Wie ich über die deutsche Ein-
heit verhandelte, with an introduction by Dirk Koch and Klaus Wirtgen
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), pp. 21-22.
1426 Figures of the Federal Republic's ministry of the interior, as quoted in New York
Times, 16 De-cember 1989.
1427 Shortly before the building of the Berlin wall, East Germans were leaving the
GDR at the rate of about 3,000 a day; for details about the earlier emigrations
trends, see above, xxx p. 132 . Terminologically, the German government made
a difference between Übersiedler, that is, Germans living in the GDR who relo-
cated from there to West Germany, and Aussiedler, members of the German mi-
nority who have lived abroad for generations, e.g. in Eastern, East-Central and
South-Eastern Europe, and were now moving to West Germany.
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a social problem’.1428 There was, of course, a theoretical possibility of
stopping the flow: the government could introduce a law on a separate
West German citizenship in the Bundestag. From a practical perspective,
however, this avenue toward the solution of the refugee problem was
blocked. It could have been argued that such a step would be a violation of
the constitution and that, to provide clarification and legitimacy to such a
measure, a decision of the constitutional court would be required or a two-
thirds majority in parliament to change the Basic Law. Whatever the legal
implications of the government's intentions, the political controversies that
would have been produced by the introduction of a new citizenship law
would have been enormous and even raising the issue would in all likeli-
hood have transformed the flow of East Germans into a torrent.
The shift of political dynamics and the popular mood in East Germany
away from GDR party and government institutions to the West German
model was amply demonstrated by Genscher's and Kohl’s visits to East
Germany. On 16-17 December, the West German foreign minister had vis-
ited several East German cities, including his native Halle. His primary
contacts there were with representatives of the democratic opposition, in
particular with leaders of the Protestant Church, and with leaders of the
liberal democratic bloc party, the LDPD, thereby heralding both the drift
of the ‘democratic bloc’ parties away from communist tutelage and the be-
ginning of attempts by the more powerful parties in West Germany to
build up corresponding party structures in the east. The most memorable
event was Genscher’s address in the city of Halle’s Market Church, which
he had attended with his parents until he left the GDR in 1952. Politically
the most important feature was the warm and at times exuberant reception
he received in the East German cities and towns he visited.1429 Kohl’s visit
to Dresden on 19 December confirmed the pattern of close interaction be-
tween West German government representatives and the East German
population. Like his foreign minister, the chancellor was enthusiastically
greeted by tens of thousands of East Germans, who waved black-red-and-
gold flags without the communist regime’s hammer-and-sickle emblem.
The green-and-white flag of the former state of Saxony was also in evi-
dence, a harbinger of yet another development to come: the abolition of
1428 Schäuble, Der Vertrag, p. 22.
1429 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 697-702.
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the GDR's administrative districts, modelled along Soviet oblasts, and the
reconstitution of the Länder structure in East Germany.1430
The degree to which East Germany, at any time in the past, had been
dependent on West Germany is still debatable. For the most part, there had
been a gap between Soviet perceptions and reality, with the imperial cen-
tre exaggerating that dependence. There can be little doubt, however, that
the perceptual gap had closed by the end of 1989.1431 This was dramatical-
ly underlined by Kohl’s talks with Modrow on 19 December in Dresden.
The almost complete exchange of the GDR’s dependence on the Soviet
Union for that on West Germany was palpable in Modrow’s demeanour.
As described by Teltschik, the East German prime minister opened the
talks between the two delegations, reading at a hectic pace from a type-
written text, his ‘face pale and contorted, his fuzzy hair in a mess. He
avoids eye contact, hardly shows any emotion ... and doesn't smile.’ He
was visibly concerned about the accelerated drift towards German unifica-
tion and domestic instability in the GDR and complained about West Ger-
man interference in East German internal affairs.1432 The central East Ger-
man demand in the negotiations was the request for West German finan-
cial assistance in the amount of DM 15 billion for the year 1990. Modrow
justified this demand not only by pointing to the acute problems caused by
the opening of the borders, the de facto introduction of the West German
mark as a second currency in the GDR and the need to finance the mod-
ernization of East German industry and agriculture. He also regarded it as
just compensation for the reparations that the GDR had paid to the Soviet
Union on behalf of all of Germany.1433 Kohl rejected the – in his view –
1430 Modrow, in retrospect, has acknowledged that there was only ‘a small number
of people who courageously demanded a continuation of the process of democ-
ratization and of the existence of the GDR’ but that a ‘large majority wanted the
unification of the two German states’; Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, p. 100.
1431 For details about the deteriorating economic conditions in the GDR and the de-
gree of East Germany’s dependency on West Germany, see xxx above, pp.
205-212, 224 and 288-89..
1432 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 88; similarly Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p.
215.
1433 According to internationally recognized estimates, Modrow wrote in his mem-
oirs, the GDR had paid reparations in the amount of DM 99.1 billion, the Fed-
eral Republic only DM 21 billion. Furthermore, West Germany had benefitted
from the Marshall Plan; Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, p. 98. Modrow as well as
Kohl and Teltschik also report the West German chancellor's objection to the
use of the term Lastenausgleich, or burden sharing. The term was used in West
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unacceptably high sum of the aid request with the argument that a frame-
work (Rahmenbedingungen) for the extension of large-scale assistance
had to be created first. He did, however, agree to the creation of a joint
hard currency fund in the amount of DM 2 billion for the purpose of facili-
tating travel between the two parts of Germany; to increase the credit line
under the European Recovery Program by DM 2 billion; to raise the credit
ceiling for East German exports to West Germany from DM 1.5 to 6 bil-
lion; and to elevate the amount of compensation for postal charges in in-
tra-German exchanges from DM 100 to 300 million. Following the estab-
lished practice of such generosity, political conditions had to be met by the
GDR. These included further commitments by the Modrow government to
liberal and market-oriented reforms; a change in the exchange rate of the
East German and the West German mark to reflect more closely their mar-
ket value; in preparation of the Vertragsgemeinschaft, the creation of a
plethora of joint commissions with the purpose of synchronizing and har-
monizing communications, environmental, legal and law enforcement ac-
tivities; and finally, as a symbolic gesture, the opening of the Brandenburg
Gate in Berlin as an exit and entry point for pedestrians.1434
Kohl’s visit to Dresden and his talks with Modrow created yet another
of the many paradoxes described here. The wide-spread popular support
for German unity and the weakness of the Modrow government amounted
to a revelation for the West German chancellor that significantly influ-
enced his thinking.1435 It reinforced his disinclination to support a govern-
ment in East Berlin that had not been legitimized by free elections and
persuaded him to push more vigorously and directly for German unifica-
tion than before. The joint declaration signed in Dresden on the establish-
Germany for compensating claimants in that part of the country who had suf-
fered economic losses in the Second World War, including those who had lost
properties in the east. The term implied a moral obligation to pay damages.
Kohl rejected such an implication and suggested instead the term Solidar-
beitrag, or solidarity contribution.
1434 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 215-16; Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp.
89-90; and press reports; for the text of the joint declaration on the talks be-
tween Kohl and Modrow, see ‘Gemeinsame Mitteilung über die Gespräche des
Bundeskanzlers mit dem Ministerpräsidenten der DDR in Dresden’, Press and
Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin, No. 148, 20 December
1989, pp. 1249-52.
1435 In his memoirs, Kohl called it a Schlüsselerlebnis, or key experience, on the
road to national unity; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 213.
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ment of a Vertragsgemeinschaft and good-neighbourly relations between
the two states as part of a ‘new European architecture’ was already obso-
lete when it was signed.1436 Modrow later was to complain bitterly but ac-
curately that Kohl reneged on almost all of the financial commitments;
that ‘as early as January [the chancellor] no longer had any interest in ne-
gotiations about a Vertragsgemeinschaft’; that for him ‘I soon became no
longer a responsible partner for talks’; and that, based on the enthusiastic
popular reception he had experienced in Dresden, he abandoned the policy
of gradualism and decided on ‘unification in quick step’.1437 Kohl, how-
ever, still envisaged a five-year time frame in which unification could be
achieved if the Soviet Union consented to it. He was still conscious of the
fact that the ‘key to German unity’ lay in the Kremlin.1438 That key was to
be handed to him in February 1990. The reasons for this fundamental
change in Soviet policy lay not only in the loss of control over events in
the GDR but in the close interaction of the accelerating collapse of the
centre's empire in Eastern Europe – the external empire – with the increas-
ing likelihood of a disintegration of the internal empire, that is, of the So-
viet Union itself. That interaction occurred in conditions of a radicaliza-
tion of Soviet domestic politics.
Yielding the Key to German Unity
The radicalization of Soviet domestic politics in the winter of 1989 and
1990 – a winter of discontent – occurred at four different levels: the top
political leadership; the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the
Supreme Soviet; the communist party; and public opinion in Moscow,
Leningrad and other big cities. The move towards more radical reform in-
cluded economic components but its primary rationale was political. As a
result, the gap between political liberalization and economic restructuring
1436 ‘Gemeinsame Mitteilung’, p. 1249.
1437 Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, pp. 99-100.
1438 Interview with Teltschik. On 21 December Mitterrand visited East Berlin. The
French president's ambiguity about the purpose of the visit was described above,
xxx in the context of his talks with Gorbachev on 6 December, p. 526. The un-
folding events had made the visit even more problematic. Since there was nei-
ther a French attempt nor indeed the possibility for France to stabilize the Mod-
row government and delay German unification, there is no point here to dwell
on the visit.
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
576
became wider and domestic political conflicts more acute. These conflicts
were exacerbated by nationality conflicts and independence movements in
the Baltic republics and Azerbaijan.
The form which the new dynamics took centred on the question as to
whether the Soviet Union should and, indeed, could achieve a transition
from a totalitarian one-party state to a pluralist democracy; from a system
dominated by a leader appointed by a party holding the monopoly of pow-
er to one with a popularly elected president; from a unitary, centralized
state to a genuine federation with power allocated to the union republics;
from a command economy and state ownership to private property and the
market; from arbitrary rule of the party to a system based on the rule of
law; from the privileged role of the military in the political system and re-
source allocation favouring the military-industrial complex to civilian con-
trol of the armed forces and defense conversion; and from Gleichschal-
tung to an active civil society. The process, as described earlier, had been
set in motion by Gorbachev’s campaign for glasnost after the Chernobyl
disaster in April 1986. It continued at the January 1987 Central Committee
plenum and the June 1988 Party conference, with their emphasis on de-
mocratization, in October 1988 with the emasculation of the central party
apparatus and in the March 1989 elections to the First Congress of Peo-
ple’s Deputies. The course of action to be decided by Gorbachev and his
advisors in 1990 was whether he should (1) take the lead in this historic
change and replace his power and authority derived from the communist
party by popular legitimacy, expunge article 6 from the Soviet constitution
that enshrined the CPSU’s monopoly of power, force a split of the party,
lead a new radical reform-socialist or social-democratic movement and,
with its backing, contest free elections for the presidency, (2) stand aloof
from party politics and popular elections and shift the centre of gravity to
an executive presidency elected by the Congress of People’s Deputies or
(3) retain his office of General Secretary of the CPSU and continue to
work for reform within the party and, through it, in the country.
‘What on earth should I do?’, Gorbachev asked Yakovlev in exaspera-
tion on 26 January. ‘[Turmoil in] Azerbaijan and Lithuania, [in Russia,
right-wing] radicals on the one hand, and social democrats on the other.
The blows are becoming ever more painful. The economy is adrift. The
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people are at the end of their rope.’1439 Yakovlev replied that the time for
decisive action had come and that Gorbachev should take charge of a
comprehensive reform effort in political, economic, and nationality af-
fairs.1440 This was essentially the course of action favoured by many par-
ticipants at the founding conference of the Democratic Platform of the CP-
SU, held on 20-21 January, with 405 party members from 78 cities attend-
ing, including the leaders of the Interregional Group from the Congress of
People's Deputies; representatives of strike committees from mining areas;
Yakovlev and Yeltsin; presidential advisor Shakhnazarov; political scien-
tist Fyodor Burlatsky; sociologist Tatyana Zaslyavskaya; economists
Nikolai Shmelev and Gavril Popov; historian Yuri Afanasyev; legal schol-
ar and (later Leningrad mayor) Anatoli Sobchak; and the future leader of
Russia's Democratic Party, Nikolai Travkin.1441 In the Politburo meeting
of 29 January, the CC secretary for economic administration Nikolai
Slyunkov proposed reform measures along the lines of Stanislav Shatal-
in’s plan for the radical reconstruction of the Soviet economy.1442 How-
ever, as on almost any other question of domestic politics and economic
affairs, Gorbachev adopted a middle course of action.
In the political domain, prior to a crucial Central Committee meeting,
first scheduled for the end of January and then held on 6 February, Gor-
bachev endorsed the abolition of article 6; objected to the postponement of
a party congress to be held in July 1990 for the adoption of a new party
program; replaced several regional party bosses; met with a group of mili-
tant miners; and permitted the largest-ever rally to take place in the Soviet
Union on the day before the CC plenum in the large square around Hotel
Moskva, with more than 200,000 people demonstrating for reform. How-
ever, he rejected the idea that a new executive president be chosen by di-
rect popular elections, opting instead for elections to that office by the
Congress of People's Deputies. In the economic realm, he instructed prime
1439 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 330. Literally, ‘What should I do?
What should I do?’
1440 Ibid.
1441 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 404; on the organization and composition of
the conference, see Matlock, Autopsy of an Empire, pp. 306-7.
1442 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 333.
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minister Ryzhkov to supplement essentially traditional government reform
measures by some ‘elements’ of Slyunkov's reform program.1443
The sense of malaise and apparent intractability of mounting problems
in what came known to be the winter of discontent was deepened by the
nationality problem. In Azerbaijan, the National Front, legalized by party
secretary Abdul Rakhman Vezirov a few months earlier, took advantage of
the Nagorny Karabakh issue to gain a mass following and began to force
out communist officials in several cities.1444 On 13 January, in a repetition
of the massacres that had taken place in the industrial city of Sumgait two
years earlier, mobs attacked apartment houses in which Armenian families
were living and killed the occupants. Women and children were thrown
from upper-story windows to their death on the pavement below. The Na-
tional Front took control of key points in Baku and, in effect, began to
seize control of the republic. On 15 January, Moscow ordered troops into
the area and, starting on the night of 19 January, entered Baku and used
force to restore both law and order and the communist party to power, ar-
resting the leaders of the National Front and dissolving informal organiza-
tions. The intervention, however, neither succeeded in suppressing the
drive for independence in Azerbaijan nor did it stifle unrest in its
Nakhichevan exclave beyond Armenian territory or mitigate the conflict
between the two Transcaucasian republics. Civil unrest and independence
movements also continued in neighbouring Georgia.
The problem in the Baltic republics could not be defused in the same
manner, not even temporarily: in contrast to the violence in Azerbaijan,
the mass demonstrations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were peaceful,
providing no obvious pretext for military intervention. Its moral and legal
basis would have been extremely shaky because of the secret protocols at-
tached to the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact and the accession of the Baltic States
1443 Ibid. It is difficult to say, of course, what the outcome of popular elections for a
presidential contender campaigning on a radical reformist platform would have
been. At that crucial juncture of Soviet history, Gorbachev's popularity was on
the decline, but the argument can be made that this was due primarily to percep-
tions of his indecisiveness. According to polls conducted by the reputable VT-
sIOM polling organization, it was not until May 1990 that Yeltsin, his likely
main competitor, moved ahead of him in the popular standing; Reitingi Borisa
El'tsina i Mikhaila Gorbacheva po 10-bal'noi shkale (Moscow: VTsIOM,
1993); as quoted by Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 203.
1444 This summary of the events in Azerbaijan follows the account by Matlock, Au-
topsy of an Empire, pp. 301-4.
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to the Soviet Union in 1940 under duress. The United States had never
recognized their incorporation in the USSR. Public opinion in that country
and in Western Europe might look with equanimity upon the use of force
against ‘uncivilized’ Moslem nationalists in the distant Transcaucasia but
certainly not in a Western-oriented part of Europe. However, a decision in
Moscow about what, if anything, to do about the Baltic problem had to be
taken in the winter of discontent after the Lithuanian CP had declared its
independence. Given the monolithic, vertical structure of both the Soviet
Union and the CPSU, that is, the lack of a genuine federalism in the state
and the party, such a declaration by a republican CP was tantamount to a
declaration of independence of the country. This was clearly recognized
by the centre.
On 3 January Vadim Medvedev went to Vilnius to prepare a three‑day
visit, with Gorbachev and Politburo and deputy prime minister Yuri
Maslyukov at the head of a 40‑member CC delegation. Their purpose was
to persuade the Lithuanian CP to reverse its secession from the CPSU and
to retract its demands for Lithuanian independence. The Soviet party
chief’s mission to Vilnius from 11 to 13 January predictably failed to con-
vince the Lithuanians that their future would be better served by staying in
the union – a failure made even more complete by his utter incomprehen-
sion of the very essence of nationalism. ‘Gorbachev,’ as Chernyaev ob-
served, ‘deep down could not reconcile himself to a secession of the Baltic
republics [from the Soviet Union]. He sincerely believed that in particular,
the population of the [Baltic] republics would suffer. He was therefore
convinced that extremists and separatists had turned the people's
heads.’1445 In his memoirs, Gorbachev still betrays utter incomprehension
of Baltic nationalism, repeating the same arguments he had made in Vil-
nius. He scornfully dismissed the Balts’ economic grievances, saying that,
in comparison to the rest of the Soviet Union, the superior labour produc-
tivity of the Baltic states had been made possible by ‘immense invest-
ments from the union budget’ and by ‘qualified specialists and workers
from Russia and other union republics,’ and that the three republics’ eco-
nomic development had been assisted by ‘the delivery of fuel and energy
free of charge [sic]’.1446 Against the background of a general economic
crisis in the Soviet Union and with the people of the Baltic countries com-
1445 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 339.
1446 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 1, p. 511. By the (absurd) ‘free of charge’ claim Gor-
bachev perhaps meant that, given the fact that the Baltic union republics were
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paring their economic fortunes with that of the neighbouring Finns and
Swedes, the appeals to economic rationality remained unconvincing. The
drive for Baltic independence thus remained and thereby the threat to the
existence of the Soviet internal empire.
On 22 March, this threat was considered serious enough for the Polit-
buro to discuss the Lithuanian problem and to support a plan by Gen.
Valentin Varennikov that closely resembled the script for the Warsaw
Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968: appeals for help by
pro-Soviet factions, invasion of Lithuania by three regiments, isolation of
the legally elected leadership in Vilnius and the creation of a presidential
regime with emergency powers. For reasons that are still unclear, the ap-
parent Politburo consensus on the use of force (‘Yakovlev and Medvedev
said nothing’) failed to be implemented, and military intervention as a
means for bringing the Baltic republics to heel was temporarily replaced
by severe economic pressure.1447
To return to the centre’s problem of external empire, the acceptance of
German unification was – figuratively speaking – squeezed in between the
use of force in Baku and contemplation of the use of force in Vilnius, and
between pressures for more radical democratic political and economic re-
form and reinstitution of the old methods to maintain Soviet power. It
would be an exaggeration to say that the German problem had become a
side issue but it certainly was not on top of the Soviet leaders’ agenda in
the winter of discontent. Nevertheless, on 26 January, Gorbachev con-
vened a small circle of top decision makers in his Central Committee of-
fice to discuss it. In addition to the Soviet party chief and Chernyaev, his
part of the Soviet Union and its internal market, no export duties were levied on
oil and gas.
1447 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 337. Chernyaev was present at the
Politburo meeting. Soviet ground forces commander Varennikov can be consid-
ered as one of the most uncompromising generals in favor of the use of force in
order to maintain the internal empire. He was in charge in January 1991 when
an attempt was made to overthrow the legitimately elected Lithuanian leaders
and institutions. On that occasion, soldiers fired on demonstrators at the Vilnius
television tower. At least fourteen people were killed and hundreds injured: they
were shot, beaten, or crushed under tank treads. Varennikov was also solidly be-
hind the August 1991 coup attempt, again advocating the use of force to dis-
lodge Yeltsin from the White House; see Brian Taylor, ‘The Soviet Military and
the Disintegration of the USSR’, paper (unpubl.) presented in the Olin Critical
Issues Series, The Collapse of the Soviet Union, Harvard University, 11 Febru-
ary 1997.
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personal aide on foreign policy, the participants included prime minister
Ryzhkov; foreign minister Shevardnadze; New Political Thinking archi-
tect and Politburo international affairs coordinator (kurator) Yakovlev;
KGB chief Kryuchkov; arms control adviser to Gorbachev and former
chief of staff Akhromeev; ID head Falin; personal aide to Gorbachev for
relations with the socialist countries Shakhnazarov; and ID deputy head
Fyodorov, responsible for these countries at the ID. The discussion,
‘tough’ at times, lasted four hours and a ‘number of most important deci-
sions were adopted’.1448
One of the questions to be decided was the problem as to who, in the
conditions of an accelerated drive towards German unity, should be the
Soviet leadership’s main addressee for the management of the problem,
East Germany or West Germany; if the former, who in that country – the
Modrow government, Gysi’s PDS, or the Roundtable? If it was to be
Bonn, should then the negotiation partner be chancellor Kohl and the rul-
ing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP, or the opposition SPD? Chernyaev
was the first to speak, emphasizing that the Soviet Union no longer had
any influence or political forces in the GDR on which it could count.
Thus, West Germany should be the main addressee of Soviet policy. And
in that country, he continued, one should deal with the chancellor, not with
the opposition. His rationale was that the social democrats were politiciz-
ing and using the issue in their electoral campaign. Kohl, on the other
hand, was aiming at German unification as part of a European process,
was in close association with his NATO partners and more reliable in his
personal relations with Gorbachev. He even went as far as arguing against
inviting Modrow, the East German prime minister, for a visit to Moscow,
let alone SED party chief Gysi, the head of a ‘party that de facto no longer
exists and that has no future’.1449 Yakovlev, Falin, Shakhnazarov and Fyo-
dorov disagreed and opted for political contacts and cooperation with the
1448 Alexander Galkin and Anatoli Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu i tol'ko pravdu. Razmysh-
leniia po povodu vospominanii’, Svobodnaia mysl, No. 3 (1994), p. 26;
Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 346; interviews with Chernyaev and
Shakhnazarov. In his memoirs, Falin (Erinnerungen, p. 489) lists Yazov as one
of the participants, but in his interviews with this author Chernyaev has emphat-
ically denied that this is correct. Shakhnazarov (Tsena svobody, p. 125) lists
Ivashko (presumably Vladimir Ivashko, the party chief in Ukraine), as one of
the participants, but this, too, appears to be incorrect. As usual, the written ac-
count and later oral clarifications by Chernyaev are more reliable.
1449 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 346.
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SPD. Shevardnadze and Ryzhkov (with the reservation of ‘let's not give
everything to Kohl’) in essence supported Chernyaev. Kryuchkov was
prepared to align himself with the opinion of the majority but agreed that
the state structures of the GDR were dissolving and that there was no one
on whom the Soviet Union could base its policies.
An important decision adopted at the meeting, in accordance with a cor-
responding proposal by Chernyaev, was the creation of a negotiation
framework of six countries, comprising the two Germanys and the four
occupation powers with special rights and responsibilities in Germany. A
final decision was to have Akhromeev draw up plans for the withdrawal of
troops from Germany.
Gorbachev summarized the results of the meeting as follows:
– To form a Group of Six.
– To orient policies toward Kohl but not to ignore the SPD.
– To invite Modrow and Gysi.
– To maintain close contact with London and Paris.
– To prepare the withdrawal of forces from the GDR.1450
In the context of decision-making theory at the micro-level and explana-
tion of the collapse of empire at the macro-level of analysis, three aspects
of the meeting deserve emphasis. First, the decisions that, in essence,
amounted to the consent to German unification were made by an ad hoc
committee, not by one of the established institutions, such as the Politburo
or the Defense Council. Second, as corroboration of the first point and as
an indication of the severe internal crisis and the pre-eminence of domes-
tic politics over foreign policy, two Politburo meetings held at about that
time did not address the German problem: the only agenda item of the PB
meeting of 22 January was the draft of a new CPSU platform, and the PB
session of 29 January dealt with the precarious state of finance and the
creation of a presidential office.1451 Third, one of the institutions that, in
the era of the dominance of the ideological and imperial paradigm, would
have been represented first and foremost was missing altogether at the
meeting: the defense ministry. There has been controversy as to whether
the ad hoc group, or any other group, was authorized by the PB and insti-
tutionalized specifically to deal with the German crisis. Falin unambigu-
1450 Ibid., p. 347. Contrary to the assertion by Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified,
p. 163, the issue of united Germany's membership in NATO does not appear to
have been discussed.
1451 Ibid., pp. 327 and 332.
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ously states that, as early as at the time of the opening of the Berlin wall,
an executive, emergency or crisis committee (Krisenstab) had been
‘formed upon my initiative’.1452 He claims that the following leaders par-
ticipated in its first meeting: Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev,
Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov, Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov. He
also states that the committee met only once more in its entirety. However,
no date is given for the first or any subsequent meeting, and it is likely that
the ID chief got confused here. In a rebuttal of Falin’s portrayal,
Chernyaev denies (‘does not remember’) the existence of such a Krisen-
stab and correctly states that Gorbachev's memoirs contain no reference to
it.1453
What is most likely behind the controversy over the emergency com-
mittee is, to put it in precise political science terminology, sour grapes.
The decisions adopted by the ad hoc committee and subsequent decisions
on the German problem were a direct challenge to the once influential ger-
manisty and the once so powerful International Department of the Central
Committee. Falin happened to be an exponent of both. They contradicted
the interests and advice of ID first deputy head Fyodorov, another special-
ist in German affairs, who was untiring in his effort to get a campaign un-
der way in the Soviet Union and abroad against German unification1454
and who, in the ad hoc meeting, still declared: ‘No one in the Federal Re-
public wants reunification.’1455 They also ran counter to the positions
adopted by Bondarenko, the chief of the MFA’s Third Department, and
Gorald Gorinovich, the head of the Fourth Department (restructured to
deal with the dwindling number of socialist countries), all of whose cau-
tion and conservatism was disregarded by Gorbachev and Shevard-
nadze.1456 ‘It was exasperating’, Falin later complained bitterly, ‘to see
how Gorbachev would express his definitive agreement with a particular
issue in my presence while his foreign minister would do exactly the op-
posite, without Gorbachev putting him into place.’1457
Gorbachev's acceptance of German unification became a matter of in-
ternational public record four days after the ad hoc meeting, when Mod-
1452 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 489.
1453 Galkin and Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu i tol'ko pravdu’, p. 25.
1454 Interview with Grigoriev.
1455 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 346.
1456 Interviews with Kvitsinsky and Tarasenko.
1457 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 491.
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row visited Moscow, and was confirmed in the Soviet leader’s talks with
Baker on 9 February, and Kohl and Genscher on 10 and 11 February. Both
privately and publicly, Gorbachev no longer referred to the GDR as the
Soviet Union’s strategic ally and reliable member of the Warsaw Pact to
which no harm would be done. That terminology was irrevocably removed
from the discourse and policy. In private conversation with Modrow, Gor-
bachev instead endorsed the East German government’s hastily construed
plan to lead from a treaty on cooperation and good neighbourliness be-
tween the two German states to a confederation and ultimately to a unified
federal state.1458 Only some faint echo of the previous hard-line approach
reverberated in the meeting. He would not permit Kohl to destabilize the
situation in the GDR, Gorbachev said. Apart from that, the conversation
had a more philosophical – typically Gorbachevian – rather than practical
content. ‘Unfortunately’, Modrow complained in retrospect, ‘Gorbachev is
not the kind of man who would delve deeply into economic problems. In
our consultations on economic problems he always avoided this issue and
transferred it to Ryzhkov. But in doing so, he didn’t in the least commit
himself and failed to provide instructions that Ryzhkov would have to car-
ry out.’1459 As the talks underlined, his endorsement of the Modrow plan
was at least in part predicated on the idea that the SPD would support
it.1460 Whereas this notion was not far-fetched, Gorbachev still harboured
illusions about the 18 March elections, assuming that the East Germans
would vote for the continued existence of the GDR.1461
Publicly, Gorbachev went on record after the meeting with the ac-
knowledgment that pressure was building up for German reunification:
‘Time itself is having an impact on the process and lending dynamism to
it.’1462 Asked about the question of German reunification by an East Ger-
man television reporter, Gorbachev replied:
1458 Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, pp. 119-23. In addition to Gorbachev, the Soviet
participants in the meeting were Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, and Falin.
1459 Ibid. Modrow, in this context, specifically mentioned the problem of Soviet oil
deliveries to the GDR. Gorbachev evaded the issue.
1460 Modrow confirmed this in the interview series conducted by Ekkehard Kuhn in
1993, id., Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit, p. 101.
1461 Ibid.
1462 Francis, X. Clines, ‘Gorbachev Sees a German Union But Warns of “Chaos of
Nihilism”’, New York Times, 31 January 1990.
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Basically, no one casts any doubt upon it. However, the development of
events in the world, in the German Democratic Republic, and in the Soviet
Union requires profound assessment and an analytical approach to a solution
of an issue which is an important aspect of European and world politics.
It was ‘essential,’ however, ‘to act responsibly and not seek a solution to
this important issue in the streets.’ He elaborated on that point and warned
that the ‘chaos of nihilism, the diktat of the crowd’ remained dangerous
obstacles to the East European processes of democratization. He also
warned of the danger of ‘neo‑Nazi excesses’ in the GDR. ‘Attempts by
radical right‑wing forces to incite neo‑Nazi attitudes in the republic are
among the most dangerous obstacles’ to increasing democratization, he
thought. Finally, he invoked ‘Four Power obligations’ for Germany.1463
Gorbachev's remarks on 30 January were correctly interpreted in West
Germany as removing Soviet objections as the single most important im-
pediment to reunification. Probably in reaction to this, Shevardnadze, in
an interview with Soviet reporters, attempted to tone done the conse-
quences of the Gorbachev statements and again to slow down the momen-
tum towards reunification, saying that ‘It is not the idea of reunification
itself but the revival of the sinister shadows of the past associated with it
as well as a possible growth of militarism that are met with apprehension
in the world.’1464 ‘All peoples’, he said, ‘especially those of the Soviet
Union, must have a guarantee that the war threat will never come from
German soil.’ How was this to be achieved? A ‘European‑wide referen-
dum with the participation of the United States and Canada’ should be
held, he suggested, or at least matters should be decided ‘by broad discus-
sion in the parliaments’.1465 It is difficult to say why Shevardnadze tabled
the referendum proposal. Not only was such an idea hardly workable but it
was sure to be rejected, first and foremost by the West German govern-
ment.
The consent in principle to German unification immediately raised the
problem of unified Germany’s international status. Shortly after his return
from Moscow, at a press conference in East Berlin, Modrow presented
some guidelines. Alluding to the image of a common European house,
Modrow stated that his plan was ‘founded on the idea that already in the
stage of confederation, both German states will step by step detach them-
1463 Ibid.
1464 ‘Po povodu pozitsii pravitel'stva GDR’, Pravda, 3 February 1990.
1465 Ibid. (italics mine).
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selves from their alliance obligations toward third countries and attain a
state of military neutrality’. He later reiterated that several conditions had
to be met on the way to unity, including ‘maintenance of the interests and
rights’ of the Four Powers in both Germanys and ‘military neutrality of
both the GDR and the FRG’.1466 Modrow’s remarks, coming so soon after
his Moscow visit, implied that the idea of a neutral Germany had been dis-
cussed with and approved by the Soviet leadership.1467
Soviet acceptance of German unification formed the basis of discussion
in the meetings between Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Baker on 8-9
February.1468 Shevardnadze regretted that unification was arriving faster
than anyone had expected. In fact, it was already a fait accompli: ‘I am
afraid that’s the case, and I’m not sure of any way to avoid it.’ He never-
theless supported the Modrow plan for the process to take place gradually
and in distinct phases. In accordance with his pessimistic view of both his-
tory and world affairs (and perhaps to buttress his ideas for Four Power
negotiations, a peace treaty, a European-wide referendum, or CSCE in-
volvement, whatever the West would accept) he expressed worries about
domestic developments in Germany. The neo-Nazis might gain power.
The right-wing Republikaner were a serious force in the country and
might receive as much as 20 percent of the vote, he thought.
In his talks with Baker, Gorbachev adopted a much more unconcerned
and cooperative stance than his foreign minister. ‘There is nothing terrify-
ing in the prospect of a unified Germany’, he said. He knew that some
countries, such as France and Britain, were concerned about who would be
the major player in Europe. But this was not a Soviet or an American
problem: ‘We are big countries and have our own weight.’ He also re-
ferred to a ‘mosaic’ of opinion in West Germany about unification. Some
1466 ‘Hans Modrow unterbreitet Konzept “Für Deutschland, einig Vaterland”’, Neues
Deutschland, 2 February 1990.
1467 Modrow confirmed this in the interview series conducted by Ekkehard Kuhn in
1993, id., Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit, p. 101. The issue of German
neutrality, or neutralization, versus membership of a united Germany in NATO
will be discussed in the next section.
1468 The account of the meetings between Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Baker is
based on the American memcons of the talks, as summarized by Zelikow and
Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 179-85. Note taker was Dennis Ross. Confirmation
of several points was provided also by Ambassador Jack Matlock, who was
present at the talks, in conversation with this author on 10 February 1997 in
Cambridge, Mass.
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wanted a confederation, others a federation. Opinion was also divided on
NATO membership, some supported it; others favoured neutralism; yet
others preferred a confederation wherein both countries would retain their
alliance memberships until the current alliances were replaced by new
CSCE structures.
Soviet acceptance of German unification as a fait accompli also posed
the problem as to the relationship between its internal and external as-
pects. Two main issues had to be addressed: one concerning the West Ger-
man constitutional provisions for such a contingency, the other the
question as to which of the two aspects should be decided first. On the
first issue, German unity could be achieved on the basis of two constitu-
tional provisions. Article 23 of the Basic Law provided for accession, that
is, there would be no necessity for constitutional revision. The existing
West German political and socio-economic system would simply be ex-
tended to East Germany. A West Germany writ large would be created.
Unification in accordance with article 146, on the other hand, necessitated
convocation of a new constitutional assembly and the adoption of a new
constitution by referendum; this would conceivably have given East Ger-
many and, by extension, the Soviet Union a chance to influence the direc-
tion and outcome of the process.1469 On the second issue, the question to
be decided was whether the internal or the external aspects of German uni-
fication should take precedence, or whether both should be resolved si-
multaneously. Falin’s position and that of his conservative fellow german-
isty in the ID and the MFA was unambiguous. As Falin put it: ‘Unification
– yes, Anschluss – no. Only the socio-economic status of the unified Ger-
many could and should be determined by the Germans. The external, that
is, the military-political conditions of unification were to be decided by
the Four Powers together with the two German states before the FRG and
the GDR were joined.’1470 Furthermore, in Falin's view, ‘the Four Plus
Two formula reflected the correct priorities. Securing European peace had
1469 The exact wording of article 23 is that ‘For the time being, the Basic Law shall
apply in the territory of the Länder. ... In other parts of Germany it shall be put
into force upon their accession.’ Article 146 provides: ‘The Basic Law shall
cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free deci-
sion of the German people comes into force’; Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1987).
1470 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 490 (italics mine).
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to come first; once a satisfactory solution was attained on this aspect, solu-
tion of the other issue would follow promptly.’1471
In retrospect, the emergence and adoption of the Two Plus Four formula
has acquired an almost mythical quality. In the Western context, notably
among American officials involved in the management of the international
aspects of German unification, it has been portrayed as an example of bril-
liant statecraft that originated in the State Department.1472 Chernyaev has
minimized its importance. In an article co-authored with German expert
Alexander Galkin, and in reference to the 26 January ad hoc meeting, he
states that he had been the first to advance this proposal but that Baker, on
many occasions, was to say that the Americans had developed it.1473 In
Russian or post-Soviet controversies over the collapse of the Soviet em-
pire and the loss of East Germany, this question has also become a bone of
contention, pulled in different directions by supporters and critics of Gor-
bachev.1474 Falin, for instance, has vehemently attacked both Gorbachev
and Shevardnadze for mismanaging the issue, conveying the notion that it
had not all been resolved as late as June 1990. Shevardnadze, according to
Falin, had returned from the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Six in East
Berlin, ‘acting like a dzhigit [daring horseman], sitting high on a white
horse’. He appeared exceedingly confident and caused everyone’s hopes
to be rekindled. Chernyaev prepared a press release in the president's
name, in which the significance of the negotiations as a whole and of the
Four Plus Two formula in particular was to be proclaimed. He called She-
vardnadze, read the text to him and the minister approved it except for a
‘slight “specification”’: the Two Plus Four formula was to be preferred.
Chernyaev was outraged, not least because Gorbachev had made it abso-
lutely clear that only the Four Plus Two formula was acceptable. The So-
viet foreign minister justified this change by saying that ‘Genscher really
pleaded for it, and Genscher is a good person’. Nevertheless, despite
Chernyaev's purported intervention, the Two Plus Four formula ‘came into
effect’ and the Soviet Union, as a result, manoeuvred itself into a ‘dead
1471 Ibid., p. 491.
1472 One does get a strong sense of this, for instance, in Zelikow and Rice, Germany
Unified, pp. 167-68. The authors credit Secretary of State Baker’s advisers Den-
nis Ross and Robert Zoellick with having invented the Two Plus Four formula.
1473 Galkin and Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu i tol'ko pravdu’, p. 26.
1474 This controversy is most apparent in Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, pp. 491-92,
and Galkin and Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu i tol’ko pravdu’, pp. 26-27.
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end’.1475 What, then, given the apparent sensitivity of the matter, is its sig-
nificance?
Chernyaev has reduced apparent complexities to their simple essence:
‘The important thing was that it should be possible quickly to design a
successful mechanism that, on the one hand, would grant the Germans the
right to select the path to unification by themselves and, on the other, give
the USSR, USA, England, and France a chance to realize their right to ad-
vance the interests of the international community and their own in the
process of German unification.’1476 As for Falin's portrayal of the alleged
haphazard and unprofessional reversal of the sequence of the numbers in
response to Genscher's pleas, Chernyaev has scathingly dismissed it as a
complete fabrication.1477 ‘[First], no one took any decision on this
question. And it would have been strange if someone had. Second, the div-
ision of the Six into two groups was of a spontaneous character. Some
used the first variant of the “sum”, others – the second. And each, of
course, [used it] with a sub-text.’ Furthermore, he (Chernyaev) ‘could not
have been “outraged” by the transformation of the Two Plus Four formula
because [I] was always indifferent to the sequence of letters, considering
that by itself the sequence could have no real influence on the course of
events.’ As for Gorbachev, he too ‘did not pay any particular attention to
the sequence of the numbers. When he mentioned the formula, he would
use it either way’. As reflected in his talks with chancellor Kohl in
Moscow on 10 February (see below), ‘this corresponded with his position
of principle’.1478 Not quite, perhaps. Gorbachev initially did prefer the
Two Plus Four sequence. Thus, in his talks with Baker, according to the
American record, Gorbachev had asked: ‘I say Four Plus Two; you say
Two Plus Four. How do you look at this formula?’, to which Baker had
replied: ‘Two Plus Four is a better way.’1479
The Soviet consent to German unification occurred most authoritatively
and unequivocally during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow on 10-11
February. Eight days earlier, the West German chancellor had finally re-
ceived a long-awaited letter from the Soviet party leader with the invita-
tion. Upon arrival at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport, the chancellor received
1475 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, pp. 491-92.
1476 Galkin and Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu, i tol’lko pravdu’, p. 26.
1477 Interview with Chernyaev.
1478 Galkin and Chernyaev, ‘Pravdu, i tol'lko pravdu,’ pp. 26-27.
1479 Memcon of the talks, as quoted by Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 182.
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another letter, this one from Baker, summarizing the content of his talks
with the Soviet leaders.1480 When the talks began, therefore, Kohl was
well briefed on the new direction of Gorbachev’s thinking, but uncertain
whether it would be confirmed in his talks with the Soviet leader.
The initial welcome accorded to Kohl by Gorbachev in the latter's
Kremlin office (in the presence of personal assistants Teltschik and
Chernyaev and the interpreters) was cool, and Gorbachev appeared deeply
pensive.1481 Kohl assured Gorbachev of the German people’s empathy
with and support for his reform efforts and, in response to a presentation
by the General Secretary of the problems encountered with perestroika, re-
iterated that the West German government was prepared, as far as possi-
ble, to expand economic relations with the GDR and the USSR. As evi-
dent in the delivery of foodstuffs subsidized by the Bonn government in
January, it was also willing to extend tangible economic assistance.1482
Kohl described the deteriorating conditions in the GDR and the acceler-
ated drive in that part of Germany towards the re-establishment of German
unity. Presumably conscious of international concern about the West Ger-
man government's position concerning the finality of Poland’s western
borders, he clarified that his government had no intention to call in
1480 The letter was handed to him by the West German ambassador in Moscow,
Klaus Blech.
1481 The subsequent account of the visit by Kohl and Genscher to Moscow is based
on Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 253-82; Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp.
137-44; and Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 722-24. − The most extensive account
is that by Kohl. The account, however, contains some inaccuracies on Soviet in-
ternal politics. The two journalists authorized to edit his memoirs (Kai Diek-
mann and Ralf Georg Reuth) quote Kohl to the effect that, ‘After the doors had
closed behind us [in Gorbachev's office in the Kremlin, in the afternoon on 10
February], I [Kohl] congratulated Mikhail Gorbachev on his assumption of the
office of president. In fact, there had been a lively debate about the creation of
this office because not everyone supported the [attendant] concentration of pow-
er. In the end, however, Gorbachev was elected with a large majority of the
votes.’ This portrayal contains two mistakes. Gorbachev was elected president
only with a small majority, with only 59 percent of the members of the Congress
of Deputies voting for him, and the elections did not take place prior to Kohl's
Moscow visit but only one month thereafter, on 15 March 1990; see
Vneocherednyi tretii s’’ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 12-15 marta 1990 g.
Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1990).
1482 The economic and financial aspects of Gorbachev’s acceptance of German uni-
fication and his consent to unified Germany's membership in NATO will be dis-
cussed in context; see below, pp. 539-58.
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question Poland’s current borders but that he wanted the consent of the
German refugees from the areas east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Fur-
thermore, the 1970 Moscow and the 1972 Warsaw treaty had been con-
cluded by the western part of a divided country, not by a united Germany
(the implication of that observation being that only the latter could decide
on the finality of the border). He also told his host that neutralization of a
united Germany would find no acceptance (presumably both domestically
and internationally) and that, as developments after 1918 had shown, any
special international status for Germany would be a historic mistake. Gor-
bachev agreed that the issue of Germany's alliance membership was a cen-
tral problem, and he also endorsed Kohl's interjection that, whereas the
Soviet Union wanted to see its security interests safeguarded, Germany
wanted to regain full sovereignty.
Discussion then turned to developments in the GDR. Gorbachev wanted
to know whether the campaign for the 18 March elections in East Ger-
many was not contributing to a division of society. Kohl rejected that no-
tion and added that a more tranquil development would have been possible
if Honecker had decided to introduce reform measures. With an air of res-
ignation, his interlocutor asserted (quite at variance with the facts) that
time and again he had urged Honecker to do just that, but in vain. He then
wanted to be informed of Kohl’s views on the electoral campaign itself
and was told in response that the starting position of the SPD was better
than that of the other parties. Thuringia and Saxony had traditionally been
strongholds of social democracy and Willy Brandt, Kohl complained, was
criss-crossing East Germany like some bishop blessing his flock, a
metaphor that was countered by Gorbachev with the remark that he
(Kohl), too, wasn’t exactly sitting around at home with folded hands and
that West Germany (the government, presumably) tried to influence East
German affairs through all sorts of channels.
In the course of the conversation, Gorbachev abandoned his detached
demeanour, and the atmosphere became more relaxed. Finally, in what
was obviously a well prepared statement, Gorbachev formally told Kohl:
I believe that there is no divergence of opinion between the Soviet Union, the
Federal Republic and the GDR about unity and the right of the people to
strive for unity and to decide on the further development. There is agreement
between you and me that the Germans themselves have to make their choice.
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The Germans in the Federal Republic and in the GDR themselves have to
know what road they want to take.1483
Gorbachev thus had formally handed to Kohl the key to German unity.
‘This is the breakthrough! Gorbachev is consenting to German unifica-
tion ...’, Teltschik confided to his diary as having been his reaction to Gor-
bachev’s statement.1484 The West German chancellor, too, was immedi-
ately aware of the historic significance of what Gorbachev had said and,
wanting to make sure that there was no misunderstanding, repeated the
Soviet leader’s words. There was no misunderstanding. Teltschik was ‘ju-
bilant’, even though both he and the chancellor refrained from expressing
that or any other emotion.
Not only was Gorbachev handing over the key to German unity, but for
all practical purposes he was doing so unconditionally. He merely elabo-
rated on his formal consent and explained that unification had to occur in
the context of realities, including the fact that there had been a war in
which the people of the Soviet Union had suffered more than any other.
Confrontation and the division now had to be overcome, and he believed
that the Germans in East and West had already demonstrated that they had
learned from history. What about neutrality as a condition for yielding the
key? He knew, Gorbachev said, that German neutrality would be unac-
ceptable for Kohl; that it would be humiliating to the German people; and
that it would appear as if all the contributions the Germans had made to
peace would be ignored. Nevertheless, he still saw a united Germany out-
side the military alliances and disagreed with the notion that at least one
part of Germany could be in NATO, with the other remaining in the War-
saw Pact.1485 Nowhere in the conversation, however, did Gorbachev pose
German neutrality as an inexorable or inalienable end result of unification.
‘Yet another sensation’, Teltschik was to confide to his diary, ‘Gorbachev
does not commit himself to a specific solution; no demand of a price, and
certainly no threat. What a meeting!’1486
What about processes of negotiation and the link between the internal
and external aspects of German unification? The two leaders agreed, in ac-
cordance with what Gorbachev had told Baker, that representatives of the
1483 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 272 (italics mine).
1484 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 140.
1485 On this issue, the accounts by Kohl and Teltschik differ somewhat; for details,
see the next section.
1486 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 141.
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two German states and the Four Powers should find acceptable solutions.
Kohl again rejected an exclusive Four Power framework and Gorbachev
assured his guest: ‘Nothing [will be decided] without you.’1487
The Soviet public was informed of the historic decisions. Earlier, after
Modrow’s visit, it had been confronted with the fact that the leadership
considered German unification inevitable. Now it was being told that the
Germans had the right to decide on the speed and direction of the corre-
sponding process and that, essentially, Moscow would set no precondi-
tions. In fact, the TASS report on the meeting went even farther than what
Gorbachev had said (as reported by Kohl and Teltschik in their published
accounts) but was closer to what Kohl told an international press confer-
ence on the night after the talks. Published on page one of Pravda, the re-
port said:
Gorbachev stated, and the chancellor agreed, that there is at present no diver-
gence concerning the view that the Germans themselves have to solve the
question of unity of the German nation and choose the forms of statehood and
at what time, at what speed, and under what conditions they will realize that
unity.1488
The report also noted correctly Gorbachev’s reference to the realities that
had to be taken into consideration and that the rapprochement between the
two German states should not ‘damage the positive results that have been
achieved in East-West relations and rupture the balance [of power] in Eu-
rope’.1489 Such qualifications, albeit without any reference to the balance
of power in Europe, were publicly reiterated by the West German chancel-
lor at the international press conference. He and Gorbachev had agreed,
Kohl stated, that ‘the German problem can be solved only on the basis of
realities, that is, that it must be embedded in the architecture of all of Eu-
rope. We must take into account the legitimate interests of our neighbours,
friends and partners in Europe and the world’.1490
1487 Ibid., p. 274.
1488 ‘Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva i G. Kolia’, Pravda, 11 February 1990 (italics
mine). On 10 February, late at night, at the Soviet Union's International Press
Center, Kohl had said that Gorbachev had ‘unequivocally agreed that he will re-
spect the decision of the Germans to live in one state and that it is up to the Ger-
mans to decide the timing and the road to unification.’
1489 Ibid.
1490 Craig R. Whitney, ‘Kohl Says Moscow Agrees Unity Issue is Up to Germans’,
New York Times, 11 February 1990.
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In addition to the top private level, the Soviet-West German exchanges
occurred in three other venues. First, Shevardnadze and Genscher held se-
parate talks. In what, according to the West German foreign minister, was
‘obviously coordinated between Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’, the exter-
nal aspects of German unification and the international negotiation process
formed the main topic of the conversation. Genscher, apparently not con-
tradicted by Shevardnadze, proposed using the upcoming (12-13 Febru-
ary) Open Skies foreign ministers’ conference of the member states of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Ottawa to agree on the Two Plus Four (‘in
that order’) format.1491 Second, in the evening of 10 February, in the
Kremlin's Garnet Room, with the members of the German delegation and
some of the major Soviet policy-makers, including Yakovlev and the Ger-
man experts, assembled around the table, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
explained the results of their talks with Kohl and Genscher. Third, conver-
sations took place also during a formal dinner in the St. Catherine’s hall of
the Kremlin.
The last two venues were instructive of Soviet domestic dissonance.
Gorbachev's explanations of the results of his talks with Kohl in the Gar-
net Room were met with utter disbelief by Falin and Bondarenko; the
West German chancellor observed ‘naked horror on their faces’.1492 At the
banquet, the two officials as well as Academician Sergei Kovalev failed to
share the generally relaxed, almost jocular, spirit: Falin looked ‘somber’
and he and the other two did ‘not want to loosen up’.1493 Evidently with a
mixture of pique and irony, Falin told Zagladin that now that the German
problem had been solved, they could leave on pension.1494 It is plausible
to infer from these reactions that the ‘professionals’ at the MFA and ID
had not been informed by Gorbachev about the far-reaching extent of his
concessions and that this was yet another major instance of his brushing
aside their reservations and hesitations. Gorbachev’s supporters made
some efforts at damage limitation. MFA spokesman Gerasimov thus re-
1491 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 723. Whereas Genscher's account of the talks is ex-
ceedingly brief, Shevardnadze's is nonexistent: in his memoirs, he leaves out en-
tirely the 10-11 February Moscow meeting(s), turning directly from a descrip-
tion of his 19 December Brussels speech to his role at the 12-13 February Ot-
tawa conference.
1492 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 275.
1493 Ibid., p. 276. ‘Auftauen’ is the German original.
1494 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 142.
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gretted the ‘bias’ and ‘euphoria’ in West German journalistic and official
comment on the Kohl visit. It was correct, he said, that ‘we have declared
that the Germans themselves have to decide the question of the unification
of the German nation, including its speed, dates, conditions, and provi-
sions’. But this was not the complete picture. The German problem ‘does
not exist in isolation but in a political, historical, geographic, and even
psychological context’.1495
The conservative component at the MFA, however, tried to rescue as
much as they could. In particular, they were intent on dispelling the notion
that a unified German state could be created under the ‘NATO roof’.1496
Furthermore, the traditionalists embarked on a general assault on Gor-
bachev’s policies on the German problem. At the 5-7 February Central
Committee plenary meeting, hard-liner Ligachev, as usual, had taken the
lead. ‘I cannot but mention one other thing’, he announced at the end of
comprehensive criticism of Gorbachev’s policies, ‘the events in Europe’:
We should not overlook the impending danger of the accelerated reunifica-
tion of Germany, or in fact, the engulfment of the German Democratic Repub-
lic. It would be unpardonably short‑sighted and a folly not to see that on the
world horizon looms a Germany with a formidable economic and military po-
tential. Real efforts of the world community, of all democratic forces in the
world, are needed in order to prevent in advance the raising of the issue of the
revision of the post‑war borders and, to put it directly, not to allow a new Mu-
nich. I believe the time has come to recognize this new danger of our era and
tell the party and the people about it in a clear voice. It is not too late.1497
But Ligachev's warnings had come too late to have an impact on Gor-
bachev’s position in the talks with Kohl. The conservatives had already
lost the battle over the internal aspects of German unification as well as
the struggle over the forum of negotiations concerning its external aspects.
From Gorbachev’s perspective and that of West Germany and its allies, the
danger now existed that disaffected, disgruntled, and dissatisfied foreign
ministry and party officials would combine forces with high-ranking mili-
tary officers and the secret police to influence the content of the negotia-
tions among, as they saw it, the Six. Their position was already unambigu-
1495 Press conference in Moscow, reported by DPA (West German news agency)
from Moscow (in German), 12 February 1990.
1496 The term was used by Alexander Bondarenko, ‘A pravda takova,’ Trud, 18
February 1990.
1497 ‘Vystupleniia v preniiakh po dokladu. E. K. Ligachev’, Pravda, 7 February
1990.
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ous on the central issue of the impending negotiations, that is, united Ger-
many’s international status and affiliation with the existing alliances. For
them, Germany’s membership in NATO, in any shape or form, was com-
pletely out of the question.
Gorbachev's Consent to United Germany's Membership in NATO
One of the first indications of Gorbachev’s realization of the complexities
of European security problems that would arise from German unification
had, as mentioned, occurred in his meeting with Genscher on 5 December.
As part of his blistering attack on Kohl’s Ten Points and the West German
government’s idea of establishing a ‘confederation’, he had also asked per-
tinent questions still relating to two German states.1498 Now, however, the
question arose as to fit a united Germany into a European security archi-
tecture. The basic problem, of course, was whether Germany should be
neutral − either in the form of a self-declared commitment or as part of a
Four Power imposition − or through the extension of West Germany’s
treaty relations, including membership in NATO, united Germany would
remain part of the Atlantic alliance.1499 However that basic question was
to be answered, a myriad of subsidiary problems had to be addressed:
1. What should be the role of the United States in Europe, and what
should be the size of its military presence?
2. What, conversely, should be the role of the Soviet Union in European
security affairs?
3. Was it legitimate and, for both East and West Europeans, politically ac-
ceptable to proceed from the premise of equivalency, that is, from the
idea that change in one alliance should be replicated by change in the
other? If, for instance, the Soviet Union were prepared to heed Eastern
European demands and withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe,
should the United States pull back its forces from Western Europe,
too?
7.
1498 See above, xxx pp. 550-52.
1499 Theoretically, a third option existed, that of united Germany being a member of
both Nato and the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev was to suggest that option (xxx see
below, pp. 614-15). How that could conceivably have worked remained obscure.
The joint membership proposal, therefore, was never seriously discussed, let
alone negotiated.
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4. Should both alliances be involved in the management of security is-
sues on the European continent? But what about the Warsaw Pact?
Should that organization be excluded, since historically it had been the
major symbol and instrument of Soviet imperial domination and in
1990 was doomed to oblivion?
5. If the Warsaw Pact were to disintegrate, what should be the status of its
members other than East Germany? Should they be allowed to join
NATO, too, or would the Soviet political and military leaders consider
this to be an unacceptable imposition, if not a provocation? Was it real-
istic to assume that such an option even existed?
6. If, on the other hand, the Warsaw Pact should survive and be involved
in the management of European security issues, how much reform
would be required to make that organization palatable to the new non-
communist countries of Eastern Europe and serve their national inter-
ests?
7. Again assuming the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact, even if
only for a transitional period, what overall force levels and military
equipment should the two alliances have in Europe?
8. What should be the total strength of united Germany’s armed forces,
and to what extent did its size depend on the country’s status, that is,
how much of a difference would it make if Germany were to be neutral
or a member of NATO?
9. What should be the role of nuclear weapons in a new Europe, and what
limits (if any) should be placed on their numbers and delivery vehicles,
and their modernization? Should they be withdrawn from West Ger-
many?
Daunting as these questions were for any international forum to resolve,
they almost paled in comparison with the problems they were likely to
cause in the Soviet domestic political context. Ever since its inception,
NATO had been portrayed by Soviet political leaders and propagandists as
the incarnation of the most aggressive and reactionary tendencies of
‘American imperialism’ and West Germany as the Pentagon’s main stag-
ing post in Europe. Gorbachev, as late as December 1989, had termed the
GDR the Soviet Union's ‘strategic ally’ and a reliable member of the War-
saw Pact to which no harm would come. Now, a few months later, his in-
creasingly unpopular leadership was being called upon not only to impute
peaceful intentions to NATO and allocate to it a constructive security role
in Europe but also to explain why it would be in the Soviet national inter-
est to hand over the GDR to the Western alliance!
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In the era of the New Political Thinking, the military had been asked to
swallow a series of bitter pills, and it had done so in reasonably good
grace. The military in both Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union had tradi-
tionally remained aloof from direct political involvement. But to ask it
now to cooperate in the dismantling of the Soviet Union’s entire strategic
glacis and voluntarily agree to a comprehensive realignment of the mili-
tary balance in Europe could be asking too much. The enormity of the
strategic changes contemplated could catapult the armed forces into politi-
cal action. Acting in conjunction with hard-line factions in the party, the
foreign ministry and the KGB they could conceivably bring down the
whole edifice of the New Political Thinking including its architects. For
Gorbachev and the reformers still committed to him and clamouring for a
radicalization of the reform effort, the problem was compounded by the
likely exorbitant costs of the withdrawal of the approximately 575,000 So-
viet troops still deployed in Eastern Europe. The pull-back of forces, fur-
thermore, raised not only the issue of who was going to pay for that enor-
mous logistical task but also how to integrate the decommissioned officers
and non-commissioned officers in the disintegrating fabric of the Soviet
economy and society.
Understanding Gorbachev’s consent to NATO’s first eastward expan-
sion and the final act in the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Eu-
rope thus necessitates reconstruction not only of the evolution of his own
thinking but also an explanation of why the obvious dangers of a domestic
revolt against his policies failed to materialize. The best starting point is a
reconsideration of the Soviet leadership’s and his attitudes to NATO and to
the role of the United States in Europe.
Gorbachev and the Atlantic Alliance
In February 1990, Shevardnadze accurately was to acknowledge that until
‘quite recently our aim was to oust the Americans from Europe at any
price’.1500 Indeed, consistently throughout the post-war period, the Soviet
leaders had adhered to that aim. For instance, at the Twenty-third CPSU
1500 E. Shevardnadze, ‘V mire vse meniaetsia s golovokruzhitel’noi bystrotoi’,
Izvestiia, 19 February 1990. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of Soviet
and Russian attitudes, see Hannes Adomeit, ‘The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet
and Russian Perspectives’, in Neil Malcolm, ed., Russia and Europe: An End to
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Congress in 1966 Shevardnadze’s predecessor at the foreign ministry
(Gromyko) reminded Washington that president Roosevelt had given a
commitment at the Yalta conference in February 1945 that American
troops would be withdrawn from Europe within two years. ‘Ten times two
years have passed’, he exclaimed indignantly, ‘but the American army is
still in Europe and by every indication claims a permanent status here.’ He
also warned the United States that ‘the peoples of Europe are having their
say and will have their say on this score’.1501 Kvitsinsky reiterated his
chief’s complaints a decade and a half later. In an intemperate outburst to
his American counterpart in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF) he snapped: ‘You have no business in Euro-
pe.’1502 What, then, traditionally, were the reasons for Soviet opposition to
the American military presence in Europe?
First, the combination of the economic, technological, and military po-
tential of the United States and West Germany, that is, the build-up of US
forces in Europe and the addition of the Bundeswehr to NATO’s integrated
command structure, significantly strengthened the overall military power
and effectiveness of the Atlantic alliance. NATO gave its European mem-
bers confidence to stand up to Soviet military pressures and placed strin-
gent limits on any increase in Soviet political influence in Western Euro-
pe.
Second, the stability of East Germany was always in doubt as long as
West Berlin was allowed to act as a showcase of the Western system and a
‘thorn in the flesh’ of the GDR. But West Berlin’s viability and security
depended vitally on the United States and its military presence in the city,
in Germany and in Europe. This had been the clear lesson of Stalin’s
Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and Khrushchev’s protracted pressure on
Berlin from 1958 to 1962.
Third, Soviet control in Eastern Europe would have been more effective
without the countervailing power of the Atlantic alliance. Just as a strong
Confrontation? Royal Institute on International Affairs (London: Pinter, 1994),
pp. 31-54.
1501 Gromyko's speech at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress, Pravda, 3 April
1966.
1502 As reported by Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Knopf, 1984), p.
113. Kvitsinsky's outburst would be repeated almost verbatim in September
1988 by Institute on Europe deputy director Vladimir Shenaev, who claimed (to
the present author) that the United States had ‘absolutely no business’ in Euro-
pe; see above, xxx p. 369, fn. 841.
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NATO and a prosperous European Community provided reassurance to its
West European members, it gave the Europeans east of the Elbe river rea-
son to believe that Soviet domination and the division of Europe would
not last forever. Differentiation and dissent could develop more easily in
such conditions. Even today it is difficult to say how much concern there
ever was in Moscow about the risks of a direct military clash between NA-
TO and the Warsaw Pact. It probably did exist at the height of the Berlin
crisis of 1961. Subsequently, however, the Soviet leaders seemed to be
more concerned with the military-political backing NATO could provide
for ideological and economic challenges, such as utilization of the econo-
mic weaknesses and exploitation of the domestic political instabilities in
Eastern Europe.
Finally, while the Atlantic alliance, from Moscow’s perspective, per-
haps served to discourage West Germany from entering upon a separate
German nationalist, militarist, or revanchist road, it was time and again to
commit itself to a European settlement that would end the division of Ger-
many and Europe.1503 Although this position, as noted, was not precisely a
sincere expression of heart-felt sentiment, it nevertheless did have political
consequences and remained a constant irritant to the Soviet leaders for as
long as they supported Germany's division.
Since a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals controlled by the Soviet
Union was impossible to achieve, NATO remained vigorous and viable
and the American military presence could not be eliminated, the Soviet
leaders from Stalin to Chernenko pursued second-best solutions, oscillat-
ing between various strategies. These included the ‘Finlandization’ of Eu-
rope (aimed at restrictions of autonomy for the Europeans and a high de-
gree of Soviet influence over their internal and external behaviour); ‘pan-
European’ security (which included American participation but still pro-
vided for the curtailment and ultimate eradication of US influence); and
variations of de Gaulle’s Europe des patries (emphasis on European state
1503 The most basic NATO commitment, reiterated time and again, was codified in
the report on the ‘Future Tasks of the Alliance’ (‘Harmel report’), adopted at the
December 1967 NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. The ‘German Question’
was defined there as the ‘first and foremost [of all] the central political issues in
Europe’. The report also asserted that no lasting settlement in Europe would be
possible unless the division of Germany and Europe were overcome; see North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Basic Documents (Brussels: NATO Information
Service, 1981), pp. 103-6 (italics mine).
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sovereignty and rejection of the role of ‘peripheral powers’, which in the
Soviet interpretation meant that American soldiers and perhaps even busi-
nessmen would go home but that the Soviet Union, as a European power,
would remain). Gorbachev's Common European Home concept initially fit
the traditional approach of attempting to drive wedges between the United
States and Western Europe. Between 1986 and 1989, however, specialists
at the academic institutes on international affairs and the foreign ministry
under Shevardnadze brought about a transformation in attitudes and policy
on NATO and the US presence in Europe. The Common House itself was
redefined to include the Atlantic dimension.1504 What were the arguments
used by this coalition to gain acceptance for such a comprehensive policy
change?
First, in contrast to Gorbachev's initial emphasis on a separate conti-
nental European identity, the theoreticians of Atlanticism acknowledged
that America ‘is part of Europe, historically, in religion, culturally, and po-
litically’.1505 Second, they noted that there were close economic bonds be-
tween the USA and Western Europe that neither of the two entities could
afford to sever.1506 One analyst even asserted that ‘economically the Unit-
ed States is more a part of Europe than most major European nations’.1507
Third, the links that had evolved in the security sphere were recognized as
being of a fundamental nature. Modern weaponry and armed forces, they
contended, had narrowed the Atlantic Ocean ‘to the size of a Gulf’ and
made the United States as close to the continent militarily ‘as England was
at the turn of the century’.1508 A significant role for the United States in
any future system of European security was therefore ‘logical and neces-
1504 See above, xxx p. 307.
1505 Sergei Karaganov, ‘Amerika v obshcheevropeiskom dome’, Moskovskie novosti,
13 November 1988 (italics mine).
1506 Ibid.
1507 Yuri Davydov, ‘The Soviet Vision of a Common European House’, Paper Deliv-
ered to the International Studies Conference (ISA) in London, 29 March–1 April
1989 (unpublished), p. 10. The author then was deputy director of the USA and
Canada Institute of the Academy of Sciences.
1508 Karaganov, ‘Amerika v obshcheevropeiskom dome’. Davydov similarly wrote:
‘The nuclear age has drastically shrunk the Atlantic, and now America is as
close to Europe in security terms as Great Britain was at the beginning of this
century, or even closer’; Davydov, ‘The Soviet Vision of a Common European
House,’ p. 10.
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sary’.1509 Fourth, despite all the talk about shifting its attention to Asia
and the Pacific, the United States in reality had no plans to quit Europe
and lose influence on the continent. If more attention was now being paid
to the Asian‑Pacific region in Washington, this was not a substitute but a
supplement to its involvement in Europe. Fifth, even if it were politically
desirable to have the United States leave Europe, from a practical point of
view it would be ‘virtually impossible, even by the concerted efforts of all
European nations’.1510 To drive wedges between the two geopolitical enti-
ties could perhaps produce some temporary tactical advantages. But from
a strategic vantage point it would be counterproductive. Sixth, they argued,
the part played by the United States in the system of European security
would serve to preserve, in most cases, the salutary influence of European
powers on American policy and military strategy. European countries had
helped deter Washington from adventurism in international crises, for in-
stance, in the 1973 Middle East war and in Korea, Vietnam and the Tai-
wan Straits, when American policy makers had ‘contemplated the use of
nuclear weapons.’1511 Seventh, a withdrawal of US forces from Europe
could create insecurity among West European countries disadvantageous
to Soviet interests. The Europeans, as a result, might be driven to strength-
en their own defense efforts. Military integration in Western Europe could
be enhanced. And such integration would most likely not be directed
against the United States but would run parallel to US defense efforts and
enhance NATO's military potential.1512 Eighth, an American withdrawal
1509 Karaganov, ‘Amerika v obshcheevropeiskom dome’.
1510 Davydov, ‘The Soviet Vision of a Common European House’, p. 10; similarly
Karaganov, ‘Amerika v obshcheevropeiskom dome’.
1511 Karaganov, ‘Amerika v obshcheevropeiskom dome.’ He author restated this ar-
gument in November 1988 in Brussels at a conference of the Center for Euro-
pean Policy Studies (CEPS) and in December of the same year in Bonn-Bad
Godesberg, at the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, a politically and economically
independent forum initiated by industrialist Hans Körber; Bergedorfer
Gesprächskreis, ed., Das gemein-same europäische Haus aus der Sicht der Sow-
jetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Protocol of the 86th round of
talks of the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, held in Bonn‑Bad Godesberg, 3‑4 De-
cember 1988 (Hamburg: Körber Stiftung, 1989), p. 78.
1512 Thus Vladimir Baranovsky argued that, in the past, West European military-po-
litical integration had proceeded parallel and in tandem with US military efforts
in Europe; see his Zapadnaia Evropa. Voenno-politicheskaia integratsiia
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1988), pp. 180-84. Baranovsky was
then head of the West European Department at IMEMO.
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could induce European states, acting individually or multilaterally, to pro-
duce and deploy nuclear weapons. De Gaulle, in that view, had ‘under-
stood before anyone else that, if the Americans were to leave Europe, the
French would need nuclear weapons [the force de frappe] to balance the
colossal economic might of the FRG.’1513 Finally, in extension of the pre-
vious point, the US presence had served as a restraint on West German nu-
clear ambitions. If the Americans were to dismantle their military presence
in Europe, Bonn could demand access to or develop its own nuclear
weapons.1514 To summarize, whatever the nuances and the merits of views
adopted, the advocates of the New Thinking agreed that the effects of a
withdrawal of the United States would be ‘destabilizing in security
terms’.1515
Such perceptions were endorsed by Gorbachev as early as 1986. In
talks with West German foreign minister Genscher, he said that he had no
wish to undermine NATO: ‘We are of the opinion that, given the alliances
that have taken shape, it is essential to strengthen those threads whose sev-
erance is fraught with the danger of a rupture of the world fabric.’1516 To
Henry Kissinger, in January 1989, he expressed the opinion that the Euro-
peans needed the participation of the USSR and the USA in the ‘all‑Euro-
pean process’. Stability in Europe was a ‘common interest’.1517 Similarly,
during his visit to Bonn, in June 1989, he told his German hosts that the
Joint Soviet‑German Declaration
1513 Radomir G. Bogdanov, ‘Glavnyi protivnik – inertsiia gonki vooruzhenii’, SShA:
Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, No. 10 (1988), pp. 62-63. Bogdanov was the
deputy head of the Institute on the USA and Canada (and known to be a KGB
colonel). His concern about the potentially destabilizing effects of an American
troop withdrawal was expressed by him also at the MFA's July 1988 Scientific-
Practical Conference; see Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, No. 15
(August 1988), p. 24.
1514 Bogdanov in conversation with this author, in Moscow, 4 October 1988.
1515 Davydov, ‘The Soviet Vision of a Common European House’, p. 10; and
Karaganov, Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, 86th session, Das gemeinsame eu-
ropäische Haus, p. 78.
1516 Soviet News (London), No. 23 (July 1986).
1517 In talks with former Western political leaders and current members of the Trilat-
eral Commission, including former French president Giscard d’Estaing,
Japanese prime minister Nakasone and US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in
January 1989 (in response to a question by Kissinger); Pravda, 19 January
1989.
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does not demand that you, or we, should renounce our uniqueness or weaken
our allegiance to the alliances. On the contrary, I am confident that maintain-
ing [this allegiance] in our policies will serve to consolidate the contribution
of each state to the creation of a peaceful European order as well as to shape a
common European outlook.1518
In Gorbachev’s perceptions, the prospect of German unification enhanced
rather than detracted from the importance of the two military alliances.
‘Now is not the time to break up the established international political and
economic institutions’, he told visiting French Foreign Minister Roland
Dumas shortly after the opening of the Berlin wall. ‘Let them be trans-
formed, taking into account internal processes, let them find their place in
the new situation and work together.’1519 Similarly, in a briefing for the
leaders of the Warsaw Pact on the Soviet‑American summit meeting on
Malta in December 1989, he stated that the two alliances ‘will be pre-
served for the foreseeable future’ because they could make a ‘contribution
to strengthening European security’ by becoming a bridge between the
two parts of Europe.1520
It could be argued that the fact that Gorbachev publicly allocated a pos-
itive role to the Atlantic alliance in European security affairs – a step un-
precedented for a Soviet leader – predetermined Soviet consent to mem-
bership of a unified Germany in NATO. There is some validity to this ar-
gument. However, the role that he was prepared to grant to both alliances
at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 was intimately connected
with the ‘post-war realities’ and the existence of not one but two German
states. The question to be decided in the spring of 1990 was whether NA-
TO should still be regarded as a stabilizing factor in the changed condi-
tions of German unification, the impending disappearance of the GDR and
a crumbling Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev’s still thought so but he continued to
cling to the notion of two alliances in Europe and avoided as long as pos-
sible to commit himself on the issue of Germany’s alliance membership.
On the latter issue, he was under severe conflicting pressures. The main-
stays of the imperial system and the germanisty flatly rejected the idea of
an extension of NATO to the eastern part of Germany, as did the East Ger-
1518 ‘Vizit M. S. Gorbacheva v FRG. Rech’ M. S. Gorbacheva’, Pravda, 13 June
1989.
1519 Bill Keller, ‘Gorbachev Urges West to Show Restraint on Turmoil in Eastern
Europe’, New York Times, 15 November 1989 (italics mine).
1520 Pravda and Izvestiia, 5 December 1989 (italics mine).
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man government until it was replaced in the elections of 18 March. Equal-
ly insistently, increasingly in the spring of 1990, he was pressured first by
the three Western allies and West Germany, and then also by the new East
German government, to allow that extension to occur.
The first major opportunity to set in stone the Soviet position on securi-
ty matters presented itself in the 26 January ad hoc meeting. Gorbachev
failed to use this opportunity.1521 Another possible occasion was the visit
by East German prime minister Modrow to Moscow on 30 January. Again
the matter was left surrounded by vagueness and indecision. The East Ger-
man prime minister certainly was committed to German neutrality. This
was evident in his four-stage plan from confederation to German unity,
which, as cited above, posited ‘military neutrality of the GDR and the
FRG on the road to federation.’1522 Modrow confirmed his commitment to
this goal at a press conference in East Berlin shortly after his return from
Moscow. German unification, he said, was intimately connected with the
idea of building a Common European Home. In constructing that new
home, he continued, one
has to proceed from the idea that already in the stage of confederation, both
German states will step by step detach themselves from their obligations of al-
liance toward third countries and attain a state of military neutrality.1523
PDS chief Gysi carried the neutrality ball several yards farther downfield.
In accordance with the proceedings at the ad hoc meeting, he had been in-
vited to Moscow and on 2 February held talks with Gorbachev, Yakovlev
and Falin. In a subsequent interview, Gysi reported that he and Gorbachev
had been of one mind on the point that, at the end of any reunification pro-
1521 See above, xxx pp. 583-85.
1522 Text as published in Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, Appendix 6, pp. 186-88; see
above, xxx p. 588.
1523 ‘Hans Modrow unterbreitet Konzept “Für Deutschland, einig Vaterland”’, Neues
Deutschland, 2 February 1990 (italics mine); see above, xxx p. 588. Apparently
based on the American memcon of the meeting, Zelikow and Rice (Germany
United, p. 181) write that Shevardnadze had told Baker on 8 February in
Moscow that the requirement that united Germany not only be neutral but also
demilitarized had not been in the original Modrow plan but had been added in
Moscow. Modrow had feared that if he had proposed this additional require-
ment, it would have spelled the end for him politically. This account is confus-
ing: neither Modrow's plan nor his explanations of the plan contain the require-
ment of a disarmed neutral Germany. It was Gysi who would raise the disarma-
ment issue.
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cess, Germany not only had to be neutral but demilitarized.1524 The TASS
report on the Gysi‑Gorbachev meeting, however, did not contain this re-
quirement. It only recorded that Gorbachev had struck a balance between
support for the GDR as a sovereign state and recognition of the momen-
tum towards German unity.1525 The Soviet leadership, it would appear,
was intent on keeping its options open. In fact, there was ambiguity about
what had actually been agreed upon between Gorbachev and Gysi, and be-
tween the Soviet leader and the East German prime minister. Gorbachev,
by supporting the Modrow plan, appeared to have bound himself to the
goal of neutralization. However, both he – and again the Soviet media –
subsequently failed to confirm this. Furthermore, no sooner had Gysi
added the disarmament requirement that Modrow backed away from Ger-
man neutrality altogether. At the World Economic Forum in Davos as well
as in interviews with German and foreign journalists he said that he had
not meant the neutralization of Germany to be a precondition for unity but
simply an ‘idea for dialogue’.1526
The ambiguities persisted in Baker’s meetings with Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze on 8-9 February. The Soviet foreign minister did not push
the idea of neutralization, telling his American counterpart only that
Moscow had once supported the idea of a unified Germany, but of a neu-
tral unified country, and that a united Germany could not be adapted to the
alliances as they now existed. In the same way as he had previously wor-
ried about the possible rise of right-wing and neo-Nazi forces, he was now
anxious about the danger of a militarized Germany.1527
1524 Gysi interview with Washington Post, 4 February 1990; see also the report in
the PDS newspaper, ‘Nicht nur Neutralität, sondern Demilitarisierung,’ Neues
Deutschland, 5 February 1990.
1525 ‘Beseda v TsK KPSS’, Pravda, 5 February 1990.
1526 ‘Modrow: Vorschläge sind ein Angebot zum Dialog’, Neues Deutschland, 5
February 1990. Yet he did not completely abandon his idea. Thus, he pointed to
international responses which had supported it. He also stated that Oskar
Lafontaine, the prime minister of the Saarland and potential SPD candidate for
chancellor, had called his proposal worthy of consideration.
1527 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 180. In his memoirs, Baker fails to re-
port Shevardnadze’s views on the issues of German neutralization and demilita-
rization; The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 202-5.
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Gorbachev, in his talks with Baker, was less concerned about such dan-
gers than his foreign minister:
Basically, I share the direction of your thinking [on the favourable possibili-
ties of Soviet-American cooperation to preserve peace]. The process is under
way. We have to adjust to this process. We have to adjust to this new reality
and not be passive in ensuring that stability in Europe is not upset. Well, for
us and for you, regardless of the differences, there is nothing terrifying in the
prospect of a unified Germany ... For France and for Britain, the question is
who is going to be the major player in Europe. We have it easier. We are big
countries and have our own weight.1528
Nevertheless, he saw advantages to having American troops in Germany
(and Europe): ‘We don't really want to see a replay of Versailles, where
the Germans were able to arm themselves. ... The best way to constrain
that process is to ensure that Germany is contained within European struc-
tures.’1529
Earlier in the conversation, Baker had assured Gorbachev that, if Ger-
many were to remain part of NATO, ‘there would be no extension of NA-
TO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.’1530 That terse
statement was to play an important part several years later in Moscow’s
vehement Russian opposition to the eastward enlargement of NATO to
embrace former member countries of the Warsaw Pact and ex-republics of
the Soviet Union (e.g. the Baltic States). It is exhibit number one in the
Kremlin’s prosecution of the case against NATO enlargement to the effect
that, in 1990, Western leaders had given ‘clear commitments’, ‘firm guar-
antees’ and ‘categorical assurances’ that such a step was ruled out. The
case is exceedingly weak.1531 The Kremlin, evidently deliberately, is con-
fusing the issue. As Jack Matlock, the United States ambassador in
Moscow and privy to the Baker-Gorbachev and Baker-Shevardnadze talks
has stated: ‘All the discussions in 1990 regarding the expansion of NATO
1528 Ibid., p. 205 (italics mine).
1529 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 184.
1530 Ibid., p. 182 (italics mine).
1531 The claim that Western leaders had made solid pledges that Nato would not ex-
pand eastwards, including beyond the territory of the former GDR, are a myth –
one, however, that continues to be difficult to dispel, no matter how much evi-
dence may be adduced in refutation. Given the political importance of the myth,
the issue will be explored in detail below, xxx pp. 656-61.
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jurisdiction were in the context of what would happen to the territory of
the GDR.’ 1532
What about other Western leaders? Did any of them give Gorbachev
guarantees or assurances that there would be no NATO enlargement be-
yond the former GDR? Foreign minister Genscher’s speech ten days prior
to the Baker talks in Moscow can be taken to be a commitment of sorts.
On 31 January, in a speech in Tutzing near Munich, he said:
NATO should unambiguously declare: Whatever may happen in the Warsaw
Pact, an expansion of the territory of NATO to the east, that is, closer to the
borders of the Soviet Union, will not occur. Such a security guarantee is of
importance for the Soviet Union and its behavior. The West must also act up-
on the understanding that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German uni-
fication process should not be allowed to lead to an impairment of Soviet se-
curity interests. It will require a high degree of statecraft by European [lead-
ers] to create the conditions necessary for this [state of affairs].1533
But what did he mean? First and foremost, his statement applied to the
GDR. This is indicated by his clarification that ‘the integration of that part
of Germany, that today forms the GDR, into the military structures of NA-
TO … would block the German-German rapprochement’.1534 This formu-
lation contained at its core the idea that Germany would continue to be a
member of NATO (so, technically, there would be no ‘enlargement’) but a
special status (Sonderstatus) would be designed for the former GDR terri-
tory. This was precisely the formula to which Genscher agreed during his
visit in Washington on 2 February so as to coordinate positions prior to the
talks of American and German leaders in Moscow, that is, that of Baker on
8-9 February and that of Kohl and Genscher 10 February.
Genscher, however, did adhere to the idea that the Soviet Union should
receive some assurance that NATO would not expand east of the borders
of the GDR. This is evident in his talks with British foreign minister Dou-
glas Hurd on 6 February and with Shevardnadze in Moscow on 10 Febru-
1532 Jack Matlock, ‘Nato Expansion: Was there a Promise?’, Jackmatlock.com,
3.4.2014, http://jackmatlock.com/2014/04/nato-expansion-was-there-a-promise/
(italics mine).
1533 ‘Rede des Bundesministers Genscher anlässlich der Tagung der Evangelischen
Akademie Tutzing, “Zur deutschen Einheit im europäischen Rahmen”, 31. Jan-
uar 1990’, in Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen informiert, Mitteilung für die
Presse, No. 1026/90 (italics mine). Ausdehnung is the term Genscher used for
expansion or enlargement.
1534 Ibid.
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ary. ‘The Russians, he told Hurd, should receive some assurance that,
when for instance the Polish government some day were to leave the War-
saw Pact, it could then not join NATO.’1535 To Shevardnadze he acknowl-
edged: ‘We are conscious of the fact that the adherence of united Germany
to NATO raises complicated questions. For us, however, it is clear: NATO
will not expand eastward.’1536 Abandoning the agreed-upon position with
the United States, Genscher stated: ‘Concerning, incidentally, [the issue
of] non-expansion of NATO, that [principle] applies in general [that is,
beyond the territory of the former GDR].’1537 Genscher thereby expressed
a point of view. He stated his personal opinion. He by no means provided
his Soviet counterpart with a ‘guarantee’, which in any case he was not
authorized to give, neither by the chancellor nor by any of the other top
Western leaders or NATO.
To return to Baker’s talks with the Soviet leadership, the U.S. Secretary
of State asked Gorbachev whether he would rather see an independent
Germany outside of NATO, with no US forces on German soil, or a united
Germany tied to NATO but with assurances ‘that there would be no exten-
sion of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward’. Gorbachev replied that he
was still giving thought to these options. ‘Soon we are going to have a
seminar [a discussion] among our political leadership to talk about all of
these options.’ One thing was clear, however: ‘Any extension of the zone
of NATO is unacceptable.’ It did not help clarity at that point in time that
Baker replied: ‘I agree.’1538 The fog that would surround the Western pos-
ition thickened when Baker remarked at a press conference after his talks
with the Soviet leaders to the effect that the United States favoured a uni-
1535 Mr. Hurd to Sir C. Mallaby (Bonn), No. 85 Telegraphic (WRL o2/1], Confiden-
tial, FCO, 6 February 1990, From Private Secretary to Secretary of State’s call
to Genscher: German Unification, in Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton and
Stephen Twigge, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 3, Vol. 7,
German Unification 1989-1990 (London/New York 2010), p. 262.
1536 Internal German foreign ministry memo about the Genscher-Shevardnadze
talks, quoted by Uwe Klußmann, Matthias Schepp and Klaus Wiegrefe, ‘Ab-
surde Vorstellung’, Der Spiegel, 48/2009, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/
d-67871653.html.
1537 Ibid. (italics mine).
1538 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 183. Jack Matlock, who was present at
the meeting and took his own notes, has confirmed the accuracy of this crucial
exchange in conversation with this author on 10 February 1997 in Cambridge,
Mass.
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fied Germany’s ‘continued membership in, or association with, NA-
TO’.1539
Whatever the contortions of the Western leaders in private and in con-
versation with their Soviet counterparts, no ‘firm guarantee’ was given
andthe issue of NATO enlargement or expansion east of the Oder-Neisse
was never made the subject of negotiation. The issue cropped up here and
there in internal Western discussion. For instance, Baker, in conversation
with Genscher, thought it possible that in the foreseeable future ‘Central
European states [could] join NATO’ to which the German foreign minister
firmly replied that ‘we should at present not touch’ this issue. Equally
readily, the US Secretary of State agreed.1540
As for the Soviet leaders, they fluctuated in their position between a
non-committal attitude (Shevardnadze) and complete rejection of the idea
of united Germany’s membership in NATO (Gorbachev). The Soviet for-
eign minister, at a press conference held immediately prior to the talks
with Kohl and Genscher, stated:
The idea of neutrality is not new. It is a good, fine idea. It was proposed right
after the war ... [We] were always for a united German nation and one Ger-
man people but for a neutral, demilitarized Germany. This was our main prin-
ciple. What is our future position on this issue? Well, today Kohl and Gensch-
er are meeting with Gorbachev. We will try to discuss these issues that are
currently very acute both for Europe and the two German states, and I guess
for the rest of the world.1541
Gorbachev, as noted above, in his meeting with the German chancellor,
was more categorical. He said that he knew that neutrality was not only
unacceptable to him (Kohl) but that it was humiliating to the German peo-
ple.1542 Nevertheless, he envisaged a unified Germany outside the al-
liances, with national armed forces adequate for national defense. He
1539 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Gorbachev Accepts Deep Cuts in Europe’, New York
Times, 10 February 1990 (italics mine).
1540 Internal memo by Frank Elbe, the German foreign ministry’s political director
Vermerk des Leiters des Ministerialbüros, Elbe, vom 26. März 1990 über das
Gespräch von Bundesaußenminister Genscher mit US-Außenminister Baker am
21. März in Windhoek, in Andreas Hilger, ed., Diplomatie für die deutsche Ein-
heit. Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amts zu den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehun-
gen 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), p. 113.
1541 Excerpts from the press conference as published in Pravda, 11 February 1990
(italics mine).
1542 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 273; see xxx p. 595.
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could not take seriously the idea that one part of Germany should be in
NATO and the other in the Warsaw Pact. He also rejected Baker’s propos-
al, according to which a unified Germany should belong to NATO with a
special status for the territory of the former GDR.1543
To review the state of affairs as of mid-February 1990, both the Western
and the Soviet position on Germany's future security status was only be-
ginning to take shape. Ambiguity surrounded both positions, although to a
lesser degree in the West than in the Soviet Union. The definite Western
preference for a unified Germany’s alliance membership was muddied by
what exactly was meant by the formula of no extension of the ‘zone’ of
NATO or NATO’s ‘jurisdiction’. However, the ambiguities in the joint and
all-important West German-American position dissipated very quickly. On
24 February, at a meeting at Camp David, Bush and Kohl agreed that
a unified Germany should remain a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, including participation in its military structure. We agreed that
US military forces should remain stationed in the united Germany and else-
where in Europe as a continuing guarantor of stability. The Chancellor and I
are also in agreement that in a unified state, the former territory of the GDR
should have a special military status [that] would take into account the legiti-
mate security interests of all interested countries, including those of the Soviet
Union.1544
Gorbachev was torn more fundamentally between various positions and
refused to commit himself to any of them, essentially until the talks with
Kohl in Moscow in July 1990. On the one hand, he recognized the dangers
of Versailles (not only because the treaty had been unable to forestall Ger-
man rearmament but also because it had encouraged a nationalist backlash
in Germany) but on the other, he emphasized the necessity of Four Power
cooperation and firm guarantees to be provided within that framework. In
accordance with the New Political Thinking, he allocated important secu-
rity functions to the Atlantic alliance and American forces in Europe but
he opposed the logical extension of this framework to include unified Ger-
1543 Ibid.
1544 Joint Bush-Kohl press conference; excerpts as quoted by Zelikow and Rice,
Germany Unified, p. 216. Notwithstanding ambiguities in the internal West Ger-
man government discussion (notably hesitations and modifications by Genscher
and the foreign ministry) and vacillation by Britain and France, the joint Bush-
Kohl position remained firm. Since the Soviet (Gorbachev’s) consent to unified
Germany's membership in NATO is at issue here, the differentiations in the
Western position will not be pursued.
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many’s membership in NATO. The principle of the Freedom of Choice
implied letting the Germans and the East Europeans decide the question of
what alliance they wanted to belong to, but he sought to place constraints
on the application of this principle. For several months, however, it
seemed as if the ambiguities had been resolved in Moscow in favour of
retrenchment and a hardening of positions on both the internal and exter-
nal aspects of German unification. The forms, circumstances, and ratio-
nales of that apparent reversal need to be explored in some detail.
Soviet Retrenchment
The turn to a more uncompromising stance became evident immediately
after the Open Skies foreign ministers’ conference in Ottawa. In what can
be regarded as having clearly been related to the upcoming Two Plus Four
negotiations formally agreed upon at the conference, Gorbachev warned
that Moscow would resist Western efforts to dictate the proceedings: ‘We
rule out such a method’, he said in an interview with Pravda published on
21 February, ‘whereby three or four [countries] first come to an arrange-
ment between themselves and then set out their already agreed-upon pos-
ition before the participants. This is unacceptable.’1545 On the form which
an agreement should take, he still − or again − thought that there should be
a peace treaty. On substance, the treaty should provide for a role of both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and he called any change in the military-stra-
tegic balance between the two alliances ‘impermissible’.1546
More intransigent inflections on the German security issue also sur-
faced in the foreign ministry. Shevardnadze formed a working group,
chaired by Deputy Minister Anatoli Adamishin and department head Bon-
darenko, to deal with the German problem and the Two Plus Four negotia-
tions, and on 24 February assembled the MFA’s Collegium, including the
deputy foreign ministers and fourteen other officials, ostensibly to drive
firm stakes into the international negotiation ground. The Collegium de-
rided the ‘prescriptions advanced in some Western countries’ and specifi-
cally the idea that NATO membership of a unified Germany in NATO
would be in the Soviet interest. It was unacceptable to the Soviet Union
1545 ‘Otvety M.S. Gorbacheva na voprosy korrespondenta “Pravdy”’, Pravda, 21
February 1990.
1546 Ibid.
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that anyone but she herself should seek to determine what constituted the
essence of Soviet security and how best to safeguard it. The USSR had its
own notions as to how to do this and ‘certainly, any variants envisaging
the membership of unified Germany in NATO do not correspond to such
notions’.1547
As for the hardening of the Soviet position on the internal issues of
German unification, Gorbachev ostensibly reconsidered the position he
had adopted when he had handed the key to German unity to Kohl and
told him that unification was the prerogative of the Germans themselves.
In the Pravda interview, Gorbachev rejected not only any attempt by three
or four of the Six to confront the remaining Two with an agreed-upon pos-
ition but he also objected to a procedure whereby ‘the Germans agree
among themselves and then propose to the others only to endorse the deci-
sions already adopted by them’.1548 Similarly, on 6 March, at the second
and last of Modrow’s visits to Moscow, he again eschewed the terms ‘Ger-
man unity’ and ‘unification’, asserting instead that it was ‘by no means a
matter of indifference how the rapprochement (sblizhenie) of the two Ger-
man states takes place’ and expressed his firm conviction that the ‘fanning
of speculation, the tendency to annex the GDR and policies designed to
create faits accomplis do not correspond to a responsible approach to a so-
lution of a problem as sensitive to the fate of Europe and the world as the
German question’.1549 In other words, article 23 of the Federal Republic's
constitution as the point of departure for unification was definitely out of
the question. Although he did not use the word Anschluss, it was clear that
this is what he meant that had to be precluded.
This apparently firm stance, however, as so many others previously,
was severely undercut by the course of events. The parliamentary elec-
tions in East Germany on 18 March produced a stunning victory for the
conservative parties, which polled 48 percent of the vote. The SPD, which
had been regarded as the front-runner, received only 22 percent, and the
1547 ‘V MID SSSR. Rassmotren shirokii krug voprosov’, Pravda, 26 February 1990.
1548 Interview in Pravda, 21 February 1990.
1549 ‘Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva s pravitel'stvennoi delegatsii GDR,’ Pravda and
Izvestiia, 7 March 1990. Gorbachev's emphasis on sblizhenie had been apparent
earlier, in his telephone conversation with Modrow on 12 February, ‘Zapis' os-
novnogo soderzhaniia telefonnogo razgovora M.S. Gorbacheva s Predsedatelem
Soveta Ministrov GDR Kh. Modrovom, 12 fevralia 1990 goda,’ Hoover Institu-
tion Archives, box 3, Zelikow-Rice Project on German Unification.
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PDS 16 percent. The most disastrous performance was that of the Alliance
90, the umbrella party for groups like the Neue Forum that had been in the
forefront of the democratic revolution of the preceding year; it garnered
less than 3 percent of the vote. It was a foregone conclusion that the new
government under Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière (CDU) would not
support anything but Kohl’s preference for unification under article 23.
Concerning the external aspects, Gorbachev now dispelled Western
hopes to the effect that his and Shevardnadze’s failure to demand a neutral
status for unified Germany had presaged Soviet consent to NATO mem-
bership. In reference to the talks between Gorbachev and Modrow, TASS
reported that
It was stated with full determination [at the talks] that the inclusion of a future
Germany in NATO is inadmissible and will not take place, whatever argu-
ments may be used. One cannot allow the breakdown of the balance [of pow-
er] in Europe, the basis of stability and security, and of mutual trust and coop-
eration.1550
On the face of it, this settled the question: unified Germany’s membership
in NATO was unacceptable. Other solutions had to be found.
It is not the purpose of this book to reconstruct in detail the tactical
twists and turns adopted by the Soviet negotiators in the Two Plus Four
talks at both the foreign ministers’ level and that of the ministries’ politi-
cal directors. The protracted talks, extending from a preliminary meeting
on 14 March in Berlin and the first ordinary meeting on 5 May in Bonn to
the final meeting on 12 September in Moscow, have been described else-
where.1551 They were characterized on the Soviet side by an erratic but in
essence uncompromising treatment of the issue both in and at the sidelines
of the Two Plus Four negotiations and the return in rapid succession to
several of the positions advanced previously, including ideas such as
1550 ‘Vstrecha M.S. Gorbacheva s pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii GDR’, Pravda and
Izvestiia, 7 March 1990.
1551 The best account here is that of Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp.
246-63; see also the account by the West German political director in the talks,
Frank Elbe, Die Lösung der äußeren Aspekte der deutschen Frage (Bonn: Eu-
ropa Union Verlag, 1993) and, with Richard Kiessler, Ein runder Tisch mit
scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1993); other sources for the arduous negotiations are the memoirs by
Shevardnadze, Baker, and Genscher.
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– the settlement of the German problem by a peace treaty;
– until the conclusion of a peace treaty, the continued presence of the
armed forces of the Four Powers in Berlin;
– the military-political status of Germany to be a non-aligned, neutral
state, partially demilitaried;
– the unification process to be synchronized with the creation of new se-
curity structures in Europe providing, above all, for the transformation
of the military alliances and a new and enhanced role to be allocated to
the CSCE;
– membership of both unified Germany and the Soviet Union in NATO;
– and dual membership of Germany in both alliances.
Everything on that menu, as Shevardnadze knew well from his talks, was
abhorrent to the taste of the two conservative-ruled Germanys and their
NATO allies, notably the United States. Nevertheless, the various indi-
gestible dishes suggested on the menu continued to be included in the pro-
ceedings and position papers at closed internal meetings and advertised in
public statements, the talks with Western officials and the Two Plus Four
negotiations.
The stubbornness with which the Soviet negotiators stuck to hard-line
and essentially unrealistic positions had much to do with internal pressure.
One major example are the Politburo’s instructions (direktivy) for She-
vardnadze for his upcoming talks with Bush and Baker in Washington on
4-6 April. The directives were issued on 2 April in the form of Politburo
approval for a draft that had been prepared a few days earlier and spon-
sored by Shevardnadze, Defense Minister Yazov, KGB chief Kryuchkov,
PB foreign policy kurator Yakovlev, CC secretary for the military industry
Oleg Baklanov, and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov.1552 As for the
internal aspects of German unification and their linkage to international
security affairs, Shevardnadze was instructed to emphasize to Bush and
Baker
the necessity of ensuring the stage-by-stage unification of the two German
states and its synchronization with the all-European process. It is important to
1552 ‘Vypuska iz protokolia No. 184 zasedaniia Politburo TsK KPSS ot 2 aprelia
1990 goda. O direktivakh dlia peregovorov Ministra inostrannykh del SSSR s
Presidentom SShA Dzh. Bushem i Gosudarstvennym sekretarem Dzh.
Beikerom (Vashington, 4-6 aprelia 1990 goda).’ The document is stored in the
Russian TsKhSD archives; a copy is available in the archives of the Hoover In-
stitution.
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prevent the movement toward unity from acquiring uncontrolled forms and
speed which would put the Four Powers, Germany's neighbours, and Europe
as a whole in a position of [having to] face accomplished facts and seriously
hamper the search for mutually acceptable decisions on the external aspects
of the building of German unity. The unification process should take place not
in the form of an Anschluss of the GDR but should be the result of agreements
between the two German states as equal subjects of international law. We
should emphasize that, naturally, we favor the existence of the GDR as an in-
dependent state for as long as possible.
Perhaps needless to repeat, by the time these restrictive directives were is-
sued, the train of article 23 had already departed from the stations in both
Bonn and East Berlin.
As for the external aspects, the directives stated:
We should emphasize that the most appropriate form of a German settlement
would be a peace treaty that would draw the line under the past war and deter-
mine the military-political status of Germany. It should have as its necessary
elements the partial demilitarization and the establishment of a reasonable
sufficiency (razumnaia dostatochnost’) for the armed forces. ... If Baker were
to react negatively to the idea of a peace treaty, we should inquire about his
vision of the forms for a peace settlement with Germany.
Until the creation of new European security structures, the directives con-
tinued, the rights and responsibilities of the Four should be preserved to
the full extent. Furthermore, ‘We should firmly state our negative attitude
to the participation of the new Germany in NATO. Germany could become
a non-aligned state, preserving [only] its EC membership.’1553
The record does not indicate whether the PB’s approval was preceded
by much or any discussion.1554 At the beginning of May, however, a
‘tough’ (zhestkii) discussion of the German problem at Politburo level did
take place.1555 Shevardnadze, assisted by Tarasenko, had prepared a pos-
ition paper which, following by then well established practice, was re-
drafted and turned in a more uncompromising direction by Bondarenko’s
Third Department. The paper was to serve as a point of reference for his
upcoming participation in the first round of the Two Plus Four negotia-
1553 Ibid. (italics mine).
1554 Chernayev has stated that only one PB session dealt with the German problem,
the one at the beginning of May. Tarasenko speaks of two PB meetings, refer-
ring perhaps – in addition to the one in May – to the meeting of 2 April; inter-
views with Chernyaev and Tarasenko.
1555 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 347.
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tions in Bonn. It was co-sponsored by Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov,
and Kryuchkov but was apparently still not tough enough to satisfy the
more conservative PB members, including Ligachev, who severely criti-
cized it. Furthermore, with the exception of Shevardnadze, the sponsors of
the new directives remained silent. Gorbachev sided with the conservative
majority faction. He burst out heatedly at one point, stating categorically:
‘We will not let Germany into NATO, and that is the end of it. I will even
risk the collapse of the [CFE] negotiations in Vienna and START but will
not allow this.’1556 The position paper, as a result, essentially was no dif-
ferent from the directives that the PB had endorsed one month earlier.
Chernyaev, who had not been asked for his opinion at the PB meeting,
sent a note to Gorbachev on the following day, reflecting both on the deci-
sion-making process in the Politburo and the Soviet negotiating position
on the German problem. He deplored the fact that, although many PB
members lacked any expertise on that problem, they were nevertheless al-
lowed to discuss it. As a result, positions were formed under the influence
of Ligachev and his dire warnings about NATO approaching the borders
of the Soviet Union. Such warnings, he told Gorbachev, were nonsense.
They reflected 1945 thinking and pseudo-patriotism of the masses. ‘Ger-
many will remain in NATO in any case,’ he predicted, ‘and we will again
try to catch up with a train that has left the station. Instead of putting for-
ward specific and firm terms for our consent, we are heading toward a
failure.’1557 To Chernyaev, at least, the consequences of the Soviet failure
to present terms in accordance with Soviet interests and acceptable to the
West were immediately obvious. The telegrams that Shevardnadze sent
from Bonn and his report on the Two Plus Four meeting after his return to
Moscow indicated that he had been forced to evade the issues by taking
recourse to ‘general phraseology’ and that ‘we lost’ another round in the
diplomatic game.1558
How, then, is the hardening of the Soviet position to be explained? One
interpretation has been advanced by Tarasenko, Shevardnadze’s personal
assistant. He has argued that the foreign minister was ‘from the very be-
ginning [the talks with Kohl and Genscher on 10 February] to the end
[Gorbachev’s formal consent in July] committed to the idea of German
membership in NATO’ and that the crucial task he saw was ‘how to man-
1556 Ibid. (italics mine).
1557 Ibid., p. 348.
1558 Ibid.
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age the problem domestically.’1559 This interpretation is reflected in She-
vardnadze’s own account. ‘Politics is the art of the possible’, he wrote.
We may like it or not, but it is an axiom that has no need of proof. In the real
world of politics we could not escape the need for a constant and scrupulous
reading of the changing political context. But the internal situation of the So-
viet Union was the crucial factor. Our position had to coincide with the will
of our people.1560
Although the importance of domestic constraints is undeniable, it was not
one emanating from ‘the people’ but from entrenched bureaucratic inter-
ests. In any case, however, Shevardnadze’s portrayal as his having consis-
tently adhered to the view of unified Germany in NATO as the best bar-
gain for the Soviet Union and of his striving for public endorsement of
this solution is not very credible. The most simple and, to a large extent,
plausible explanation for the hardening of his stance lies in the time-hon-
oured diplomatic practice to construct a tough, even maximalist, position
at the outset of negotiations and settle for a ‘compromise’ solution that
more or less reflects what one thought possible to achieve. Furthermore, it
is questionable whether Shevardnadze, from the very beginning of the
negotiation process, did have a firm view not only of what was possible
but also of what was desirable. As for Gorbachev and his attitudes on the
NATO issue, no claim of constancy and foresight has been advanced ei-
ther by him or by his supporters. Gorbachev may have been conscious of
the disadvantages of a neutral status for a unified Germany, but (as evident
in the PB meeting of early May) he was genuinely and adamantly opposed
to Germany’s exclusive membership in the Atlantic alliance. He was wed-
ded instead to an idea that would seemingly permit safe passage for the
Soviet ship of state between the Scylla of German neutrality (and a possi-
ble renationalization of German security policies) and the Charybdis of the
GDR's full integration in NATO, namely: dual membership of unified Ger-
many in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As absurd as this idea may appear in
retrospect, he tenaciously clung to it for several months, encouraged per-
haps by the support it received from experts in the academic institutes on
international relations.1561 In a variation on this idea, one of the possibili-
1559 Interview with Tarasenko.
1560 Shevardnadze, My vybor, p. 238 (italics mine).
1561 Sergei Karaganov of the Institute on Europe, for instance, asserted that dual
membership of Germany in both alliances was not such a strange idea. The
United States was not only a member of NATO but also of ANZUS, and previ-
7. Gorbachev's Consent to United Germany's Membership in NATO
619
ties he contemplated was that if a unified Germany joined NATO, the So-
viet Union should be invited to join NATO as well.1562 Gorbachev's
stance, in turn, provides another clue to Shevardnadze’s tactical procedure.
It undercut the degree of flexibility that the foreign minister may have
been prepared to show at the negotiating table. But he was also in all like-
lihood not prepared openly to challenge Gorbachev on a position that was
supported by the pillars of Soviet power and within his own ministry.
A second interpretation of the reasons why the Soviet position hardened
in the spring of 1990 is connected with the by now familiar conservative
charge of ineptitude and lack of professionalism. Akhromeev and Ko-
rnienko, for instance, contend that, prior to the Camp David agreement be-
tween Bush and Kohl on 24 February, the Western leaders had not exclud-
ed the possibility of a modified or partial membership of a unified Ger-
many in NATO, notably its not entering into the military structure of the
alliance, and that ‘it was only in March, that is, after the NATO train had
left the station, that we started to put forward the unacceptability of Ger-
man inclusion in NATO’ and to argue that such a step ‘would lead to the
breakdown of the balance of power in Europe’.1563 Only then, on 14
March, did the Soviet foreign ministry issue an official statement that
more or less clearly outlined a Soviet concept on German unification. ‘But
it was too late’, they charge,
especially since the elections in East Germany on 18 March had produced a
new government headed by [Christian Democrat] de Maizière and the negoti-
ations on German affairs, which were held under the Two Plus Four formula,
very quickly turned into a formula of Five Minus One, that is, the USSR be-
came a pariah at these negotiations. Our improvisations to ‘neutralize Ger-
many’ (which was, of course, unrealistic) or to have it enter both alliances,
NATO and the Warsaw Pact (which was even more unrealistic, especially un-
der the circumstances where the days of the Warsaw Pact were numbered), of
course did not help.
ously of SEATO and CENTO; in conversation with this author in Moscow on 5
May 1990.
1562 Shevardnadze, too, had advanced this proposal; see Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Sovi-
ets Promise to Pull Back Some Tactical Nuclear Arms’, New York Times, 6 June
1990.
1563 Pravda, 7 March 1990, as quoted by Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami mar-
shala i diplomata, p. 260. Their reference is presumably to the TASS statement
on the talks between Gorbachev and Modrow on 6 March; see above, xxx p.
556, fn. 1388.
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As a result of these ill-advised improvisations, the conservative critics
conclude, it was not at all surprising that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
changed course yet again and, ‘at the time of the July visit of Chancellor
Kohl to the USSR, officially removed all Soviet objections to German
membership in NATO’.1564 Irrespective of whether one agrees with the al-
legation that the Final Agreement constituted a violation of Soviet (and
Russian) security interests, the conservative criticism of Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze is well founded at least in one respect. A good case can be
made for the argument that, at the time when Gorbachev handed the key to
German unification to Kohl and consented to letting the Germans decide
on the form and speed of that process, he and Shevardnadze had not
thought through the practical consequences of that blanket authorization,
notably the implications of unification on the basis of article 23 of the
West German constitution. Accession of East Germany according to the
constitution would mean that West Germany’s network of treaties, includ-
ing the Final Act of 1954 that provided for the Federal Republic's mem-
bership in NATO, would automatically be extended to the eastern part of
the enlarged Germany and thus would prejudge the outcome of what was
ostensibly in the purview of the Two Plus Four negotiations. It would
seem that on 6 March Modrow and his government delegation had suc-
cessfully impressed upon Gorbachev, from their perspective, the negative
implications of article 23.
A third interpretation sees the hardening of the Soviet position as a re-
sult, at least in part, of a reassertion of the interests of the Soviet armed
forces on the German issue. Scrutiny of role of the armed forces in deci-
sion-making on Germany's membership in NATO confirms the enervation
of their influence on overall Soviet international security affairs. As de-
scribed in the previous chapter, this assessment runs counter to general
patterns of behaviour of the mainstays of imperial power throughout world
history. Given the trends toward the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the inclusion of unified Germany in NATO, one should have expected a
determined effort by the armed forces in conjunction with and blessing of
hard-line factions of the party to forestall both. Such an effort, however,
was not made. A more thorough analysis of this phenomenon, drawing on
the earlier discussion of military and party influence on policy-making in
the Gorbachev era, is appropriate.
1564 Ibid.
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Military and Party Opposition
Expressions of dissatisfaction with the political leadership’s handling of
international security matters by military officers in the crucial period be-
tween February and July 1990 can certainly be found. In that period, the
military’s position on the central question of the possible inclusion of uni-
fied Germany in NATO seemed to be consistent. As expressed by General
Staff department head Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov as late as July 1990,
such a step would ‘definitely be unacceptable, both politically and psycho-
logically, to the Soviet people. It would seriously upset the military bal-
ance of strength that has developed in Europe’.1565 Furthermore, as
Mikhail Moiseev, the chief of general staff, had warned several months
earlier, any Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, including from East
Germany, had to be matched by Western, foremost American pull-backs.
The Soviet Union, he told French journalists in early February, was ready
‘to withdraw its forces from the GDR completely if those of the United
States, Britain, and France were withdrawn from the FRG’.1566 His pos-
ition remained unchanged as late as July 1990. He bluntly told German
visitors that Soviet soldiers would remain in Germany ‘as long as there are
American troops in the Federal Republic’.1567 Similarly, with impeccable
military logic Lt. Gen. Igor Sergeev, deputy chief of the strategic rocket
forces, told the weekly Moskovskie novosti that a mass pullout from
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary would upset strategic parity with
NATO and overturn Soviet military calculations:
We will lose ground and be that much closer to danger. If someone loses in
parity, then someone else naturally gains. Forthcoming changes in the War-
saw Pact of course mean losses for us from the military standpoint. All the
theoretical discussions about changing from a military to a political pact are
cold comfort. It is playing with words.1568
Even more strident criticism of the allegedly disastrous drift of Soviet se-
curity policies was expressed by military officers at the Congress of Peo-
1565 Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, ‘United Germany Should Not Be NATO Member’,
Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), 1 July 1990, quoted in Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS‑SOV‑90‑129, pp. 4‑5.
1566 ‘UdSSR bereit zu sofortigem Truppenabzug aus der DDR’, Neues Deutschland,
5 February 1990 (italics mine).
1567 Der Spiegel, 16 July 1990, p. 27.
1568 Moskovskie novosti, 21 February 1990.
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ple’s Deputies and the founding congress of the Russian Communist Party,
which took place from 19 to 23 June and the Twenty-eighth Party
Congress, held from 2 to 13 July. Its exponents were Albert Makashov,
commander of the Volga-Urals Military District; Colonels Viktor Alksnis
and Nikolai Petrushenko; Generals Alexei Lizichev, head of the Main Po-
litical Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy; Nikolai Boiko, his
counterpart in the Air Defense Forces; Ivan Mikulin, chief of the Southern
Group of Forces’ Political Directorate; and Admiral Gennadi Khvatov,
commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Gen. Makashov’s diatribes were particularly scathing and insulting to
the political leadership. Warning of the dangers inherent in the impending
incorporation of a unified Germany into NATO and the emergence of a
powerful Japan in the Far East, he charged sarcastically that ‘only our
learned peacocks are crowing that no one is going to attack us.’1569 The
strange birds he figuratively referred to were obviously the academic spe-
cialists who had been elevated by the political leadership to a preeminent
role in international security decision-making. Reinforcing his sarcastic
comment, he fumed that the president ought to meet ‘not only with the in-
telligentsia and owners of cooperatives but also with the defenders of the
state’. Obviously contemptuous of Gorbachev for his lack of military ex-
perience and expertise, he suggested that military service should be made
mandatory for future presidents and that newly elected leaders should un-
dergo three months of training at the General Staff Academy. On foreign
policy and the loss of empire in Eastern Europe, and in obvious criticism
of Shevardnadze and by implication again of Gorbachev, he deplored that,
‘because of the so-called victories of our diplomacy, the Soviet army is be-
ing driven without a fight out of countries that our fathers liberated from
fascism’. Furthermore, he pointedly asked why NATO was continuing to
strengthen despite the erosion of the Warsaw Pact. He even went as far as
claiming that ‘the realities of the world today are such that continuing uni-
lateral disarmament would be an act of stupidity, or a crime’.1570
1569 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 21 June 1990. This account of the military's criticism of the
political leadership on defense and international security issues follows Stephen
Foye, ‘Military Hard-Liner Condemns “New Thinking” in Security Policy’, Re-
port on the USSR (Radio Liberty, Munich), Vol. 2, No. 28, 13 July 1990, pp.
4-6.
1570 Ibid.
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Some of that criticism, albeit less ominous and vitriolic, was in evi-
dence also at the Twenty-eighth CPSU Congress. At the outset of the
congress, the chances of a full-fledged political battle developing over in-
ternational security issues seemed high. Not only was the military estab-
lishment represented by a contingent of 269 delegates, but a high percent-
age of those officers were drawn from the conservative High Command.
Furthermore, evidence gathered at a series of military party conferences
that preceded the congress indicated that the military leadership had ma-
nipulated the selection of delegates to ensure a predominantly conserva-
tive slate.1571 The most disparaging comments were voiced during a
stormy meeting of the working group on international affairs on 5 July. At
that meeting, Mikulin laid the blame for the impending ouster of Soviet
forces from Eastern Europe to the New Thinking and its architects. He
also charged that the idea that the Common European Home would elimi-
nate the opposing military blocs was simply a ‘myth’.1572 Admiral Khva-
tov summed up the allegedly dire security position that the New Thinking
(rather than pre-Gorbachev imperial policies) had produced: ‘We have no
allies in the West. We have no allies in the East. Consequently, we are
back to where we were in 1939.’1573
There is little doubt that such sentiments were widely shared in the mil-
itary officers’ corps. The imminent inclusion of unified Germany in NA-
TO, the unilateral reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and large
asymmetrical cuts in CFE were, after all, merely some more milestones
marking the sharp decline of military factors in Soviet foreign policy and
the emasculation of the military’s influence in decision-making. To that
1571 Stephen Foye, ‘Defense Issues at the Party Congress’, Report on the USSR (Ra-
dio Liberty, Munich), Vol. 2, No. 30 (July 1990), pp. 1-4, and id., ‘The Soviet
Armed Forces: Lead-Up to the Party Congress,’ Report on the USSR (Radio
Liberty, Munich), Vol. 2, No. 28 (July 1990), pp. 1-4.
1572 Foye, ‘Defense Issues at the Party Congress’, p. 2; Paul Quinn‑Judge, ‘Military
Assails Concessions to West, Arms Cuts’, Boston Globe, July 6, 1990. The in-
tended targets of the military criticism did not fail to respond. Shevardnadze, for
instance, stated: ‘I was told that some comrades said at the section’s session that
the idea of a Common European Home is an illusion or a myth. Thinking like
that means failing to notice what is going on around us and closing one’s eyes to
the facts’; ‘Otvety na voprosy uchastnikov s’’ezda. E.A. Shevardnadze’, Prav-
da, 11 July 1990.
1573 John-Thor Dahlburg, Los Angeles Times, 6 July 1990, as quoted by Foye, ‘De-
fense Issues at the Party Congress,’ p. 2.
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extent, the important point to consider is not whether the military’s criti-
cism at the Russian and Soviet party congresses was the tip of an iceberg
of military grumbling and dissatisfaction – a point that can be taken for
granted – but whether its exponents were the spearhead of a coordinated
effort to intervene in politics or even the organizational core of a military
coup. Such an interpretation is essentially incorrect. The following consid-
erations support this conclusion.1574
One is the low rank of some of the most vociferous military critics.
Alksnis and Petrushenko were merely colonels – the ‘black colonels’ as
they were called derisively by civilian reformers – and they lacked the
standing and a wider base in the military establishment that would justify
regarding them leaders of a political revolt. Neither was ethnically and
culturally ‘true-blooded’ Russian, Alksnis being Latvian and Petrushenko
Belorussian. Their support and that of the conservative Soyuz parliamen-
tary group, where they played a prominent role, was drawn mostly from
assimilated non-Russians or Russians from outside the RSFSR.1575
Makashov’s extreme reactionary diatribes could only serve to undermine
rather than support the formulation of a politically sound and coordinated
military position that could be taken seriously and become politically ef-
fective. Lizichev, Boiko and Mikulin were political officers and because
of that function presumably more representative of the views of the party
than of the professional officers’ corps. Only Khvatov was a high-ranking
professional military officer but his position and influence in the armed
forces, like that of the others critics, was also not comparable to that of,
say, the commanders of the five branches of the Soviet armed forces or the
chiefs of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.
Another reason for questioning the validity of the theory that the mili-
tary critics at the party congresses were the spearhead and organizational
core of a coordinated effort to topple the political leadership and change
security policy is the failure of the top military leaders, at a crucial junc-
ture of Soviet domestic politics, to provide public backing for the critics’
frontal attack. Whereas Yazov, in two interviews at the end of June, had
1574 Concerning the role of the armed forces in the demise of the Soviet Union see
Hannes Adomeit, ‘Der Machtverlust der Sowjetarmee als Machtfaktor,’ in Mar-
tin Malek and Anna Schor- Tschudnowskaja, eds., Der Zerfall der Sowjetunion:
Ursachen, Begleiterscheinungen, Hintergründe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013),
pp. 187-202.
1575 Miller, Gorbachev, p. 164.
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indeed associated himself with some of the positions at variance with
those of the political leadership and had again rejected the ideas of Ger-
man NATO membership and asymmetrical cuts in conventional
weapons,1576 he gave an essentially bland and non-committal speech at the
Twenty-eighth Party Congress. In the circumstances, this could be inter-
preted as support, albeit lukewarm, for the president. Moiseev’s speech
was more critical, but at the same time he defended Gorbachev against
some of the charges of complacency and failure to meet rising dangers,
stating that the Soviet Union possessed ‘a reliable rocket shield that en-
sures its full security’.1577
Another reason lies in the attention paid by the congress to a myriad of
other issues. In relative perspective, Eastern Europe and unified Ger-
many’s membership in NATO were neither treated extensively nor were
they the most contentious. Scrutiny of the transcripts indicates that the
most controversial issues were personnel and party power and organiza-
tion; ‘depolitization’ (depolitizatsiia) and ‘departization’ (departizatsiia)
that is, dissolution of the party structures, in the armed forces, the internal
security ministry, and the KGB; the crisis of ideology; the abysmal state of
the economy; the problems of national emancipation in the USSR, such as
the Baltic crisis and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh; the extent of republican sovereignty; and the resigna-
tion of the Democratic Platform from the CPSU, including its leading
members Yeltsin, Gavril Popov and Anatoli Sobchak (the latter two being
the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad), and the historian Yuri Afanasev.
Yet another reason for doubting the organizational cohesion and politi-
cal effectiveness of military opposition lay in the fact that the armed
forces were internally divided. There was no unanimity even on the issue
that could be considered central to the military’s concerns: united Ger-
many’s membership in NATO. Maj.-Gen. Geli Batenin is an example of
the divergence of views. In an article for an East German newspaper pub-
lished on 4 May, he rejected both the concept of dual membership of a
united Germany in the two blocs – a concept, he thought, was ‘favoured
1576 Rabochaia tribuna, 26 June 1990, and TASS, 27 June 1990, as quoted by Foye,
‘Military Hard-Liner Condemns “New Thinking”’, p. 6.
1577 TASS, 5 July 1990, as quoted by Foye, ‘Defense Issues at the Party Congress,’
p. 2.
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by the Soviet foreign minister’ – and German neutrality.1578 He based his
case against the dual membership idea on the premise that such a solution
would be useful only if the Warsaw Pact had some prospects to become a
viable organization. After the formation of the new governments in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, however, he saw no chance of that happening:
‘Czechoslovakia, one of the most important Warsaw Pact countries in mil-
itary terms’, he wrote, ‘is practically on the verge of leaving the alliance.
Similar developments can be observed in Hungary and Romania.’ Further-
more, he reasoned, dual membership would have a destabilizing effect ‘on
the process of unification of the two Germanys because in this way con-
frontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO will continue to be fo-
cused on the territory of the united Germany’.
Batenin also argued that a neutral or non-aligned Germany would not
be in line with European security interests. ‘The military and economic
potential of a unified Germany concentrated in the centre of Europe’, he
contended, ‘would give rise to serious concerns among its neighbours.’
The chances were slim, he continued, that a united Germany would volun-
tarily accept military-political impotence, and it was for that reason that
demilitarization of Germany should be ruled out, except within the context
of coordinated and comprehensive European arms control and disarma-
ment measures. The best solution in Batenin’s view, therefore, was
to include the whole of Germany into the political organization of NATO. The
military jurisdiction of NATO will remain effective on the territory of the
present-day FRG. In other words, concerning its military incorporation in
NATO, Germany will retain its current status during the entire transition peri-
od [of perhaps five to ten years]. The Bundeswehr, being part of NATO’s inte-
grated command structure, will remain within the boundaries of the western
part of a united Germany. In the eastern part, the National People’s Army will
1578 Maj. Gen. Geli Viktorovich Batenin, ‘Vorgezogene Version: Ganz Deutschland
in der NATO’, Berliner Zeitung, 4 May 1990. At the time when his article was
published, Batenin was assigned to the Central Committee’s Ideological Depart-
ment. Importantly for the current context, he was not a political officer without
professional experience. According to information which he himself provided in
an interview with Hans-Henning Schröder of the then Bundesinstitut für ost-
wissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne, he was born in Vladi-
vostok, entered officer's school in the 1950s, was commissioned first as an ar-
tillery officer and then in the rocket forces, served in the General Staff specializ-
ing in nuclear strategy and, in 1989-90, was involved in drafting the Soviet pos-
ition in the CFE negotiations. He was also a member of the Soviet delegation
during Gorbachev’s visit to West Germany in June 1989.
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continue to exist but it will no longer be under the operational control of the
Warsaw Pact.1579
Even more at variance with conservative military opinion, in an earlier in-
terview with a German defense specialist, he had stated: ‘To maintain a di-
viding line between Germany and Germany, or between Germany and
Poland, is unacceptable. That would mean to remain stuck in outdated
thinking. ... Both alliances [for the duration of the Warsaw Pact’s exis-
tence] have to link up with each other in order to overcome this div-
ision.’1580
One of the possible options for the military to delay, deflect or derail
Gorbachev’s impending decision on Germany’s NATO membership in the
spring and summer of 1990 was to forge an alliance with conservative par-
ty officials. The CPSU, however, was in disarray.1581 The legislative and
executive branches of government, including and above all the emerging
presidential structures, were beginning to replace the party’s power and in-
fluence; its Marxist-Leninist foundation lay in shambles; and its popular-
ity was being eroded by glasnost. A neo-Stalinist Communist Party of
Russia (CPRF) was created to compete against both its communist parent
and the decidedly more democratic and liberally inclined Russian
Congress of People’s Deputies. Another split, one involving the CPSU it-
self, was imminent, with the members of its Democratic Platform, as men-
tioned, about to leave the party and perhaps intent on creating a new so-
cial-democratic entity. In March 1990, the constitutional article guarantee-
ing a political monopoly to the CPSU had been abolished; the Central
Committee was involved in a bitter dispute with ‘social’ organizations’
such as the Komsomol and labour unions; its Secretariat had been emascu-
lated; and rank-and-file members were leaving in droves.
Furthermore, the once mighty Politburo was now a stricken and inter-
nally divided group that had seen its decision-making power and authority
curtailed progressively since the October 1988 party reorganization and
1579 Ibid. (italics mine).
1580 Batenin interview with Hans-Henning Schröder, Moscow, 4 April 1990.
1581 This analysis of the role of the CPSU and CPR in Soviet decision-making on
unified Germany and NATO draws on Fredo Arias-King, ‘Essence of a Soviet
Decision: Allowing a United Germany to Join the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. An Organizational-Bureaucratic Approach’, Research Paper, the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 1996 (unpub-
lished), pp. 1-16.
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was scheduled to be further emasculated at the Twenty-eighth CPSU
Congress. At that congress, its full and alternate members had to answer
for the massive failures of the Soviet economy and other domestic ills:
Prime Minister Ryzhkov and his deputy and planning chief Yuri
Maslyukov on the economic decline; Vadim Medvedev on the demise of
Marxism; Lev Zaikov on the bloated and inefficient military-industrial
complex; and Georgi Razumovsky on personnel policy and the drain of
the party membership. Ligachev, who had vehemently attacked Gor-
bachev’s policy on the German issue at the February Central Committee
plenum and was to do so again at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, cer-
tainly was one of the potential organizers of a revolt against the president.
But the PB, in conjunction with the CC, could no longer remove Gor-
bachev from the office of General Secretary, let alone from the presiden-
cy.1582 Furthermore, Ligachev’s power was waning and, indeed, at the
congress, he was ousted.
Although in no way an action channel for Soviet foreign policy or even
domestic politics, the Communist Party of Russia exerted some influence
on decision-making but in ways quite contrary to its members’ intentions.
Given its utterly reactionary and unrepresentative nature, the fierce attacks
directed at the founding congress against Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevard-
nadze as well as against moderate or conservative party officials not only
served to further delegitimize communism but forced moderate party lead-
ers to side with the reformers. This occurred, for instance, at the Russian
Congress of People’s Deputies, held at the same time as the CPR’s inaugu-
ral congress. At the former congress, CPR spokesmen blasted a large part
of the CPSU’s moderate strata, insulting even the stalwart economist
Leonid Abalkin and vowing to cleanse ‘cancerous tumours,’ including
Pravda (!), and to re-impose censorship. What about a possible alliance
between the hard-line military opposition, like-minded officials in the CP-
SU, and the CPR? This, too, would have been counterproductive. Even
Ligachev was averse to associating himself with this new party entity and
Igor Polozkov, its new leader, and openly criticized him. Similarly, on the
day of his election as CPR chairman, the nightly news program Vremya
1582 This required a two-thirds vote of the legislature.
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chose not to cover the proceedings, featuring instead a story on Yeltsin
and Popov.1583
To summarize, although the military criticism of the political leader-
ship’s policies on the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from Eastern
Europe and NATO’s first eastern enlargement was certainly indicative of
wide-spread dissatisfaction in the armed forces, it should not be interpret-
ed as proof of a coordinated attempt to intervene in domestic politics. This
was because of the relatively low rank and standing of the most vociferous
critics in the military establishment; the disassociation of the top military
leadership from both extreme positions and direct involvement in politics;
and internal divisions concerning the most appropriate response to a rapid-
ly changing security environment in East Germany and Eastern Europe.
As for military and party collusion, by the spring and summer of 1990
Gorbachev had effectively emasculated the party apparatus and curtailed
the party’s and the military’s influence in international security decision-
making by transferring many of their previous functions to a combination
of reformist foreign ministry personnel, academic specialists and a small
circle of like-minded decision-makers. There was no unanimity of views
in the military. The party was hopelessly divided, and the creation of the
reactionary Russian Communist Party unwittingly served to undercut the
construction of a reasonable conservative alternative to Gorbachev’s inter-
national security policies and drive moderate party leaders into his camp.
The Twenty-eighth Party Congress, therefore, contrary to his and his sup-
porter’s anxiety, did not turn into a major impediment to his policies but,
perhaps paradoxically, even helped facilitate his consent to unified Ger-
many’s membership in NATO.
In the remaining sections, the timing and circumstances of that consent
will be described. Three possible explanations will be examined. First, the
Soviet Union may have been running out of viable alternative options.
Second, the West may have offered sufficiently favourable conditions.
Third, Gorbachev came to accept that unified Germany’s membership in
NATO served Soviet security interests better than any other possible solu-
tion. Evidently, none of these explanations are mutually exclusive.
1583 Arias-King, ‘Essence of a Soviet Decision’, p. 11; Alexander Rahr, ‘The Rus-
sian Triangle: Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Polozkov’, Report on the USSR (Radio Liber-
ty, Munich), Vol. 2, No. 27 (July 1990), p. 5.
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The Consent to NATO Membership
When Chernyaev was asked, when it was that Gorbachev consented to
unified Germany’s membership in NATO, he unhesitatingly replied: ‘At
the Soviet-American summit.’ When the supplementary question was put
to him, what had induced the Soviet leader to change his mind, the answer
was equally short and precise: ‘Baker’s nine points.’1584 From 16 to 19
May, Baker had again visited Moscow and talked to Gorbachev and She-
vardnadze, with the German problem as the main focus of discussion. The
secretary of state presented a comprehensive package of incentives de-
signed to persuade Gorbachev to accept the basic foundation of all subse-
quent and supplementary measures for a German settlement. As Baker has
explained in his memoirs, the nine points had been advanced individually
‘but by wrapping them up in a package and calling them ‘nine assurances’
we greatly enhanced their political effect’.1585 The nine points were as fol-
lows:
1. Limitation of the size of armed forces in Europe, including in Central
Europe, in a CFE agreement, with further reductions to be provided for
in CFE follow-on negotiations.
2. The beginning of arms control negotiations on short-range nuclear mis-
siles to be moved up.
3. Reaffirmation by Germany that it would neither possess nor produce
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
4. No NATO forces to be stationed on the former territory of the GDR
during a specified transition period.
5. An appropriate transition period to be agreed upon for the withdrawal
of all Soviet troops from German territory.
6. A comprehensive review of NATO strategy and change of NATO’s
conventional and nuclear force posture.
7. Settlement of Germany’s future borders, that is, essentially confirma-
tion of the Polish-German frontier.
8. Enhancement of the functions of the CSCE to ensure a significant role
for the Soviet Union in Europe and linkage of a summit meeting of that
organization with the finalization of a CFE treaty, both to take place at
the end of 1990.
1584 Interview with Chernyaev.
1585 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 251n.
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9. Development of Germany’s economic ties with the Soviet Union, in-
cluding fulfillment of the GDR’s economic obligations to the
USSR.1586
Gorbachev took copious notes of Baker’s presentation. But his reaction
was contradictory. He approved much of what the secretary of state had
said but adhered to the by then standard Soviet position that it was impos-
sible for the Soviet Union to accept a unified Germany in NATO. This
would constitute a fundamental shift in the strategic balance of forces and
jeopardize his program at home. ‘It will be the end of perestroika’, he
warned. Although he knew that united Germany would remain close to the
United States, it still should not be in the Western alliance. If that was un-
acceptable to the United States, then perhaps the Soviet Union should be
admitted to NATO.1587 His ambiguous and conceptually incoherent pos-
ition was reflected also in his reply to Baker’s question as to whether, by
insisting that Germany remain outside NATO, he was talking about a neu-
tral Germany. ‘I don’t know if I’d call it that’, Gorbachev said. ‘Maybe I’d
call it nonaligned.’1588
The nine points also figured prominently at the Soviet-American sum-
mit in Washington, 30 May-3 June.1589 On 31 May, in response to Presi-
dent Bush’s review of the assurances, Gorbachev initially reiterated the in-
transigent Soviet position (letting a united Germany join only NATO
would ‘unbalance’ Europe), and he repeated the alternatives he preferred:
Germany should either be a member of both alliances or not belong to any
1586 Ibid, pp. 250-51; and Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 263-64. The nine
points were prepared by National Security Council staff member Robert Zoel-
lick. Earlier on the same day, Zoellick, National Security Council expert on So-
viet affairs Condoleezza Rice and Raymond Seitz of the State Department's
European bureau had discussed these points with Kvitsinsky and Bondarenko.
Confirmation of this and other points related to the U.S.-Soviet summit as pro-
vided by Zoellick in conversation with the author at a conference of the Freie
Universität Berlin on 5 July 1994, attended by the Political Directors of the Two
Plus Four negotiations.
1587 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 265.
1588 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 251.
1589 On 30 May, Gorbachev had arrived in Washington from Ottawa. In talks with
Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney, the Soviet president again had shown
no flexibility on the German problem. The account of the proceedings at the So-
viet-American summit follows Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 276-81.
An earlier, less detailed, account of the meeting can be found in Beschloss and
Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 215-30.
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alliance. Shevardnadze supported the dual membership idea and Gor-
bachev added that perhaps any country could join either alliance, musing
(again) whether the Soviet Union should apply for NATO membership.
(Bush, with a smile, wondered how Marshal Akhromeev – sitting across
the table – would like serving under an American NATO commander.)
The American president then introduced an argument that other US and
West German officials had begun to employ at lower levels. Under the
CSCE’s principles in the Helsinki Final Act, all nations had the right to
choose their own alliances. Should Germany, too, not have the right to de-
cide for itself which alliance it would want to join? Gorbachev nodded and
in a matter of fact way confirmed that it did.1590
That nod amounted to a bombshell, but did Gorbachev actually mean
what he said? For the American negotiators, it was important to ascertain
whether his change of position was merely a lapsus linguae and temporary
aberration or, if not, to induce him to commit himself publicly to the rever-
sal of position. Prompted by a note from Robert Blackwill, Bush said: ‘I
am gratified that you and I seem to agree that nations can choose their
own alliances.’ Gorbachev reiterated the reversal: ‘So we will put it this
way. The United States and the Soviet Union are in favor of Germany de-
ciding herself [after a Two Plus Four settlement] in which alliance she
would like to participate.’1591 As for a public commitment to the changed
state of affairs, the NSC staff prepared a statement for the president to be
delivered on 3 June, at the end of the summit conference. It submitted the
draft statement to Soviet ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh for his re-
view and approval by Gorbachev. There were no objections. The state-
ment read:
On the matter of Germany’s external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor
Kohl and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full
member of NATO. President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But
1590 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 277. Participants in the meeting on the
Soviet side included Shevardnadze, Chernyaev, Akhromeev, Falin, Dobrynin,
and Alexander Bessmertnykh, the Soviet ambassador in Washington.
1591 There is a discrepancy in the rendering of the conversation between the Ameri-
can account, as reconstructed by Zelikow and Rice, and the Soviet version, as
contained in Gorbachev’s and Chernyaev's memoirs. According to the latter ac-
count, ‘the Soviet Union’ was omitted in Gorbachev’s reply (Gorbachev, Zhizn’,
Vol. 2, p. 175; Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 348).
7. Gorbachev's Consent to United Germany's Membership in NATO
633
we are in full agreement that the matter of alliance membership is, in accor-
dance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide.1592
The de facto consent to unified Germany’s membership in NATO was
completely unexpected by any of the participants, American or Soviet. On
the Soviet side, there had been no prior consultation or coordination. Gor-
bachev had acted unilaterally and spontaneously. Even his personal assis-
tant on foreign policy had not been alerted to the impending change of his
chief’s position.1593 In the White House’s Cabinet Room on 31 May, there
was consequently a palpable atmosphere among Soviet participants, who
almost physically distanced themselves from Gorbachev’s remarks.
Akhromeev and Falin could be observed uncomfortably shifting in their
seats.1594 Gorbachev slipped a piece of paper to the latter, asking him to
explain the legal, political, and military rationales that made a pro-Atlantic
solution unacceptable. Falin replied on that paper that he was ready to do
so.1595 While he launched into his presentation, Gorbachev conferred with
Shevardnadze. When Gorbachev re-entered the discussion, he proposed
that Shevardnadze work with Baker on the German issue. Oddly, Shevard-
nadze at first refused, right in front of the Americans, saying that the mat-
ter had to be decided by the heads of government.1596
It is appropriate to clarify at this stage that Gorbachev’s agreement with
the Western position that Germany be allowed to choose the alliance
membership it wanted was neither unconditional nor irreversible. In his
mind, at least, there vaguely still existed different options, one of which
would somehow make it possible to avoid Germany’s full membership in
NATO.1597 The ambiguities of his position were reflected in his public
stance. On 12 June, in his report on the Soviet-American summit to the
Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev said that he had ‘told the president that I think
that the American presence in Europe, since it fulfils a certain role in
maintaining stability, is an element of the strategic situation and does not
represent a problem for us.’ He also outlined a solution, according to
1592 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 281.
1593 Interview with Chernyaev.
1594 Zoellick, personal communication to the author [Editor: delete xxx.]; Baker, The
Politics of Diplomacy, p. 253; and Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp.
277-78.
1595 Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 493.
1596 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 278.
1597 Interview with Chernyaev.
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which ‘the Bundeswehr would, as before, be subordinate to NATO, and
the East German troops would be subordinate to the new Germany’, which
obviously meant that they would no longer be subordinate to the Warsaw
Pact.1598 However, this applied only to a ‘transition period’. How long that
period would last and what would happen if the new Germany would
choose to stay in NATO was left open by Gorbachev. The murky security
waters were muddied further by the ideas, also mentioned in his report, of
‘associate membership’ of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact and a unified Ger-
many having to ‘honour all obligations’ inherited from the two Germanys,
and by his return to the ‘dual membership’ proposal.1599 Only one thing
was crystal clear: there was complete and in all likelihood deliberate lack
of clarity in the Soviet stance, except for the fact that the notion of a uni-
fied Germany in NATO as being absolutely unacceptable was no longer
valid.
This applied also to Shevardnadze’s position. His initial recalcitrance at
the Soviet-American summit to work with Baker on details of a security
arrangement that would – in accordance with Gorbachev’s spontaneous
consent – proceed from the premise of unified Germany’s membership in
NATO did not mean that the foreign minister objected to the principle of
the revised Soviet stance. In the internal management of the issue, how-
ever, it was sensible for him to let Gorbachev take responsibility rather
than leading or leaving the conservative opposition to believe that yet an-
other fundamental change in international security policy had unilaterally
been decided by the foreign minister.
If it is correct that Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev were now
resigned to accept a formula that would allow unified Germany to join
NATO, how could they explain and justify the fundamental change of pos-
ition? How if at all, could they assuage the conservative opposition and
the public at large? Much depended on whether they could deliver on two
crucial issues: the transformation of NATO and transitional arrangements
until the consolidation of a new European security system. As for the first,
the Soviet leadership had to be able to portray an alliance that would trans-
form itself from a primarily military alliance to one emphasizing its politi-
cal character – a demand that had figured prominently as soon as German
1598 ‘Vystuplenie M.S. Gorbacheva na tret’ei sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR’,
Pravda and Izvestiia, 13 June 1990.
1599 Ibid. (italics mine).
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unification had been put on the international agenda.1600 At the 5 July
London summit, as will be shown below, the West would make an effort
to accommodate this demand.
Concerning the issue of a transition period, to borrow a phrase from the
Nixon administration’s problem to explain the inevitability of the with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the hand-over of power to the Vi-
et Cong, a ‘decent interval’ was needed for the Soviet leadership to save
face. Similarly, at the 11 June meeting between Shevardnadze and Gen-
scher in Brest, the Soviet foreign minister had put forward the basic ratio-
nale for a transitional period. If there was to be no such period, he argued,
the Soviet Union would be isolated. The political and military balance in
Europe would be changed. The GDR would be part of NATO. And the So-
viet Union would have no guarantees for its security.1601 But what should
be the content of such a period? Specifically, what should be the length of
time during which the Soviet armed forces should be allowed to stay in
East Germany? What would be their status? Should the alliances them-
selves only exist for a transitional period and then be dissolved in favor of
a new European security system? If so, in accordance with the equivalen-
cy principle, should the Western allied forces, like those of the Soviet
Union, only be permitted to stay for a specified period and then also be
withdrawn from Germany?
Some of these issues were addressed in a draft treaty on the external as-
pects of German unification prepared by the MFA’s Third Department
(Bondarenko) and tabled by Shevardnadze at the 22 June Two Plus Four
meeting in East Berlin. For at least five years after unification, according
to the draft, all the GDR’s international agreements would remain in force;
the competence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO could not be changed and
would not extend to territories that had previously not been within their
scope; ceilings on German armed forces would be imposed in quantity (no
more than 200,000 to 250,000 troops) and in quality, with implementation
of the reductions and structural changes within three years. After five
years, the troop contingents of the Four Powers would either be withdrawn
or retained at token levels; the Bundeswehr and the East German National
People’s Army would be confined to their former territories. The settle-
1600 See above, xxx. pp. 637-38.
1601 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 811.
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ment of these issues would remain in effect until both NATO and the War-
saw Pact were dissolved or Germany withdrew from both alliances.1602
The MFA’s draft evidently was completely unacceptable to Western ne-
gotiators and quickly passed into oblivion. In that meeting of 22 June, as
Shevardnadze was speaking, Baker passed a note to Genscher asking,
‘What does this mean?’ Genscher (accurately) replied: ‘Window dress-
ing.’1603 The West German foreign minister was apparently confident that
the presentation of the draft was essentially a holding operation designed
to gain time and to prepare the Soviet foreign policy establishment and
public opinion to accept the inevitable. That confidence he derived from
an earlier meeting with Shevardnadze, on 18 June in Münster, where
Frank Elbe, his aide, had been given a ‘non-paper’ by Tarasenko that did
not contain any reference to the retention of Four Power rights after the
end of a transition period, and where he (Elbe) had been told ‘not to wor-
ry’. Everything would ‘proceed as [outlined] in this [non-]paper’.1604
To return to the central issue of the Soviet leadership’s consent to uni-
fied Germany’s membership in NATO, at the beginning of July the stage
for the formal consent was set: various alternative options had been pre-
sented and rejected by the West; a plethora of private talks and the Two
Plus Four meetings at the foreign ministers’ level had clarified the form
that could be attached to the eastward extension of NATO: non-integrated
German units could be stationed in the former GDR immediately after
Germany regained full sovereignty, and German NATO-integrated forces
could be deployed there after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but no al-
lied forces; Germany would not produce or possess nuclear, bacteriologi-
cal or chemical weapons; NATO, at its London summit, had ostensibly
committed itself to a transformation of its structure and its role in Europe;
the G-7, at its meeting in Houston, had held out the prospect of economic
assistance; Kohl had committed himself to codifying a complete rear-
rangement of German-Soviet political and economic relations in a com-
prehensive bilateral treaty and to accept the Polish-German borders as fi-
nal; Lithuania had created favourable conditions for a policy change in
Moscow by suspending its declaration of independence; and the conserva-
tive opposition of Soviet party and foreign ministry officials and military
officers had been out-manoeuvred or isolated itself and was politically in-
1602 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 296-97.
1603 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 824-25.
1604 Ibid., p. 821, and Kiessler and Elbe, Ein runder Tisch, p. 159.
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effective as both the Russian and Soviet party congresses had demonstrat-
ed. The stage was set for the formal consent to unified Germany’s mem-
bership in NATO during Chancellor Kohl visit to the Soviet Union from
14 to 16 July.1605
On 11 July, in a letter to Kohl, Gorbachev had confirmed his invitation
for the German chancellor to visit the Soviet Union, including the sugges-
tion for a side-trip to Stavropol, the town and krai where he had grown up
and begun his career, and the small North Caucasian mountain resort of
Arkhyz, about 100 miles south of the city. The suggestion was obviously
meant to provide a personal touch to the visit and set the stage for a repeti-
tion of the informal conversations which the two leaders had had in June
1989 along the banks of the Rhine, and it augured well for what the Ger-
man participants could expect from the talks.1606 According to the ac-
counts provided by Chernyaev and Teltschik, the breakthrough on the
main issues took place on 15 July in Moscow, in the guest house of the
Soviet foreign ministry on Tolstoy street. The private conversations be-
tween Kohl and Gorbachev were witnessed only by the two aides and in-
terpreters.1607
1605 The significance of the Lithuanian decision and of the results of the London and
Houston summits will be discussed below, xxx pp. 651-52 and 670.
1606 This was recognized by Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 310; for the informal conversa-
tions between Kohl and Gorbachev on the banks along the Rhine, see above,
xxx pp. 483-84. Gorbachev's commitment to hold talks in the second half of Ju-
ly and to include the Caucasus as their venue had occurred on 14 May, when
Teltschik had been on a secret mission to Moscow. [Delete xxx.]
1607 The subsequent account of the 15 July talks is based on ibid., pp. 319-24 and
Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 358-59. Kohl’s memoirs essentially
confirm these accounts; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 421-44.
There are some important differences in the portrayal and interpretation of the
talks between Teltschik and Chernyaev, on the one hand, and that of Kohl on the
other. These will be pointed out below, xxx pp. 642-43. – Concerning decision-
making processes in the Soviet Union, immediately prior to the Kohl visit, Falin
had become a mere footnote to Soviet history on the German problem. Accord-
ing to his own account, as Kohl was already on his way to Moscow, he called
Gorbachev and asked for ten to fifteen minutes of his time. Shortly before mid-
night, the Soviet leader obliged and returned the call. Falin wanted to impress
three points on Gorbachev for the upcoming negotiations. (1) An Anschluß on
the basis of article 23 should be ruled out. (2) Unified Germany should not be
allowed to become a full member of NATO. At the very least, if he (Gorbachev)
were to agree to it nevertheless, Germany’s status should be similar to that of
France, but under no circumstances should nuclear weapons be stationed in any
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The German chancellor pointed out that these were historic times and
that the opportunities that had presented themselves should be used to
good effect. Bismarck had once said that one had to seize the coattails of
history.1608 Gorbachev replied that he had not been aware of this remark
but that he found it quite interesting and agreed with it. Kohl reminded his
host that they both belonged to the same generation – too young to fight in
the Second World War but old enough consciously to experience these
years. Against the background of their common experience, the German
chancellor continued, they had an obligation to use the opportunities for
change.
Kohl had apparently struck a responsive chord in Gorbachev. He
replied that he was ten years old when the war began and that he could
remember very well the events that had occurred during the war. He said
that he shared Kohl’s view that their generation possessed unique experi-
ences and he also agreed that, if unique opportunities for change existed
now, it was the task of that generation to use and shape them. He was im-
pressed above all by the fact that there was less talk now as to who had
won or lost the war and a greater understanding of one world.
The German chancellor then spoke of the trust that he thought had de-
veloped between them in their conversations in Bonn in June 1989, in the
park of the chancellor’s office, on the banks of the Rhine. On that occa-
sion, they had talked of their common obligation to shape the future of
their peoples and to develop relations of friendship, he reminded Gor-
bachev. He, Kohl, still considered this exchange to have been an event of
fundamental importance that had established a relationship of trust be-
tween them.
The next portion of the exchange between the two leaders is of crucial
importance for appreciating the new frame of reference that had developed
in Gorbachev’s mind. Rather than continuing to see the world through the
prism of Marxism-Leninism and the state interests of the Soviet Union, he
part of Germany. (3) No agreement on the political issues should be signed un-
less all matters concerning Soviet assets in the GDR were settled. Gorbachev
asked a few polite questions and concluded the conversation by saying, ‘I will
do what I can. Only I fear that the train has already left.’ Falin, Politische Erin-
nerungen, pp. 493-94.
1608 Bismarck had said: ‘The essence of] politics is to listen to God’s steps through
world history, to then link up and attempt to seize the tail of His coat.’ (Politik
ist, dass man Gottes Schritt durch die Weltgeschichte hört, dann zuspringt und
versucht, einen Zipfel seines Mantels zu fassen.)
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reverted to national images. He introduced what he himself called
thoughts of a basic nature. A situation was now developing, he said, that
had to bring Russia and Germany together again. If both peoples had been
separated in the past, they now had to come together again. For him that
goal was equally important as the normalization of relations with the Unit-
ed States. If it were possible to find a new quality in the relations between
Russia and Germany, both peoples and all of Europe would benefit.
The German chancellor agreed and provided incentives for Gorbachev
to consent to German demands. The Federal Republic, he said, was pre-
pared to conclude a comprehensive treaty with the Soviet Union to cover
all areas of cooperation. To be included in such a treaty could be princi-
ples such as the renunciation of force and non-aggression, along the lines
of provisions contained in the declaration adopted at the July NATO sum-
mit meeting in London. Furthermore, reporting on the results of the sum-
mit meetings of the European Council in Dublin, NATO in London and
the G-7 in Houston, he assured Gorbachev that the common theme at all
of these meetings had been the conviction that the processes of reform in
the Soviet Union had to be supported. Kohl then added another incentive
by stating that, in his view, economic and financial cooperation were an
integral part of the total package.
He also addressed the dynamic process of German unification and de-
scribed the still deteriorating conditions in the GDR. As if in response to
what had been a recurrent Soviet warning since the autumn of 1989, he as-
sured Gorbachev that he was not attempting to accelerate matters artifi-
cially. From the very beginning, he had had different ideas as to the time
scale of unification. He would have liked to have had more time, he said
regretfully, but the economic decline of the GDR had been dramatic. Turn-
ing to specific problems to be resolved, Kohl mentioned three areas in
which agreement had to be reached if the time-table for the conclusion of
the Two Plus Four talks and the CSCE summit conference were to be met:
the withdrawal of Soviet Union forces from East Germany; membership
of a united Germany in NATO; and the numerical strength of the armed
forces of the united country. Restoration of full sovereignty of Germany
had to be the final result of the Two Plus Four talks.
The two leaders exchanged papers (evidently prepared by Teltschik and
Chernyaev) containing their mutual ideas about the provisions to be con-
tained in a treaty on partnership and cooperation to be concluded between
the Soviet Union and Germany.
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Gorbachev then returned to security issues. Germany, he acknowl-
edged, should regain full sovereignty. On the central issue of NATO, Gor-
bachev said that membership of unified Germany in that alliance constitut-
ed the most important problem. De jure the question was unambiguous.
De facto matters were more complicated. NATO authority could not im-
mediately be extended to the former territory of the GDR. A transitional
period was necessary. Kohl and Teltschik were stunned as to that apparent
consent to united Germany’s membership in NATO. Six weeks earlier, at
the US-Soviet summit, the consent was implied but this time it was explic-
it. The German chancellor outwardly reacted calmly and was eager to
make sure that there had been no misunderstanding. Pressed by him, Gor-
bachev clarified that Germany could remain in NATO but the Western al-
liance NATO had to take into consideration that its authority could not be
extended to the territory of the former GDR for a transitional period, that
is, for as long as Soviet troops continued to be stationed there. He rein-
forced this historic concession by a second commitment. The final settle-
ment in the Two Plus Four framework should provide for the immediate
abolition of Four Power rights. A separate treaty should govern the status
of the Soviet armed forces on the territory of the former GDR.
The historical record at this point remains somewhat unclear. Kohl and
Teltschik’s account differ on both what Gorbachev said subsequently and
on the implications of what he had said. Concerning the issue of the status
of the Soviet forces and a future treaty on the modalities of their with-
drawal, Gorbachev – according to Kohl – had stated that negotiations on
that issue could begin after an (unspecified) transitional period.1609
Teltschik, in contrast, does not record Gorbachev mentioning anything
about the beginning of such negotiations. He also has Gorbachev saying
that the treaty ought to govern the presence of the Soviet forces for a peri-
od of three to four years.1610 The inference to be drawn from this is that
negotiations could begin immediately, without any transitional period.
The second issue of divergence concerns Gorbachev’s distinction be-
tween Germany’s de jure and de facto NATO membership. What Gor-
bachev seemed to have in mind, according to Kohl, was to limit NATO for
all practical purposes to the western part of Germany and that any change
of that restriction could only be agreed upon later, after the successful con-
1609 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 425.
1610 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 324.
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clusion of the negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Contrary to
his host’s assurances, as Kohl correctly wrote, the Federal Republic would
not have regained sovereignty after all. The later negotiations on the with-
drawal of forces would have provided Moscow with a lever with which to
exert pressure on Bonn to accede to Soviet demands on the alliance prob-
lem.1611 Apparently sensing the disappointment of his guest, Kohl contin-
ues, Gorbachev said reassuringly: ‘We have [only] begun our talks here in
Moscow and will continue them in the Caucasus mountains. In the moun-
tain air, things will be seen much more clearly.’1612
Teltschik did not share Kohl’s scepticism. For Chernyaev, too, the mat-
ter was settled. In his view, his chief had no longer suggested any ‘diluted
versions’ on Germany’s full membership in NATO. In accordance with his
position and protocol, Chernyaev should have accompanied his chief to
the Caucasus. However, he talked his way out of it. ‘The issue has already
been settled in Moscow,’ he thought, ‘and I would only get in the way.’ As
a reflection of the tremendous strain under which he and others in Gor-
bachev’s entourage were working, he had another, more important reason
why he chose not to go along: ‘I had taken a dislike to Gorbachev since
the events at the two party congresses. I did not want to be near him. In
my opinion, he did not even notice my absence on the trip. More and more
often I thought of resigning.’1613
It was only on 16 July in Arkhyz, after having ‘argued back and forth’,
according to Kohl, with Gorbachev ‘yielding step by step to our tenacious
urging’, that the Soviet president relented and agreed that German troops,
as part of NATO’s integrated command structure, could be stationed on
the territory of the former GDR.1614 The final agreement reached at the
talks was announced at the neighbouring spa of Zheleznovodsk. It consist-
ed of the following eight points:
1611 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 425.
1612 Ibid., p. 426.
1613 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 359.
1614 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 435. Genscher appears to concur with
the interpretation that this issue was settled only in Arkhyz; Genscher, Erin-
nerungen, pp. 839-40.
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1. A unified Germany shall comprise the Federal Republic, the GDR, and
Berlin.
2. The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers will end after the
achievement of German unification, and unified Germany will enjoy
full and unrestricted sovereignty.
3. The unified Germany, exercising its unrestricted sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with the Helsinki Final Act, may decide freely and by itself
which alliance it wants to belong to.
4. The unified Germany and the Soviet Union will conclude a bilateral
treaty providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR
within three to four years. Another treaty will cover the consequences
of the introduction of the Deutschmark in the GDR for this transitional
period.
5. For as long as Soviet troops remain stationed on the territory of the for-
mer GDR, NATO structures will not be extended to this part of Ger-
many. The immediate applicability of articles 5 and 6 of the NATO
treaty will remain in effect. Non-integrated units of the Bundeswehr –
that is, units of the Territorial Defense – may be stationed immediately
after unification on the territory of the GDR and Berlin.
6. Troops of the three Western powers shall remain in Berlin for the dura-
tion of the presence of Soviet troops on former GDR territory. The
Federal government will seek to conclude corresponding agreements
with the three Western governments.
7. The Federal government is willing to make a binding declaration in the
current CFE talks in Vienna to reduce the level of the armed forces of a
unified Germany to 370,000 soldiers and that this is to be achieved in a
period of three to four years.
8. A unified Germany will refrain from producing, storing, or controlling
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and continue to adhere to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.1615
It is now appropriate to return to the rationale and reasons why Gorbachev
relented and acceded practically without dilution or modification to all the
1615 This enumeration is derived from Kohl’s statement at the 16 July press confer-
ence in Zheleznovodsk, as carried by the German news agencies and TASS;
‘Press-konferentsiia M.S. Gorbacheva i G. Kolia’, Pravda and Izvestiia, 18 July
1990, and ‘Excerpts from Kohl-Gorbachev News Conference’, New York Times,
17 July 1990. The announcement was structured in seven points; points five and
six, as presented here, were merged in Kohl’s statement.
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positions on the international security status of a unified Germany as de-
veloped by the West, foremost by the United States and West Germany.
The domestic dimension of his consent has amply been covered. What re-
mains to be examined in more detail are the international rationales of the
consent.
The Demise of the Warsaw Pact
The central point to be made about the international dimension of Gor-
bachev’s consent to unified Germany’s membership in NATO is that in the
spring of 1990 the Soviet Union was running out of options: the neutral-
ization of Germany failed to attract support in both Eastern and Western
Europe and in the United States, and ideas such as ‘dual membership’ of
Germany in both alliances and ‘associate membership’ of the eastern part
of Germany in the Warsaw Pact were rendered obsolete by the rapid disin-
tegration of the latter alliance. Were Gorbachev, his close advisers, and
Shevardnadze conscious of these constraints?
Concerning the issue of neutralization, matters were fairly simple. At
the February 1990 Open Skies foreign ministers’ meeting of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in Ottawa, it had become apparent that only two foreign
ministers were calling for the neutralization of Germany: Shevardnadze
and East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer. At the mid‑March 1990
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers’ conference in Prague, the USSR and the
GDR again found themselves in a minority on the issue. At the closing
news conference, Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiří Dienstbier said that
neutrality would be ‘the worst alternative’.1616 Polish foreign minister,
Krystof Skubiszewski, agreed by making the point that a neutral Germany
would ‘not be good for Europe’; it would ‘foster some tendencies in Ger-
many to be a great power acting on its own’.1617 Only the East German
foreign minister, a member of the communist old guard, still supported his
Soviet colleague. But he was to be replaced a few weeks later as a result
of the free elections in the GDR. This settled the matter of neutralization
once and for all.
1616 Celestine Bohlen, ‘Warsaw Alliance Split on Germany’, New York Times, 18
March 1990.
1617 Ibid.
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As for the role of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, as mentioned above, Gor-
bachev had initiated a retreat from the traditional Soviet dissolution-of-
the-blocs campaign during his June 1989 visit to West Germany and con-
firmed that retreat in talks with French foreign minister Dumas in Novem-
ber, after the fall of the Berlin wall, declaring that now was not the time to
break up the established international political and economic institu-
tions.1618 That line continued into the spring of 1990. On 12 June, for in-
stance, Gorbachev – reporting to the Supreme Soviet on the results of the
Soviet-American summit in Washington – stated that the rival blocs would
continue to exist ‘for longer than might be imagined’.1619 Was a new Euro-
pe then, with NATO but without the Warsaw Pact, inconceivable to Soviet
decision makers? Was there a direct connection between the Soviet con-
sent to membership of united Germany in NATO and the continued exis-
tence of the Warsaw Pact? But if so, how could Gorbachev ever have be-
lieved that it could be possible to salvage the Pact from the revolutions of
1989 in East Central Europe?
The answer lies in the vision and willingness of the Soviet political
leadership and, nolens volens, the military to convert the Warsaw Pact
from an instrument of Soviet domination and control to a political institu-
tion respecting the sovereignty of its member nations. Only in the medium
to long term, they thought, would the alliances be dissolved in favor of a
new European security structure. A transformation of the Warsaw Pact,
they hoped, would be feasible even after the systemic changes in Eastern
Europe because the ‘state interests’ of the member countries of the Pact
would remain essentially unchanged. Marshal Akhromeev, in November
1989, had expressed this idea as follows:
First of all, there’s the stability of the territory and state boundaries. Second,
there are the economic interests of the states. After all, they’ve been linked
for many decades. That is why the military‑political alliance remains. The
state interests of both alliances still remain, and the contradictions remain.
And a certain quantity of arms and armed forces will remain. But what mat-
ters is that it be such a quantity which would not permit the country to start a
war, even if it wanted to.1620
1618 See above, above, xxx pp- 606-607.
1619 ‘Vystuplenie M.S. Gorbacheva na tret’ei sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR’,
Pravda and Izvestiia, 13 June 1990.
1620 Interview with Bill Keller, ‘Gorbachev’s Hope for Future: “A Common Euro-
pean Home”’, New York Times, 30 November 1989 (italics mine).
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In conformity with such rationales and rationalizations, the head of a de-
partment of the Soviet General Staff, Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, an-
nounced at a meeting of military chiefs from thirty-five nations held in Vi-
enna in January 1990 to discuss military doctrine that the Warsaw Pact
would be thoroughly restructured. The Pact’s future, as a Soviet foreign
ministry participant in the meeting explained, would be shaped by political
and regional interests rather than by ideological solidarity.1621
The hope that after injection of a reformist antidote the moribund War-
saw Pact would survive and return to the life of European politics was en-
couraged by attitudes even in Poland in the first half of 1990. For a brief
time interval, reflecting anxiety about the reconstitution of a potentially
powerful Germany at its western borders, Poland remained committed to
cooperation with the Soviet Union in a reformed Pact. The then Polish
prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, made this clear when he said that, in
its alliance with its eastern neighbour, Poland had passed from the ideo-
logical level to the state level. But this did ‘not mean that at the state level
we do not see the importance of this alliance for the problem of security
for our borders’. He even argued that Soviet troops should remain in
Poland because of ‘the German problem’.1622 Obviously under the impres-
sion of such statements, Gen. Batenin still thought in April that Poland
would want to retain a Soviet military presence in the country and that the
organization would still be viable, at least for a transitional period: ‘The
USSR and Poland – only two fingers are needed to count the members.’
But other countries would be interested as well. ‘Czechoslovakia, no mat-
ter what, will remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. [Czechoslovak presi-
dent] Havel is now in an exceptional mood, [caught up in] the euphoria of
power.’ However, this mood would dissipate.1623
The Soviet concept for reform of the alliance was presented to the Pact
members at two meetings in the spring of 1990. One was the 7 June con-
ference of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow, the other the
Military Committee’s gathering on 14-15 June in Strausberg near East
1621 Alan Riding, ‘At Conference Soviet General Sees Changes in Warsaw Pact’,
New York Times, 18 January 1990; see also Maj. Gen. Yuri Kirshin, ‘Why is
Military Reform Needed’, New Times (Moscow), No. 12 (March 1990), pp.
30-31.
1622 In a news conference in Warsaw, Associated Press (from Warsaw), 21 February
1990.
1623 Batenin interview with Hans-Henning Schröder in Moscow, 4 April 1990.
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Berlin. Despite some differences of position, the trend that emerged from
the final document adopted by the PCC and statements of participants at
both meetings was clear. The member states, according to the declaration
adopted at the Warsaw Pact summit meeting, would review the Warsaw
Treaty and ‘initiate efforts to transform it into a treaty of sovereign, equal
states that is based on democratic principles’.1624 The ‘character, func-
tions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact’ were to be thoroughly reviewed.
The organization was to change from a military alliance to a political orga-
nization with military consultation; the centralized, Soviet‑controlled com-
mand structure was to be abandoned, which in practice meant that a Soviet
deputy minister of defense would no longer be the Pact’s commander in
chief and that perhaps the Supreme Joint Command would be dissolved;
the member states would gain control of their own national forces in con-
formity with the principle of full national sovereignty; and for the duration
of the existence of multilateral institutions representatives of the member
states would fill positions by rotation. Nothing, however, was said of a
possible dissolution of the Pact.
To use the convenient metaphor of departing trains again, this time the
Soviet political leadership had not only firmly positioned itself on the
Warsaw Pact reform train but was in the driver’s seat. However, as it rec-
ognized to its dismay, most of the member countries of that organization,
while ostensibly negotiating reform, at the same time were preparing to
leave that train.1625 Above all, the new governments in two of the four
countries where Soviet troops were stationed, Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary, made it clear early on that they wanted the Soviet forces out as
quickly as possible.1626 Gorbachev acceded to these demands. In both cas-
es the withdrawal negotiations dealt almost exclusively with the logistics
of the pullout of Soviet forces, not with the principle of their withdrawal.
Although Soviet negotiators insinuated that unilateral withdrawals would
adversely affect the Warsaw Pact’s negotiation position at the CFE talks in
1624 Text of the declaration as published in Pravda, 8 June 1990.
1625 Interview with Shakhnazarov.
1626 The account of the Warsaw Pact’s demise is based on Douglas L. Clarke, ‘Sovi-
et Troop Withdrawals from Eastern Europe’, Report on Eastern Europe (Mu-
nich, Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe), 30 March 1990, pp. 43-44. Another
detailed and well documented analysis is Daniel N. Nelson, ‘Watching the Pact
Unravel: The Transformation of East European Political-Military Policies’,
Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Cologne),
Research Report, No. 32 (1990).
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Vienna, they made no serious effort to try to retain a residual force. During
President Václav Havel’s visit to Moscow in late February, the Czechoslo-
vak and Soviet foreign ministers signed an agreement calling for the bulk
of the Central Group of Forces to be out of Czechoslovakia by the end of
May 1990 and for all of the troops and equipment to be withdrawn no later
than the end of June 1991. On 9 March, Hungarian and Soviet negotiators
concluded an agreement that stipulated the same final withdrawal date for
the Southern Group of Forces, that is, June 1991. As these negotiations
and the Two Plus Four talks progressed, the Polish government revised its
position on the German danger and also began calling for the withdrawal
of Soviet forces.
These developments put the Soviet Union in an awkward position. In
the preceding era, its armed forces had fulfilled important political and
strategic functions, foremost, to maintain its vassals in power and safe-
guard the empire against external threats. In the form of status of forces
agreements, their presence had some legal justification. But after the revo-
lutions of 1989 in Central Europe, these rationales no longer existed: the
socio-economic systems changed fundamentally; NATO officially and de
facto was no longer regarded as a threat; and the legal basis of the pres-
ence of Soviet troops was put in doubt. The repercussions of these devel-
opments on the Soviet forces in Germany were considerable. If the North-
ern, Central, and Southern Groups of Forces were to be withdrawn, the
Western Group of Forces in Germany would find itself in a militarily un-
tenable position: its supply lines would be cut. Furthermore, after the
18 March elections, these forces would find themselves in a political envi-
ronment that would make them an unwanted anachronism. Moscow would
also be pushed into another race against time. Agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union on the level of their forces in Europe
could enshrine the legitimacy of the Soviet military presence, perhaps
even an equal number of forces of the two superpowers, and the continued
existence of the Warsaw Pact. But the pressures from the Central and East-
ern European countries for a speedy unilateral withdrawal of the Soviet
forces and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, regardless of developments
in NATO, threatened to render obsolete any such agreement. This race
against time can be demonstrated in reference to the negotiations on the
level of Soviet and American forces in Europe.
At the beginning of February, in his State of the Union address, Bush
had proposed limits of 195,000 American and Soviet troops in Central Eu-
rope, which he defined as embracing West Germany, the Benelux coun-
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tries, Denmark, and all of Eastern Europe except Romania and Bulgaria.
The proposal also envisaged retention of 30,000 American troops at the
‘flanks’, that is, in countries like Britain and Turkey. Gorbachev’s counter-
proposal reflected completely unrealistic notions about the future level of
Soviet forces in Europe. It rejected any asymmetry in the level of Soviet
and American forces and stipulated that both the USSR and the USA re-
duce their troops in Europe to either 195,000 or 225,000 each.1627 But
where did the Soviet political and military leaders expect this enormous
number of Soviet forces to be stationed? Which governments, did they
think, would be prepared to agree even to a token presence of Soviet
troops? In 1990, except for allusions to on-going negotiations with NATO
and within the Warsaw Pact, no answer was given in Moscow to these per-
tinent questions. This also applied to the events of mid-May, when
Moscow halted the withdrawal of forces from East Germany. (By that
time two Soviet tank divisions and other military units had been pulled
back.) A Soviet foreign ministry spokesman merely explained that ‘a fur-
ther decision on questions connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from the GDR will depend on the results of the Vienna talks on the reduc-
tion of conventional armaments in Europe and a political solution to the
German question’.1628
The results obtained after difficult negotiations in Vienna, codified in
the Paris CFE agreement on 19 November 1990, skilfully sidestepped the
issue of whether the Warsaw Pact would continue to exist. Although the
agreement de facto embodied the bloc-to-bloc structure of the Cold War
and the military alliances were called upon to decide among themselves
how to apportion cuts in the treaty-limited equipment, it was multilateral
in nature and divided the signatories into Groups, thereby avoiding the
term alliance. The agreement, therefore, was not prejudicial to the contin-
ued existence of the alliances. Simply put, the CFE agreement was de-
signed to survive the possible dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Further-
more, the zones of reduction that were devised and the ceilings for Soviet
and American forces that were set would make a complete withdrawal of
1627 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Gorbachev Accepts Deep Cuts in Europe if Forces Are
Equal’, and Michael R. Gordon, ‘A Troop-Cut Assent: Gorbachev Accepts Vital
Part of Plan by Bush to Reduce Forces in Europe’, New York Times, 10 February
1990.
1628 The explanation was provided by foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasi-
mov, TASS International Service, in Russian, 17 May 1990.
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Soviet forces from Eastern Europe feasible while allowing the continued
presence of American forces in Western Europe.1629
If the Warsaw Pact could perhaps be reformed and at least temporarily
be preserved as a political organization, changes in the Western military
alliance were indispensable from Gorbachev’s perspective. If not the reali-
ty, at least the semblance of change was necessary to facilitate his task of
justifying Soviet consent to Germany’s NATO membership. Specifically,
an appropriate response was required to the Warsaw Pact summit meet-
ing’s call for ‘constructive cooperation’ between the two blocs and a Euro-
pe ‘without artificial barriers and ideological hostility’.1630 The reply was
duly provided in the declaration adopted by NATO’s summit conference in
London on 6 July. The Atlantic alliance, according to the declaration, ex-
tended the ‘hand of friendship’ to the countries of the East. NATO was
ready ‘to enhance the political component of our Alliance’; to intensify
military contacts with ‘Moscow and other Central and East European capi-
tals’; to field, after the conclusion of the CFE negotiations, ‘smaller and
restructured active forces’; to move ‘away from “forward defense”’ and to
reduce its ‘reliance on nuclear weapons’.1631
In view of the Kremlin’s sharp turn to anti-Western rhetoric and policies
starting in earnest at the beginning of Putin’s third term in office as presi-
dent in May 2012, including charges that the West had invariably been
hostile to Russia and that the collapse of the Soviet Union had essentially
being engineered by the Western intelligence agencies, first and foremost
the CIA, it is appropriate to draw a balance sheet of Moscow’s gains and
losses. In particular, the question needs to be addressed as to whether the
agreements on German unification and united Germany’s membership in
NATO, as outlined in basic form in Moscow and Arkhyz, refined in the
Two Plus Four negotiations and codified on 12 September in the Final Set-
tlement, constitute the best possible deal from the Soviet perspective, or
1629 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Con-
sequences of the CFE Treaty, Center for Science and International Affairs
(CSIA), John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 54-61, 76-77; Jonathan Dean and Ran-
dall Watson Forsberg, ‘CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms
Control’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 76-121; Jef-
frey D. McCausland, Conventional Arms Control and European Security, Adel-
phi Paper 301 (London: IISS, 1996), p. 14.
1630 Communiqué of the PCC’s Moscow meeting, Pravda, 8 June 1990.
1631 Text of the London declaration of NATO, New York Times, 7 July 1990.
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whether they violated basic Soviet and therefore, mutatis mutandis, Rus-
sian security interests.
The Balance Sheet: Defeat or ‘Win-Win’?
Answers to the question of whether the Final Settlement served or violated
Soviet security interests depend on the yardstick of assessment. Should the
frame of reference consist of principles of the New Political Thinking and
Euro-Atlantic cooperation or be based on the traditional Imperial and
Ideological paradigm, Eurasianist concepts and Russian Great Power im-
ages? Using the former yardstick of evaluation, the Soviet Union on bal-
ance gained a lot.
– It was finally able to rid itself of an empire that was politically non-
viable and economically inefficient and that could only be preserved
by means of recurrent military intervention.
– The country was no longer saddled with the task of having to maintain
the division of Germany through the threat or the use of force but was
free to construct an entirely new, cooperative relationship with the new
Germany.
– The policies of unified Germany would be more predictable since it
would remain firmly anchored in Western institutions, including the
European Economic Community and the Western military alliance.
– NATO had committed itself to structural reforms and to abandoning its
previous anti-Soviet political and military orientation, permitting the
Soviet Union to scale down its armament efforts and concentrate on in-
ternal reform.
– To the extent that NATO could still be considered a military competitor
in Europe, the problem was mitigated by the fact that foreign armed
forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers would not be stationed in
the former East Germany.
– The risk of a new security threat in Europe was obviated or at least
significantly lessened by unified Germany’s NATO membership; the
presence of American forces in that country and in Europe; limitation
of Germany’s armed forces to 370,000 servicemen; and the German
government’s re-affirmation that it would not produce or possess nu-
clear, biological, and chemical weapons.
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An assessment of the settlement on the basis of the traditional Soviet and
current Russian Great Power paradigm, of course, yields entirely different
results.
– The Soviet Union and, by extension, Russia suffered a disastrous de-
feat in the competition with the United States and Germany, losing its
traditional sphere of influence in Europe and exposing itself yet again
to the risk of the emergence of a powerful Germany in Europe.
– The negotiations were conducted unprofessionally and in complete ig-
norance of military affairs, the officials responsible needlessly consent-
ed to a fundamental shift in the balance of power, committing the Sovi-
et Union to large-scale asymmetrical reductions and the unilateral dis-
mantling of its force posture in Europe.
– These negotiators missed the opportunity to provide for a neutralized
and demilitarized Germany and thereby squandered the chances of
constructing a new European security system without military blocs.
– They agreed instead to a significant strengthening of NATO by aban-
doning the GDR and handing that country over to the adversary; en-
dorsed the continued stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons
on West German soil; consented to an excessively high number of Ger-
man conventional forces as part of NATO’s integrated command struc-
ture; accepted at face value unilateral NATO commitments that could
be rescinded at any time and at that organization’s convenience; and
failed to provide safeguards against a further NATO expansion east-
ward.
To provide the flavour of the conservative criticism of the Final Settle-
ment, it is useful to refer again to Akhromeev and Kornienko. They write
that Gorbachev, his associates and advisors, and Shevardnadze essentially
used three arguments in their attempt at justifying their consent to what
they only yesterday had called unthinkable and a violation of the global
balance of power. First, at its London summit, NATO had adopted a decla-
ration to the effect that the alliance would transform itself into an organi-
zation emphasizing its political character and re-examine its military doc-
trine. Second, the West German chancellor had pledged that a unified Ger-
many would not deploy foreign troops on the soil of the former GDR and
would not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons there. Third, he had
also committed Germany to a ceiling of 370 000 officers and men for Ger-
many’s armed forces, meaning that the total number of troops would be
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only half the size of the combined forces of the FRG and the GDR before
unification.1632
In their rebuttal of the first argument, Akhromeev and Kornienko state
that ‘time keeps moving and the promises of a re-evaluation of the organi-
zation of NATO still remain nothing more than projects, while at the same
time the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist altogether and Soviet military
doctrine was redesigned three years before the London NATO summit
meeting. Consequently, the restructuring of the Soviet military forces has
commenced and is proceeding right now.’ They then quote Gorbachev
telling Genscher on 18 March 1991 that ‘we do not see much of a transfor-
mation of NATO from the perspective of the formulation of an all-Euro-
pean security system. What is being discussed is rather a strengthening of
the security structures for those who belong to the [Western military] orga-
nization.’1633
In refutation of the second argument, they acknowledge that not de-
ploying foreign troops and nuclear weapons on the territory of East Ger-
many was, of course, advantageous for the USSR. But in the context of
the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet
forces not only from East Germany but also from Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, one could not fail to raise the following question: why,
under these conditions must foreign forces and nuclear weapons remain on
the territory of West Germany? This question, they write, has been asked
not only in the Soviet Union. Egon Bahr, for instance, put it the following
way: ‘Honestly speaking, I am amazed at Gorbachev’s consent to the in-
clusion of a united Germany in NATO. I was [also] surprised that the fate
of nuclear weapons was not touched upon. You can say that NATO has
achieved a tremendous victory.’1634
In their criticism of the third alleged advantage derived from the Soviet
Union from the Final Settlement, they assert that it was logically unsus-
tainable to maintain that the limitation of the size of the German forces to
370 000 officers and men was fair to the Soviet Union because the limita-
tion constituted a reduction to half the combined armed strength of the
East and West German armed forces before German unification. Previous-
1632 Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, pp. 260-61.
1633 Pravda, 19 March 1991, as quoted by Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami
marshala i diplomata, p. 261.
1634 Pravda, 19 July 1990, as quoted by Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami mar-
shala i diplomata, p. 261.
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ly, these two armies existed on opposite sides of the barricade. It had been
inappropriate, therefore, to combine them for the purpose of calculating
respective gains and losses. Logic would have demanded that the number
of forces of the East German forces (173,000) be subtracted from the num-
ber of forces of the Bundeswehr (previously 495,000). This would have
meant to settle on no more than 322,000 officers and men for the armed
forces of the new Germany rather than the 370,000 agreed upon.1635
The central focus of the conservative criticism, however, are not on the
details of the Final Settlement but the principle of unified Germany’s
membership in NATO. Akhromeev, Kornienko, Kvitsinsky, Falin, Bon-
darenko than and many other previous Soviet and current Russian govern-
ment officials and members of the military establishment thought and still
believe today that a neutral Germany would have served Soviet and Rus-
sian security interests better than a Germany in NATO. On balance, how-
ever, it stands to reason that the latter solution was far more advantageous
for the new Russia as well as for Germany and her European neighbours.
To that extent, it can be regarded as a ‘Win-Win’ outcome. Gorbachev ul-
timately came to see it that way. When the question was put to Chernyaev
as to what convinced his chief to opt for this solution, his reply concerning
specific modalities of German NATO membership were Baker’s nine
points or incentives. On more basic principles, he mentioned two consid-
erations. (1) Gorbachev was impressed by the reasoning that a neutral
Germany could, and one day might, seek access to nuclear weapons. (2)
‘The West had the better arguments.’1636
To conclude the discussion of the security dimensions of German unifi-
cation, it is appropriate to return to another major contention that forms
part of the current Russian anti-Western narrative about her national inter-
ests, that is, whether Western leaders reneged on ‘clear commitments’,
‘firm guarantees’ and ‘categorical assurances’ not to enlarge NATO be-
yond the borders of the former East Germany.
1635 Ibid., p. 262. Akhromeev and Kornienko were in all likelihood conscious of
what Shevardnadze had said. On 3 July 1990, evidently in anticipation of the
Moscow and Arkhyz accords, he had asked the delegates to the Twenty-eighth
CPSU Congress: ‘What is better for us? To deal with a Bundeswehr of the FRG
that comprises half a million men or, say, an army that is half that size of a unit-
ed Germany?’
1636 Interview with Chernyaev.
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The Myth of the NATO ‘Guarantee’ Not to Embark on Eastern
Enlargement
Former Soviet and current Russian officials have repeatedly asserted that
the West did give unambiguous assurances to the effect that there would
be no NATO eastward expansion. One of the prime witnesses for the pros-
ecution of the case is Gorbachev:
[Chancellor] Kohl, US foreign minister James Baker and others assured me
that NATO would not move one centimetre to the east. The Americans did not
stick to it [that commitment], and the Germans didn’t care. Perhaps they even
rubbed their hands [and celebrated] how skilfully one had pulled the Russians
over the table. But what did it lead to? The result has been that now the Rus-
sians no longer trust Western assurances.1637
Chernyaev, his foreign policy advisor, concurred with his chief,1638 as
have many Russian officials far too numerous to be quoted here.1639 The
most noteworthy and politically most relevant repetitions of the ‘firm
commitments’ claim are those disseminated by Putin. This applies first
and foremost to his speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference on 10
February 2007. He called NATO expansion a ‘serious provocation’ and
went on to ask:
What happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolu-
tion of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even
1637 Gorbachev in an interview with the German mass circulation tabloid Bild
Zeitung, ‘Die Deutschen waren nicht aufzuhalten’, Bild.de, 2 April 2009, http://
www.bild.de/politik/2009/bild-medienpreis/die-deutschen-waren-nicht-
aufzuhalten-7864098.bild.html (italics mine).
1638 Chernyaev, for instance, at the annual meeting of the Göttinger Arbeitskreis, in
Mainz, 4-6 May 1995, where he promised proof of the Russian contention in the
form of an 800-page documentary collection. Such a collection, however, was
never published.
1639 To provide a random sample, advocates of the ‘assurances’ viewpoint include
then deputy defense minister Andrei Kokoshin at the 3-4 February 1996 Munich
international security conference, then called Wehrkundetagung; for details see
Fred Oldenburg, Deutsche Einheit und Öffnung der NATO, Berichte des Bun-
desinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 52 (1996),
pp. 5-6; Gennadi Seleznev, then chairman of the State Duma, on a visit to Nor-
way; ITAR-TASS (in Russian), 29 May 1997; and Alexei Pushkov, ‘Lidery Za-
pada ne zderzhali obeshchanii’, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 19 March 1997, at that
time ORT’s (Russian television) director for its international relations pro-
grammes and at present chairman of the Duma’s foreign affairs committee.
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remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was
said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary [Manfred]
Wörner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that ‘the fact that we
are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the So-
viet Union a firm security guarantee’. Where are these guarantees?1640
Some Western officials have supported such contentions. US ambassador
to Moscow Matlock, for instance, who was present at the talks between
Baker and Gorbachev as well as with Shevardnadze on 9 February 1990
and took notes, averred that Gorbachev received a ‘clear commitment that
if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not
move eastward’.1641 Western scholars have accepted this version and
claimed that at the Ottawa ‘Open Skies’ meeting the Western foreign min-
isters had ‘agreed not to extend NATO to the east and to let the Soviets
know that the Western alliance would not accept the former Warsaw Pact
states as members in NATO’.1642
The chief witness for the NATO ‘firm commitment’ case, however, is
on record not only as having reiterated the claim but also as having stated
the very opposite. In an interview with the Russian government newspaper
Rossiiskaia gazeta, Gorbachev corrected earlier statements of his and clar-
ified:
The subject of ‘NATO expansion’ [in 1989-1990] was not discussed at all, it
was not raised in these years. I say that with a full [sense of] responsibility.
Not a single East European country touched upon this question, not even after
the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. The Western leaders also did not
raise it.1643
1640 Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, Securityconference.de,
10 February 2007, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?
menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=de&id=179& (italics mine).
1641 House Committee on International Relations, U.S. Policy toward NATO En-
largement: Hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., June 20, 1996, p. 31. Matlock reit-
erated this position in conversation with the author in Cambridge, Mass. on 10
February 1997.
1642 Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p. 64, based on an article in Der
Spiegel, No. 9, 26 February 1990, p. 21. In contrast to Szabo, Michael Mandel-
baum, another American analyst, uncritically accepts this contention as fact; see
his The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund
Press, 1996), p. 63.
1643 ‘Mikhail Gorbachev: Ya protiv liubykh sten’, Rg.ru, 16 October 2014, http://
www.rg.ru/2014/10/15/gorbachev.html.
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Ambassador Matlock, too, corrected himself. In an article commissioned
by the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaia pravda, as quoted in part
above, he stated:
All the discussions in 1990 regarding the expansion of NATO jurisdiction
were in the context of what would happen to the territory of the GDR. There
was still a Warsaw Pact. Nobody was talking about NATO and the countries
of Eastern Europe. However, the language used did not always make that spe-
cific.1644
This is indeed the crux of the matter. The propagators and propagandists
of the ‘firm commitments’ myth, either ignorant of the facts or deliberate-
ly, fail to make that important distinction. When Baker on 9 February as-
sured Gorbachev that if Germany were to remain part of NATO, ‘there
would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one
inch to the east’, it is clear from the context that ‘east’ meant East Ger-
many.
Furthermore, any ambiguity how far eastward NATO ‘jurisdiction’ was
to extend was dispelled on 24 February in the Bush-Kohl meeting at Camp
David: unified Germany would be a full member of NATO and NATO
would thereby move eastward but there would be a special military status
for the former East Germany. That stance, amply reconstructed here, was
immediately made public; presented directly to Gorbachev by Baker in
Moscow on 18 May, by Bush on 31 May in Washington, and by Kohl on
15-16 July in Moscow and Arkhyz; discussed at length and in detail in the
Two Plus Four negotiations; and codified in the Final Settlement. There is
no evidence that further NATO enlargement eastward was dealt with at
any time in any of the negotiation formats and forums.1645
Putin has to be counted among the propagators and propagandists delib-
erately bending and falsifying the historical record to suit the Kremlin’s
1644 Matlock, ‘Nato Expansion: Was there a Promise?’; see above, xxx. p. 610 (ital-
ics mine). Matlock repeated that important clarification in correspondence with
me on 15 April 2015.
1645 For more detail on the false ‘firm commitment’ narrative see Mark Kramer,
‘The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia’, The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2009), pp. 39-61. Kramer’s article is one of the best
researched and most convincing. It also contains a comprehensive review of re-
cently declassified documents relating to the problem. − The same conclusions
were reached earlier by Hannes Adomeit, ‘Gorbachev’s Consent to United Ger-
many’s Membership in NATO’, in Frederic Bozo et al., Europe and the End of
the Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 107-18.
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political purposes. This is evident, for instance, in the sophistry of his uti-
lization of NATO General Secretary Wörner’s speech in Bremen on 17
May 1990. Wörner had stated:
The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the terri-
tory of the Federal Republic [of Germany] gives the Soviet Union firm securi-
ty guarantees. Moreover we could conceive of a transitional period during
which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain stationed in the
present-day GDR.1646
A comparison of Wörner’s speech with Putin’s quotation demonstrates,
first, that although Putin correctly provides the date of the speech, he
falsely put it into the context of alleged ‘assurances our western partners
made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact’, an event that took place
more than one year later.1647 Second, the Kremlin chief quotes Wörner as
stating that ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside
of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee’. But
Wörner did not say that. He did not refer to possible enlargement outside
of German territory, that is, deployment of NATO troops east of united
Germany but he declared NATO’s readiness ‘not to deploy NATO troops
beyond the territory of the Federal Republic’.1648 That is a crucial differ-
ence. Third, what was at issue for Wörner was not NATO enlargement and
the stationing of NATO forces east of the Oder and Neisse rivers but a
special status for East Germany. This is indicated by the sentence that fol-
lowed immediately after ‘security guarantee’ and that Putin − evidently
for propagandist purposes – conveniently omitted, namely that NATO
‘could conceive of a transitional period during which a reduced number of
Soviet forces could remain stationed in the present-day GDR’.1649
That, in conclusion, leaves the question as to why the issue of NATO
enlargement east of united Germany did not figure in the negotiations in
1990. It is not difficult to reconstruct the Western rationale. In accordance
with CSCE principles, all European nations had the right to choose their
own alliances. That was a principle that Baker asserted for Germany at the
1646 ‘The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s. Address by Secre-
tary General, Manfred Wörner to the Bremer Tabaks Collegium’, Nato.int, 17
May 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900517a_e.htm.
1647 Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference (italics mine). The War-
saw Pact was dissolved on 1 July 1991.
1648 Wörner, ‘The Atlantic Alliance and European Security’ (italics mine).
1649 Ibid. (italics mine).
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US-Soviet summit in Washington at the end of May and beginning of June
1990, and one that Gorbachev accepted. Then why should the West de-
clare that principle to be invalid for the ex-Soviet satellite countries in
East-Central Europe? That would have meant to resurrect the Brezhnev
doctrine of limited sovereignty for countries declared by Moscow to be
part of a Russian sphere of influence.
But why did the issue of NATO enlargement east of the Oder and
Neisse rivers fail to be raised not only by Gorbachev but also by his con-
servative critics and the germanisty, including Kvitsinsky, Falin and Bon-
darenko? The answer lies in the fact that, like unified Germany’s NATO
membership until the spring of 1990, it seemed inconceivable to them that
any of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact in addition to East
Germany would one day want to join the Western alliance.1650 Testifying
to the persistence of illusions, they thought, as noted above, that with the
removal of Marxist-Leninist ideology and reforms of the Pact, the ‘state
interests’ of these countries and images of a rising and potentially danger-
ous Germany would prevail and keep them in line.1651
This reconstruction of the Soviet consent to unified Germany’s mem-
bership in NATO and the balance sheet of advantages and disadvantages
from Soviet and later Russian perspectives has almost exclusively been fo-
cused on political and security dimensions. What is missing is a discussion
of economic factors in Gorbachev’s decision to consent to Germany’s uni-
fication and the united country’s membership in NATO.
The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent
In that context, several questions need to be posed. Are the conservative
Russian critics correct in contending that Gorbachev traded vital long-term
Soviet security interests for short-term economic gain? How well did So-
viet negotiators succeed in integrating security and financial issues in one
8.
1650 As so often in 1989-1990, Hungary proved to be the exception. At the end of
February 1990, in a conference in Budapest on European security matters, for-
eign minister Gyula Horn said that ‘a new approach is possible in the frame-
work of which one could not even exclude membership of Hungary in NATO’.
Horn’s prophetic view was reported verbatim on 23 February 1990 by Vremya,
the main evening newscast, airing on − as it was then known – the First Pro-
gramme of Central Television of the USSR.
1651 See above, xxx pp. 646-47.
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comprehensive negotiating package? Did they, from their own perspec-
tive, strike a good bargain? How significant were the sums of money re-
ceived? These questions can meaningfully be addressed only in the larger
context of the economic dimension in the Soviet imperial decline and col-
lapse and what many observers consider to be the most fundamental of all
questions: did the economic crisis lie at the root not only of the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe but did it determine Gor-
bachev’s consent to German unification and unified Germany’s member-
ship in NATO?
The record of Soviet economic performance between 1985 and 1987
may be debatable. It seems that there may even have been some stabiliza-
tion due to the traditional Soviet approach of administrative streamlining,
anti-corruption measures and pressure exerted on the middle levels of the
economic bureaucracy from the top.1652 From 1988 to 1990, however,
some of the measures adopted previously and new decisions by the politi-
cal leadership pulled the economy into a severe downturn, with fateful
consequences. The essence of the problem lay in a sharp divergence of the
pace of political and economic reform; the conscious curtailment of the
party’s power in economic decision-making; erosion of the ideological ba-
sis on which the party’s authority in economic management had rested; the
deliberate dismantling of the command bureaucratic system; a disastrous
reorganization of the agro-industrial complex; the replacement of the cen-
trally organized supply system by market relations between enterprises
and last but not least an anti-alcoholism campaign that played havoc with
the state finances. Laudable as the intentions of the political leadership
and its economic advisers may have been, the consequences of the reform
measures were enormous. They included a decline in output; the disrup-
tion of the supply system; severe shortages in consumer goods and agri-
cultural products; significant differentials in state and market prices; bud-
get and foreign trade deficits; the destabilization of fiscal and monetary re-
lations; the re-emergence of barter trade; and widening queues and strikes
in the mining and transportation industries. The government made at-
tempts to counter negative developments in the nascent private economic
1652 The argument made in this and the next paragraph closely follows Michael Ell-
man and Vladimir Kontorovich, ‘Overview’, in Michael Ellman and Vladimir
Kontorovich., eds., The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London:
Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-39, and Vladimir Kontorovich, ‘The Economic Falla-
cy’, The National Interest, Vol. 31 (Spring 1993), pp. 35-44.
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sector by introducing rationing and giving sweeping powers to the KGB
and the police to combat purported profiteering and an increasingly
powerful mafia. These and other measures, however, were to no avail. As
Western economists concluded, the collapse of the Soviet economic sys-
tem was the ‘unintended result of a small number of disastrous decisions
by a few individuals’ who based their actions on ‘a mistaken belief in the
boundless ability of the traditional system to reform itself’ but who, in
economic affairs, displayed ‘monumental incompetence’.1653
What about the subjective dimension of the problem? Was Gorbachev
aware of the serious economic problems? And, if so, how did he propose
to address them? On 29 January 1990, in what Chernyaev has described as
a ‘stormy’ meeting of the Politburo, one of the main items on the agenda
was the economic and fiscal state of affairs of the Soviet Union. Prime mi-
nister Ryzhkov introduced the discussion by saying: ‘The situation is diffi-
cult, if not critical, and continues to worsen. The apex of the crisis of 1989
has not been overcome.’1654 Planning chief Nikolai Slyunkov confirmed
the gloomy appraisal: ‘One can no longer call the state of affairs difficult.
The people no longer see any way out. And, in fact, there will be [no way
out] if the government is incapable of balancing expenditure and revenue.’
As a reflection of the continuing stalemate in the top leadership on the
central issue of economic reform, Slyunkov advocated an immediate price
liberalization and drastic reform measures, many of which later formed
part of Grigori Yavlinsky's 500 Days Plan for a rapid transition to a market
economy. He was supported by Yakovlev and Medvedev and, in vivid tes-
timony to the depth of the crisis, also by Ligachev. Kryuchkov, however,
thought: ‘Perhaps we ought to rescind some of the measures [of perestroi-
ka].’ Gorbachev summarized the discussion by saying that the economic
turn promised for 1989 had not been achieved. People would lose confi-
dence. ‘We can’t go on this way. That concerns everyone in this room. If
we go on working like this, our days are numbered. The people will de-
pose us.’1655
The impact of such perceptions on Soviet foreign policy was twofold:
(1) the leadership's willingness to prop up an economically inefficient em-
pire was even more rapidly being eroded in 1988-90 than in 1985-87; and
1653 Ellman and Kontorovich, ‘Overview’, p. 32; Kontorovich, ‘The Economic Fal-
lacy’, p. 44.
1654 Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, p. 332.
1655 Ibid.
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(2) not only had any disruptive shocks potentially emanating from the
world economy to be avoided but Western economic and financial assis-
tance became part of the political leaders lifeline for their own survival
and avoidance of the collapse of the national economy. Requests for such
assistance, however, posed painful dilemmas for Gorbachev. In the inter-
est of an effective negotiation stance on the German problem, it was ad-
vantageous not to convey the impression that the Soviet Union’s bargain-
ing position was exceedingly weak. But failure to raise significant sums of
hard currency would surely accelerate the economic crisis, with potential-
ly disastrous political consequences.
The first initiative to alleviate economic and financial stringencies by
relying on international assistance was an urgent request to West Germany
for food deliveries. On 15 January 1990, ambassador Kvitsinsky asked for
a meeting with Teltschik and gave him a list of supplies that were immedi-
ately required. The request, perhaps more clearly than anything else, re-
vealed how far the once mighty country had fallen. Significantly for the
nexus between economic and political issues, an agreement between
Moscow and Bonn about the requested deliveries was signed on 9 Febru-
ary, one day before Kohl’s departure for the Soviet capital. West Germany
would supply 52,000 tons of canned beef, 50,000 tons of pork, 20,000
tons of butter, 15,000 tons of milk powder and 5,000 tons of cheese as
well as clothing and other consumer goods. The deliveries would be subsi-
dized by the federal government with DM 220 million (then about $100
million).1656 On 10 February, Gorbachev thanked Kohl for the assistance
provided, adding – presumably for the reasons mentioned above – that
some time ago (when Kvitsinsky had made the request?) matters looked
bleak but in the meantime things had changed to the better.1657
Although the deliveries agreed upon were designed to deal with short-
term supply bottlenecks and involved only relatively small sums of mon-
ey, the connection between economic issues and German unification in-
volved much more substantial and long-term issues. In the era of the Cold
War, whenever West German political leaders and pundits had discussed
the question as to how Moscow could ever be persuaded to yield the key
to German unification, substantial economic concessions had been consid-
ered an indispensable part of a more comprehensive package. Consequent-
1656 Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 108, 114; Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp.
280-81.
1657 Ibid., p. 270.
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ly, when Gorbachev visited West Germany in June 1989, Kohl had out-
lined his vision of a complete rearrangement of Russian-German relations
and the conclusion of a Grand Treaty that would integrate political, securi-
ty and economic dimensions.1658 Kohl returned to this theme during his
visit to Moscow in February 1990. He noted that East Germany, as a prin-
cipal supplier of manufactured goods to the Soviet Union, was defaulting
on its delivery contracts. A unified Germany could do better, he told Gor-
bachev. It could furnish supplies of a higher quality, more cheaply and
more reliably, and it could provide the Soviet Union with access to the
market of the European Economic Community.1659 The German chancel-
lor thereby de facto reinforced the advice Gorbachev was receiving from
his market-oriented economists, such as Grigory Yavlinsky, Stanislav
Shatalin, Nikolai Petrakov, Nikolai Shmelev and Boris Fyodorov, to the
effect that large-scale Western involvement was crucial for a revitalization
of perestroika. In the summer of 1990, their advice was to take concrete
shape in a comprehensive reform programme for the creation of a compet-
itive market economy, mass privatization, prices determined by the mar-
ket, a large transfer of power from the Union government to the Republics
and integration with the world economic system, all of this to be achieved
in 500 days – hence the colloquial reference to the plan as the ‘500 Days
Plan’.1660
On 4 May the Soviet Union again turned to West Germany for assis-
tance.1661 Using the occasion of the Two Plus Four meeting in Bonn and
acting in accordance with instructions by Gorbachev and Prime Minister
Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze explored the possibilities of a government-guar-
1658 Ibid., pp. 42-44.
1659 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 188. The account of the economic de-
tails is based on what Teltschik told American officials after the Moscow talks.
They are not contained in Teltschik’s and Kohl's memoirs.
1660 The program was proposed by Grigory Yavlinsky and further developed by a
group of economic specialists under the direction of Stanislav Shatalin. For a
comprehensive analysis see Marie Lavigne, Financing the Transition: The
Shatalin Plan and the Soviet Economy (New York: Westview, 1990). − In the
summer of 1991, Yavlinsky was to return to this plan jointly with Graham Alli-
son of Harvard University to develop the ‘Grand Bargain’ reform program for
Gorbachev’s negotiations with the G-7 over financial aid in support of transition
to the market.
1661 The account that follows is drawn from Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 221, 226-28,
230-35, and Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 25-31.
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anteed credit. On the following day, Kvitsinsky conveyed the details of the
Soviet request, including first and foremost a credit in the amount of DM
20 billion ($12 billion) with a duration of five to seven years. His own re-
action to the aid request he had been obliged to transmit is instructive of
both the political sensitivity and internal opposition to any trade-off be-
tween Western economic assistance and Soviet concessions on unified
Germany’s membership in NATO. Kvitsinsky deplored the fact that his
chief had lent himself to raising the aid issue although ‘Shevardnadze had
no direct responsibility for economic management in the country’. He also
objected to the very principle of the request and criticized those who had
told Shevardnadze to submit it. It was clear to him that the credit, if it
were to be granted, would be ‘eaten up’ within a few months. It would
provide no impulse to an acceleration of reforms in the Soviet Union be-
cause the government simply had no concept as to how to increase exports
or gain hard currency, let alone how to lead the country out of the crisis. In
Kvitsinsky’s view, the conclusion to be drawn was obvious:
The request for a financial credit could only be the beginning of a long chain
of similar pleas, which would lead to ever more humiliations and induce the
West to pose ever more disagreeable political demands. ... To have sent off
[Shevardnadze] to beg for money meant that we ourselves, whether we in-
tended it or not, were hinting at a connection between the solution of the Ger-
man problem and the extension of credit.1662
The West German government, of course, saw such a connection. It was
prepared to act upon the request in full consciousness of its political impli-
cations, that is, that foreign assistance could help keep Gorbachev in pow-
er and could serve to persuade Gorbachev to accept unified Germany’s
membership in NATO.1663 Given the sensitivity of the issue, it decided to
proceed in secrecy. On 13 May, accompanied by Hilmar Kopper of
Deutsche Bank and Wolfgang Röller of Dresdner Bank, Teltschik flew to
Moscow on a West German military aircraft. In the morning of the follow-
ing day, the three held talks in the Kremlin with Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze,
deputy prime minister Stepan Sitaryan, Yuri Moskovsky (the chairman of
1662 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm p. 25 (italics mine).
1663 In his talks with Bush in Washington and Camp David, Kohl had reportedly
said: ‘The Soviets are negotiating. But this may end up as a matter of cash. They
need the money. ... There will be security concerns for the Soviets if Germany
remains in NATO. And they will want to get something in return’; Baker, The
Politics of Diplomacy, p. 213.
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the Bank for Foreign Trade) and Kvitsinsky in his new role as deputy for-
eign minister with responsibility for European affairs.1664 In the afternoon,
they met separately with Gorbachev in his Kremlin office, with only
Ryzhkov and Kvitsinsky present.
Characterizing the first round of meetings, Kvitsinsky observed a
difference in the approach of the two sets of participants: whereas the Ger-
man envoys tried to link financial issues and the German problem, the So-
viet participants attempted to separate the two issues. Thus, at the outset
of what was to be an extensive survey of Soviet economic difficulties,
Ryzhkov stated that the Soviet leadership was, of course, paying attention
to German unification, but it also imparted great importance to the proper
management of economic affairs in the triangular relationship USSR-
GDR-FRG. For the purpose of such management, he said, six commis-
sions would be established at the Council of Ministers. Shevardnadze later
endeavoured to delink the two dimensions by postulating the preferred So-
viet sequence. In an interjection to Teltschik’s remark that ‘if we are able
to come to an agreement today [on economic and financial matters], this
will contribute to calming the controversy in the area in which Shevard-
nadze is conducting negotiations,’ he quipped: ‘Or vice versa.’1665
Ryzhkov justified the Soviet aid request as follows: between 1985 and
1987, economic reforms had been prepared, and in the following two
years their implementation had begun. The rigid system of central plan-
ning was gradually being abandoned, but neither the infrastructure nor
models for a new economic system had as yet been developed. Many
problems had arisen, including a disproportion between the volume of
money in circulation and the availability of goods. Concerning foreign
trade, he deplored that in 1990 the Soviet Union year would have to im-
port 42 million tons grain at the cost of 4.5 billion roubles ($2.7 billion),
which constituted 25 percent of the country's hard currency earnings. The
chances for an improvement of hard currency earnings were limited be-
1664 Kvitsinsky was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the West Ger-
man mission to Moscow would indeed be kept secret. Corresponding measures,
to be agreed upon with Teltschik, pertained to the route the plane would be tak-
ing to Moscow, non-disclosure of the identity of the members of the German
delegation and confidentiality of their reception at the airport. Not even the West
German embassy in Moscow was informed of the trip; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p.
230; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 25.
1665 Ibid., p. 26
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cause of the ‘unauthorized’ export of raw materials and metals and de-
creasing prices for oil on the world market. Overall, the country had to
overcome a very complicated stage in its development and needed foreign
aid. The transition problems could be solved without such assistance but
this would mean that the standard of living of the population would have
to be lowered, which would imperil not only perestroika but also the fu-
ture of the Soviet Union. Specifically, he asked West Germany for an un-
conditional credit in the amount of 1.5 to 2 billion roubles ($900 million to
$1.2 billion) to meet current payment requirements. This sum would be
part of an overall package of 10 to 15 billion roubles ($6 to $9 billion), to
be repaid over ten to fifteen years, with no payment due for five years.1666
Gorbachev, in essence, reiterated Ryzhkov’s plea for assistance as well
as the main line of reasoning that made such assistance necessary.1667 He,
too, spoke of a very complicated transitional stage which the country was
experiencing but thought that this phase could be overcome within two to
three years. An overall improvement of the economy could be achieved
within five to seven years. He considered foreign assistance for the Soviet
Union to be a fundamental and strategically important issue. Europe had
arrived at a turning point, and it would be parochial pragmatism if at-
tempts were made now to exploit instabilities for egoistic reasons. In obvi-
ous allusion to differences in approach between West Germany and the
United States on the issue of credit to the Soviet Union, he regretted that
Washington was still hesitating and was not conducting a far-sighted poli-
cy. As for the total Soviet credit requirement, he thought that what was
needed were between 15 and 20 billion roubles ($9 to $12 billion), with a
grace period for repayment of about seven or eight years.1668 Gorbachev,
too, eschewed the idea of a specific linkage between economic assistance
and Soviet concessions on security issues. Nevertheless, he agreed with
Teltschik that it was appropriate to link all issues in a comprehensive
treaty to be concluded after the achievement of German unification, with
preparatory work to begin immediately. Furthermore, it was at this meet-
ing where Gorbachev not only proposed another Soviet-West German
summit – to be held, as he mentioned, after the Twenty-eighth CPSU
1666 Ibid., pp. 27-28; Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 23-32.
1667 Since Gorbachev's approach was almost identical to that adopted by Ryzhkov,
there is no need to repeat it here in detail. Only some important additions will be
noted.
1668 Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, pp. 29-30.
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Congress – but also responded positively to the German suggestion for the
two leaders to meet in the Caucasus.1669
What, then, was the fate of Gorbachev's request for West German finan-
cial assistance? The Bonn government agreed to provide guarantees for an
unconditional bank credit in the amount of up to DM 5 billion ($3 billion).
The lack of conditionality, however, applied only to the financial techni-
calities. Unmistakably, there were political strings attached. As Kohl ex-
plained to Gorbachev in a letter on 22 May, the extension of credit re-
quired a considerable political effort domestically. He expected, therefore,
that the Soviet government, in a spirit of cooperation, would do everything
in its power to help settle as yet unresolved issues in the Two Plus Four
negotiations. As for additional and more long-term loans, he said that
common action of all the Western industrialized countries was necessary
and promised to pursue the matter in talks with his partners in the Euro-
pean Community, the G-7 and the Group of 24.1670
Despite the urgency of the loan from Moscow’s perspective and its per-
ceived political importance in Bonn, it took until early July for the pack-
age to be assembled and approved by the two governments. In vivid testi-
mony to the liquidity crisis facing the Soviet Union, the full amount was
called up within a week after approval.1671 However, as Kvitsinsky cor-
rectly comments, the credit was quite insufficient to meet the Soviet lead-
ership's objectives of putting the Soviet Union into a position to fulfil its
payment obligations and to eradicate concern on the international financial
markets about the country's credit standing.1672 For a larger loan approxi-
mating the amounts that Gorbachev had suggested to the German delega-
tion on 14 May, and as Kohl had said in his letter, a more comprehensive
international effort of both banks and governments was needed, which
would certainly have to include the United States and Japan. In fact, only
four days after the Teltschik mission, the Soviet president and party chief
repeated his plea for international financial assistance to Baker in
Moscow, although now with a focus on the United States and an increase
1669 Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 233-34; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 31.
1670 Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 243-44.
1671 Theo Waigel, the West German finance minister, communicated this fact to the
chancellor on 13 July; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 316. In the memoir literature
(Kohl, Genscher, Teltschik and Kvitsinsky), there is no explanation why it took
so long for the credit to be made available.
1672 Kvitsinsky, Vor dem Sturm, p. 28.
8. The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent
667
in the total amount of credit required. The next few years would be criti-
cal, he told Baker, because the Soviet Union would move to a market
economy. To cushion the impact and expedite the transition, it had to buy
consumer goods and invest in the conversion of defense industry to civil-
ian production. To cover the costs of imports and structural change, it
needed hard-currency credits in the amount of $20 billion.1673
West Germany, mainly for incontrovertible political reasons, was pre-
pared to participate in an international assistance effort and, more specifi-
cally, be instrumental in the establishment of an international banking con-
sortium to finance Soviet requirements. However, the political impedi-
ments to such an approach were daunting. Neither the Japanese govern-
ment nor Japanese banks would subscribe to it for as long as Moscow
failed to make concessions on the Kurile Islands or Northern Territories is-
sue (more of this later).1674 As for the United States, as Bush told Kohl on
17 May in Washington, his hands were tied because of the Baltic problem.
Given the pressure tactics Gorbachev had adopted toward Lithuania, in-
cluding an economic blockade, and opposition in Congress, neither most-
favoured-nation status (MFN) nor large American loans could be granted.
Bush also maintained that the Soviet Union would be unable to repay sub-
stantial loans.1675
The American president adhered to that position at the Soviet-American
summit. He wanted to help, Bush told Gorbachev, but American credits at
this stage would not be forthcoming. The right conditions had to be creat-
ed first. What was needed were more far-reaching economic reforms, end-
ing pressure on Lithuania, a reduction of Soviet subsidies to Cuba and −
last but not least − progress on the German problem. The only concession
he was willing to make was the promise that the G-7 summit meeting,
scheduled to take place in Houston from 9 to 11 July, would consider the
possibilities of a multilateral assistance program.1676 As for American
trade benefits, including MFN, as Gorbachev observed in retrospect, ‘of
all the agreements concerning the further development of our relations,
none was more bitterly fought over than the planned trade treaty’.1677 The
major obstacle here, in addition to those previously mentioned, were the
1673 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 249.
1674 See xxx below, pp. 682-84.
1675 Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 237-38.
1676 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 282.
1677 Gorbachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 183.
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continuing restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews and the failure of
the Supreme Soviet to adopt a liberal emigration law. Emigration had been
the issue that had led to the collapse of the 1972 Foreign Trade Act in the
fall of 1974 and contributed to the demise of détente. In 1990, the linkage
between the two issues remained as close as ever. Both Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze were emotional on the conclusion of a trade treaty, the latter
exclaiming at one point to Baker: ‘I’ve rarely spoken like this with you,
but it’s extremely important that this be done.’1678 Bush finally relented
and consented to signing the treaty but not without having clarified first
that the ultimate fate of the act would depend on Moscow adopting the
emigration law and lifting the economic blockade on Lithuania.1679
To return to the issue of a multilateral aid package, on 11 June, in an-
other letter to Kohl, Gorbachev formalized his request for such a package
to be assembled and asked the chancellor to use his good offices for that
purpose.1680 At the 25-26 June EC summit in Dublin, Kohl obliged and
was supported by Mitterrand. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher,
however, objected. She did not want Western money to become ‘an oxy-
gen tent for the survival of much of the old system’ and found the lack of
serious economic analysis at the summit appalling, arguing that ‘no board
of directors of a company would ever behave in such an unbusinesslike
way’.1681 The criticism was, in essence, well founded: neither had a seri-
ous study been made nor had a plan been developed in West Germany (or
as yet in the Soviet Union) to ascertain how the $15-20 billion Gorbachev
had suggested would be used so that they would effectively contribute to
the restructuring of the Soviet economy; the political rationale for an inter-
national loan package was seen as more important in Bonn. The split in
the Western position did not augur well for the Houston summit of the
G-7. In fact, the divisions were replicated there. Whereas the European
1678 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 218 (emphasis in original); on
the trade and emigration issues see also ibid., pp. 222-23.
1679 Ibid., p. 223; Zelikow and Rice, Unified Germany, p. 281. Gorbachev has cor-
rectly said in retrospect that ‘the first demand, [passage of] the emigration law,
presented no big problem. ... But Lithuania was a different problem’; Gor-
bachev, Zhizn’, Vol. 2, p. 183.
1680 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 397; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 265. On 4
July, Gorbachev also sent a similar letter to Bush in his capacity as chairman of
the G-7 summit meeting in Houston, reiterating his plea for international finan-
cial and economic assistance for the Soviet Union; ibid., p. 304.
1681 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp. 762-63.
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members, except Britain, argued for a speedy multilateral effort, the Unit-
ed States, Canada, and Japan were reluctant. As a result and as so often in
such cases of disagreement, the resolution of the problem was postponed
and transferred to the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for further study.1682
To review the state of affairs prior to the Soviet-German negotiations in
Moscow and Arkhyz in mid-July, the Soviet Union had, on balance, been
unsuccessful in its attempt to involve the Western industrialized countries
in a comprehensive program to underpin perestroika. An international
banking consortium for that purpose had failed to materialize. To the ex-
tent that aid or aid commitments existed, they were bilateral and scarce,
and extended by countries like France and Italy, whose financial assistance
potential was limited. Japanese assistance was blocked by the Kurile Is-
lands issue. The only country with major resources that was both able and
willing to help was West Germany. But what were its commitments thus
far? In January, the government in Bonn had subsidized the export of
foodstuffs and clothing with DM 220 million; in early July, it had ap-
proved federal guarantees for a bank credit in the amount of DM 5 billion;
in the same month, it had expressed its willingness to honour the econo-
mic obligations the GDR had assumed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, at an
uncertain cost; and it had agreed to meet the East German financial obliga-
tions for the stationing of Soviet forces for the year 1990, at an estimated
cost of 1.4 billion marks.1683 By any measure of comparison and, in partic-
ular, relative to West Germany’s large hard-currency reserves, the sums in-
volved can be said to have been between miserly and modest. But if Gor-
bachev intended to establish a firm quid pro quo between Soviet consent
to unified Germany's membership in NATO and large-scale West German
economic and financial aid, and drive a hard bargain, the opportunity to do
so presented itself at the Soviet-West German summit. The opportunity,
however, essentially was not used.
In fact, it is astounding how little was said about economic and finan-
cial matters at the summit. There was hardly any discussion of specific
figures. This applies not only to the exchanges among the top political
leaders but also to the talks at the ministerial level. Kohl assured Gor-
bachev that the common theme at the European Council in Dublin, NATO
1682 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 416-18; Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp.
306-10; Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 829-30.
1683 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 279.
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
670
in London and the G-7 in Houston had been the idea that the processes of
reform in the Soviet Union had to be supported.1684 He reiterated the
theme that to him economic and financial cooperation was an integral part
of the total package. Gorbachev spoke about the great economic opportu-
nities that existed for West Germany in the Soviet Union and said that the
USSR was not concerned about economic dependency. He also expressed
his gratitude for the DM 5 billion loan that West Germany had extended.
Ryzhkov then raised three specific issues. (1) He said that some solution
had to be found for the 370 economic framework agreements concluded
between the GDR and the USSR – a point readily conceded by the Ger-
man participants who said that the unified Germany would honour East
Germany’s economic obligations. (2) He also introduced the point, to
which Gorbachev later returned, that Germany should contribute beyond
1990 to the financing of Soviet troops transitionally stationed in the east-
ern part of Germany.1685 (3) Finally, Ryzhkov advanced claims for com-
pensation for Soviet assets in the GDR, mentioning a figure of DM 20 bil-
lion – a figure that was immediately rejected by the German finance mini-
ster as unacceptable. Kohl only promised that the issue could be raised in
later negotiations.1686 Sitaryan, in separate discussions with Waigel in
Moscow, explored the possibilities of further unconditional financial cred-
its and was brushed off by the latter with the explanation that German
credits could not be increased infinitely; that an international aid effort
was needed; and that all short-term payment problems should be referred
to the IMF.1687 In Arkhyz, in the early morning hours, the Soviet deputy
prime minister made another attempt to discuss with the German finance
1684 This account is based on Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 319-42; Kohl, Ich wollte
Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 421-44; Theo Waigel and Manfred Schell, Tage, die
Deutschland und die Welt veränderten: Vom Mauerfall zum Kaukasus. Die
deutsche Währungsunion (Munich: Bruckmann, 1994), pp. 26-56: and inter-
views of this author with Teltschik.
1685 Ryzhkov also gave some indication as to the likely costs that might arise, saying
that the Soviet Union had previously paid for the stationing costs with the
equivalent of 6 million tons of oil. After the establishment of the economic and
financial union between the two Germanys on 1 July 1990 and the necessity for
Moscow to pay in hard currency, the equivalent volume had risen to an estimat-
ed 11 million tons; Waigel and Schell, Tage, pp. 37, 45.
1686 Waigel and Schell, Tage, p. 46; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 337.
1687 Waigel and Schell, Tage, p. 31.
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minister specific sums for German financial commitments across various
dimensions; this attempt, too, was unsuccessful.1688
To summarize the various fragments of discussion in Moscow and
Arkhyz, there was agreement on several principles. West Germany should
play a major role in the reconstruction of the Soviet economy; honour the
GDR’s economic agreements with the USSR; embark upon negotiations
on compensation for Soviet assets in the GDR; contribute to the financing
of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany for the transition period until
their complete withdrawal; and help pay for the resettlement of the Soviet
military officers in their homeland. As for the mechanics and machinery
of addressing these problems, two agreements were to be negotiated, one
on the transitional presence of the Soviet armed forces, the other on the
modalities of their withdrawal. Specific figures for the financing of the
Soviet forces’ transitional presence, withdrawal and reintegration would
be integrated into the two treaties.1689
Apart from the rather unspecific and indeterminate treatment of the eco-
nomic and financial issues in Moscow and Arkhyz, another anomaly was
the delay that occurred until serious negotiations were finally to begin. It
was not until 23-24 August that finance officials Sitaryan and Waigel met
in Moscow for a first round of talks, with the second round taking place on
3-4 September in Bonn.1690 The negotiations were rife with controversy,
with the final figures left unresolved until high-level intervention. One of
the controversial issues discussed was the significant deficit in Soviet-East
German trade, expressed in so-called ‘transferable roubles’, an artificial
unit of account and the very antithesis of transferable currency. Sitaryan
argued that the imbalance had been caused by the preferential conditions
accorded to the GDR in its trade with the Soviet Union, foremost the low
1688 Ibid., p. 49.
1689 The two agreements were concluded on 9 October 1990; see Abkommen zwis-
chen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der
Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken über einige überleitende Maßnah-
men and Vertrag ... über die Bedingungen des befristeten Aufenthalts und die
Modalitäten des planmäßigen Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen aus dem Gebiet
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Press- und Information Office of the Federal
Government, Bulletin, No. 123, 17 October 1990, pp. 1281-1300.
1690 The account of the negotiations draws on Waigel and Schell, Tage, pp. 53-55.
For a discussion of the difficulties in reaching agreement on the various econo-
mic and financial issues, see ‘Bonn und Moskau uneins über finanzielle Hilfe
beim Truppenabzug’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 September 1990.
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prices for oil. Waigel countered this explanation by saying that East Ger-
man commodities had been undervalued in the bilateral trade. The total
figure for Soviet indebtedness to the GDR was, therefore, unknown but
likely to rise in the remaining months of 1990 as a result of (1) a substan-
tial decrease in Soviet-East German trade as a result of the Soviet econo-
mic crisis; (2) the rise in export prices charged by East German firms and
now to be paid by Soviet importers in hard currency; and (3) a slackening
of demand in the eastern part of Germany for Soviet commodities. The
two sides again shelved the solution of the issue, agreeing only to estab-
lish precise figures of the Soviet trade debt at the end of the year and, by
30 June 1991, to express it in a hard currency equivalent.1691
A second problem to be addressed were the costs for the transitional
stationing of the Soviet forces. Waigel’s proposal to agree upon a total
sum for 1991 to 1994 was rejected. Sitaryan demanded instead DM 2.5
billion for 1991 alone – a sum that was allegedly based on the number of
forces that would still be on German soil after partial troop withdrawals in
that year. That figure, in turn, was rejected as too high by the German fi-
nance minister. He also argued that, if Moscow were to agree to lower fig-
ures for the stationing of troops, funds would be freed up for other purpos-
es. Resolution of this matter, too, was postponed.1692
A third issue were the costs for the withdrawal of the Soviet armed
forces. The Soviet side envisaged sums in amount of DM 2 to 3 billion,
based on Comecon prices, for the transportation of the troops to the Soviet
border. The German negotiators rejected in principle covering transporta-
tion costs but were prepared to provide and pay for ‘technical assistance’,
such as supplying container vessels and services of the German rail-
ways.1693
A final issue was payment of the costs for the resettlement of the offi-
cers and non-commissioned of the Soviet forces in their homeland. The
1691 In October 1990, the trade debt of the USSR with the GDR at the end of 1990
was estimated by the German government to amount to 5 billion transfer roubles
(TR), or DM 11.70 (at an exchange rate of 1 TR = DM 2.34); ‘Der Osthandel
der ehemaligen DDR bricht zusammen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1
November 1990. In negotiations conducted between Moscow and Bonn in 1991,
it turned out that the Soviet Union wanted to pay as little as possible of its trade
debt, preferably nothing at all; see ‘Bonn pocht auf Guthaben in Transferrubel,’
ibid, 10 July 1991.
1692 Waigel and Schell, Tage, p. 54.
1693 Ibid.
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Soviet negotiators wanted the German contribution to a resettlement pro-
gramme to be based on the volume of housing necessary for 72,000 offi-
cers, with Bonn covering the requirements of half of that total number.
They suggested comprehensive investments in the infrastructure of hous-
ing compounds, with projects in almost twenty Soviet cities, including
Minsk, Kiev, Rostov and Odessa. From the German perspective, the geo-
graphical area and the likely cost slated for infrastructure and housing con-
struction was likely to be enormous and excessive. Waigel, therefore, sug-
gested a financial ceiling to be put on the total cost. No agreement was
reached on such a ceiling.1694
On 5 September, presumably in response to the obvious disagreements
and deadlock on issues of principle and specific costs, the new ambas-
sador in West Germany, Vladislav Terekhov, presented a huge bill to the
West German government. The bill included (1) contributions to the cost
of the stationing of the Western Group of Forces in the period from 1991
through 1994 in the amount of DM 3.5 billion; (2) payment of transporta-
tion costs for the withdrawal of Soviet forces amounting to DM 3 billion;
(3) a share in the construction of 72,000 apartments, including a support-
ing infrastructure consisting of kindergartens, shops and pharmacies, at a
sum total of DM 11.5 billion; (4) the financing of retraining schemes for
returning officers and non-commissioned officers and their integration in
the Soviet economy at DM 500 million; and (5) compensation for Soviet
assets in the GDR in the sum of DM 17 billion to DM 17.5 billion. The
grand total of this bill as an integral part of the German settlement
amounted to about DM 36 billion. All of that money was directly related
to the transitional stationing, withdrawal and resettlement of the Soviet
forces only. It did not include any money for other purposes. And the sum
stood in stark contrast to what Germany was willing to pay, namely DM 6
billion, which was to be used primarily for the construction of housing.1695
Nothing was mentioned about Soviet assets, with another huge bill pre-
sumably still to be presented unless the USSR chose to follow the prece-
dents established in its negotiations with Hungary and Poland, which pro-
vided that the costs of environmental clean-up would be offset against the
presumed value of the military installations.
1694 Ibid.
1695 Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 357-58.
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The large gap between the Soviet and the German figures was both a
mutual embarrassment and a practical problem that urgently needed to be
dealt with. The gap was bridged in what must probably be ranked as two
of the most expensive telephone conversations in Soviet-German history.
In a first telephone conversation with Gorbachev on September 7, the Ger-
man chancellor suggested a total of DM 8 billion. Gorbachev reacted
harshly and said that DM 11 billion would be required for housing con-
struction alone. He also now, at that late stage, directly linked possible So-
viet concessions in the (final stages of the) Two Plus Four negotiations
with sums to be obtained from Germany. He was unsure what instructions
he should give to Shevardnadze in these negotiations. ‘For me’, he ex-
plained, ‘the situation is alarming. I have the impression that I have fallen
into a trap.’1696 The telephone conversation ended without a resolution of
the problem and with the German chancellor merely suggesting to talk
again three days later. In the telephone conversation on 10 September,
Gorbachev was more conciliatory, saying that he did not want to haggle
about figures, but he still considered Kohl’s counteroffer of DM 11 to DM
12 billion inadequate. He added that, after all, German unification was at
stake. Gorbachev finally accepted another offer by Kohl of DM 12 billion
plus an interest free credit of DM 3 billion.1697
In conclusion, it is appropriate to ask two questions pertaining to the
discussion of the economic and financial aspects of the Soviet consent to
German unification and Germany’s NATO membership: (1) How to assess
the DM 15 billion agreed upon for the direct costs of the stationing, with-
drawal and resettlement of Soviet forces and other German assistance?
Should the sums of money that were provided be regarded as adequate and
reasonable or as too low? (2) Why did Gorbachev, until his telephone con-
versations with Kohl in September, fail to drive a hard bargain on the eco-
nomic and financial issues, and why from Kohl’s perspective did he (Gor-
bachev) suddenly put unacceptably high figures on the table only after the
resolution of the international security provisions of German unification?
1696 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 467-68. If this was an expression of
genuine belief, it was obviously based on misperception. To be blamed for the
existence of the wide discrepancy between what he now demanded and what
Kohl was willing to pay was not, it would seem, bad faith shown by the West
German government but inept Soviet negotiating tactics.
1697 Ibid., p. 468; Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 358.
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As for the first question, on 12 September Gorbachev was asked on na-
tional television to comment on the impending finalization of the Two
Plus Four negotiations and, more specifically, on his two telephone con-
versations with Chancellor Kohl. He put his explanations in the context of
the conclusion of a new comprehensive treaty with a unified Germany and
other documents that were being prepared, including a treaty on economic
cooperation, and he linked these talks with the troop issue. A direct
question was then put to him:
[Interviewer:] And what have we acquired?
[Gorbachev:] Yes, and what we have acquired? You are right. The Germans
understand the fact that they should participate in the settlement of our return-
ing servicemen.
[Interviewer:] That will be fair.
[Gorbachev:] That will be fair, and they are responding and are ready to do so
within the framework of certain amounts – in my view the amount being ob-
tained is quite good. I think it is a total of about 15 billion [currency not stat-
ed]. Twelve billion will be expenditures on the maintenance and settlement
[of the armed forces], and there will be three billion by way of financial aid at
the present time. So I would say that everything is being decided on the basis
of concord and cooperation – well not immediately and not from the very out-
set.1698
Thus, perhaps predictably in view of the necessity to justify the far-reach-
ing strategic withdrawal from Central Europe, Gorbachev expressed satis-
faction with the German contribution to its cost. But everything is relative.
The sum of DM 15 billion, much of it to be paid over several years, for a
country as huge as the Soviet Union, pales in comparison with the net
transfer of about DM 200 billion in public money allocated per annum for
more than a decade (and continuing to this very day, even though at a low-
er level) since the achievement of German unity to the reconstruction of
the new Länder.1699
1698 ‘Vremya’ news broadcast, 12 September 1990, 5 p.m. GMT; television records,
the Harriman Institute, Columbia University (italics mine).
1699 According to the German Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH), in the
period 1990-2003, annual ‘net transfer costs‘ (Nettotransferkosten), i.e. expendi-
ture mainly for social security, amounted to DM 130 billion and allocations to
the improvement of the infrastructure as well as support for the restructuring,
modernization and creation of new enterprises (Aufbauhilfen and Sonderleistun-
gen) DM 68 billion; see https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Kosten_der_deutschen_Einheit. The IWH figures were in Euro, converted here
for comparison to Deutschmarks (DM).
Chapter 6: The Last Crisis
676
The figure of DM 15 billion agreed upon between Gorbachev and Kohl,
however, does not represent the actual total payment to the Soviet Union
for its consent to German unification. The price tag is larger than that. As
shown in Table 6, by mid-1991 the sum of German government and some
private assistance provided to the Soviet Union amounted to approximate-
ly DM 60.1 billion.
Even if one accepts the revised figures, it would appear that German
unity and unified Germany’s membership in NATO were obtained rela-
tively cheaply. The German finance minister certainly is of that opinion. In
his memoirs, he quotes from notes by Franz-Josef Strauß written in 1966.
He (Strauß) had thought that the Soviet Union might perhaps be tempted
by an offer of DM 100 to 120 billion of investment aid to consent to a
package consisting of a status for East Germany like that of Austria, exit
of West Germany from NATO and the EEC, and a German commitment
not to pose the question of unification until the end of the century. Waigel
calculates that the figure, adjusted for inflation, would have amounted to
approximately DM 450 billion in 1990 and sconcludes that ‘all of those
who consider the price for German unity to have been too high should
think about this’.1700
The ‘Price Tag’ of German Unification (in billions of DM)
1. A. Grants and Commodities Free of Charge
 1. Contributions to the Transitional Presence and the Withdrawal of the Soviet
Armed Forces Pursuant to the Überleitungsabkommen
  – Housing Construction for Returning Officers 7.8
  – Stationing Costs 3.0
  – Transportation Costs 1.0
  – Retraining 0.2
  – Interest for the DM 3 Billion Credit 1.5
 1. Stationing Costs for 1990 0.7
 1. Deliveries from Berlin and Bundeswehr Stocks 0.7
 1. Donations by the German People 0.2
 1. Grants for Consulting and Training Programs 0.03
 1. Germany's Share in EC Grants 0.4
1. B. Credits and Credit Guarantees
 1. Government Guarantees for Unconditional Financial Credits 1.
  – Balance of Payments Credit of July 1990 5.0
Table 6:
1700 Waigel and Schell, Tage, p. 56.
8. The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent
677
  – Credit Pursuant to the Überleitungsabkommen 3.0
 1. Export Guarantees (Hermes) 19.5
 1. Germany's Share in EC Credit Guarantees for Food Exports 0.3
C. Soviet-GDR Trade Imbalance
 1. Transferable Ruble Debt Account 15.0
 1. Interest on that Account, 1990-91 1.9
 TOTAL 60.1
a  Adapted from Christian Meier, ‘Economic Relations Between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Soviet Union in the Context of Support for Soviet Perestroika,’ in
Armand Clesse and Rudolf Tökés, eds., Preventing a New East-West Divide: The Eco-
nomic and Social Imperatives of the Future Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp.
460-67.
As for the second problem, that of why Gorbachev and his negotiators
failed to state a high price in the spring or summer of 1990 and why he
demanded specific sums only in September, that is, after the most impor-
tant international security provisions of German unification had already
been agreed upon, five interpretations are possible. The first is that of in-
ept negotiating tactics. This view could rest on the idea that Gorbachev
and the government either did not recognize the opportunities that existed
or were too distracted or overwhelmed by the myriad of domestic prob-
lems, including the preparations for the Twenty-eighth CPSU Congress, to
deal effectively with the issue. The second interpretation is the opposite of
the first, that is, skilful, if not devious, negotiating tactics. Soviet negotia-
tors would pretend to agree to all major security aspects of German unifi-
cation and only later, in the midst of euphoria in Bonn, would present their
bill in the full knowledge that West Germany would have to pay whether it
liked to or not. The third is that of good will and faith. This interpretation
could be based on the notion that Gorbachev was quite confident or even
certain of Kohl’s gratitude and saw no problem, once agreement on the
central security issues was reached, to ‘cash in’ later. The fourth is that of
a comprehensive view of future Soviet-German political and economic re-
lations, one that Kohl had suggested to Gorbachev as early as June 1989
in Bonn. This interpretation implies that Gorbachev assumed that a funda-
mental change of Soviet-German relations towards cooperation would
lead to a substantial expansion of economic exchanges, including both
government-guaranteed credits and private investments, and that specific
sums to be agreed upon for a transitional phase were less important than
the long-term benefits. The final interpretation is that of domestic consid-
erations and constraints. Gorbachev, it could be argued, sought to avoid
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the potentially damaging impression that major concessions on central se-
curity problems affecting the position of the Soviet Union for decades to
come had been made in exchange for short-term and perhaps short-sighted
economic benefit.
Although analytically distinct, the interpretations – except the second,
that of devious negotiating tactics – are mutually reinforcing and in all
likelihood played some role in the composite set of considerations on the
German problem. Certainly, expectations as to the substantial long-term
economic benefits and of a complete rearrangement of Soviet-German po-
litical relations were widely shared in the Soviet Union. For instance, one
day after the finalization of the Two Plus Four agreement, Izvestiia com-
mentator Alexander Bovin told his readers that German unification would
change the European political landscape. He reminded them that West
Germany's GDP was the third largest (after the USA and Japan); its share
in world trade amounted to a quarter of the total; and its industrial might
was as big as its financial clout. In the preceding year, he explained, it was
the world’s second largest creditor (behind Japan), and its net financial as-
sets amounted to $427 billion. This economic giant was no longer a politi-
cal dwarf. ‘Must we fear [this giant]?,’ he asked. His reply:
I am convinced we must not. ... In the FRG a stable democratic society has
been formed, and a return to the past is practically excluded. One can assume
that trust will be established because of the traditions and experience in eco-
nomic and political cooperation between the USSR and the GDR, and be-
tween the USSR and the FRG. It is not hard to imagine that a unified Ger-
many will be extremely interested in having a permanent partner with a huge
market and constant demand for investment from abroad.1701
Another centrally important clue to solving the mystery of why Moscow
did not drive a hard bargain in July 1990, failed to attach tough economic
conditions to unified Germany’s NATO membership and thus only re-
ceived relatively modest sums has been provided – at superficial consider-
ation, not very convincingly − by Chernyaev. He argued that Gorbachev
would have considered such an approach to be ‘undignified’.1702 Put dif-
ferently, appearances domestically were important. To Kohl, for instance,
this was confirmed in the context of a discussion on how to present the
security provisions of the Arkhyz agreement. Gorbachev, according to the
1701 Alexander Bovin, ‘Novaia Germaniia,’ Izvestiia, 14 September 1990 (italics
mine).
1702 Interview with Chernyaev.
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German chancellor, thought that ‘the first question to the federal chancel-
lor would be: “Did Gorbachev consent to entry of unified Germany into
NATO?” It would then be said [in the Soviet Union]: “The Soviet General
Secretary allowed unified Germany’s membership in NATO to be
bought.”’1703 Waigel, similarly, quotes the Soviet leader as having posed
the following question:
What will be said when [we announce] that Gorbachev has consented to Ger-
many’s entry into NATO? What will be the repercussions on the atmosphere
in the Soviet Union? [Our consent] will be interpreted as a trade for credits, as
reprehensible. We are conducting Realpolitik. We must find appropriate lan-
guage in order to gain acceptance.1704
Negotiations on German Economic Assistance and the Kurile Islands
To broaden the perspective, it is useful to compare Gorbachev’s failure to
link security and financial issues on the German problem in a coherent,
competent and timely fashion with Soviet negotiating tactics vis-à-vis
Japan on the issue of the southern Kurile Islands / Northern Territories.1705
This procedure is appropriate given (1) the strong economic and financial
position of both Germany and Japan in the world economy and their po-
tential importance for the modernization of the Soviet economy; (2) the
opportunity in both cases to link Soviet concessions on territorial and se-
curity issues with economic and financial assistance; and (3) the fact that
an attempt was made to apply lessons from the negotiations with Germany
to those with Japan. Put simply, in the Japanese case, at issue was a ‘cash
for the islands’ deal. Such a deal had painstakingly been prepared in back-
channel negotiations between Arcady Volsky, chairman of the Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and Ichiro Ozawa, chairman of the
Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party. It was meant to form the basis of an
agreement to be reached at the April 1991 summit between Gorbachev and
Japanese prime minister Toshiki Kaifu.1706
1703 Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, p. 437.
1704 Waigel and Schell, Tage, p. 46.
1705 According to Japan’s position the four islands in questions – Etorofu, Kunashir,
Shikotan and the Habomai group − never formed part of the Kurile Islands
chain. Tokyo, therefore, referred to them as its Northern Territories.
1706 The account of the back-channel negotiations on a ‘cash for the islands’ package
follows Lisbeth T. Bernstein, ‘On the Rocks: Gorbachev and the Kurile Islands’,
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At the end of January 1991, Gorbachev commissioned vice president
Gennady Yanaev to hold a meeting of a preparatory committee for the
Gorbachev’s upcoming visit to Japan. The meeting was attended by Vol-
sky, Sitaryan, Vitali Ignatenko (Gorbachev's press secretary), Alexander
Panov (head of the MFA’s department for the Pacific and Southeast Asian
countries), Falin and Andrei Grachev (head and deputy head of the Central
Committee’s ID respectively), Vassili Saplin (desk officer in charge of
Japan at the CC ID), Konstantin Sarkisov (head of the Japan section of the
Oriental Institute), Vladylen Martynov (director of IMEMO), Anatoli Mi-
lyukov (head of the Economic and Social Forecasting Department at Gor-
bachev's office) and Vladislav Malkevich (chairman of the Soviet Cham-
ber of Industry and Commerce). Faced with reservations, hesitation, and
wavering on the proposed package deal, Volsky burst out in anger:
This is our last chance. Just think about the food and all sorts of other aid.
This [discussion] is all bad. You are all politicians here. To hell with all of
you. You understand nothing. Economics is more important, and [returning
the islands] is the only way [the Japanese] will give us some money. ... We
must go [to Japan] and not just for nothing. We must go for credits. Let’s ana-
lyze again the Ozawa proposal. The Ozawa plan offers $22 billion. The plan
offers short-term credits and gradual credits. What they give us immediately,
and we should grab it, is $1.5 billion to buy medicines; $1.5 billion to buy
food; $1 billion for consumer goods. For medium-term credits, they give us
$8 billion. And for long-term credits, they give us $10 billion.
I spoke to Ozawa, I am in touch with him, as you know. Ozawa said [sarcasti-
cally]: ‘You don't need it [this money]? If you don't need it, then what do you
need?’ Ozawa then said’ ‘Give me a formula. Let's postpone the actual
sovereignty over all the islands for fifteen years, but give a promise to us now
that we will have them in fifteen years.’
It's a symbolic question, but I support this solution of the so-called ‘postponed
sovereignty’ in the following way: we give them two islands immediately,
and assure them that they will get [the] two more [remaining islands] within
fifteen years.1707 We ourselves are making a mistake. ... If we don't need it
[the package deal] then give me a hint and I will stop it. But what shall we do
without money? We already owe them $450 million that we cannot pay back.
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
May 1997. Her account is based on interviews with several of the participants in
the negotiations, including the January meeting, and on personal notes taken by
Sergei Grigoriev, assistant to Vitali Ignatenko and executive secretary of the
meeting.
1707 Essentially, that was the formula Khrushchev agreed to in 1956, that is, the im-
mediate return of two islands – Shikotan and the Habomai group – with
sovereignty over the other two islands to be settled later.
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Volsky then turned to Sitaryan as the official formally responsible for ne-
gotiating a deal and told him: ‘You should do it. My [opinion] is that it
should either be the Ozawa line or we should not go to Tokyo.’
Earlier in the tense meeting, Sitaryan had indicated his guarded agree-
ment in principle. He cryptically put it in the context of the failure (in
essence, his own) effectively to link economic and security issues on the
German problem, saying that considering ‘our careless activities in the
West, we should now learn how to tie things up. So the biggest question is,
if we give them the islands, what do we get back?’1708
For reasons which go beyond the scope of this book, Gorbachev failed
to endorse the proposed package deal. There is, however, one important
point to note. Despite the fact that at issue was much less territory over
which the Soviet Union would lose control and that much larger sums than
those agreed upon by Kohl were contemplated as part of a comprehensive
settlement with Japan, no agreement correspondingly was reached. By
January 1991 Gorbachev had in all likelihood become concerned about the
strength of nationalist opposition to further losses of territory – in this case
perceived genuinely Russian territory.1709 President Boris Yeltsin, for that
very reason, in September 1993 abruptly had to cancel plans to visit Tokyo
to resurrect the islands-for-economic-assistance deal.1710 The stage was
beginning to be set for Putin and the reassertion of the influence of the
siloviki and the adherents of ‘Great Power’ concepts (derzhavniki), as well
as imperial, nationalist, chauvinist, ‘Eurasian’ and anti-Western forces,
over Russian foreign policy.
1708 Ibid. (italics mine).
1709 The southern Kurile Islands (Kuril’skie ostrova) were part of the Russian Union
republic (RSFSR).
1710 For detail about the sudden cancellation of Yeltsin’s trip to Japan and the turn
away from the idea of forging a Euro-Atlantic Community ‘from Vancouver to
Vladivostok’ to nationalist Great Russian and Eurasian concepts see Hannes
Adomeit, Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs: Images and Reality, Inter-
national Affairs (London), Vol. 71, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 35-68.
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CONCLUSIONS
As explained in the Introduction, the purpose of this book is to examine
the reasons why Germany was divided after the Second World War; why
the division was maintained for such a long time; why the Soviet Union
accepted German unification; and why Moscow consented to membership
of unified Germany in NATO. The inquiry was set into the general theo-
retical framework of the rise, decline and fall of empires and the specific
context of the evolution and collapse of the Soviet empire in what was
then called ‘Eastern Europe’. The examination produced the following re-
sults:
The division of Germany did not occur as a consequence of Stalin’s
‘foresight’ and on the basis of ‘scientific’ analysis derived from Marxism-
Leninism. It was also not part of a deliberate, well thought-out Soviet poli-
cy of establishing an empire in East Central and South Eastern Europe
with the inclusion of East Germany. Instead, it constituted the outcome of
unplanned processes, uncoordinated actions and a perceived lack of better
alternatives. The division thus occurred by default rather than by design.
The default, however, was not spurious or accidental. It conformed to a
particular logic that rested in what has been called here the Ideological and
Imperial paradigm. Stalin was the unchallenged leader in the Soviet Union
after the Second World War. He made his imprint on and, in a fundamental
way, he was the Soviet system. Thus, his political philosophy and world
view were a decisive factor in the evolution of events. Both centered on
the acquisition, maintenance and expansion of power, no matter whether
in the Soviet Union itself or abroad. His was an imperial mind-set. In his
approach to international affairs, furthermore, raw indicators of power
took center stage, including population size, geographical expanse, natural
resources, volume of industrial output, acquisition of territory, control
over human and material resources, and the number and quality of divi-
sions, tanks, aircraft, artillery and nuclear weapons.
Stalin’s drive for personal power and the expansionist tendencies inher-
ent in imperial systems were reinforced by the universalist features of
Marxist-Leninist ideology. By ideological definition, the existing world
system was considered to be unjust. The status quo had to be changed in
favor of ‘world socialism’, that is, in favor of the Soviet Union. Since
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Stalin lacked confidence in autonomous political processes and distrusted
unplanned activities ‘from below’, history had to be given a push by bayo-
nets. There was, of course, nothing in Soviet ideology that would have
supported the de facto pre-eminence of military and geopolitical factors in
Soviet policy over economic considerations. On the contrary, historical
materialism posited a world development in which autonomous socio-eco-
nomic processes determined politics. It was Stalin, if not Lenin, who gave
Marxist-Leninism a peculiar bent towards the preeminence of political and
military power. At the end of the Second World War, the internal empire
constructed on that basis was already firmly in place. Not much was re-
quired for its expansion when the opportunity arose in East Central and
South Eastern Europe. An ‘informal’ empire was added to the existing for-
mal empire. It was this triangular structure − the confluence of Stalin’s
personality, Soviet imperial structures and Marxist-Leninist ideology –
that predetermined the fate of the part of Germany occupied by the Red
Army.1711
A revolutionary transformation of the whole of Germany, as Stalin
came to realize, was not a viable option. German nationalism, as he knew,
militated against a division of Germany. But the logic of the paradigm re-
quired holding on to an area under Soviet control, and subjectively Stalin
considered the risks of doing anything else to be greater than keeping what
he had.
But why did the division of Germany last for such a long time? Part of
the answer again rests in the compelling nature of the paradigm combined
with the normative Kraft des Faktischen, or the ‘power’ of facts to estab-
lish norms. The ‘building of socialism’ in the Soviet zone of occupation
and the German Democratic Republic within the context of the Soviet im-
perial system in East Central Europe, including the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon, created powerful vested interests among both Soviet and East
German institutions. Bureaucratic inertia is always an important character-
istic of imperial systems, and this certainly applied to the Soviet Union
under Stalin and his successors. This reinforced pressures not to tamper
with the imperial possessions. Yet the currency reform in the Western
zones and the momentum towards the creation of a separate West Ger-
many allied with the United States posed in a most tangible form the dis-
1711 Stalin changed the name of Red Army to Soviet Army in 1946.
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advantages of a continued division of Germany. Stalin reacted by impos-
ing the Berlin blockade.
The 1948 Berlin crisis underlined the complete lack of conceptual clari-
ty on the German issue. Stalin was unable to convey a clear message as to
what it was he wanted, that is, the incorporation of all of Berlin to round
off the Soviet empire in East Central Europe (Berlin as a prize) or the pre-
vention of the formation of a separate West German state (Berlin as a
lever). If the former was his goal, he was unprepared to accept the risk of a
military confrontation with the United States which such a goal carried
with it. If the latter was his aim, he was unwilling to relinquish Soviet con-
trol in the Soviet zone of occupation and make a reasonable offer of Ger-
man reunification.
In 1952, he made such an offer. On paper it looked reasonable. But it
was not credible. As the archival evidence underlines, the objectives to be
achieved to one degree or another were to gain greater influence over West
German public opinion; to counteract Western initiatives on free elections
to be held in both parts of Germany under United Nations supervision; to
delay or prevent West German defense integration in the framework of a
European Defense Community; and to obtain a gradual pullout of Western
allied troops from West Germany.
Imperial dilemmas again became dramatically evident in 1952-53. In
reference primarily to the mass exodus of East Germans to West Germany,
Prime Minister Malenkov had to acknowledge at a meeting of the govern-
ment in May 1953 that the Soviet leadership faced an internal catastrophe
in East Germany and that it was obliged to face the truth and admit that
without the presence of Soviet troops the existing regime in the GDR was
not stable.1712 The available evidence is strong that Beria was prepared to
draw appropriate conclusions and do something about the problem but that
he was unprepared to set a price acceptable to the West, let alone to aban-
don the GDR unconditionally. No one knows what result, if any, negotia-
tions conducted under Beria’s leadership would have obtained. In any
case, he was not given a chance to try, and his executors – some of them at
least – used both the East German popular uprising of June 1953 and the
argument that Beria had embarked upon a criminal scheme towards the
GDR as justification, if justification indeed was needed, to stay the course.
1712 See above, xxx pp. 117-18.
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This meant that the imperial dilemmas would return, as indeed they did
in 1958-61. As early as August 1958, Central Committee department head
Andropov had warned of another critical phase in East Germany caused
by another mass exodus of skilled workers and the intelligentsia. In
November 1960, an exasperated Khrushchev complained to Ulbricht about
the costs of empire and constantly being asked to bail East Germany it out.
The GDR, he said, should have learned how to walk on its own feet.
Khrushchev’s solution, after long hesitation and pressure exerted on him
by Ulbricht, was to give his consent to the building of the Berlin wall.1713
The wall had major consequences. The East Germany appeared to be-
come a viable political entity after all. The wall induced conformity and
cooperation of the population with the regime, rising identification with
the state, or Staatsbewußtsein. It also produced economic progress and ad-
vances in technology − but not enough of it. Like in the Soviet Union, the
communist system in East Germany failed to adapt to the challenges of
globalization, proved incapable of political and socio-economic modern-
ization and innovation, and fell behind in the competition with the capital-
ist world. As a result, the GDR’s financial and economic dependency on
West Germany was incessantly rising which, in turn, for Moscow meant
the return of imperial dilemmas and increasing ‘costs of empire’.
That problem the wall had not solved. In fact, all the Soviet leaders fol-
lowing after Khrushchev – Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gor-
bachev – warned of the ‘great danger’ of East Germany’s indebtedness to
the West. At a meeting in East Berlin in October 1979, for instance,
Brezhnev pounded his fist on the table and in front of the assembled SED
Politburo accused Honecker of leading the GDR into bankruptcy.1714 In
August 1984, after the GDR had accepted another major credit from West
Germany and after yet again having failed to inform Moscow in advance
of plans to that effect, Chernenko reminded Honecker that the GDR, by
accepting new credits, was becoming even more dependent on West Ger-
many.1715
‘Dependency’, from the Soviet perspective in the early to mid-1980s,
meant the translation of West German economic power into a never-end-
1713 The argument, however, that the tail wagged the dog, that is, that Ulbricht
forced Khrushchev to build the wall contrary to his own assessment of the re-
quirements, is unconvincing; see above, xxx p.137.
1714 See above, xxx p. 208.
1715 See above, xxx pp. 223-26.
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ing chain of East German political concessions and ultimately change of
the communist system – an assumption, given Honecker’s utter aversion
to reform, that in retrospect appears strange. Equally wide of the mark was
Moscow’s assessment that the German-German contacts, including Ho-
necker’s wish to visit West Germany, were somehow the harbingers of all-
German unification.
The Gorbachev Era
Viewed through the conceptual lenses of the paradigm in force from 1945
until 1985, the GDR looked indispensable. It was regarded in Moscow as
an integral part of the Soviet empire in East Central Europe, a bulwark of
ideological orthodoxy, a strategic glacis, a staging area for the Soviet
armed forces and a supplier of machinery, chemical products and uranium.
Gorbachev initially did not abandon this frame of reference when he as-
sumed power in March 1985. In fact, in the period of perestroika without
democratization, with the declared aim of ‘acceleration’ and ‘perfection’
of the communist system, the perceived importance of East Germany in
the bloc was even rising. A telling example of this was Gorbachev’s – ut-
terly unrealistic − endeavour to bundle Soviet and GDR high technology
(and that of Czechoslovakia) to counter president Reagan’s Strategic De-
fense Initiative. In 1986-87, however, Gorbachev moved away from the
Imperial and Ideological paradigm to a new framework, to that of the New
Political Thinking. This had serious consequences for the Soviet Union’s
role in East Central and South Eastern Europe and the German problem.
Gorbachev and the German Problem. When Gorbachev took office he
did, of course, have some notions about Germany and the Germans. How-
ever, these essentially appear to have been stereotypes, consisting of a
mixture of standard Soviet interpretations and traditional Russian views.
His attitudes were also governed more by common sense than by intellec-
tual sophistication or in-depth knowledge. Importantly, however, he
proved capable of learning and willing to adjust to ever changing circum-
stances. One of his beliefs, shared widely in Europe, was the notion that in
an era of nationalism and the nation state the division of Germany was un-
natural and artificial and could not last. But contrary to that, he also sub-
scribed to the idea that East Germany was basically politically stable, so-
cially integrated, economically viable and operating in a favourable envi-
ronment of increasing international acceptance of the division of Ger-
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many. Both of these two, in principle, contradictory and irreconcilable no-
tions – ‘the division of Germany is artificial and cannot endure’ and ‘the
division of Germany will last because the GDR is stable and no one really
wants reunification’ – coexisted in Gorbachev’s mind until the summer
and fall of 1989.
The Politics of Soviet Non-Interference and Deference. One of the ways
in which these contradictions were ‘solved’ was typically Gorbachevian
and perhaps inspired by Marxist dialectics: history would decide. He, Gor-
bachev, was not to take up the question of the continued division or reuni-
fication of Germany but to wait for things to get more mature. For shaping
his own political agenda, the ‘realities’ of the division were the decisive
frame of reference; and thus there was no point, as he admitted to presi-
dent von Weizsäcker in July 1987, in worrying about what would be ‘in a
hundred years’. The extension of glasnost and the introduction of
demokratizatsiia as a new priority in domestic politics in January 1987 ob-
jectively had the effect of undermining the legitimacy of orthodox, bu-
reaucratic, and neo-Stalinist regimes, including that of Honecker in East
Germany. However, contrary to widely held assumptions, Gorbachev did
not interfere in the course of events, let alone embark on a coordinated
policy initiative for comprehensive change within the bloc.
In fact, in what may be considered as one of the most astounding fea-
tures of his tense relationship with Honecker, in the many private conver-
sations with the East German leader he not only abstained from criticism
but was complimentary about the GDR’s economic and technological
achievements, praised its social policies and even lauded its internal politi-
cal development, comparing it favourably with the course pursued by
Hungary and Poland.
– To his close associates in Moscow, he complained about Honecker be-
ing recalcitrant and arrogant, and incessantly portraying the GDR as a
model of socialist development in the bloc but in conversation with the
East German leader Gorbachev de facto acknowledged the model char-
acter of the GDR’s development.
– He repeatedly complimented Honecker and the GDR for having drawn
the appropriate lessons from the global scientific-technological revolu-
tion and having developed and applied the concept of the ‘unity of eco-
nomic and social policy’ and, in retrospect incomprehensively, averred
that perestroika was essentially the same kind of response to that very
development that East Germany had adopted fifteen years earlier.
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– Whereas his explanations to Honecker of his program of change in the
Soviet Union were utterly defensive, his attitudes and tone concerning
developments in the GDR were laudatory and deferential.
At no point in time did he clearly and openly impress upon Honecker the
need for democratic change and liberalization in the GDR. His repeated
warnings that ‘those being late will be punished by history’, as he himself
clarified, meant to apply first and foremost to the Soviet experience. It was
only in October 1989 in East Berlin that he included the GDR in this
warning.1716
GDR Debts and Dependency. Gorbachev shared the wide-spread notion
of his predecessors that West Germany was deliberately and effectively
using large-scale credits, trade preferences and transfer payments to under-
mine the ‘socialist foundations’ of the GDR. In contrast to his predeces-
sors, however, Gorbachev was too polite, too timid or perhaps too ill-in-
formed to raise the matter head-on with Honecker. In his many private
conversations with the East German leader, he merely alluded to the prob-
lem, and only meekly. It was only in November 1989, after Honecker’s
successor Krenz had described in detail the disastrous economic and fi-
nancial state of the GDR, that Gorbachev was to acknowledge that he had
not imagined the economic situation to be that precarious and East Ger-
man dependence on West Germany to be so far-reaching.1717
The ‘Freedom of Choice’. His aversion to volunteer for the role of mid-
wife of history was complemented by his refusal to interfere in order to
stop change. That provided the major dynamics of change in East Central
and South Eastern Europe, including in East Germany. Since the ruling
communist parties had relied on the threat of Soviet military intervention
to guarantee their survival but in 1989 were faced with broad popular
movements for regime change, they (the anciens régimes) did not risk us-
ing the required massive force themselves to try to turn back the clock of
history.
Reform Socialism in the GDR. Until the very end of the GDR’s exis-
tence, Gorbachev’s approach to that country remained rife with unresolved
contradictions. The reason for this in all likelihood was that he anticipated
the creation of a reform socialist East Germany that would remain an inte-
gral part of the Soviet sphere of influence in East Central Europe and con-
1716 See above, xxx pp. 503-04.
1717 See above, xxx p. 522.
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tinue to be an active member of a reformed Warsaw Pact and Comecon.
The replacement of Honecker, first by Krenz and then by Gysi as party
chief, and by Modrow as prime minister, reinforced rather than detracted
from this idea. Although Gorbachev appreciated the fact that it was too
early to present a detailed plan of change, as he told Krenz on 1 November
1989, he was nevertheless heartened by the outlines of the main directions
of an action program which Honecker’s successor had allegedly developed
and which Gorbachev considered to be characterized by ‘more socialism’,
by renewal and democratization. The idea that the East Germans would
build a reform socialist country persisted until the 18 March 1990 parlia-
mentary elections in the GDR, where more than two thirds of the voters
voted for the branches of the main West German political parties, with the
ex-SED, now called the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), received
only 16.4 percent and the Allianz 90 a mere 2.9 percent of the vote.
Acceptance of German Unification. In retrospect, Gorbachev and his
supporters have argued that their primary concern in the period from the
opening of the wall on 9-10 November until the end of January 1990 was
not the prevention of unification but the management of a process that
could have gotten out of control and led to unpredictable consequences.
Support for this view could be found in the fact that Gorbachev refrained
from adopting the kind of forceful measures at the military level, but also
at the political and diplomatic level, that would have been necessary in or-
der to arrest the inexorable movement towards German unity. The means
for him to do so were certainly still available to him in the form of the
continued presence of substantial Soviet military forces in Europe. But
this interpretation is credible only up to a point. Gorbachev’s preferences,
as noted, were clear: East Germany was to be transformed from a mori-
bund, orthodox system to a viable, reform socialist country. To that extent
he was against unification. It is, therefore, not convincing to argue that his
negative attitude towards German unification was essentially tactical and
temporary, embarked upon under the assumption that the GDR and with it
Soviet empire in ‘Eastern Europe’ were irretrievably lost. Until March
1990 it was still unclear, certainly to Gorbachev, whether a reform experi-
ment in the GDR might not succeed after all. There was nothing to tell
how long this purportedly provisional support for a reformist GDR would
have lasted and what its impact would have been on the distribution of
power and influence in Central Europe. Paradoxically, therefore, German
unification – like the division of Germany – did not occur in accordance
with Soviet preferences. It also did not take place on the basis of Soviet
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policy initiatives. It was not even formally discussed and decided upon as
a policy option but accepted or ratified at the end of January 1990 as an
accomplished fact.1718 This also applied, with some modification, to the
Soviet consent to unified Germany’s membership in NATO.
Consent to German NATO Membership. Gorbachev was torn funda-
mentally between various positions and refused to commit himself to any
of them, essentially until the talks with Kohl in Moscow in July 1990. On
the one hand, he recognized the dangers of Versailles but, on the other, he
emphasized the necessity of Four Power cooperation and firm guarantees
to be provided within that framework. In accordance with the New Politi-
cal Thinking, he allocated important security functions to the Atlantic al-
liance and American forces in Europe but he opposed the logical extension
of this framework to include unified Germany’s membership in NATO.
The New Thinking principle of the Freedom of Choice as well as the
CSCE principle of freedom for the signatories to decide to which alliance,
if any, they wanted to belong to, in essence prejudged united Germany’s
membership in NATO. Gorbachev, however, for several months in the
spring of 1990, attempted to prevent the application of this principle. All
the ambiguities, it appeared at that point in time, had been resolved in fa-
vor of retrenchment and a hardening of positions on both the internal and
external aspects of German unification.
The reversal of that position occurred as a result of several domestic
and international factors.
– There was no viable alternative option to unified Germany’s member-
ship in NATO.
– The Soviet Union was isolated on both the issue of German neutrality
and Gorbachev’s idea of unified Germany’s dual membership in both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
– There was no support for it in Western and Eastern Europe, let alone
from across the Atlantic.
– At the end of January 1990, Gorbachev in essence had consented to
East Germany’s accession to the West German constitution on the basis
of article 23. This meant that West Germany’s network of treaties, in-
cluding the Final Act of 1954 that provided for the Federal Republic’s
membership in NATO, would automatically be extended to the eastern
part of the enlarged Germany.
1718 See above, xxx pp.583-86.
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– Gorbachev and his military advisor, Marshal Akhromeev, still thought
that the Warsaw Pact could be salvaged and would continue, albeit in a
thoroughly reformed shape, to provide a counterbalance to NATO.
– They and the adherents to the New Political Thinking came to accept
the Western argument that the policies of unified Germany would be
more predictable if it were to remain firmly anchored in Western insti-
tutions, including the Western military alliance.
– NATO had committed itself to structural reforms and to abandoning its
previous anti-Soviet political and military orientation. To the extent
that NATO could still be considered a military competitor in Europe,
the problem was mitigated by the fact that foreign armed forces and
nuclear weapons or their carriers would not be stationed in the former
East Germany.
The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent. The tremendous security implications of
unified Germany’s membership in NATO for the Soviet Union affected
Gorbachev’s bargaining position on the price to be exacted for his consent.
In theory, he could exact a heavy price. But he faced a dilemma. The Sovi-
et economic and financial state of affairs in the spring and summer of
1990 was critical and perceived to be so both in Moscow and internation-
ally. Gorbachev and his political and economic advisors considered in-
volvement of the Western industrialized countries, including West Ger-
many, a matter of top political priority both for the short term (to alleviate
severe bottlenecks in the supply of the population with foodstuffs and oth-
er consumer goods) and the medium- and long term (to assist the Soviet
leadership in a comprehensive reform effort). However, direct linkage be-
tween the security and economic dimensions of the German settlement
had to be avoided. The impression had to be dispelled that the leadership
of the Soviet Union was making far-reaching concessions on security is-
sues for short-term and possibly short-sighted economic and financial ben-
efit. This at least in part explains the reluctance by Gorbachev and his top
economics and trade officials to adopt a tough negotiating stance and de-
mand a high price. It was only after the security issues had been settled in
principle that a concomitant attempt to do so was made with results that
permit different interpretations. Measured against the vast sums expended
by West Germany for the reconstruction of the new Länder, the sums ob-
tained by Gorbachev after some tough bargaining at a late stage, in
September 1990, can be considered rather modest. Nevertheless, the com-
prehensive rearrangement of the political relationship between the Soviet
Union and Germany created significant economic opportunities which the
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former country, however, was unable to realize due to its failure to create a
viable framework of reform.
Domestic Politics: The Institutional Constraints. None of the estab-
lished institutions played a significant role in breaking new ground. They
were all wedded to the Imperial and Ideological paradigm. This applies
first and foremost to the CPSU and its subordinate branches, including the
CC’s International Department but also to the middle and upper-middle
levels of the foreign ministry, the KGB and the armed forces. Generating,
adapting to, and re-conceptualizing the changes unleashed in Eastern Eu-
rope, including in East Germany, fell almost entirely to a narrow circle of
top leaders and their closest advisors: Gorbachev, Shevardnadze,
Yakovlev, Chernyaev and Shakhnazarov.
– As the CPSU and its central apparatus were lagging behind in the re-
form process and losing their mobilizing function in Soviet society, at-
tempts were made by Gorbachev to alter this state of affairs. The Octo-
ber 1988 reorganization of the CC departments dealing with interna-
tional affairs and their merger in one single streamlined ID, with Falin
as its head, was to serve this purpose. However, Falin’s role on the
German problem was symptomatic of that of all major leading german-
isty: He was one of the chief architects of the August 1970 Moscow
Treaty and the September 1971 Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin and
viewed these agreements as strong pillars of European security. He
also had a vested interest in the continuation of the conceptual and
practical approaches he had developed. However, times had changed,
and he was unable or unwilling to change with them.
– Another leading germanist was Alexander Bondarenko. From 1971 to
1991, as chief of the MFA’s Third European Department, he was re-
sponsible, among other countries, for the relations with both Germanys
and Berlin and then, after an ill-advised reorganization in 1986, for the
western areas of Central Europe (minus West Berlin). In that function,
he played a similar role as Falin – not as valiant head of the advance
party on German unification and unified Germany’s membership in
NATO but as one of the rear-echelon commanders, initially attempting
to stop any advance and then, after this proved impossible, to delay or
deflect it.
– Bondarenko was supported in this role by Yuli Kvitsinsky, like Falin
another former ambassador to West Germany and, starting from May
1990, deputy foreign minister with responsibility for European affairs.
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– The attitudes of the chiefs of the ID and of the Third European Depart-
ment are representative for the role of these and other institutions. De-
spite several attempts at structural reorganization, the unwillingness or
inability of the main institutions to mend their ways remained an obsta-
cle that constantly had to be overcome by pressure and persuasion
from the very top. In the central party apparatus this task was fulfilled
by Yakovlev as the kurator of the new ID in the Politburo and by She-
vardnadze in the foreign ministry. In these institutions, as well as in the
KGB and the armed forces, there was wide-spread dissatisfaction and
frustration. No attempt was made, however, to assemble oppositional
leaders and factions in these institutions in a coordinated endeavour to
reverse the top political leadership’s course on the German problem or,
indeed, stop the accelerating drift towards the dissolution of the Soviet
empire and the Soviet Union until it was too late.
Domestic Politics: Decision Making. Theoretically, one of the central ana-
lytical tasks could be the attempt to pinpoint the precise date when the So-
viet leadership consented to German unification and decided on the basic
outlines of united Germany’s international status. Ideally, one would be
able to identify one or more Politburo meetings where the internal and ex-
ternal aspects of German unification were put on the agenda, discussed,
and then resolved. In practice, however, both the internal and external as-
pects were never formally discussed and decided simultaneously. A formal
meeting of the Politburo to consent to German unification or to decide the
Soviet position on Germany’s international status was never held. A meet-
ing that was held at the end of January 1990 and that involved a select cir-
cle of decision-makers, including several Politburo members, simply took
German unification for granted. Its participants decided a few procedural
questions for negotiations with West and East German leaders but failed to
address, let alone resolve, the principles of the Soviet negotiating position
on the external aspects of German unification.1719 A formal Politburo
meeting on the German problem took place at the beginning of May 1990,
but it continued to treat the internal and international problems of the Ger-
man problem as separate, and the majority of its participants, including
Gorbachev, were adamantly opposed to united Germany’s membership in
NATO.1720
1719 See above, xxx pp. 583-86.
1720 See above, xxx p. 619.
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This apparently firm position was reversed less than four weeks later by
Gorbachev, single-handedly, at the Soviet-American summit in Washing-
ton – to the surprise of the American and the consternation of the Soviet
participants, without prior consultation of other Politburo members and
top decision-makers, and contrary to the advice of all the senior experts on
Germany. The explanation for this extraordinary state of affairs lies in the
deliberate enervation of the power of the traditional decision-making insti-
tutions and machinery and their relegation to a secondary role; the disor-
ganization and disruption produced by an incomplete and ineffective shift
from a centralized, one-party state to a presidential system with some
forms of parliamentary control; the shift in decision-making authority to a
small circle of top leaders and their advisers and personal assistants; the
exacerbation of conflict between the broad base of conservative bureau-
cracies and the thin layer of advocates of the New Thinking at the top; and
an increase in pressure for more radical reform exerted by the newly creat-
ed legislative bodies and the politically aware segments of public opinion.
Collapse of the Soviet Empire: The Utility of Theories of Imperialism
Applying theories of imperialism to the demise of Soviet empire in Euro-
pe, with the loss of East Germany as a case study, an integrative approach
is useful.
Metrocentric Theories. Explanations provided by Schumpeter and Ned-
erveen Pieterse, with their emphasis on political and military power and
the political will of elite groups, rather than Marxist, neo-Marxist or radi-
cal-liberal economic concepts, probably yield the sharpest and most accu-
rate images. Soviet imperialism, to use their approaches, was not an ex-
pression of economic dynamics but primarily a political phenomenon. The
quest for power, expressed in the perennial question of kto-kogo, or who
will beat whom, was a central concern for Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky,
Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky and other leading figures of the Bolshevik revolu-
tion. Their drive to gain the upper hand in Russia was so determined that
they turned Marxism on its head. They, or rather those of them who re-
mained on top in the domestic power struggle, refused to contemplate
Gorbachev-style attitudes and policies of waiting for matters to get more
mature, that is, in 1917 for backward Russia to develop capitalism and a
strong working class. The Bolshevik leaders rather than ‘history’ estab-
lished a political superstructure with which they constructed ex post facto
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the appropriate socio-economic base for a socialist system. Also, contrary
to Marxist ideas about the ‘withering away of the state’, they built strong
institutions, including a centralized party, armed forces and a large securi-
ty apparatus. These instruments of power served these leaders well in the
recreation and extension of the Czarist empire, first, with the reincorpora-
tion of Ukraine, Belorussia, the southern Caucasian and Central Asian ter-
ritories after World War I; second, the addition of the Baltic states during
the Second World War; and third, extension of the empire to East Central
and South Eastern Europe after the war.
Power and political will were also the determining factors in the refor-
mulation and adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideology to serve imperial
needs. This was evident, among other things, in the Stalinist definition of
‘true internationalism’ as defense of the Soviet Union ‘without reserva-
tion, without wavering, and unconditionally’.
The problem with the primacy of politics over economics in the con-
struction of the Soviet empire, however, was the gap that opened between
economic potential and military capabilities and between foreign-policy
ambitions and the means for their realization. This problem existed in the
Stalin and the Khrushchev era but became acute under Brezhnev in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviet economy became overburdened
with a vast and growing bureaucracy, including a large ‘army’ of govern-
ment officials, economic administrators, the armed forces, police and the
KGB. As described by Paul Kennedy, an extraordinarily large portion of
the country’s resources was allocated to ‘guns’ rather than ‘butter’. This
accelerated the country’s economic decline, impaired its long-term ability
effectively to compete with economically more efficient and innovative
adversaries and eroded its ability to maintain its internal and external em-
pire. To that extent, the problem of overextension started in the centre, in
the form of imperial stagnation and decay. However, this had important
implications for the Soviet Union’s global position.
International Systemic Factors. Soviet imperial overexpansion was a
relative phenomenon, as indeed were the economic problems of the Soviet
imperial system. The collapse of both the Soviet external and internal em-
pire, as Kontorovich has convincingly argued, was not the result of an
acute economic crisis but of a crisis of ideology and the disintegration of
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the political system in the Soviet Union.1721 The impetus for fundamental
change, including the turn away from empire, was rooted in Gorbachev’s
realization and that of the advocates of the New Political Thinking that in
comparative perspective the Soviet Union and its East European depen-
dencies were falling behind in the economic and technological competi-
tion with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and some of the newly
industrializing countries. Indeed, one is left to wonder how much change
there would have occurred even under Gorbachev if the Western system
had not performed as well as it did. Given the competitive pressures from
abroad, however, the costs of empire had to be considered in a different
light. For the Soviet Union successfully to compete, it made a substantial
difference whether its European possessions were an asset or a liability.
The worsening of the international power position of the Soviet Union ne-
cessitated the adoption of conciliatory policies and a reduction rather than
an expansion of imperial commitments. Contrary to Snyder’s theoretical
constructs dressed as empirical observations, a fairly broad coalition of
domestic actors, including Gorbachev himself, recognized this objective
necessity and acted accordingly. To the extent that there was resistance
among the institutions with a vested interest in the maintenance of empire,
they had no valid counterarguments.
Pericentric Theories. As for the pericentric analytical lens, nothing
could cloud a proper understanding of the relationship between the
Moscow centre and its dependencies in Eastern Europe more than the con-
sideration of these relations as ‘involuntary imperialism’ or conforming to
a pattern of ‘autocolonization’. The foundation of Soviet empire, to reiter-
ate the point, was predicated upon the centre’s political will. The fact that
the modern-day Soviet equivalents of provincial governors, satraps or pal-
adins, once they had been put in power by the imperial centre, perennially
needed and asked for Moscow’s support, including intermittently in the
form of military intervention, was not an expression of the centre’s aver-
sion to empire but a function of the non-viability of imperial structures in
Eastern Europe.
The lack of viability had many reasons. For instance, in contrast to
many previous examples of empire-building, including the Russian colo-
nization in Central Asia, where the low level of socio-economic develop-
1721 Vladimir Kontorovich, ‘The Economic Fallacy’, The National Interest, No. 31
(Spring 1993), pp. 35-45.
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ment facilitated the establishment of imperial control, the Soviet system in
East Central, South Eastern Europe and the Baltic States had been im-
posed on economies and societies that were in many ways more advanced
than Soviet society. This provided the seeds, to use a favourite Marxist-
Leninist term, of contradictions between European societies and the Sovi-
et-type communist regimes, and formed the basis for anti-Soviet and anti-
Russian national emancipation. Kennan, as he admitted twenty years after
the publication of his July 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, could have
made a much better case for the tenuous nature of Soviet rule if he had
added to his analysis the ‘embarrassments’ of imperialism which the Sovi-
et leaders had taken upon themselves with their conquest of European na-
tions.1722
In the Stalin era, the imperial possessions had still fulfilled their tradi-
tional purpose of adding to the power and wealth of the centre. This was
achieved by a blatantly exploitative policy. Khrushchev ended that policy
and after 1958 even promoted concepts of voluntary cooperation, suprana-
tionality and ‘socialist division of labour’. But neither his reformist at-
tempts nor Brezhnev’s re-emphasis on bloc discipline could transform the
centre-periphery relations to a condition of viability and efficiency. Peren-
nial subsidization and recurrent military intervention constituted ‘costs of
empire’ which, under Gorbachev, powerfully eroded the centre’s will to
empire. As for Gorbachev’s attitudes specifically to East Germany, the
perceived dependency of the GDR on West Germany as well as Honeck-
er’s recalcitrance and arrogance played a large part in the erosion of impe-
rial will.
Because of the widely assumed East German economic and technologi-
cal progress and political stability, imperial overstretch in that exposed
part of the periphery was not the most visible. But it was the most funda-
mental. There were two reasons for this.
– First, to the population in Moscow’s European holdings, liberalization
first and foremost meant liberalization of travel. For the East Central
and South Eastern European countries, this was a manageable conces-
sion. Because of the would-be emigrants’ lack of familiarity with the
language of the countries abroad and the difficulty for them to receive
work permits it was likely that they would return from visits. This,
however, was completely different in the East German case. For
1722 See above, xxx p. 45.
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would-be emigrants to West Germany there was neither a problem with
the language nor with work permits or even citizenship. Liberalization
of travel, therefore, would have and, when it was ultimately intro-
duced, did have the opposite effect than elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. It
led to population drain and to erosion of the country’s stability.
– Second, the national question also differentiated the GDR from all oth-
er East European countries. The communist regimes in reformist
Poland and Hungary as well as in dictatorial Romania could play the
national card in order to enhance their legitimacy. This was and turned
out to be impossible for the SED. Playing the national card meant rais-
ing the issue of German unification and threatening the existence of the
GDR. The unresolved German problem, among many other factors,
also made it impossible for Gorbachev to transform the European em-
pire to a ‘simple’ Soviet sphere of influence and change Moscow’s re-
lations with is dependencies from imperial domination to hegemony.
This inability was compounded by the exposure of the East Central and
South Eastern European societies and economies to Western influence.
That brings into play transnational factors of imperial decline and col-
lapse.
Transnational Factors. United States and European technology, trade
and credits, as well as businessmen and bankers, were some of the most
important transnational ‘forces’ that made an important impact on the So-
viet Union’s empire in Europe. Equally important agents of change were
the manifold contacts and exchanges between the rank-and-file members
of the ruling communist parties and ‘social organizations’ and activists of
the Western ‘peace movement’; the Eurocommunist parties, notably those
of Italy and Spain; the European social democratic parties; the trade
unions; cultural and church groups; and academic specialists in universi-
ties and research institutes. The most corrosive influence on the Soviet
empire, however, was provided by the extensive rights and freedoms and
the rapid rise in the standard of living enjoyed by the citizens of Western
European countries. For them, the centre of attraction did not lie in
Moscow but in many different Western European capitals.
The effectiveness of transnational factors was enhanced by concepts
such as détente, ‘bridge building’, ‘constructive engagement’, Ostpolitik
and Wandel durch Annäherung, or change through rapprochement. The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided a
particularly useful umbrella under which transnational forces could deploy
and operate. East Central and South Eastern European society, therefore,
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was thoroughly penetrated. This vastly complicated Soviet control and
produced ‘costs of empire’ that were perhaps less tangible than the direct
economic and financial costs but no less important because of their politi-
cal repercussions.
East German society, as the Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev
came to realize, was the most penetrated of all. This was the result of a
flood of radio and television broadcasts from West Germany and West
Berlin unhampered by the language barrier, millions of visits in both di-
rections and East German economic and financial dependencies. The SED,
as Honecker repeatedly complained in private conversation with Gor-
bachev, was put in the awkward − in reality hopeless − position to fight a
two-front war: against ideological penetration from West Germany and
West Berlin and the effects of glasnost and democratization in the Soviet
Union.1723
The Importance of Individual Leaders, Ideas and Objective Forces in
History. In the evolution of events leading to both the division of Ger-
many and to German unification the party leaders – Stalin and Gorbachev
– played a central role. It is more than a play on words and stating the ob-
vious that Stalinism would have been impossible without Stalin. The
vozhd, or Führer, was not merely a party leader but also an institution. He
gave Marxist-Leninist ideology a particular bent. His ideas, limited and
parochial as they may have been, massively shaped history. This had the
effect that his successors, including Khrushchev in his reform effort, were
severely constrained in their freedom of action by the ideological and in-
stitutional framework that he had created. Hence, in the more than three
decades after Stalin’s death, objective forces rather than political will
proved dominant. It took a severe crisis in all dimensions of policy and an-
other leader with new ideas to change this state of affairs.
For heuristic purposes, Gorbachev’s role can be said to lie on a continu-
um, ranging from perfect control to loss of control, and from planning to
subjectivism and spontaneity. On this continuum, two schools of thought
can be distinguished. The first interprets Gorbachev’s role and the dissolu-
tion of empire as a complex and difficult but essentially managed process.
The second argues that the Soviet party leader initiated processes over
which he lost control. The two schools, in turn, are found in two variants.
One variant of the first interpretation sees Gorbachev as a midwife of his-
1723 See above, xxx pp. 349, 570.
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tory, helping to give birth to something new and desirable, with pain obvi-
ously to be expected in the process. The other variant, ardently promulgat-
ed by orthodox communists, sees him as a more sinister character, full of
criminal energy, at the head of a conspiracy to destroy both the Soviet em-
pire and the Soviet Union. The first variant of the second school could be
called that of the sorcerer’s apprentice. It consists of the idea that the Sovi-
et leader did have some idea as to what certain magic spells, such as pere-
stroika, glasnost, New Political Thinking, Freedom of Choice, and the
Common European Home, would lead to and that he, like the sorcerer’s
apprentice in Goethe’s ballad, got the abracadabra to work wonders, but
that things then spun out of control. The second variant takes this case to
the extreme and accuses Gorbachev of lack of foreign-policy professional-
ism and foresight, incompetence and ignorance, and simply reacting to
and endorsing events as they unfolded.
The solution to the riddle of Gorbachev’s role in history probably lies in
a combination of elements of the various interpretations and in a proper
assessment of the changing context of his policies. In the first four years
of his tenure in office, Gorbachev acted primarily as ‘midwife of history’.
Major processes of change were set in motion by his endorsement of the
New Thinking and the Common House of Europe in 1985-86, the broad-
ening of glasnost and the introduction of democratization in 1987, and of
the Freedom of Choice in 1988. The role of the individual in history and
that of ideas was preeminent. In 1989, however, both in domestic politics
and in international affairs, Gorbachev essentially lost control. He was no
longer guiding the course of events but merely reacting to them. Abroad,
the drift became evident first and foremost in East Central Europe, in Hun-
gary and Poland, and then in East Germany. The uncontrollable dynamics
culminated in the torrents that led to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon and then of the Soviet Union itself. This also makes Gorbachev
a ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ – a prisoner of the new paradigm he had con-
structed. A prominent place for him in European and world history is well
deserved, however, not because of his keen analytical sense and political
foresight but because of his willingness to adapt to ever changing realities
and his unwillingness to use force in order to arrest or deflect fundamental
change.
The costs of empire and Soviet imperial overstretch evidently carry im-
portant lessons but these appear to be entirely disregarded by present-day
Russia.
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Lessons Unlearned: Putin in Brezhnev’s Footsteps
History, of course, is never ending and it does not repeat itself. Neverthe-
less, for international relations analysts as well as for Russian policy-mak-
ers the collapse of the Soviet Union provides lessons. It can serve as a case
study to compare the fate of the USSR with the path taken by Russia un-
der Putin, especially since the beginning of his third term in office as pres-
ident. The following considerations make this an analytically fascinating
and, for the Kremlin, politically expedient endeavour.
First, although the resurgence of imperial ambitions dates back to the
Yeltsin era, to 1993,1724 the pursuit of imperial ambitions has assumed par-
ticularly assertive and even aggressive form under Putin.1725 The frame-
work of reference for the resurgence was provided by his initiative in Oc-
tober 2011 to achieve ‘a qualitatively higher level of integration’ on post-
1724 Important markers of that year are, in addition to the above mentioned rejection
of the ‘Khrushchev formula’ for the solution of the conflict over territory with
Japan xxx (pp. 682-684), the adoption of a more ‘even handed’ approach to-
ward the war in the former Yugoslavia, that is, in essence, a more pro-Serbian
stance; revision of attitudes towards NATO, now calling it again the ‘biggest
military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive potential’
but remained wedded ‘to the stereotypes of bloc thinking’ (November 1993, re-
port by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service); assertion of ‘vital interests’
and ‘special rights’ on the territory of the former USSR with the corollary that
‘the United Nations should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace
and stability in the region (Yeltsin in February 1993, in a speech to a congress of
the Civic Union, a center-right alliance); the claim that Russia did not only have
the right but the obligation to protect not only ethnic Russians but also ethnical-
ly non-Russian, but culturally assimilated, citizens in the newly independent
states, the russkoiazychnie; connected with it, military-political pressure exerted
on Latvia and Estonia, where Moscow condemned ‘mass violations of human
rights’ and openly supported the ‘rights’ of the Russian minority; and, finally,
military intervention on post-Soviet geopolitical space, e.g. in Tajikistan, Abk-
hazia and Transnistria. A detailed reconstruction of Russia’s turn away from
Euro-Atlantic cooperation ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’ to a narrow under-
standing of Russian interests under Yeltsin, can be found in Adomeit, ‘Russia as
a “Great Power”’.
1725 For the argument that Putin’s Russia, because of serious structural deficiencies
of the economy, excessive expenditure for internal and external security, low oil
prices and confrontationist policies towards the West, is at risk of repeating the
stagnation (zastoy) and decline of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, see id.,
‘Russlands imperialer Irrweg: Von der Stagnation in den Niedergang’, Osteu-
ropa, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2015), pp. 67-94.
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Soviet space through the creation of a full-fledged economic and ultimate-
ly political union, that is, the ‘Eurasian Union’.1726 Execution of the
framework could be seen in operation in the severe pressure exerted on
Ukraine to desist from concluding with the EU a Deep and Comprehen-
sive Association Agreement; the annexation of Crimea; the war in eastern
Ukraine; and the vision to resurrect and extend the Czarist province (gu-
berniia) of Novorossiya to embrace the separatist entities of Lugansk and
Donets and stretch from there via Mariupol, the Crimea, Mykolaiv and
Odessa to Moldova’s breakaway republic of Transnistria. The return to the
imperial part of the Soviet leadership’s Imperial and Ideological paradigm
has significant direct costs attached to it, including expenditure for the in-
tegration of the Crimea in the Russian Federation; subsidization of
Eurasian Economic Union members Belarus and Armenia; keeping in
power the separatist regimes in Donetsk, Lugansk, South Ossetia, Abk-
hazia and Transnistria; and maintaining and extending military support
and modernizing military bases in the dependencies. The return to imperi-
al policies carries with it also significant indirect costs such as Western
sanctions that contribute to the stagnation and decline of the Russian econ-
omy.
A second major indication of the return of the Soviet leaders’ ‘imperial
overstretch’ syndrome under Putin is the widening gap between Russia’s
expenditures for internal and external security and its economic and fi-
nancial resources. The Kremlin leader has professed awareness of the
problem by saying: ‘Some people argue that rebuilding our military-indus-
trial complex will saddle the economy with a heavy burden, the same bur-
den that bankrupted the Soviet Union.’ However, he dismissed that idea as
‘profoundly delusionary’.1727 If meant seriously, it would betray an acute
loss of a sense of reality. Russia in nominal terms only occupies tenth
place on the list of world economies.1728 Its growth rates have turned from
an average 7.8 percent in Putin’s first two terms in office as president in
1726 ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii – budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia
segodnia’, Izvestiia.ru, 3 October 2011, http://www.izvestia.ru/news/502761.
1727 In an article for the U.S. Foreign Policy magazine, ‘Being Strong: Why Russia
Needs to Rebuild its Military’, Foreignpolicy.com, 21 February 2012, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/21/being-strong/.
1728 Behind the United States, China, India, Japan, Germany, Britain, Brazil, Italy
and India. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, http://
statisticstimes.com/economy/world-gdp-ranking.php. Data for 2014. − The pic-
ture for Russia looks better in purchasing power parity terms. According to the
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2000-2008 to an estimated contraction of between 3.5 and 4 percent in
2015. Growth in 2016 is estimated to be in the range of 1.5 to 0.3 per-
cent.1729 But Russia continues to implement an arms programme for the
years 2011-2020 in the amount of 23 trillion roubles, the equivalent of
$755 billion when it was adopted on 31 December 2010.1730 The country
maintains land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strate-
gic bombers claimed to be on a par with the United States; armed forces of
one million men; several hundreds of thousands of troops in other armed
formations, including forces of the ministry of the interior (MVD) and the
secret police (FSB); an ‘army’ of civil employees in the armed forces and
other military organisations; and more than two million employees in the
military-industrial complex. Its leadership, furthermore, believes that it
can afford to maintain military bases – in part contrary to international law
and against the will of neighbouring states – in what is claims to be a
sphere of ‘privileged interest’ on post-Soviet space.1731
A third milestone of the return of the ‘imperial overstretch’ syndrome
under Putin are increasing structural similarities between Brezhnev’s
USSR and Putin’s Russia – as, indeed, encapsulated in the latter’s state-
ppp ranking of world GDP, Russia occupies sixth place. That location, however,
is still for instance, behind that of Germany.
1729 The 1.5 to 0.3 percent estimate for Russia’s GDP growth in 2016 is that of the
economists at the Russian Alpha Bank. The corresponding estimate of the Rus-
sia specialists at Bloomberg is 0.5 percent. Data according to Valeriia
Kushchyk, Pomoshchnik Putina zayavil o neobkhodimosti strukturnykh reform
dlia rosta VVP, Rbc.ru, 17 August 2015, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/
17/08/2015/55d211f19a7947fabf79f411.
1730 The official figure for the 2011-2020 State Armament Programme (GPV) is 20
billion roubles. The expenditure of another 3 billion roubles is allocated to spe-
cific projects of the military-industrial complex. ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi
Federatsii ot 31 dekabria 2010 g.’, Biulleten’ Schetnoi palaty, No. 1565, Gov.ru,
6 October 2013, http://ach.gov.ru/userfiles/bulletins/2013-10-06-buleten_doc_
files-fl-2454.pdf. − Part of the evidence for Russia’s imperial overstretch is the
precipitous fall in the value of its currency. Whereas, on 31 December 2010, the
23 billion roubles were worth $755 billion, on 31 July 2015, their value had
dropped to a mere $333 billion.
1731 The claim that Russia had ‘privileged interests’ on post-Soviet space was ad-
vanced by then president Medvedev after the war in Georgia; see Interview giv-
en by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel




ment that ‘The Soviet Union, too, is Russia, only under another name.’1732
The similarities of the ‘Putin system’ with that of the Soviet Union can be
found in many different areas. In the political realm, they include an au-
thoritarian and arbitrary form of government focused on one single leader;
the abolition of ‘checks and balances’, as evidenced in the pre-eminence
of the executive with the emasculation of the legislative and re-establish-
ment of political control over the judiciary; ‘the culture of legal nihilism
that in its cynicism has no equal anywhere on the European continent’;1733
limitation of the freedom of the media, with national television function-
ing as a major instrument of government propaganda; curtailment of civil
society as witnessed in the harassment of non-governmental organization;
the progressing role of ‘state management’ of the economy and society;
and the elevation of the military-industrial complex to a ‘motor’ or ‘loco-
motive’ for the modernization of the economy.
Foremost, however, among the structural or systemic similarities be-
tween the Putin and Soviet system is the perpetuation of a ‘primitive raw
materials economy’, ‘humiliating dependency on raw materials’ and the
perennial ‘illusion that [because of high oil prices] structural reforms can
wait’.1734 Medvedev, when he was president, recognized that the abolition
of this dependency and the establishment of a modern, innovative econo-
my and society was ‘a question of our country’s survival in the modern
world’.1735 Putin, too, shortly before the Kremlin’s ‘tandem’ arrangement
took effect (Medvedev as president, and Putin as prime minister), recog-
nized that only fragmentary attempts had been made to modernize the
1732 Putin on 17 October 2011 in the Direct Line television conference with Russian
viewers carried live by all three main channels, the First, Rossiya 1 and NTV;
‘Sovetskiy Soyuz – eto ta zhe Rossiya, no s drugim nazvaniem’, Ruskline.ru, 18
October 2011, <http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/10/18/sovet-
skij_soyuz_eto_ta_zhe_rossiya_no_s_drugim_nazvaniem/>.
1733 This is a complaint that Medvedev, when he was president in 2008-2012, repeat-
edly advanced; see for instance his ‘state of the nation’ address in 2008,
‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Kremlin.ru, 5 Novem-
ber 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/05/1349_type63372type-
63374type63381type82634_208749.shtml; the article titled ‘Go Russia!’,
‘Rossiia vpered!’, ibid, 10 September 2009, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5413;
and the ‘state of the nation’ address in 2009, ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, ibid., 12 November 2009, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/
5979.
1734 Medvedev, ‘Poslanie’, 2009, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/5979.
1735 Ibid.
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economy. As a result, Russia’s dependence on raw materials exports and
imported goods and technology was increasing, and ‘if we were to contin-
ue on this road … we would be placing [Russia’s] very existence under
threat’.1736 Like the Soviet leaders from Khrushchev via Brezhnev and
Andropov to Chernenko, however, Putin has proven averse to putting in
place a comprehensive and sustainable reform programme to achieve
modernisation and instead has placed the emphasis on mobilization.
Fourth, not only has the imperial part of the Soviet era’s Imperial and
Ideological paradigm returned under Putin but also an ideological com-
ponent that resembles Soviet ideology. Of course, that systemic ingredient
has nothing to do any more with Marxist-Leninist universalism. However,
it encapsulates its Stalinist deformation towards Russian nationalism and
patriotism. Its constituent elements consist of traditional 19th century
Great Power attributes; the glorification of the Russian imperial past and
the Russian army and navy’s brilliant military achievements; the resurrec-
tion of Stalin as a great political and military leader who led Russia
through the Great Patriotic War to achieve superpower status; the empha-
sis on the ‘liberation’ of the Baltic nations, East Central and South Eastern
Europe from fascism with the concomitant denial of the replacement of
one foreign occupation regime by another – up to including the argument
that the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a pre-
emptive move to protect the country against a coup engineered by NA-
TO.1737
To a large extent, Soviet ideology has been replaced by what today goes
under the name of ‘traditional Christian values’, with the Russian Ortho-
dox Church as a declared bulwark against Western liberalism, individual-
ism and materialism. The Czarist empire’s trinity of orthodoxy, autocracy
(autoritarianism at present) and nationality − pravoslavie, samoderzhavie,
narodnost’ − is being resurrected and integrated into the Putin system. The
‘new’ ideological component contains the idea of the Russian World
1736 Putin, still in office as president, on 8 February 2008 in a speech at an enlarged
session of the state council, where he introduced his ‘Strategy for Russia’s De-
velopment until 2020’; V. Putin, ‘Vystuplenie na rasshirennom zasedanii Gosu-
darstvennogo soveta, “O strategii razvitiia Rossii do 2020 goda”’, Kremlin.ru, 8
February, 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/02/08/1542_type63374-
type63378type82634_159528.shtml.
1737 According to a documentary on the Warsaw Pact aired by the Russian national




(russkii mir) with ‘the Russian Orthodox Church … essentially unifying
the millions of people who belong to it’ and with ‘the Russian language as
the main form of expression and bearer of national unity, cementing to-
gether the vast Russian world that stretches far beyond our country’s bor-
ders’.1738 That concept is also being used to deny to Ukraine and Belarus a
separate identity. This is because ‘at the foundation of the Russian nation
and the centralized Russian state are the same spiritual values that unite
the whole of that part of Europe now shared by Russia, Ukraine and Be-
larus’, and that their peoples have a ‘common destiny’.1739
The cultural aspect, that is, the defense of the Russian World against the
intrusion of the ‘libertine’ and ‘decadent’ West with its multiculturalism,
radical feminism and homosexuality, is closely linked to the political di-
mension. The Western governments, through its secret services, are being
accused, through ‘colour revolutions’ and ‘so-called non-governmental or-
ganisations’ – essentially ‘foreign agents’ − not only to destroy the moral
fibre of the countries and peoples of the Russian World but to achieve
regime change.
That portrayal, finally, links up with the claim that the West, from the
time of the Teutonic Knights via the Cold War to the present, has been
hostile to Russia. In recent history, the United States and the CIA in partic-
ular have been held responsible for engineering the break-up of the War-
saw Pact and the Soviet Union, and attempting to disassemble the Russian
Federation − ‘to tear off “juicy pieces” from us’.1740 To that extent, the
class-based Marxist-Leninist concept of ‘U.S. imperialism’ has simply
1738 ‘Vladimir Putin: V osnove russkoi natsii i rossiiskogo tsentralizovannogo gosu-
darstva lezhat edinye dykhovnye tsennosti’, Regnun.ru, 23 July 2013, http://
www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1687151.html.
1739 Ibid.
1740 Putin in a televised address after the September 2004 Beslan terror attack. To
put the quote in context, he said: ‘Generally speaking, one has to admit that we
failed to understand the complexities and dangers of processes under way in our
own country and in the world. At any rate, we failed to respond appropriately to
them. We showed weakness. And the weak get beaten. Some would like to tear
off a “juicy piece” from us. Others help them. They help, because they believe
that Russia as one of the major nuclear powers is still a threat to them, a threat
that should thus be removed. And terrorism is, of course, a mere instrument to
achieve such aims.’ ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina’, Krem-
lin.ru, 4 September 2004, http://www.kremlin/ru/appears/
2004/09/04/1752_type63374_76320.shtml. 
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been replaced by the charge that the rationale of ‘U.S imperialism’ is
geopolitical and geostrategic.
What about Germany in all of this? The collapse of Russia’s relation-
ship with Germany has become one of the major indirect costs of Putin’s
imperial policies. Until Moscow’s annexation of the Crimea, Germany had
been a major partner in an endeavour in what Berlin hoped would con-
tribute and lead to the political, economic and social modernization of
Russia. Putin’s turn to imperial reconstruction on the basis of an anti-
Western ideological hodgepodge has turned Germany away from coopera-






Notes on Archival Research
One of the most important sources used here are the archives of the East
German communist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
(SED). They are to be found in the Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbe-
wegung, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Institute for the History of the Workers’
Movement, Central Party Archives), referred to in the footnotes as SED,
Central Party Archives. The archives are now under the administration of
the German federal government and called Bundesarchiv für Partei- und
Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR (Federal Archives of the Par-
ty and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR).
The archives are important for a number of reasons. The first is their
broad scope, covering the period from 1949 to 1989 and including the Ar-
beitsprotokolle, or official records of the Politburo sessions; personal files
of the party chief and Politburo members (Büro Honecker, Krenz, Hager,
and Axen, for instance); and the files of the CC secretariats and depart-
ments. Apparently not in their worst nightmares did the East German lead-
ers imagine that the records of their private conversations and crimes
would see the light of day. This pertains even to the records of private con-
versations in cars to and from airports and to what the top party leaders
told each other in closed session at Warsaw Pact summit conferences. A
second reason is their accessibility. The ‘red Prussians’ certainly lived up
to their reputation for order and thorough work (deutsche Ordnung und
Gründlichkeit). Everything is neatly ordered and easy to find. Third, they
are highly reliable. Given the importance of the Soviet connection for the
survival of the regime, the Politburo wanted to have a complete and accu-
rate record of every nuance and shading of what the ‘Soviet comrades’
said, thought, and did. Because of this, it is difficult to imagine GDR
scribes putting a negative or positive slant on the Soviet position as re-
flected in secret, confidential, or open meetings. Through interviews with
the participants he author, furthermore, had the opportunity to gain impor-
tant insights into the context of conversations, negotiations, and decisions.
Given the importance of the East German communist party archives, it
is not surprising that Gorbachev attempted to prevent their publication. A
letter dated 13 March 1991 and addressed to Ivan Ivashko, the deputy
chief of the CPSU, revealed that Gorbachev had sent a confidential letter
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to Chancellor Kohl, appealing to him to try to stop the opening of the SED
archives. The letter noted that a first request had not borne fruit. But per-
haps, it continued, one should renew the request in a coming meeting with
Foreign Minister Genscher or by phone with the chancellor. The letter is
part of the so-called Special File, a highly secret repository used by the
communist party leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev. They were declassi-
fied but not published despite or because of the on-going preparations for
a constitutional court hearing on the fate of the then banned CPSU.1741
The reasons for Gorbachev’s intervention may have been both personal
and political. When he was taking the initiative for the suppression of the
documents he was nominally still head of the CPSU. The transcripts in the
archives would show him numerous times in confidential conversations
and meetings with East German friends and comrades assuring them of the
unwavering support they would receive from the Soviet party and its gen-
eral secretary. But in his capacity as executive president of the Soviet
Union he would eventually abandon East Germany and agree to German
unification and unified Germany’s membership in NATO. In the internal
struggles in the party and with the nationalist opposition this would be fur-
ther proof of Gorbachev’s treacherous double-dealing.
But another reason was probably more important. The East German
archives, he told Ivashko, contained ‘documents connected with the activi-
ties of illegal communist parties, which the SED has assisted in coordina-
tion with us’ and of secret assistance provided to West German organiza-
tions. This is also the reason why Gregor Gysi, the last party chief of the
SED and also the head of its successor organization, the PDS, had warned
Falin in a confidential conversation the day before Gorbachev’s letter that
publication of the archives would be ‘a real catastrophe’.1742
Some of the transcripts are in direct speech, others in indirect speech.
To preserve consistency and readability, direct speech has been used
throughout in this book. When indirect speech was used in the original,
this has been indicated accordingly in the footnote.
1741 The documents were shown to Paul Quinn-Judge, Moscow correspondent of the
Boston Globe; a report on the circumstances and the content of the letter was
published by the paper on 29 May 1992.
1742 Ibid.
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Biographical Notes
The biographical data are not meant to be exhaustive. For the most part, in
this book information has been provided about the offices held by Soviet
and German officials only where this appeared relevant to an understand-
ing of their role in decision-making.
 
Arbatov, Georgi A., 1968-96, Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and
Canada under the Soviet (later the Russian) Academy of Sciences, member of the
Academy of Sciences, the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR; advisor to all six Soviet and Russian leaders, from Khrushchev to
Yeltsin.
Axen, Hermann, 1970-89, Politburo member and secretary of the SED CC for foreign
relations.
Boldin, Valery, 1981 joined Gorbachev’s staff as an adviser on agricultural questions
and advanced in conjunction with his chief’s career; 1986 candidate member and
1988 full member of the Central Committee; 1987-90, head of the CC’s General
Department; 1990-91, Gorbachev’s chief of staff and in that capacity helped exe-
cute the August 1991 coup attempt against the president.
Bykov, Vladimir L., 1986-91, section head in the Fourth European Department of the
Soviet foreign ministry dealing with the socialist countries of Europe, including the
GDR.
Chernyaev, Anatoli S., 1970-86, deputy head of the CPSU CC International Depart-
ment; starting from February 1986, chief foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev.
Dashichev, Vyacheslav I., sector head, professor and German expert at the Institute for
the Study of the Economy of World Socialism at the USSR Academy of Sciences in
Moscow.
Falin, Valentin M., 1971-78, Soviet ambassador to West Germany; 1978-83, deputy
head of the CPSU CC’s International Information Department; 1983-86, political
commentator for Izvestiia; 1986-88, chief of Novosti press agency; 1988-91, head
of the reorganized ID.
Gerasimov, Gennadi I., 1986-90, Soviet foreign ministry spokesman under Shevard-
nadze; 1991, Soviet ambassador to Portugal.
Gorinovich, Gorald N., 1971-84, chargé d’affaires at the Soviet embassy in East
Berlin; 1984-86, deputy head of the Third European department at the Soviet for-
eign ministry; 1986-90, chief of the MFA’s department for European socialist coun-
tries.
Grigoriev, Sergei A., 1984-90, official in the American section of the ID; from Octo-
ber 1990 until July 1991 deputy press spokesman for Gorbachev.
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Honecker, Erich, 1971-89, General Secretary of the SED; 1973-89, chairman of the
State Council of the GDR.
Kornienko, Georgi M., 1977-86, first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union;
1986-91, deputy chief of the ID.
Krenz, Egon, 1976-89, candidate member and – after 1983 – full member of SED
Politburo; 1983-89, CC secretary responsible for security; replaced Erich Honecker
as party chief on 18 October 1989.
Kvitsinsky, Yuli A., 1959-65, Soviet embassy official in East Berlin; 1978- 81, Soviet
embassy official in Bonn; 1981-83, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva INF
talks; 1986-90, ambassador in Bonn; May 1990 until September 1991, deputy and
first deputy foreign minister.
Maksimychev, Igor F., one of the few progressive germanisty in the Soviet foreign
ministry under Shevardnadze; 1956-58, official at the Soviet consulate in Leipzig;
1958-60 and 1976-84, posted to the Soviet embassy in Bonn; 1987-92, deputy chief
of mission at the Soviet embassy in East Berlin.
Medvedev, Vadim A., 1986-90, Secretary, CC CPSU; 1988-90, full member of the
Politburo; 1986-88, head of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Work-
ers’ Parties of Socialist Countries; 1988-90, CC secretary responsible for ideo-
logical questions, chairman of the CC’s Ideological Commission, and member of
the Politburo’s Commission for Further Study of Materials and Documents Related
to the Repressions of the Stalin Years.
Mittag, Günter, 1986-89, SED Politburo member and CC secretary responsible for eco-
nomic affairs.
Rykin, Viktor S., 1970-90, official in the CPSU Central Committee’s international de-
partment, responsible for relations with Western political parties and movements,
notably the social-democratic parties of Western Europe; 1988-90, ID deputy head;
interpreter for Gorbachev on numerous occasions, including Gorbachev’s first visit
to West Germany in 1975.
Schabowski, Günter, 1985-89, Politburo member and first secretary of the SED’s
Berlin district.
Shakhnazarov, Georgi K., 1969 deputy head, 1986 - October 1988, first deputy head of
the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries; October 1988, appointed spe-
cial assistant to Gorbachev for relations with the socialist countries; in addition,
from autumn 1989, special assistant to Gorbachev on Soviet legal issues; 1989-91,
member of Supreme Soviet and Congress of People’s Deputies.
Steinbach, Thilo, March 1990 - October 1990, foreign policy aide to East German
Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière.
Tarasenko, Sergei P., 1986-90, personal aide to foreign minister Shevardnadze.
Teltschik, Horst, 1982-91, department head in the West German chancellery’s office
and chief advisor to Chancellor Kohl on foreign policy.
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Tsipko, Alexandr S., December 1986 ‑ November 1989, Central Committee consul-tant
in the Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist
Countries (later renamed Department for Relations with Communist and Workers’
Parties of Eastern Europe), with GDR and Poland as a special sphere of responsibil-
ity.
Wolf, Markus, 1951-87, GDR Ministry of Security; his last position was chief of the
main intelligence directorate and deputy minister.
Yakovlev, Alexander N., June 1987 - July 1991, member of CPSU Politburo, secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee; 1988-90, CC secretary in the Politburo responsi-
ble for the ID (that is, ID kurator); January 1990 - July 1991, head of the CC For-
eign Policy Commission; one of Gorbachev’s closest and most influential advisers.






The author conducted interviews with the following Western, Soviet, and
East German party or government officials:
Blech, Klaus, ambassador, May 1991, March 1992, and June 1993, in
Moscow.
Braithwaite, Sir Roderic, ambassador, 30 April 1994, in St. Petersburg.
Bykov, Vladimir L., 29 June 1993, in Bonn.
Chernyaev, Anatoli S. , 25 June 1993 and 29 April 1994, in Moscow.
Dashichev, Vyacheslav I., 29 June 1993, in Bonn.
Gerasimov, Gennadi I., 25 June 1993, in Moscow.
Grigoriev, Sergei A., 23 and 27 March 1994, in Boston.
Krenz, Egon, 23 and 26 July 1993, in Berlin.
Kvitsinsky, Yuli A., 5 June 1994, in Berlin.
Maksimychev, Igor F., 2 June 1993, in Moscow.
Palazchenko, Pavel R., 10 February 1995, in Boston.
Pavlov, Nikolai, 9 June 1993, in Moscow.
Rykin, Viktor S., 11 June 1993, in Moscow.
Shakhnazarov, Georgi K., 3 December 1994, in Providence, Rhode Island.
Steinbach, Thilo, 15 May 1990, in East Berlin and in 1992-93 at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass.
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659, 693
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 571
Bönte, Andreas 439, 450, 454
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Inozemtsev, Nikolai 138, 365
Ischinger, Wolfgang 15, 541
Ivashko, Ivan 711, 712
Ivashko, Vladimir 582
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Medvedev, Vadim 37, 167, 236, 239, 319,
330, 580, 629
Meier, Christian 678





Meyer, Stephen M. 234
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